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This thesis is an attempt to examine the process
of social policy development by reference to one particularly
interesting case-study.
The movement for family allowances originated in
demands for a 'living wage' in the late 19th century,
which in turn led on to demands that wages take account
of varying family needs. This became a concerted campaign
in Britain in the period 1918-45, and was led by Eleanor
Rathbone and the Family Endowment Society. Arguments for
family allowances in this period were many and varied,
but generally they centred on two points: that family
allowances would alleviate poverty in large working class
families, and that they might raise the birth rate.
The composition, aims and methods of the Family
Endowment Society are analysed, and then the thesis goes
on to describe how the anti-poverty and pro-natalist
arguments were presented to the Government. The attitudes
of the main political parties are examined, and a brief
account is given of foreign developments and of private
family allowance schemes in Britain.
Finally, the events of the Second World War period
are described in detail. In this period family allowances
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were suddenly accepted by the Government and quickly passed
into law, and the question is whether this indicated an
acceptance on the part of the Government of the arguments
put forward by the campaigners over the previous twenty-
five years.
The conclusion is that the Government introduced
family allowances in 1945 not for the anti-poverty or
pro-natalist reasons, but for reasons relating to the




Social administration as an academic discipline is
still a relatively new subject. The last twenty years have
seen it expand rapidly, with the establishment of new uni¬
versity departments and a growing realisation that it must
encompass not only the training of social workers but
specialised research into problems of social policy. Yet
still there is a widely-held feeling that the subject
requires a much greater measure of theoretical coherence
if it is to become a recognised independent entity rather
than just an untidy meeting-place for several diverse
academic disciplines.
One way in which this might be achieved is through
a deeper understanding of the historical development of
welfare provision, for only by analysing the "intricate
relationship between interest, ideology and the pressures
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inherent in administrative procedures themselves" can
one hope to arrive at a proper evaluation of the function
of welfare in modern societies. Indeed, one writer has
even gone so far as to suggest that "the dearth in this
country of adequate studies in depth of the intricate
relationships which have determined particular social
policies.... is one of the main obstacles to the develop-
p
ment of the subject of social administration".
1. J.R. Foynter: Society and Pauperism (1969), quoted
by Una Cormack in Social and Economic Administration, 4,
January 1970, p.59~.
2. Una .Cormack, ibid.
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With a number of laudable exceptions, much of the
existing work on the historical development of social
policy fails to analyse satisfactorily the complex inter¬
action of these 'intricate relationships'. On the one hand
are the generalist 'Poor Law to Welfare State' accounts
which are obviously intended as rapid guides for the non-
specialist; the tendency of these books to view social
policy development as a gradual, orderly process marked by
legislative achievements has been savagely criticised in
recent years as a latter-day version of the 'Whig' view of
history in which societies are seen as inevitably progressing
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upwards on a path to perfection. On the other hand there is
a considerable volume of dilettantist sociology on welfare
development which, while it may sometimes present stimu¬
lating ideas, is usually based on such woefully inadequate
historical data as to be almost useless.
1. For example, Bentley B. Gilbert: The Evolution of
National Insurance in Great Britain (1966).
2. For example, in England's Road to Social Security
(New York, 1961 ed .) Karl de Schweinitz concludes (p. 246):
"The realisation in statute and administration of the
ideals of the Beveridge Report may take time; but there
is a quality of inevitability about the project and its
auspices The people of England in their long pilgrim¬
age have come at last "to the top of the hill called
Clear", whence they can see opening before them the way
to freedom with security".
3- For example, John Carrier and Ian Kendall: "Social Policy
and Social Change - Explanations of the Development of
Social Policy", Journal of Social Policy, 2, July 1973,
pp. 209-224, and "The Development of the Welfare State",
ibid., 6, July 1977, pp. 271-290. A notably successful
effort at synthesising social policy history and sociology,
howeveris W.G. Runciman: Relative Deprivation and
Social Justice (1972 ed.), especially pp. 57-77 where
Runciman analyses events in Britain in the inter-war years.
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The aim of this thesis is to try and examine all the
influences that brought about one particular piece of social
policy, and in doing so to provide a case study that might
contribute to the sociology of welfare. Generally - and it
must be borne in mind that what follows must of necessity be
the briefest of summaries - theories of social policy develop¬
ment have tended to fall into two categories, the 'consensus'
and the 'conflict' interpretations. Despite the fact that
this categorisation can easily be criticised as too rigid,
and that to discuss it adequately one would really need to
refer to the extensive literature on social and political
theory, it still provides a useful framework of analysis.
The consensus interpretation of welfare development
posits that social policies have come about as a result of
a fundamental consensus on the need for them. Empirical
evidence of hardship, produced by social investigators,
reformers, pressure groups, etc., awakens public opinion
to the need for a social policy and, after a period of
campaigning in which the evidence is presented to the
Government, eventually this need is met through an appro¬
priate peice of social legislation. Sidney Webb once told
Eleanor Rathbone that in Britain exactly nineteen years were
required to elapse between the birth of an idea on social
1. For example, there is the question of whether the notion




policy and its eventual acceptance by public opinion;
it was no doubt a remark in jest, but at the same time was an
accurate reflection of the Webbsian empiricist view of social
policy development which has long been the dominant ideology
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in social administration and which maintains that if
incontrovertible empirical evidence is presented forcefully
enough to governments, the latter will, in a rational manner,
respond by introducing social legislation. This, for
example, was the view of the Fabian William Robson in 1943
after reading the Beveridge Report: the fact that the
Fabian Society's recommendations were very close to what
Beveridge eventually recommended showed, Robson wrote, that
"if persons with qualified and trained minds will apply
themselves in a disinterested manner to a great social
problem the proper principles will emerge so unmis¬
takably that the right solution will cease to be a matter
of mere opinion and become a question of scientific
knowledge".
In general, the consensus view sees welfare as
taming the worst excesses of free-market capitalism: social
policy is seen as "a collective term for the public provisions
through which we attack insecurity and correct the debili-
4
tating tendencies of our 'capitalist' inheritance".
1. Mary Stocks: Eleanor Rathbone (1949), p. 86.
Sir John Walley attrioutes a similar remark to another
public figure of 'pragmatic socialist' views - Ernest Bevin.
Walley: Social Security: Another British Failure? (1972),
p. 54.
2. For an interesting historical account, see Robert- Pinker: . ,
-Social Theory and Social Policy (1971), chapter 2.
3. W. kobson (ed.): Social Security (1943), pp. 4-5.
4. H.L. Beales: The Making of Social Policy (1946), p. 7.
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Perhaps the best example of this viewpoint can be seen in
the writing of T.H. Marshall. "The central function of
welfare", Marshall maintains, "....is to supersede the
market by taking goods and services out of it, or in some
way to control and modify its operations so as to produce
a result which it would not have produced itself". Marshall
argues that as democratic rights were extended in Britain by
stages, so also were 'citizenship' rights extended to a
larger number of people; part of this extension of citizen¬
ship rights was achieved through welfare provision, the aim
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of which is "to give equal care to similar cases". Social
policy thus comes about through a fundamental consensus in
society and has as its primary aim the alleviation of hardship
and the reduction of inequalities.
On the other hand, the conflict view maintains that
class conflict is fundamental to societies and that social
policies are introduced as a means of appeasing political,
economic and social discontent and thus consolidating the
power and legitimacy of the ruling class. Saville sees the
development of social policy in Britain as the result of three
main influences: the struggle of the working class against
their own exploitation; the requirements of industrial
1. T.H. Marshall: "Value Problems of Welfare-Capitalism",
Journal of Social Policy, 1, January 1972, p. 19.
2. Ibid., p. 29. Marshall expresses similar ideas in
"Citizenship and Social Class", in Sociology at the
Crossroads (1963), pp. 67-127.
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capitalism for a more efficient environment in which to
operate and the need for a healthier, more productive work¬
force; and the recognition by property owners that a price
-1
must be paid for political security. For Saville, "the
range and distribution of social security in Britain represents
no more than elementary social justice for the mass of the
people; and from the side of industry it can be reckoned a
2
sound economic investment".
Social policy is thus one out of a range of controls -
social, political, cultural, economic - by which a ruling
group maintains its position of power, and far from being a
rational and objective response to evidence of hardship it is
in fact a reluctant concession to political power: a ruling
group only admits that a social problem exists when it is
forced to do so. Hay has shown, for example, that in the
early twentieth century many employers were extremely inter¬
ested in welfare policy as a possible means of counteracting
militant trade unionism and controlling their workforce;
this is in contrast to the older, consensus-orientated view
of social policy history which assumed that employers were
generally hostile or indifferent. Thus while a piece of
social policy may be presented as a sharing of wealth and
1. John Saville: "The Welfare State: An Historical Approach",
New Reasoner, 1, Winter 1957-8, pp. 5-6.
2. Ibid., p. 17. For another brief outline of the conflict
view, see Victor George and Paul Wilding: "Social Values,
Social Class and Social Policy", Social and Economic
Administration, 6, September 1972, pp. 236-2A8.
3. Roy Hay: "Employers and Social Policy in Britain: the
Evolution of Welfare Legislation, 1905-14", Social History,
4, January 1977, pp. 435-455.
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economic power, in fact it may really perpetuate inequality,
impose a greater measure of social control over a politically-
threatening group and leave those for whom it is ostensibly
designed little better off.
The consensus and conflict views obviously require a
1
far lengthier exposition than can possibly be provided here.
What particularly concerns this thesis is the basic question
that gives rise to a crucial point of difference between the
two views, and that question is: do social policies come
about through governments responding rationally to evidence
of need, and therefore are they primarily aimed at assisting
those in need; or is it the case that despite the presentation
of such evidence by reformers, social investigators, pressure
groups, etc., governments do not really accept its validity
and, while pretending to assist those in need, in fact intro¬
duce social policies for ulterior political and economic
motives? It is this fundamental question that this thesis
attempts to answer.
1. For an interesting summary of the opposing views, see
Adrian Webb in Hall, Parker, Land and Webb: Change, Choice
and Conflict in Social Policy (1975), pp. 130-153. Most
advocates of one view are aware of valid points in the
other. For example, Richard Titmuss, generally consensus-
orientated, on one occasion wrote that "welfare can serve
different masters. A multitude of sins can be committed
under its appealing name. It can be used as a form of
social control.. It can be used as an instrument of economic
growth which, by benefiting a minority, indirectly promotes
greater inequality". R.M. Titmuss: "Poverty versus




Family allowances are a particularly suitable case-
study for this type of approach, for a number of reasons.
First, the movement for their introduction fits nearly into
the 1918-45 period and can thus be studied with the aid of
much newly-released Public Record Office material. Beveridge
on one occasion declared that the 1945 Family Allowances Act
was "in all the legislation of recent years the greatest break
with the old tradition", since in all other respects his 1942
Report was "no more than a completion of what was begun in
Britain in 1911: the battle of Social Insurance for cash
benefits and for medical treatment was fought and won in
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principle thirty-six years ago". In studying family allow¬
ances one is studying a piece of social policy that arose out
of conditions in the inter-war years, and had important
implications for many areas of social policy.
Second, family allowances are very interesting to study
because they attracted support (and opposition) from a very
wide range of opinion, often for very confused and contradictory
reasons. The topic of family allowances "could be approached
from so many directions with such an infinite variety of
1. Family allowances must be distinguished from family
endowment. The former are cash payments paid (usually
weekly) in respect of a stipulated number of dependent
children in a family, thus adjusting the wage-system so that
some account is taken of varying family needs. The latter,
however, usually refers to any policy which provides
assistance in relation to family needs: for example, rent
rebates proportional to family size. Sometimes, however,
the terms were confused, particularly in the early 1920s
when family endowment usually meant family allowances.
2. Beveridge in epilogue to E. Rathbone: Familv Allowances
(1949), p. 269. '
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emphasis and application. It could be handled as a problem
of vital statistics, housing administration, minimum wage
legislation, child nutrition, national insurance, teachers'
salary scales, coal mining economics, feminism, social
•i
philosophy or pure finance". In analysing why family
allowances came about one must therefore bear in mind
Goldthorpe's point that a movement for social reform may
consist of many different interest groups, each with its
2
own perspective, and that in contrast to the functionalist
view of welfare development, one must not assume that there
was fundamental agreement on the nature of the problem and
the necessity for solving it. Family allowances were a
social policy ostensibly aimed at assisting children, and
it is possible that since children are one of the few groups
in society unable to campaign for themselves the motives of
those who supported or opposed family allowances were, as a
result, more complex and devious than in a more orthodox
case of self-interest.
A third point of interest is that despite these many
different perspectives the movement for family allowances was
based on two obvious arguments: that a considerable amount
of poverty existed in large working class families thanks to
a wage system that took no account of family needs, and that
1. Stocks, op. cit., p. 102.
2. John Goldthorpe: "The Development of Social Policy in
England, 1800-1914", Transactions of the Fifth World
Congress of Sociology" (Louvain, 1964), p. 56.
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the steadily-declining birth rate would eventually cause
very serious social and economic problems. Family allowances
were seen as a remedy for both of these (the former always
being the most important), and in support a vast amount of
evidence was repeatedly presented to the Government. In
the Family Endowment Society one has an excellent example of
a pressure group marshalling this evidence, and the evidence
itself being the product of detailed research by leading social
scientists, nutritionists, medical officers, demographers, etc.
In short, if the consensus theory holds true, then at some
point in the twenty-five year process the Government must have
admitted the validity of this evidence and rationally decided
to introduce family allowances as the appropriate remedy.
This is essentially what is under investigation in what
follows.
In this thesis, therefore, the approach has been to
build up a picture of the movement for family allowances -
who belonged to it, what their reasons were, how it was
organised, the evidence that was produced - and then examine
what exactly happened when this movement presented its case
to those in government. In doing so, it has been decided
to adopt a thematic approach, examining each constituent
part of the movement separately; while this may at times
be a little confusing chronologically, or result in a certain
amount of repetition, it provides a more interesting analysis
than if each chapter dealt with, say, successive five-year
14
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periods. The thesis therefore begins with a chapter
outlining the historical background; although some of it
deals with the period before 1918, and therefore strictly
outwith the scope of the title, it is nevertheless very
important to look at the long-term causes behind what
happened in the inter-war years in Britain. Chapter two
begins with a description of the family background and
early life of Eleanor Rathbone, the acknowledged leader
of the movement, showing how she arrived at the idea of
family allowances; and then it analyses the composition,
aims and methods of the main pressure group founded by her,
the Family Endowment Society. Chapters three and four
examine the two main areas of argument presented in the
inter-war years, the family poverty and the demographic,
and analyse the extent to which these arguments were
accepted by those in government by 1939. Chapter five
1. Wherever possible, of course, unpublished sources have
been used, but in three cases this proved difficult.
First, there seems to be no large surviving collection
of Family Endowment Society papers. Neither the late
Baroness Stocks nor Mrs. Diana Hopkinson (Eva Hubback's
daughter) knew of any such records, and the Eleanor Rathbone
Papers contain disappointingly little on the Society.
Second, unpublished Public Record Office material on the
population problem of the 1920s and 1930s is extremely
scanty simply because the Government took little interest
in it. Third, attempts to find manuscript material
relating to the interest shown by politicians and
political parties were also relatively unsuccessful, and
again the conclusion to be drawn from this is that by and
large most politicians (predominantly male) were indifferent.
Generally the length of each chapter reflects the relative
importance of its subject and the availability of good
evidence.
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describes the gradual emergence of the family endowment
principle in income-maintenance policies towards the
unemployed in the period 1918-39, and shows how this
eventually produced a demand for the principle to be
applied to wages also. Chapter six deals with the three
least important elements in the movement: the attitude of
political parties, the development of family allowances
in foreign countries (which, though again strictly outwith
the scope of the title of this thesis, adds an. important
extra dimension to one's understanding of events in Britain),
and the growth of private industrial schemes and other forms
of family endowment. These six chapters, therefore, provide
a thematic account of the movement for family allowances in
the period 1918-39, and the impression it made on those in
government. Finally, chapter seven deals with the Second
World War period, during which the need for family allowances
was dramatically accepted by the Government, and examines
the extent to which the 1945 Family Allowances Act was
passed because the Government admitted the validity of the
family poverty and demographic arguments.
CHAPTER ONE: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.
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Family allowance systems are essentially a feature
of advanced industrial societies which have placed
restrictions on the employment of children and have
introduced some form of compulsory education - thus
creating a situation where large families "become a major
cause of poverty, and giving rise in turn to demands that
1
the wage-system should take account of family needs.
This stage was reached in Britain in the late 19th
century and the demand for family allowances grew in
strength thereafter, reaching a peak in the early 1940s.
Yet paradoxically the idea of paying bonuses to
parents who have large families is also a very old one,
and instances can be found throughout history. Glass
mentions several ancient systems, including three laws
introduced by the Roman Emperor Augustus sometime between
18 B.C. and 9 A.D., and shows that various pro-natalist
2
policies have existed in Europe ever since. Thus all
modern family allowance systems have inherited an inter¬
esting history, and in order to understand fully the
movement for family allowances in Britain between 1918 and
1945 it is important to have an understanding of this
history. The discussion of family allowances in Britain
in the inter-war years tended to revolve round two main
areas of controversy: firstly, whether allowances would
1. J.H. Richardson: Economic and Financial Aspects
of Social Security (1960). p. 141.
2. D.V. Glass: Population Policies and Movements in
Europe (1940), pp. 86-98.
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influence the birth rate, and secondly, what effect they
might have on wage levels. In both cases historical
evidence was frequently cited, and therefore this evi¬
dence must be examined.
In Britain the most important historical legacy was
left by the pre-183^ Poor Law, and in particular by the
so-called 'Speenhamland System' under which relief payments
based on family size and the prevailing price of bread were
1
granted to labourers to supplement their wages. The
origins of this system are conventionally seen as Gilbert's
Act of 1782 (which sanctioned the principle of relieving
the able-bodied without requiring them to enter the work¬
house) and the historic decision of the 6th May 1795 at
the Pelican Inn at Speehhamland in Berkshire where, in a
period of rapidly rising wheat prices, bad harvests, severe
winters and a French blockade of British shipping, the local
magistrates decided to adopt a scale of allowances in aid
of wages graded according to family size as a means of
2
alleviating temporary distress. So began the first
family allowance system in British social policy.
1. For example, when a gallon loaf cost 1s.Od. every
man would receive 3s.Od. per week for himself, and
1s.6d. cash in respect of his wife and children, either
in wages or relief. Sir George Nicholls:
A History of the English Poor Law (1898), p. 131.
2. Mark Neuman: "Speenhamland in Berkshire" in
E.W. Martin (ed.): Comparative Development in
Social Welfare (1972), pp. 85-9•
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Thereafter, it was long believed, this practice
of supplementing wages had a disastrous effect. Labourers
became idle (since their income, in wages or relief, was
guaranteed whether they worked or not) and bred recklessly
(since the normal economic penalties of a large family were
now removed); farmers were encouraged to pay lower wages
(since they knew these would be made up to the agreed
"J
minimum by relief payments), and prices rose. The system
also corrupted many sections of society apart from the
labouring class: for example, those who stood to gain
from the labourer having a guaranteed income (such as small
shopkeepers and publicans who paid low rates) encouraged
him to spend it to their own profit, and supported the
2
allowance system by all kinds of dishonest means. Most
important of all, Poor Law expenditure rose alarmingly:
in 1760, the cost of the poor rate had been £1,250,000
(equivalent to 3s.6-fd. per head of population) but in 1834
it was £6,317,000 (8s.9ig-d. per head)."' From the point of
view of the 1834- Commissioners, this experiment in family
allowances had provided "a bounty on indolence and vice"
by setting up a wage system under which "idleness,
improvidence, or extravagance occasion no loss, and
4
consequently diligence and economy can afford no gain".
Modern economic historians have almost completely
demolished this view, however. In the first place, there
1. The'Poor Law Reoort of 1834- (ed. S. and E. Checkland,
1974), pp. 140-179.
2. Ibid., p. 138-9.
3. Nicholls, op. cit., p. 225.
4. 1834 Reoort, pp. 121, 156.
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is evidence that Poor Law family allowances existed long
before the 1790s. The pre-1834 Poor Law was administered
in many different ways according to local economic and
geographic conditions. Over fifteen thousand parishes
existed in the 18th century, and each carried out its
duties with only a vague reference to the Elizabethan
statutes that ostensibly formed the basis for the Poor
Law; often, indeed, parishes had little knowledge of what
1
was being done in other areas. Thus many ad hoc irregu¬
larities occurred, particularly in the case of allowances
to subsidise the wages of labourers with large families.
Hampson found them quite common in Cambridgeshire in the
2
18th century and earlier; the Webbs pointed out that the
policy made notorious by Speenhamland "had long existed in
the spontaneous practice of the overseers, and was, in
fact, the most obvious device for saving themselves
trouble and the parish immediate expense";"' and other
writers have emphasised that when the Speenhamland
magistrates made their historic decision they were in
fact merely formalising what had been a common practice
Zl
for centuries.
1. S. and B. Webb: English Local Government: English
Poor Law History; Part I, the Old Poor Law (1927)T
pp. 149-150.
2. E.M. Hampson: The Treatment of Poverty in Cambridgeshire,
1597-1834 (1934), p. 37.
3. S. and B. Webb, op. cit., p. 170.
4. J.D. Marshall: The Old Poor Law, 1795-1834 (1968), p. 11;
Mark Blaug: "The Poor Law Report Re-examined", Journal
of Economic History, 24, June 1964, pp. 231-2.
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Secondly, modern research disputes the fact that
the Speenhamland System raised the birth rate and
encouraged earlier marriages, as the 1834 Commissioners
maintained. Blackmore and Mellonie made this point in
1
1927, but it was not until recently that it was further
investigated. Blaug views the Speenhamland decision as
2
a response to an already-rising birth rate, and from a
detailed study of two parishes in Kent (one of which
operated an allowance system and one of which did not)
Huzel concludes that allowances had no measurable effect
on birth rates or marriage rates, though they might have
lowered infant mortality.
Similarly, it is likely that allowances were the
effect rather than the cause of low wages. Gilbert's Act
and the Pelican Inn meeting simply gave official sanction
to a practice that was spreading anyway, and which was
"an alternative to, and a method of evading the payment of
a minimum statutory earned wage" in a period of acute
5
economic crisis. Faced with widespread distress and
falling real wages, magistrates in declining rural areas
simply adopted the most convenient and time-honoured
1. J.S. Blackmore and F.C. Mellonie: "Family Endowment
and the Birth Rate in the Early Nineteenth Century",
Economic Journal, 37, May 1927, pp. 205-213.
2. Blaug, op. cit., p. 232, and "The Myth of the Old Poor
Law and the Making of the New", Journal of Economic
History, 23, June 1963, pp. 173-^i
3. J.P. Huzel: "Maithus, the Poor Law, and Population in
Early Nineteenth Century England", Economic History
Review, 22, December 1969, pp. 445-451.
4. Other parishes were adopting similar policies at this
time, e.g. Wettlesford in 1783. Hampson, op. cit.,
pp. 189-190.
5. Marshall, ope cit., p. 13.
22
solution - one which would, they hoped, temporarily
relieve unemployment by encouraging farmers to use more
labour than they could otherwise have paid for. Indeed,
in many ways the allowance system of the Old Poor Law,
with its cost-of-living basis for minimum wages, its
family allowances, its unemployment relief and its job-
creation scheme, was remarkably akin to modern welfare
. . 1
provision.
Lastly, it is important to remember that despite
the Commissioners' rhetoric against them, allowances
continued after 1834. Local Boards of Guardians still
enjoyed considerable autonomy, even after the creation of
a strengthened Central Poor Law Board in 1847, and inevitably
2
resorted to this cheap and convenient form of relief. For
example, in one quarter of 1840 more than 20% of all adult
able-bodied persons on relief in England and Wales were
3
receiving allowances in aid of wages.
That the conclusions of the 1834 Commissioners were
in fact a wilful distortion of the evidence to fit Benthamite
A
prescriptions is now well known, but for over a century
their view of Speenhamland remained the standard one and
1. Blaug, op. cit., p. 152.
2. The payment of allowances (especially to certain classes
like widows with dependent children) was cheaper than the
cost of maintaining a pauper in a workhouse. M.E. Rose:
"The Allowance System Under the New Poor Law", Economic
History Review, 19, December 1966, pp. 613, 616. For
evidence of the continuance of allowances in Lancashire,
see E.C Midwinter: Social Administration in Lancashire,
1830-1860 (1969), pp. 49-52.
3. Rose, op. cit., p. 608.
4. For an account of how this was done see S.E. Finer:




was repeated by subsequent writers to such an extent that
the 1909 Majority Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor
Laws could assert that "no economic doctrine has gained wider
currency than that public relief is a grant in aid of wages
2
and tends to reduce them". By the early 20th century,
'Speenhamland' stood for everything that ruling class
opinion feared most from over-generous relief - that it
would create an ever-expanding army of indolent, work-shy
paupers who would breed recklessly and whose attitudes would
eventually infect the rest of the workforce. From this view¬
point, the first experiment in family allowances appeared to
have been an unmitigated disaster.
This historical legacy dominated subsequent discussion
of family allowances and deeply affected the attitudes of
those involved. Eleanor Rathbone referred to "the disastrous
experiment in subsidising wages known as the Speenhamland
system" which "put the idle or inefficient family on the same
level with the industrious", and always insisted that by
paying them to the mother family allowances would be kept
completely separate from wages. -Perhaps the most influenced
were trade unionists, the majority of whom remained staunchly
opposed to family allowances in the inter-war years for fear
1. For example, Sir George Nicholls maintained that the
Speenhamland experience had demonstrated that to adjust
wages to family size and the cost of living was
"contrary to the ruling of providence". Nicholls,
op. cit., p. 132.
2. Quoted in Rose, op. cit., p. 607.
3- E. Rathbone: The Disinherited Family (1924), p. 12.
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. that they would depress wages. In 1928, for example,
a Trade Union Congress and Labour Party Committee warned
that "the notorious Speenhamland System, originating in
1795, was an early example of the family allowance principle
grafted on to the Poor Law the disastrous effects of
this policy in reducing wages are too well known to require
-i
comment". This opposition from trade unionists was a
factor very much taken into account by civil servants when
family allowances were first being seriously considered by
the Government in 1939-42. The Treasury even composed a
special memorandum on Speenhamland and wages since "the
Trade Unions have always studied Economic History and this
point is in their minds when they express doubts about
2
family allowances". Thus when the Government published
a White Paper on family allowances in 1942 (one purpose of
which was to set out the arguments for and against) they
included in it a warning that to use family allowances to
bring wages up to a specified minimum level would "make
the amount of his wages a matter of indifference to the low
wage earner with a family, and this would lead to consequences
similar to those which resulted from the wage subsidy associ-
ated with the name of Speenhamland".
1. T.U.C. General Council and Labour Party Executive:
Joint Committee on the Living Wage: Interim Report
on Family Allowances and Child Welfare (1928), p. 6.
2. Margin comment by Sir Horace Wilson in E. Hale to
B. Gilbert, 8/10/41 , P.R.U T 161/1073.
3. Family Allowances: Memorandum by the Chancellor
of the Exchequer, 1942, Cmd. 635e, p.
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However, alongside this rather negative legacy was
the important fact that by 1918 the principle of family
endowment had been quite openly recognised by Government
spokesmen on several occasions. The earliest example of
this (the significance of which has been noted by several
writers) was William Pitt's interest in family allowances
as an alternative to a statutory minimum wage. Speaking
against Samuel Whithread's wage-regulation bill in the
House of Commons in 1796 Pitt pointed out that a minimum
wage on the lines of Whitbread's that took no account of
varying family needs was useless, since "were the minimum
fixed upon the standard of a large family it might operate
as an encouragement to idleness in one part of the community,
and if it were fixed on the standard of a small family,
those would not enjoy the benefit of it for whose relief
2
it was intended". In a remarkable passage which presaged
20th century thinking (and which was greatly abhorred by
subsequent Malthusian pamphleteers) he suggested that the
solution was "to make relief in cases where there are a
large number of children a matter of right and an honour,
instead of a ground for opprobrium and contempt. This will
make a large family a blessing, and not a curse; and thus
1. Rathbone, op. cit., p. 163; V. George: Social Security,
Beveridge and After (1968), p. 187; Sir John Walley:
Social Security: Another British Failure? (1972), pp. 16-20;
Hilary Land: "The Introduction of Family Allowances" in
Hall, parker, Land and Webb: Change. Choice and Conflict
in Social Policy (1975), p. 157; J.C. Vadakin: Family
Allowances: an Analysis of their Development and
Implications (Miami, 1958), p. 21. It was also mentioned
by Sir William Jowitt, Minister of National Insurance, in
a 1944 Commons debate on social insurance. Hansard,
(5th series); Vol. 404, 2/11/44, Col. 988. (All Hansard
references are to 5th series).
2. Quoted in J.R. Poynter: Society and Pauperism (1969),
pp. 58-9. Poynter mentions that the question of the family
wage was discussed in several popular pamphlets at this time.
Ibid., pp. 59-60.
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will draw a proper line of distinction between those who
are able to provide for themselves by their labour, and
those who, after having enriched their country with a large
number of children, have a claim on its assistance for their
support". Quite how serious were Pitt's intentions is
hard to know. Certainly, he later attempted to introduce
a bill to give effect to his family endowment plan, but
it had to be withdrawn in face of hostile criticisms over
2
other proposals contained in it. What is so interesting,
however, is that the 'family allowances versus a minimum
wage' arguments of which Speenhamland and Pitt's bill were
practical manifestations were exactly those that were to be
repeated again and again in the campaign for family allow¬
ances that began over a hundred years later.
In the early 20th century there were two important
practical recognitions of family needs in public policy.
The first of these occurred in 1909, when Lloyd George as
Chancellor of the Exchequer introduced child tax rebates in
his budget, casually admitting the family endowment principle
when he reasoned that "the family man is, generally speaking,
a much heavier contributor to that portion of the revenue
which is derived from indirect taxation and inhabited
home duty, so that in comparison with the bachelor he is
taxed not so much in proportion to his income as in proportion
to his outgoings". The implications of this went completely
1. Ibid., p. 59•
2. Walley, op. cit., pp. 17-20
3. Hansard, Vol. 4, 29/4/09, Col. 507. Child tax allowances
had previously operated between 1796 and 1806.
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unchallenged in a House of Commons whose Members had
everything to gain from it; indeed, the only point of
dispute was whether the allowances should not have been
higher. These new rebates provided a £10 abatement for
each child under 16 years of age for parents with incomes
below £500 and above £160 per annum (the exemption limit),
and in 1910 were benefiting 3i million taxpayers out of
2
an estimated 18 million income recipients. The importance
of this quietly-introduced precedent has often been over¬
looked; one economist has even suggested that the 194-5
Family Allowance Act was far less historic than the 1909
measure, since "whatever revolution there was in 194-5 was
chiefly in the manner and coverage of family differentiation".
Certainly, campaigners for family allowances in the inter-war
years were to make much of the anomaly of 'family allowances
for the rich and none for the poor'.
The second instance of State family endowment took
place during the First World War, when service pay separation
allowances were extended to cover Britain's first conscript
army. Along with the enormous step forward made by women
through their entry into previously all-male professions
there occurred during the War what Eleanor Rathbone saw
1. Ibid., Vol. 11, 20/9/09, Cols. 182-6.
2. Allan M. Cartter: "Income Tax Allowances and the
Family in Great Britain", Population Studies, 6,
March 1953, p. 219.
3• Ibid.
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as "the largest experiment in the State endowment of
i
maternity that the world has ever seen". These separation
allowances were additions to the serviceman's pay in respect
of his dependants - the term dependant covering a wide range
of categories, including the children of a household
"permanently maintained by him" (i.e. illegitimate children);
servicemen had to make an allotment from their pay, to which
the Government added an allowance. The administrative
structure of these allowances was highly complex, covering
differences in rank and family circumstance (for example,
some allowances were higher in winter than in summer), but
the main distinction was between separation allowances (for
the dependants of men fighting abroad) and family allowances
(in respect of men stationed at home)^ - though the term
'separation allowance' is generally used to describe both.
As with so many rapid expansions of wartime social policy
there was much administrative confusion, payment being made
by five main authorities: the War Office through regimental
paymasters dealt with the army; the Admiralty operated
slightly different scales for the navy; • the Old Age Pensions
Committees assessed the needs of dependants other than wives
and children; and two bodies, the Civil Liabilities Committee
and the Local Committees, were jointly responsible for
1. E. Rathbone: "The Remuneration of Women's Services",
Economic Journal, 27, March 1917, p. 55. The principle,
however, was an old one. The 1834 Poor Law Report mentions
an Act of 1793 "which ordered that if a militia-man, when
called out and ordered to march, should leave a family
unable to support themselves", the overseers should pay
that family a weekly allowance "according to the usual
price of labour", op. cit., p. 214.
2. War Office Pamphlet: Regulations for the Issue of Army
Separation Allowances, Allotments of Pav and Family
Allowances During the Present War (1916), p. 17.
3. Ibid., pp. 1-4, 43.
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1
supplementing allowances in cases of exceptional distress.
In addition, there were intricate regulations to cover all
eventualities - such as what should happen if a soldier
2
deserted, or was reported missing. Thus no single cash
figure can be quoted as a 'typical' allowance level, but
for the sake of illustration a corporal or private in 1916
serving abroad would have had paid to his wife 12s.6d.
(representing the allotment from his pay plus the separation
allowance) and to a wife and four children 25s.0d. - while
for a warrant officer the equivalent amounts would have
been 23s.Od. and 35s.6d. respectively.
However, for this study the most interesting feature
of the separation allowance system was not its administrative
complexity but the principle behind it. The stated aim of
the system was to make good the difference between normal
and service pay: allowances were intended "to represent
the loss which the dependant has sustained by the man's
enlistment" and were therefore supposed to be "based on
the value of the support given to the dependants by the
soldier before his enlistment". In other words, they
compensated the enlisted man for the drop in his income
brought about by service in the Armed Forces - and thus
1. E. Rathbone: The Muddle of Separation Allowances (1915),
p. 2.
2. Regulations, p. 11.
3. Ibid., p. 30.
4. War Office Pamphlet: Recoverable Advances, Supplementary
Separation Allowances and Temporary and Special Grants
Authorised under Part II of the Regulations (1916), pp. 4, 12.
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contained the implicit assumption that his normal
civilian wages were sufficient to meet his family needs.
In a sense, therefore, separation allowances were not
analogous to a family allowance system, since the principle
behind the latter is that normal wages are inadequate to
1
meet family needs. Again, separation allowances covered
many types of dependant and included grants for special
cases of distress (illness, funeral expenses, high rents,
etc.). Thus they were essentially a compensation for loss
of earnings and could just as easily be likened to unemploy¬
ment assistance or workmen's compensation.
Yet in several respects they did establish a family
allowance precedent. The State had undertaken to meet
family needs and had drawn up the scales of allowances in
a way that recognised the extra financial burden brought
by each additional child. Many aspects of the administrative
machinery, such as payment through the Post Office by means
of draft books, anticipated the 1945 Family Allowances Act.
More importantly, they appeared to demonstrate that family-
adjusted income improved child health and nutrition - a point
1. This was a point later made by opponents of family
allowances. For example, Alexander Gray asserted that
separation allowances had been paid "because the State
could not enter into a contract to pay to all the wages
they had previously received" and that the principles of
the system were thus "very different to those applicable
to free and voluntary labour". Gray: Family Endowment,
a Critical Analysis (1927), pp. 23-4.
2. Recoverable Advances, etc., p. 21.
3. Ibid., p. 2.
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1
later stressed by supporters of family allowances.
Separation allowances also provided the precedent for
dependants' allowances in out-of-work donation after 1918,
which in turn led to the introduction of dependants'
allowances (and thus the concept of family needs) into
the main unemployment insurance scheme in 1921. Lastly,
the experience of separation allowances transformed
Eleanor Rathbone's vague ideas on State motherhood endow¬
ment into a coherent advocacy of family allowances. Her
experience while working for the Liverpool branch of the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association (a charitable
body that made cash advances to wives whose separation
allowance payments had been delayed) convinced her that
the system ought to be applied to normal wages in peace-
2
time and inspired her to begin her campaign.
Such were the practical precedents. At the same time
there were occurring several important changes in the
economic structure of the working class family. In the
pre-industrial economy child labour had been an important
source of family income: children were expected to work
as soon as it was physically possible for them to do so,
and so large families automatically earned a collective
1. E. Rathbone: The Disinherited Family (1924), pp. 59-61.
Some observers maintained, however, that this had been
brought about more by the high wartime wages. See
T.E. Gregory: "The Endowment of Motherhood",
The Common Cause, 18/10/18.
2. Mary Stocks: Eleanor Rathbone (1949), pp. 73-7.
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1
wage roughly commensurate with their needs. In the
initial hundred years or so of industrialisation child
labour had been an essential factor in producing rapid
economic growth, and thus the working class wage continued
to be related to family needs, albeit crudely and inadequately.
But with the gradual limitation of child labour and the intro¬
duction of State elementary education (made compulsory by
stages after 1870) this situation changed. Children ceased
to be producers of family wealth and became passive consumers.
The larger the working class family, the more likely it was
2
to be living in poverty. The social surveys of Booth and
Rowntree at the end of the 19th century provided statistical
proof of this: Rowntree, for example, showed that in York
in 1899 22.16% of primary poverty was caused by 'largeness
of family', i.e. more than four children. In addition,
51.96% of primary poverty was caused by 'low wages', i.e.
wages insufficient to maintain a family of not more than
three children in a state of physical efficiency. More
striking still was Rowntree's point that a high proportion
of working class individuals were likely to pass into poverty
1. For example, Daniel Defoe, writing of a visit to
Yorkshire in the 1720s, noted that "scarcely.anything
above four years old, but its hands were sufficient
for its own support". Quoted in H.N. Brailsford:
Families and Incomes: the Case for Children's
Allowances (1926), p. 3~.
2. Lord Shaftesbury seems to have been aware of this,
for when moving an amendment to the 1870 Education
Bill to lower the school leaving age from 13 to 10
he said that "the extent to which persons in London
depended on the labour of their children their Lordships
would scarcely be aware of, it was impossible that a
man could maintain a wife and family on 9s.Od. a week
unless he was assisted by such labour". Quoted in Women's
National Liberal Federation: Children's Allowances (1927),
p. 4.
3. B.S. Rowntree: Poverty, a Study of Town Life (2nd ed.,
1902), p. 120.
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at three stages of their lives - childhood, parentage
and old age - which he illustrated thus:
CHILDREN BEGIN CHILDREN MARRY
MARRIES TO EARN & LEAVE HOME
ACE 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 CO 65 70
Children were thus the cause of primary poverty at two
stages: at the first, the individual and his siblings
dragged the family below the poverty line; at the second,
his own children repeated the process.
Alongside this change in the economic role of children
(which was taking place in all advanced industrial societies)
there was occurring the movement for women's emancipation.
A full account of the feminist movement is obviously well
outside the scope of this study, but several aspects of it
need to be mentioned briefly. First, the entry of a large
number of women into voluntary social work in the latter
half of the 19th century was important. This was one of
the first manifestations of the feminist movement, and was
led initially by upper-middle class women who wished to find
a useful alternative to the stultifying boredom of their
1. Ibid., p. 137.
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domestic role as mere decorative appendages of their
husbands. The entry of these women into voluntary social
work, prison reform, nursing, hospital administration, etc.,
was of vital importance to the later development of the
women's suffrage movement and to future developments in
1
social policy. Within such work women were able to create
their own career structures and 'professionalise' themselves
to the extent that thereafter they began to demand entry into
the conventional male-dominated professions; day-to-day .
contact with social problems gave them valuable practical
experience; and in such work they learned the techniques
2
of political campaigning at local and municipal level.
Allied to this was the fact that their later involvement in
the suffrage movement provided women with an excellent
education in the nuances of pressure group politics; or,
as Eleanor Rathbone put it, "the struggle for the right to
become politicians in itself made women into politicians".
In their struggle for the vote, women inherited and further
developed the techniques of political propaganda that had
1. "The breaking up of the masculine monopoly was made
possible because the work undertaken by women was of a
charitable nature and therefore not in conflict with
the prevailing ideas of femininity; it was in a new
field and therefore did not, at first, mean an intrusion
into masculine spheres; and in most cases it was not
connected with remunerative reward and therefore did not
imply loss of caste." Viola Klein: "The Emancipation of
Women: its Motives and Achievements", in H. Grisewood (ed.):
Ideas and Beliefs of the Victorians (1949), p. 266.
2. Women gained the local government franchise (by Acts
of 1869, 1888 and 1894), were able to serve on School
Boards from 1870, as Poor Law Guardians from 1875 and on
Parish and District Councils from 1894. Constance Rover:
Women's Suffrage and Party Politics in Britain (1969), p. 29.
3. E. Rathbone: "Changes in Public Life", in Ray Strachey
(ed.): Our Freedom and its Results (1936), p. 21.
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been developed over the previous hundred years by such
groups as Christopher Wyvill's Yorkshire Association, the
Anti-Slavery Movement, the Chartists and the Anti-Corn
1
Law League. Each of the three major figures of the
Family Endowment Society - Eleanor Rathbone, Mary Stocks
and Eva Hubback - had been involved with the women's
suffrage movement and used the same campaigning methods
in their fight for family allowances.
Each of these three women saw the movement for
family allowances as a natural outgrowth of the struggle
for the vote: only when political equality had been won
could women move on to the much more difficult and lengthy
2
task of gaining economic equality. They realised that
this latter struggle would involve campaigning over an
enormously wide field, and would have to overcome all
kinds of deep-seated prejudices and taboos that winning
the vote had done nothing to remove - for example, the
fact that before the turn of the century a bill in Parlia¬
ment to enforce the proper training and registration of
midwives had little chance of intelligent general discussion,
since "the very word 'midwife' in those days was apt to
make Members titter and dig each other furtively in the
3
ribs". Family allowances were thus one out of several
causes that Eleanor Rathbone supported with the overall
1. Ibid.
2. E. Rathbone: Milestones: Presidential Addresses
at the Annual Council Meetings of the National Union
of Societies for Equal Citizenship (1929), PP. 6-8.
This was the view of many feminists. See Vera Brittain:
Lady into Woman (1953), p. 7.
3. E. Rathbone in Strachey, op. cit., p. 49.
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aim of gaining economic justice for women; for instance,
in the 1930s much of her time was taken up with campaigning
for the rights of coloured women in the British colonies,
and she even asserted that the desire to help Indian women
was one of the "principal motives" or even "the deciding
2
factor" "behind her entering Parliament in 1929. Similarly,
Mary Stocks looked on her campaigning for "birth control and
family allowances as part of a much wider effort on behalf
of women; she "always regarded the two subjects as the
3
positive and negative of voluntary parenthood".
Feminists were not the only ones concerned with
the economic rights of women, however. In the early 20th
century State motherhood endowment became a favourite cause
of many socialists, who argued that the capitalist industrial
system had destroyed family life; since motherhood and
child-rearing was so important to society, under socialism
the State should assume greater responsibility in these
areas. "People rear children for the State and the future",
wrote H.G. Wells; "if they do that well, they do the whole
world a service, and deserve payment just as much as if they
4
built a bridge or raised a crop of wheat". Wells saw State
payment for motherhood as part of a general transformation
of the family under socialism, with legal and economic
1. Stocks, op. cit., pp. 115-8.
2. Ibid., p. 125.
3. Mary Stocks: My Commonplace Book (1970), p. 162.
4. H.G. Welis: Socialism and the Family (1906), pp. 57-8.
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1
equality for women as an essential cornerstone. Wells's
fellow-Fabian Henry Harben demanded improved maternity
services, the provision of pure milk and the payment of
free, universal and non-contributory maternity pensions
2
of 10s.0d. per week for eight weeks' confinement. The
socialist Dr. M.D. Eder went as far as to advocate a
State system of creches and maternity wages, maintaining
that by raising the status of women and encouraging earlier
marriages, motherhood endowment would eliminate such evils
3
as prostitution and its social obverse, enforced celibacy.
The most extreme language came from Sidney Webb, who advo¬
cated motherhood endowment for eugenic, pro-natalist reasons.
Lamenting the decline in the birth rate and the concomitant
growth of differential fertility, Webb advocated the
encouragement of motherhood in "the best members of the
middle and upper artisan classes", instead of the existing
situation in which "half, or perhaps two-thirds of all
married people are regulating their families" yet at the
same time children were being "freely born to the Irish,
Roman Catholics and the Polish, Russian and German Jews on
the one hand, and to the thriftless and irresponsible -
largely the casual labourers and other denizens of the
4
one-roomed tenements of our great cities - on the other".
1. Ibid., pp. 56-9. Wells also mentioned motherhood
endowment in his satirical novel The New Machiavelli
(1911), pp. 410-5.
2. Henry Harben: The Endowment of Motherhood (1910), pp. 12-21.
3. M.D. Eder: The Endowment of Motherhood (1908), pp. 11-12,
46-52.
4. Sidney Webb: The Decline in the Birth Rate-(1907),
pp. 16-17, 19.
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The form of motherhood endowment envisaged by such
socialists was thus extremely paternalistic and sprang
in large part from fears over declining national fitness,
but other sections of the labour movement were showing
a milder interest in the subject. In 1905 a conference
on the State maintenance of children was organised by the
T.U.C., the London Trades Council and the Social Democratic
Federation, which passed a motion in support of Treasury- or
i
rate-financed school meals, and pressure from Labour M.P.s
was an important factor behind the Liberal Government's
introduction of the 1906 Education (Provision of Meals)
Act which allowed local authorities to provide rate-
2
financed school meals for needy children.
From feminists came the cry of 'equal pay for equal
work'; from socialists, the demand for a 'living wage';
and in addition to this there emerged in all advanced
industrial societies in the late 19th and early 20th cent¬
uries a debate over whether wages should be 'industrial'
(i.e. solely based on the individual's productivity) or
'social' (also related to family needs). On what basis
should wages be calculated? Against a background of growing
international economic rivalry and a resultant increasing
concern over the industrial efficiency of the workforce, plus
fears of rising socialism, economists were forced into the
1. Hilary Land, op. cit., pp. 158-9.
2. J.R. Hay: The Origins of the Liberal Welfare Reforms
of 1906-1914 (1975). on. 45-4.
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realisation that a wage that provided minimum human needs
would result in higher per capita productivity and might
also stifle political discontent. Perhaps the best example
of this strand of thought can be seen in Seebohm Rowntree,
employer and social scientist. Rowntree's interest in
minimum human needs stemmed from his concern that a
seriously underfed workforce was also a chronically
inefficient one. "The relation of food to industrial
efficiency", he wrote, "is so obvious and so direct as
to be a commonplace amongst students of political economy";
what an employer got out of a workman depended on what he
first got into him, and for Rowntree the significance of
this had "now acquired an urgency that it is not easy to
exaggerate in consequence of the stress and keenness of
international competition.... the highest commercial success
will be impossible so long as large numbers even of the most
sober and industrious of the labouring class receive but
-i
three-fourths of the necessary amount of food". Again,
the living wage, argued the Polish economist Piotr Prengowski,
was necessary in order to maintain good relations between
employer and employee, and to keep the worker immune from
2
"the revolutionary propaganda of the enemies of social order".
Gradually the industrial advantages of the living wage began
1. Rowntree, op. cit., pp. 260-1.
2. Piotr Prengowski: Workers' Family Allowances (1931), p. 53.
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to be more clearly perceived, and in the process it began
to attract increasing attention from academic economists
and others who attempted to construct elaborate theoretical
justifications for it. An interesting expression of this
was the 1891 Papal Encyclical 'De Rerum Novarum' which
suggested that "the wage paid to the working man must be
sufficient for the support of himself and of his family...
if in the present state of society this is not always
feasible, social justice demands that reforms be introduced
without delay which will guarantee every adult working man
just such a wage", and went on to praise existing industrial
family allowance schemes in Europe. In 1906 the American
economist John A. Ryan published 'A Living Wage' in which he
supported the idea of the family wage on grounds of abstract
human rights and social justice. "The right to a family
Living Wage", argued Ryan, "belongs to every adult male
labourer, whether he intends to marry or not; for rights
are to be interpreted according to the average conditions
of human life, and these suppose the labourer to become
2
the head of a family". Thus the living wage should be based
on the needs of a man, wife and the average number of children
in a working class family (which Ryan' put at 4.4) - 'needs'
being defined with reference to "the conventional standard
■5
of life that prevails in any community or group".
1. Quoted in The Family Endowment Chronicle, July 1931, 1, p. 1.
2. J.A. Ryan: A Living Wage (2nd ed., 1912, New York), p. 120.
3. Ibid., pp. 125-133. The living wage was also discussed
less interestingly by Sidney and Beatrice Webb in
Industrial Democracy (1919), pp. 590-9.
41
But it was just after the First World War and
during the 1920s that the discussion of wages and family
needs reached a peak in Britain. Essentially, the points
of dispute were (a) whether wages should take account of
family size, and (b) if so, what size of family should be
assumed as average.
On the first point, there was much theoretical
opposition from economists to any concept of need in
wage-calculation. J.H. Richardson (though interested in
family allowances for the low-paid) expressed the view held
by many academic economists when he argued that "as a
general rule, the adjustment of needs to income is prefer¬
able to the family allowance system of adjusting income to
needs". D.H. Macgregor argued that family allowances would
increase the birth rate and thus exacerbate the wages problem
they set out to solve: "it is one thing to relieve distress,
another to adapt the wage system so as to create the conditions
2
that require relief". The most virulent criticism came from
Alexander Gray, Professor of Economics at Aberdeen University,
who maintained that not only were needs impossible to assess
("the needs of the loafer, by virtue of his leisure, may
indeed exceed the needs of the worker") but that if needs
were to be henceforth the basis of wage-regulation then soon
1. J.H. Richardson: A Study on the Minimum Wage (1927),
p. 15. For a similar view, see D.H. Robertson,
"Family Endowment" (1924), in Economic Fragments
(1931), p. 150.
2. D.H. Macgregor: "Family Allowances", Economic Journal,
36, March 1926, pp. 4-5.
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the rights of private property would "be challenged ("once
a society has embarked on this slippery slope, there is no
logical stopping-place until the community is at the mercy
of those who ask loudest and are most unrestrained in the
•1
satisfaction of their desires").
But this opposition was more than counteracted by
a growing support for the idea of the family wage such
that in 1925 Eveline Burns could claim that "for those who
have eyes to see, an exciting social revolution can be watched
at the present time.... Economics is beginning to take account
2
of the family as an institution". A foreign observer noted
that the discussion of family endowment in Britain in the
early 1920s sprang from as many as five separate sources:
apart from the newly-formed Family Endowment Society
(examined at length in the following chapter) these were
the State Bonus Plan, Beatrice Webb's equal wage and child
endowment proposals, Seebohm Rowntree's interest in a
minimum wage plus family allowances, and a continuing
discussion of motherhood endowment within the T.U.C. and
-x
Labour Party.
1. Gray, op. cit., pp. 27, 32.
2. Eveline Burns: "The Economics of Family Endowment",
Economica, 5, June 1925, p. 155.
3. Paul Douglas: "The British Discussion of Family
Endowment", Journal of Social Forces, 3, November 1924,
pp. 118-124.
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The State Bonus Plan originated in 1918 when
Dennis and Mabel Milner published their Scheme for a State
Bonus, in which they argued that every man, woman and child
regardless of income should receive a 'State bonus' of
5s.Od. per week which would be paid for out of a 20% levy
on all earned and unearned incomes and would be analogous
1
to the service separation allowances then in force. The
idea was to establish a basic guaranteed minimum that would
be completely stigma-free, paid as of right, and would not
2
be regarded as part of wages. At a contribution rate of
20% of income, a family of five whose income was £2.10s.0d.
per week would pay 10s.0d. a week into a fund and receive
£2.5s.0d. back (at a bonus rate of 9s.Od. per person),
making their final income £4.5s.0d. Dennis Milner was
the son of a Quaker manufacturer and had been educated at
Bootham School in York (a background similar to
Seebohm Rowntree's), and together with another Quaker,
Bertram Pickard, the Milners founded the State Bonus
League in 1918. The League soon developed twenty-four
branches and Dennis Milner contested a seat at the 1918
General Election campaigning on the State Bonus issue.
Over the next three years the League continued its activi¬
ties, and in 1919 even persuaded the Labour Party (of which
Milner was a member) to appoint a committee to consider
1. E. Mabel and Dennis Milner: Scheme for a State Bonus
(1918), pp. 4-12. This 5s.Od. was at pre-war prices.
2. Bertram Pickard: A Reasonable Revolution (1919), pp. 14,
3. E. Mabel and Dennis Milner: Labour and a Minimum Income
for All (1920), pp. 2-5.
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the idea. But in 1921 the Labour Party Executive eventually
rejected it, and the State Bonus League had to be disbanded
through lack of support.
Beatrice Webb's brief interest in family endowment
occurred when she was appointed to a War Cabinet Committee
on Women in Industry in 1918 which investigated, amongst
other things, the question of women's wages. The Majority
Report of the Committee rejected the idea of family endowment
2
in wages, but Beatrice Webb published her own Minority
Report in which, while admitting that wages could not be
determined by family obligations, she nevertheless supported
the idea of "a children's allowance on the scale of the
present separation allowance" financed out of taxation.
Probably the most coherent advocacy of family endow¬
ment at this time (apart from the Family Endowment Society)
came from Seebohm Rowntree. Rowntree's suggestion was that
a distinction should be made between minimum wages and wages
above the minimum; "the former should be determined primarily
by human needs, the latter by the market value of the services
4
rendered". After a calculation of the cost of minimum human
needs Rowntree arrived at a figure of 35s.3d. (at 1914 prices)
5
as a minimum income for a man, wife and three children.
However, although 46.4% of men investigated by Rowntree in
1. Douglas, op. cit., pp. 120-1. Report of the Annual
Conference of the Labour Party for 1920, pp. 185-6, and
ibid, for 1921, pp. 60-62.
2. Report of the War Cabinet Committee on Women in Industry,
1919, Cmd. 135, pp. 177-9.
3. Ibid., pp. 285-7, 305-7.
4. B.S. Rowntree': The Human Needs of Labour (1918), p. 15.
5. Ibid., pp. 126-9.
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York had three or more dependent children (thus justifying
the three-child minimum wage), 62.0% of the children belonged
to families having four or more dependent children; such a
minimum wage would thus leave nearly two-thirds of the
children unprovided for. The only solution was a three-
child minimum wage plus a system of family allowances, which
Rowntree suggested should be 3s.Od. per week.
Finally, family endowment was still being discussed
within the labour movement. In February 1920 several Labour
M.P.s (led by Tyson Wilson, and including Arthur Henderson,
John Jones and J.H. Thomas) attempted to introduce a Women's
2
Pensions Bill in the House of Commons, without success.
The Bill would have provided pensions for women with one or
more children who had been widowed, deserted, or who had an
invalid husband, at a rate of 36s.8d. per week for a mother
and one dependent child, rising to 50s.2d. for a mother
and three dependent children, with 6s.Od. per week for each
subsequent child. Labour M.P.s continued to press for a
Government Committee on Mothers' Pensions, and in June 1921
Tyson Wilson and his group again attempted to introduce a
5
Bill, without success. Meanwhile, the National Conference
of Labour Women, meeting at Manchester in April 1921, passed
a resolution calling on the Government to introduce a Mothers'
1. Ibid., pp. 34-41, 141-2.
2. Hansard, Vol. 125, 13/2/20, Col. 388, and ibid.,
20/2/20, Col. 1233.
3. Women's Pensions Bill, Parliamentary Papers, 1920, v, 709.
4. Hansard, Vol. 130, 23/6/20, Col. 2172, and ibid.. Vol. 131,
29/6/20, Col. 261.
5. Ibid., Vol. 142, 2/6/21, Col. 1250, and ibid., 9/6/21,
Col. 2221. Though listed in Parliamentary Papers, 1921,
iv, 65, the Bill was never printed.
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Pensions Bill and requesting the Labour Party to- set up
a committee to investigate the general question of mother-
hood and child endowment, and at the main Labour Party
Conference in June 1921 a resolution was passed that
called for mothers' pensions on the lines of the 1920 Bill
2
and maternity payments for twelve weeks' confinement.
In September 1921 the Labour Party Executive appointed
the Committee, and the following year they published their
Report, which was intended to provide a basis for discussion.
The Report recognised that wages were often inadequate for
family needs, and included a brief survey of foreign family
allowance systems, but came out in favour of extensions of
services in kind (e.g. universal free education from nursery
school to university, universal free health services, better
maternity care, etc.) as having greater priority over cash
allowances. At the 1923 Conference of Labour Women, the
Report was debated: Mary Stocks attempted to introduce a
motion in favour of endowment in cash rather than in kind,
but it was defeated by 206 votes to 49.^ Nevertheless,
interest in family allowances remained strong in the Labour
Party, even though the leadership was by-and-large opposed.
1. Labour Party: Report on Motherhood and Child Endowment
(1922), p. 3.
2. Report of the Annual Conference of the Labour Party for
1921, p. 210 '
3. Report on Motherhood and Child Endowment, pp. 5» 10-16.
4. Douglas, op. cit., pp. 123-4.
5. According to Mary Stocks, the vote went against cash
allowances "at the instance of the Party bureaucracy".
Stocks, op. cit., (1949), p. 101.
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However, one difficult problem encountered by all
who supported the principle of the family wage was the
question of exactly what constituted the 'average family'.
Generally, this was assumed to consist of man, wife and
three children, but critics of the family wage principle
were quick to point out that only 9% of married workers had
the supposedly 'average' family of three dependent children;
42% had none, 23% had one, 16% had two and 10% had more than
2
three. Thus a three-child minimum wage would be on the
one hand wasteful, since it would provide more than was
needed by the 81% of married workers who had fewer than
three children (plus the single workers, who constituted
26.5% of the workforce),^ and on the other hand would be
insufficient for the needs of the 10% with more than three.
This former point gave rise to moralistic warnings that
single and small-family men would fritter away the surplus
Zj.
income on drink, gambling, cigarettes, etc., while the
latter point Rowntree attempted to overcome by recommending
that the three-child minimum wage be supplemented by family
allowances starting with the fourth child.
1. In the 1920s there were a number of studies into
family dependence. See, for example, B.S. Rowntree
and F.D. Stuart: The Responsibility of Women Workers
for Dependants (1921), and H. Peat: "Economic Welfare
and Family Responsibility", Economica, 6, November 1926,
pp. 269-284.
2. Figures from Paul Douglas: Wages and the Family
(Chicago, 1925), p. 32. (Figures from 1921 Census).
3. Ibid.
4. Some even made this point about the existing wage
system. See Mrs. H.A.L. Fisher: "Family Allowances",
Quarterly Review, 480, July 1924, pp. 76-7.
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But a more serious criticism made against the three-
child wage was its cost. The economist A.L. Bowley calcu¬
lated that to raise all adult male wages before the First
World War up to the Rowntree 'Human Needs' level of 35s.3d.
per week and women's wages to 20s.Od. per week would have
cost about £250 million - but raising this sum would have
involved the nationalisation of all unearned income except
that belonging to persons with less than £160 per annum
all told, and reducing all other sources of income from
salaries, profits, earnings, etc., down to £160 per head
1
per annum. Similarly, Sir Josiah Stamp calculated in
1921 that if all persons with incomes over £250 per annum
pooled the excess over that amount and redistributed it
(after deductions for public expenditure) the resulting
2
sum would provide less than 5s.Od. per week per family.
Such figures seemed to provide reassuring proof to opponents
of the family wage that the concept was pure economic
moonshine.
This, then, was the situation at the beginning of
the movement for family allowances in Britain. The prin¬
ciple of family endowment was an old one, and had twice
1. A.L. Bowley: The Division of the Product of Industry
(1919), pp. 18-20.
2. Sir Josiah Stamp: Wealth and Taxable Capacity (1921)
pp. 95-7.
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been recently acknowledged by the Government, in child
tax rebates and service separation allowances. On the
other hand, classical economic thinking strongly opposed
any concept of family need in wages, and held up the
apparently disastrous Speenhamland policy as an example.
However, by the beginning of the 20th century concern
over the industrial efficiency of the workforce had
reopened the question of the 'living', 'social' or
'family' wage. This was the intellectual climate in
which Eleanor Rathbone formed her Family Endowment Society
and began the campaign.
CHAPTER TWO: ELEANOR RATHBONE AND THE FAMILY ENDOWMENT
SOCIETYo
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The Rathbones were a prominent Liverpool family
who had built up a large importing and shipping business
by the beginning of the 19th century and wielded corres¬
pondingly great social and political power in Liverpool
society. It was exactly the same background as had
produced the pioneer social investigator Charles Booth,
and like Booth the Rathbones' Nonconformism imposed on
them a religious obligation to take an active interest in
philanthropy - so much so that it seems they even regarded
business activity as primarily a means to an end, as a way
1
of financing their charitable work. William Rathbone VI,
Eleanor's father, displayed all those contradictory motives
2
that characterised his fellow Nonconformist merchants:
a frugal and abstemious man (and well liked), he apparently
pursued wealth solely for the power and social status enjoyed
by rich men, yet was continually afraid that excessive wealth
would cause "too much danger of enervation to a man's self and
Ll
still more to his children". Always acutely conscious of
the duties of the rich, throughout his life he gave away a
proportion of his income to charity, this proportion rising
5
as his income rose. This insistence on self-imposed ethical
1. Sheila Marriner: Rathbones of Liverpool4 1845-75 (1961),
p. 3.
2. A man "in whom a sensitive social conscience and the
compulsions of Christian obligation were in some degree
frustrated by the class assumptions of his age" was
David Owen's comment. Owen: English Philanthropy(Cambridge,
Mass. y ^9^5)> ]?• ^*5^*
3. Eleanor Rathbone: William Rathbone, a Memoir (1905), p. 113.
4. Ibid., p. 114.
5. Marriner, op. cit., p. 4.
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standards often posed the Rathbones with serious moral
dilemmas in their everyday affairs in the brutally
competitive Liverpool shipping business - as in their
quandary over whether to participate in the Chinese opium
trade of the 1850s - but despite these uncertainties the
family had amassed enough of a fortune by the late 19th
century to let the business run down, leaving them free
-i
to pursue public activities.
In William Rathbone's case this was philanthropy,
and his work in Liverpool provides a fascinating microcosmic
view of the growth of charity organisation outside London.
Indeed, along with Thomas Chalmers in Glasgow in the 1820s,
William Rathbone was one of the great British pioneers of
2
charity organisation and social casework. Rapid commercial
expansion in Liverpool in the first half of the 19th century
had brought with it all the attendant problems of over¬
crowding, disease and poverty - all accentuated by the city's
dependence on its docks, and hence on a large army of casual
:2j
labourers, many of them rootless immigrants. By the 1860s
there were growing fears amongst the wealthy merchant
community that pauperism was getting out of control and
expanding faster than existing charities were able to cope;
1. Ibid., p. 151.
2. A.F. Young and E.T. Ashton: British Social Work in
the Nineteenth Century (1956), pp. 67-80, 955
3. Owen, op. cit. , p. 45m-. Margaret Simey: Charitable
Effort in Liver-pool in the Nineteenth Century (1951),
pp. 8-12.
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a prominent charity, journal warned in 1869 that "pauperism
is literally flooding us. It is growing much faster than
our growth; strengthening out of all proportion to our
strength. Fast as our population increases, the increase
of our pauperism is far quicker. It may almost be said
that every man earning a living in this town has now a
-i
pauper on his back". In the eyes of the merchant class
the causes of this new urban danger lay partly in the
failure of the Poor Law to stick to the principle of
less eligibility, with its strict Benthamite distinction
between poverty and indigence, and partly in the chaotic
and indiscriminate way that existing charities handed out
relief to all who applied. William Rathbone deplored this
wastefulness which he saw as demoralising both the giver of
charity (the raising of money being dependent on "fancy
balls and bazaars") and the receiver (who, it seemed, was
turned into a scrounging idler). He visited the German
town of Elberfeld in 1869 and was very impressed with its
use of citizen committees to administer relief in accord-
ance with defined rules; the system appealed to his
conviction (already voiced in books and pamphlets) that
business methods could be used to solve social problems via
rational and scientific conclusions, and he persuaded the
Committee of the Liverpool Central Relief Society to adopt
A
a similar approach. Thereafter, his commitment to the aims
1. Quoted in Simey, op. cit., p. 81.
2. Ibid., p. 82.
3. Young and Ashton, op. cit., p. 79.
4. Rathbone, op. cit., chapter 10.
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and methods of the newly-founded Charity Organisation
Society greatly increased, and it was in this social and
intellectual "background that Eleanor grew up.
The ideology of the Charity Organisation Society was
complex, and has "been closely examined by several writers.
Although the subtleties of the Society's attitudes are well
outside the scope of this study, two strands of C.O.S.
.thought need to be mentioned briefly. On the one hand there
was the class-orientated, harshly individualistic analysis
of poverty which saw it as a product of the individual's own
moral failure and thus opposed all moves towards State
intervention into social problems. This intense fear of
a pauperised army of indolents roaming the streets haunted
2
C.O.S. thinking, and gave rise to a highly emotional and
moralistic attitude towards the poor. Thus in its assessment
of whether applicants for charity were 'deserving' or not
strict moral tests were used; for example, if a destitute
old person applied for relief the first consideration was
to be: "Have they wasted their earnings in drink or
'gambling, or led vicious lives? If so, they may be fairly
said to have chosen their own lot, and they belong to a
type which we do not wish to encourage by giving them
special assistance to avert the consequences of their own
1. Owen,, op. cit., pp. 215-246, Young and Ashton, op. cit.,
pp. 92-125, C.L. Mowat: The Charity Organisation Society,
1869-1915 (1961), M. Rooff: A Hundred Years of Family
Welfare (1972), K. Woodroofe: From Charity to Social Work
(1962), pp. 25-55.
2. "Throughout its history, the Charity Organisation Society
carried the scars of the panic that led to its creation,
and it could never shake off an almost pathological fear
that pauperism might get out of control", commented
David Owen, op. cit., p. 222.
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misdeeds". Similarly, the Society opposed free school
meals on the grounds that these would weaken parental
2
responsibility.
Yet on the other hand, alongside this highly
emotional fear of pauperism the ideology of the C.O.S.
contained a firm conviction that social problems needed
far more dispassionate and 'scientific' investigation
than had been the case in the past; indeed, arguably
the only positive legacy left by the C.O.S. was its
pioneering work in social casework techniques. Precise
investigation of social problems was thought to be part
of the process of bridge-building between classes; the
rich should involve themselves actively in the administration
of charity rather than merely salving their consciences
with an easy donation, for in this way they: would learn to
view the poor "primarily as husbands, wives, sons and
daughters, members of households as we ourselves, instead
of contemplating them as a separate class", as Octavia Hill
l±
put it. This belief in scientific social casework,
carefully-administered relief and intimate investigation
of working class problems thus ran alongside (and indeed,
was a natural corollary of) a deep-seated fear of the
1. Helen Bosanquet: The Strength of the People
(2nd ed., 1903), p. 258.
2. Mowat, op. cit., pp. 74-5.
3. Owen, op. cit., p. 236.
4. E. Moberly Bell: Octavia Hill (1942), p. 108.
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potential power of the urban poor, a fear that expressed
itself in decidedly unscientific outbursts of moralism.
These two strands of C.O.S. thinking were always to
be found in Eleanor Rathbone. "Of all his children she was
the most obvious inheritor of her father's qualities",
Margaret Simey has noted, and certainly Eleanor was the
offspring who carried the Rathbone tradition on into the
20th century. Born in 1872, she grew up when the influence
of the C.O.S. was at its zenith, and died just as the
Beveridge proposals were coming onto the statute book:
her life thus spanned the formative years of the Welfare
State and the greatest period of women's emancipation.
Significantly, the changes in her attitude towards poverty
and social problems mirrored almost identically the general
changes of attitude in the British political mainstream in
the years 1872-1946.
At Oxford (1893-6) her fondness for metaphysics and
philosophical problems became tempered by the influence of
Edward Caird and D.G. Ritchie, two teachers'who were
disciples of the T.H. Green 'Idealist' school of philosophy
that preached the individual's Christian duty to social
reform and had such a powerful influence in the years
1880-1914 on Oxford undergraduates who later entered many
1. Simey, op. cit., p. 133. The Eleanor Rathbone Papers
contain little of interest before the 1920s, and
therefore this section has to rely on published
sources.
1
branches of public life. The strong pull of her
background meant that after graduation she returned to
Liverpool to immerse herself in various aspects of charity
organisation and voluntary work. In addition to C.O.S.
casework as a visitor for the Liverpool Central Relief
Society she also served on the board of Granby Street
Council School and as Honorary Secretary of the Liverpool
2
Women's Industrial Council. Thus began the first phase
of her public life, in which an involvement in local
politics taught her many important lessons for the
future.
During this period she appears to have accepted the
rigid principles of the C.O.S. quite readily; possibly
its grim intellectual certainty appealed to the system-
building philosopher in her. In 1896, for example, she
wrote to her father complaining that the Liverpool Central
Relief Society was not keeping up to strict London C.O.S.
standards: the proper business of charity visitors, she
maintained, ought to be "not so much to relieve as to
prevent the poor from needing relief, and when relief is
given to let it be in such a form as may, if possible,
help them into a position of self-support"; thus no
relief should be given for such regular events as "the
wife's annual confinement", for thus "the fear of being
1. Mary Stocks: Eleanor Rathbone (1949), p. 40.
T.S. Simey: Social Purpose and Social Science
(Eleanor Rathbone Memorial Lecture, 1964), pp. 8-9.
2. Stocks, op. cit., p. 50.
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driven into the workhouse, which is the only inducement
likely to drive the average labourer to save, is removed
from him".
Gradually her attitudes changed, though. By the
time she published How the Casual Labourer Lives (1909)
and The Condition of Widows Under the Poor Law in Liverpool
(1913) her views had softened. The years of practical
contact with the day-to-day realities of working class
poverty plus the influence of the new trend of thought
based on empirical social investigation had left their
mark on her, and although the upper-middle class moralising
remained it was increasingly tempered with genuine sympathy.
Thus while on the one hand she could look on Poor Law widows
who were bad mothers as "the grossly negligent and slatternly,
as well as the chronic drinkers and loose livers", suggesting
that their out-relief be stopped and their children confis-
2
cated from them, on the other hand she could also see that
"it is hard for a woman to be an efficient housewife and
parent while she is living under conditions of extreme
poverty The astonishing thing to us is not that so
many women fail to grapple with the problem successfully
but that any succeed", and recognise that since they suffered
from a "completely blameless misfortune" widows should be
removed from a Poor Law based on the principle of deterrence.
Similarly, in her analysis of separation allowances she could
1. Ibid., p. 51•
2. E. Rathbone: Report on the Condition of Widows Under
the Poor Law in Liverpool (1913). P. 24.
3. Ibid., pp. 29-30.
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maintain that the prime reason for her concern was "the
sapping of public morality" brought about by their
inefficient administration, yet four years earlier her
analysis of the economic problems of seamen's wives
displays very little moral hysteria, and after sympathising
with their difficulties places the blame not on individual
failings but firmly at the door of the Merchant Shipping
2
Act.
Certainly, Eleanor Rathbone was capable of the kind
of empirical approach to social problems pioneered by
Charles Booth - though this approach was undoubtedly not
as free from middle class moralising as has sometimes been
3
assumed. Her enquiry into dock labour in Liverpool, for
example, was a pioneer of its kind, and anticipated Beveridge's
famous analysis of unemployment by several years (Beveridge
4
acknowledging his debt to it '). In a masterfully few pages
she outlines the main problems of casual dock labour,
inevitably concluding that "it is by the wives and children
that the hardship of irregular earnings are felt most keenly.
Low earnings are of course an evil in themselves, but quite
apart from the amount the mere irregularity exercises a most
5
demoralising influence on the family life and habits".
1. E. Rathbone: The Muddle of Separation Allowances (1915),
p. 14.
2. E. Rathbone and E. Mahler: Payment of Seamen (1911)
3. J. Brown: "Charles Booth and Labour Colonies",
Economic History Review, 21, August 1968, pp. 349-360,
and "Social Judgements and Social Policy", ibid., 24,
February 1971, pp. 106-113.
4. W.H. Beveridge: Unemployment, a Problem of Industry
(2nd ed., 1910), pp. 95-b, 108.
5. E. Rathbone: Report of an Inquiry into the Conditions
of Dock Labour at the Liverpool Docks (1904), p. 43.
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Eleanor Rathbone, in fact, remains something of an
enigma to the historian. Her twin inheritance of "a long
-]
tradition of public service and a considerable fortune"
gave her the financial and intellectual independence to
take up any cause she wished, and she was thus uniquely
placed to apply herself dispassionately to social problems.
Yet she never quite lost her upper-middle class values,
despite efforts to the contrary. An immensely down-to-earth
and practical woman, she steadfastly refused to commit
herself to any political party and throughout her Parlia¬
mentary career (1929-46) remained an Independent M.P. for
the rather anachronistic Combined English Universities
2
seat. The causes she espoused were many and varied,
bringing her into a wide range of political company: when
first developing the idea of family allowances she worked
with the socialist H.N. Brailsford, yet when campaigning
to stamp out female circumcision in the British Empire her
companion was the arch-conservative Duchess of Atholl.
One of her closest friends described the source of her
personal motivation as a "personal awareness of individual
human distress and a desire to relieve it whether it
occurred in the back-streets of Everton, the ghettos of
4
Warsaw or the villages of the Punjab", and in that respect
she was cast firmly in the mould of the upper-middle class
1. Barbara Wootton: Remuneration in a Welfare State
(E. Rathbone Memorial Lecture, 1961), p. ~
2. "The one good argument for university representation"
was how Hugh Gaitskell saw the situation. Gaitskell:
Population Trends and Social Policies (E. Rathbone
Memorial Lecture, 1954), p.
3. Stocks, op. cit., pp. 200-2.
4. Mary Stocks: The Philanthropist in a Changing World
(E. Rathbone Memorial Lecture, 1952), p. 11.
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evangelical social reformer; yet her practical experience
of working class family problems usually made her avoid the
hypocritical attitudes often displayed by that species.
Because of these contradictions, many would-be opponents
found her hard to fathom; trade unionists, for example, were
for a long time suspicious of possible hidden motives in - as
her biographer put it - "a woman of the privileged classes who
owed no party allegiance and professed views which were in
some respects surprisingly revolutionary, and in others
uncompromisingly critical of the motives and methods of
1
left-wing bureaucracy".
Thus besides family endowment and the rights of
women, the causes she espoused included Spanish Civil War
and Czechoslovakian refugees, coloured women in the colonies,
child poverty and malnutrition, stopping persecution of Jews,
2
housing and anti-Nazism. Indeed, these campaigns received
far more of her attention during her Parliamentary career
than did family allowances.
Undoubtedly, however, there ran through her thinking
an underlying conservatism which surfaced from time to time
in some of the causes she espoused. This was particularly
true of her involvement with India, when what one writer has
1. Stocks: Eleanor Rathbone (1949), p. 96. The ambiguity
of her political attitudes may explain why "in Parliament
Eleanor was admired and respected but never popular".
Pamela Brooks: Women at Westminster (1967), p. 159.
2. On the Jewish question, for example, see Rathbone:
Falsehoods and Facts About the Jews (1945) and
Rescue the Perishing (1945).
3. Evidence for this can be seen in a digest of speeches
and questions by her in the Commons, contained in
Eleanor Rathbone Papers, XIV, 3. 5.
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called "her characteristic hull-in-a-china-shop
1
indignation" revealed a complete lack of understanding
and sympathy for Indian nationalism. In 1927 she read
Katherine Mayo's book Mother India and was immediately
horrified by its lurid descriptions of child marriage,
suttee, purdah, sexual taboos against women and the
wastage of life through infant and maternal mortality.
Ignoring the fact that Mayo's book was a piece of pro-
imperialist propaganda, she began a series of meetings to
discuss the problem of Indian women which were clumsily-
organised and which engendered much suspicion in Indian
2
nationalist circles. A rapid six-week tour of India
followed in 1932, and this slender experience (plus some
reading of official reports) formed the basis of her
campaign, during the negotiations leading up to the 1935
Government of India Act, to secure separate representation
for women in the new legislature. The letters sent home
during this tour display her lack of sympathy with the real
issues of Indian nationalism and the bitterness felt by
Indians: to her, Congress was "the most unscrupulous and
relentless enemy-propagandist body in the world", and the
women who supported it were "completely illogical" in their
■5
arguments. She was thus very apprehensive of any transfer
of power that would mean placing the fate of 170 million
1. Vera Brittain: Lady Into Woman (1953), P- 5.
2. Stocks: Eleanor Rathbone (19ffiJ), pp. 13^-^0.
3. Circular letter, 23/2/32. Eleanor Rathbone Papers
XIV. 1. 6-13.
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Indian women in the hands of these "largely untried
rulers". It never occurred to her to question Britain's
imperial role in India: her attitude was that "so long
as imperialism is an inescapable fact, its responsibilities
are also an inescapable fact and these, for the women of
this country, include the welfare of all those women in
India and the East whose wrongs, as compared to the worst
2
wrongs of our past, are as scorpions to whips". Much the
same approach governed her campaign against female circumcision
3
in Kenya.
This brief account of Eleanor Rathbone's social
background and political attitudes, with all their contra¬
dictions, must be borne in mind when considering the
development of her interest in family allowances. Why did
a wealthy upper-middle class woman steeped in C.O.S.
philosophy eventually campaign for a cause that proposed
a drastic reorganisation of the wage-structure and was
(initially at any rate) supported by many left-wing
intellectuals?
The starting-point was undoubtedly her interest in
feminism. The demand of 'equal pay for equal work', an
important feminist cause, was usually met by the argument
that men should be paid more than women because they had
wives and children to keep. But if this was so, should not
1. E. Rathbone: Child Marriage, the Indian Minotaur (1934),
p. 14.
2. Quoted in Stocks, op. cit., p. 127.
3. Eleanor Rathbone Papers XIV. 2. 1.
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men with large families logically be paid more than men
with small ones - and should bachelors receive the same
wage as fathers with nine children? Eleanor Rathbone's
mind was working on this question when she published a
pamphlet in 1911 in which, she said much later, the idea
-i
of family endowment was "hinted shyly at". In fact, far
from being shy, the language is strongly feminist and
uncompromising: observing that in the present wage
structure "economic and social forces have worked out a
solution satisfactory alike to masculine sentiment and to
masculine love of power" she insists that "the community
must provide somehow for the rearing of fresh generations.
Hitherto it has provided for it indirectly and only half
consciously by paying through the employer of the adult
male worker (who is assumed to be normally a husband and
father) enough to cover the prime cost of the maintenance
2
of his own family". The seeds of her future arguments are
all there - in particular the crucial point that the existing
wage structure treats all men as 'hypothetical fathers' -
but they remain undeveloped.
Gradually, she began to examine the whole problem of
the economics of motherhood. She saw that the wives of
3 4both dock labourers amd seamen suffered greatly from the
way that their husbands were paid, and that no amount of
1. Speech for Family Allowances Reception, 13/11/45.
Eleanor Rathbone Papers XIV. 3- 82.
2. E. Rathbone: Disagreeable Truths About the
Conciliation Bill (1911). P. TCh
3. Rathbone, op. cit., (1904).
4. Rathbone and Mahler, op. cit., (1911).
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moral exhortation could change this. She investigated
the circumstances of Poor Law widows and their children
in Liverpool, and was amazed that they had to live on so
little in such desperate circumstances: "it may be said
that thousands of non-pauper families of Liverpool live
under no better conditions", she wrote, and hinting at
her future ideas added, "true, but the community has not
assumed direct responsibility for the welfare of these
families, as it has done.for those of the widows". By
1917 her thoughts on women's wages were almost settled.
Now she rejected the feminist slogan of 'equal pay for
equal work' because the real problem was varying family
needs, and paying women the same would do nothing to alter
a wage system that gave bachelors and fathers of one child
the same wage that was paid to the father of fourteen
2
children. The rearing of future generations was of vital
importance to the State, yet the State did nothing to improve
the lot of the average housewife, who would still be
dependent for money on the whim of her husband since
"whether he expends the wages so received upon his family
or upon his own 'menus plaisirs' depends, of course, entirely
upon his goodwill, since the State, though it recognises in
theory the rights of wife and children to maintenance, does
■5
practically nothing to enforce it".
1. Rathbone, op. cit. (1913)s p. ,17.
2. E. Rathbone: "The Remuneration of Women's Services",
Economic Journal, 27, March 1917, pp. 64-5.
3. Ibid., p. 61.
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This feminist strain of thought sometimes gave rise
in her writing to moralistic outbursts against bachelors,
accusing them of being financially irresponsible. Because
of this, at least one writer has taken the view that family
allowances "accorded with the middle class view that working
class fathers were thriftless characters too much given to
-i
beer and tobacco". Certainly, an important element in her
argument was that bachelors were paid too much in relation
to family men, and in emphasising this she often lapsed into
C.O.S. language. But she did temper this with an under¬
standing of human nature, observing that "the demoralising
feature about our present system is not that it gives young
men a considerable surplus above the minimum necessary for
the satisfaction of primary physical needs, but that they
come into the enjoyment of that surplus at a time when their
habits and standards have already been formed, amid the
2
wrong environment and at a low level". If a proper family
wage was paid, nobody would grudge bachelors and spinsters
this extra, she maintained. Essentially what she objected
to was, she claimed, the unequal distribution of much of
the existing economic system: housing subsidies, for example,
failed to concentrate on those in greatest need and through
1. L.C.B. Seaman: Post-Victorian Britain., 1902-1951 (1966),
p. 442. In fact, as a heavy smoker herself
Eleanor Rathbone rarely mentioned tobacco as a
wasteful expense.
2. E. Rathbone: The Disinherited Family (1924), pp. 45-6.
3. Ibid., p. 36.
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inefficiency of administration were allowed "to slip into
the hands of people well able to look after themselves and
clamorous in pressing their claims".
Besides feminism, the second reason for her interest
in family allowances was the years of practical experience
in observing the harsh realities of working class poverty
in her social work in Liverpool. It was this that changed
the brash social worker of 25 who liked the C.O.S. because
2
it made 'respectable citizens' out of the poor, and the
mature woman of 52 who realised that "most well-to-do
parents indeed would be aghast at the idea of a cherished
daughter running such a risk as is undertaken by nearly
z
every working woman who marries within her own class".
Finally, the experience of helping to administer
separation allowances in the First World War set the seal
on her ideas. Just at the time when she was ruminating on
payment for motherhood there was instituted this highly-
organised State family allowance system. In her S.S.F.A.
charity work amongst the wives and children of Liverpool
servicemen she met a far wider section of the working class
than with the Central Relief Society (thereby seeing the
magnitude of the problem of family poverty), saw that often
these allowances were the only thing preventing such families
1. E. Rathbone: The Use and Abuse of Housing Subsidies
(1951), p. 8. '
2. Stocks, op. cit., p. 56.
3- E. Rathbone: The Disinherited Family (1924), p. 249.
68
from starvation, and witnessed their beneficial effect
on child health. She also had to investigate cases where
Liverpool servicemen had deserted their wives or brought
charges against them, and this led her to the inescapable
conclusion that "as for the actively unhappy marriages, it
is probably safe to say that in the large majority the
rift has begun .in quarrels about money, in the husband's
inability to earn, or refusal to give, enough for the
i
support of the home".
By 1924 her thoughts on family endowment had
crystallised, and in that year she published her magnum
opus, The Disinherited Family. It is a remarkable book,
in which she combined ruthlessly logical argument, practical
experience, sympathy for working class women and a sardonic
feminist wit into one devastating attack on male-dominated
economic theory. It starts from the fact that although
much has been written about the family, nowhere is the
2
importance of the family as an economic unit considered.
Although "the whole business of begetting, bearing and
rearing children is the most essential of all the nation's
business", generations of male economists have refused to
recognise this; indeed, "if the population of Great Britain
consisted entirely of adult self-propagating bachelors and
spinsters, nearly the whole output of writers on economic
theory during the past fifty years might remain as it was
1. Ibid., p. 253-
2. Ibid., pp. vii-viii.
3. Ibid., p. ix.
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1
written". Their most recent creation, the living wage
concept, is a fallacy, since to base such a minimum on the
supposedly 'average' family of two adults and three children
would be both wasteful (in that it would make provision for
3 million phantom wives and over 16 million phantom children,
in the families containing fewer than three children and in
the case of bachelors), yet at the same time insufficient
(because in families containing more than three children,
over million would still remain unprovided for). To
talk of 'low wages' or 'large families' as being causes of
poverty (as Rowntree had done in his York survey) is to
miss the blindingly obvious point that "by far the greatest
cause of poverty is the failure of the wage system to adapt
itself to the needs of the variously sized households actually
dependent on the wage-earner".
It is when she goes on to describe the effects of the
existing wage-system on family and home life that she shows
greatest sympathy for working class mothers. Even a married
couple who were models of thrift and abstinence would be
"not a match for the laws of arithmetic" if their family
4
size increased while their income did not. In addition to
this wellnigh impossible task of running a household whose
needs leapt ahead of income (likened to "making bricks
without straw") the wife must live in a state of legal
1. Ibid., p. 13.
2. Ibid., p. 20.
3. Ibid., p. 27.
4. Ibid., p. 56
5. Ibid., p. 88.
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and social disadvantage - yet at the same time accept
hypocritical praise for her role in society ("popular
sentiment places her little lower than the angels, the
law a little higher than a serf").
The second part of the book gives a comprehensive
survey of foreign family allowance systems, and considers
possible schemes for Britain. Rejecting fears over the
possible adverse effect of family allowances on the birth
rate, parental responsibility, wage levels and industrial
costs, she investigates the unconscious irrational
opposition that such a family-orientated measure is likely
to arouse, naming it the 'Turk complex'. This, she believes,
is the real underlying force behind male opposition -
stemming from the man's psychological need to dominate and
possess, and his refusal to recognise his wife and children
as separate personalities with rights equivalent to his own.
Thus opponents of family allowances may pretend to put
forward reasoned arguments, but when examined none of
these stand up, and ultimately the task of family allow¬
ance supporters must be the very difficult one of over¬
coming the irrational prejudices of this 'Turk complex'
that permeates politics, the civil service, the professions,
2
the trade unions - indeed all walks of public life.
1. Ibid., p. 68.
2. Ibid., pp. 256-7, 268-274.
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The most striking feature of The Disinherited Family
is thus its iconoclastic challenge to existing economic
theory, and its attempt to re-direct economic thinking
towards the needs of the family. Accordingly, no one
particular scheme of family endowment is suggested: a
State-financed system of cash family allowances would
be best, but one run by private industry might be easier
to achieve in the short term. Essentially, the book
is a plea that the principle of family endowment be applied
wherever possible in social and economic policy.
This was to be Eleanor Rathbone's aim throughout
the movement for family allowances, and was the policy
of the pressure group formed by her. Having examined
Eleanor Rathbone's background, motivation and growth
of interest in family allowances, we must now examine
the composition, aims and methods of the Family Endowment
Society.
1. Ibid., pp. 312-4.
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1
The Family Endowment Society originated in a small
committee assembled by Eleanor Rathbone in October 1917 to
discuss possible schemes of family allowances. Clearly,
she wanted to share with some sympathetic companions the
vague ideas expressed in her article in the Economic Journal
of March 1917, and shape them into a coherent plan. Not
surprisingly, therefore, the composition of this 'Family
Endowment Committee' had strong leanings towards feminism
and socialism: apart from Eleanor Rathbone herself, three
of the members (Kathleen Courtney, A. Maude Royden and
Mary Stocks) had connections with the N.U.W.S.S., one
(H.N. Brailsford, the author and journalist) was a
prominent member of the Independent Labour Party, and
the remaining two (Emile and Elinor Burns) were "both good
2
feminists, socialists and students of economics". The
Committee began by examining the popular feminist slogan
of 'equal pay for equal work' - at that time attracting
much attention through the entry of so many women into
previously all-male jobs during the War. Rejecting this
slogan as irrelevant and misleading, they maintained that
family endowment would achieve equality of wages anyway,
since men would no longer have the excuse that they need
higher wages because they had families to keep. The heart
1. A Family Endowment Society existed as far back as 1836,
when an insurance scheme under that name was set up to
cover the cost of bringing up children. Family Endowment
Society: Observations Explanatory of the Principles and
Practical Results of the System of Assurances Proposed by
the Family Endowment Society (18361
2. Stocks, op. cit., p. 84.
3. K.D. Courtney, et al.: Equal Pay and the Family (1918), p. 18
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of the problem was a wage system that took no account of
family needs, and by a majority they came out in favour of
a national family allowance system providing 12s.6d. per week
for mothers, 5s.Od. per week for the first child and 3s.6d.
per week for each subsequent child, to cover children of
at least up to the age of 5 and preferably up to 14. The
language of the Committee's report reflected its political
2
complexion: along with a visionary utopianism there was
a strong element of State paternalism, with allowances being
payable to the mother only on condition that she "obtained
at regular intervals from any registered infant welfare
centre, nursery school, or qualified visiting officer a
certificate that the general condition of her children
was satisfactory".
The Committee thereafter gradually built up publicity
for its cause (Brailsford developing it into his 'Living
Wage' policy within the I.L.P.). They gave evidence to the
4
1918 War Cabinet Committee on Women in Industry, began
collecting information on the subject and in 1924 expanded
into a fully-fledged society. From the beginning the
Family Endowment Society's aims were kept deliberately
vague - "to collect and disseminate information, to promote
1. Ibid., pp. 35-41. The cost would have been about
£240 million.
2. "We thought we were originals, building castles in the
air", Eleanor Rathbone later recalled. Speech for Family
Allowances Reception, 13/11/45, Eleanor Rathbone Papers,
XIV. 3. 82.
3. Courtney, op. cit., p. 48.
4. Report of the Committee on Women in Industry. Appendices,
Summaries of Evidence, etc., 1919. Cmd. 1b7, pp. 46-7.
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discussion and to take action, with a view to bringing
about as quickly as possible a more adequate method than
at present of making provision for families" - so that
all sections of opinion could be accommodated. The Society
thus aimed at stimulating public discussion with a view to
2
getting the principle of family endowment accepted.
Membership was never large - only 77 in 1925 rising to
123 in 1930, equally divided between the sexes and pre¬
dominantly of university-educated middle class professional
people of some public standing. There was thus never any
attempt at being a mass organisation, powerful through
weight of numbers; instead, the Society concentrated on
'capturing' important and influential public figures who
knew their way round the corridors of power in Westminster,
Fleet Street and the civil service. These figures would be
utilised at the appropriate moment to put the case for
family endowment by a process of very elitist permeation.
Eleanor Rathbone early on realised that "in a subject so
new it is very valuable to have a strong list of names,
4
representative of different sections of the community",
since the idea would have little chance of catching on
"so long as those pressing for it are a small group of
people, mostly women whose names naturally carry little
weight with large employers, trade unionists, politicians,
1. Report of the Family Endowment Society for 1925, p. 1.
2. E. Rathoone: The Ethics and Economics of Family
Endowment (1927), p. 9.
3- Report of the Family Endowment Society for 1925, p. 1,
and for 1930, pp. 4-5.
4. Rathbone to Beveridge, 20/5/24. Beveridge Papers,
lib. 23 (Part 3).
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A
etc." These important names made up the Council (about
fifty strong in the 1920s); in addition there were the
ordinary members and subscribers; and at the heart of the
organisation worked the small group on the Executive
Committee, carrying on the day-to-day business.
For most of the 1920s the Society's joint Presidents
were Professor Gilbert Murray, Sir Henry Slesser, K.C.,
2
and Lord Balfour of Burleigh. The Council included such
names as Sir William Beveridge, the Bishop of Manchester,
H.N. Brailsford, Lady Astor, the Archbishop of York,
Professor R.A. Fisher (the statistician), Ramsay Muir
(historian and a Liberal M.P. from 1923-4),
Sir Arthur Newsholme (former Chief Medical Officer
at the Local Government Board), Ernest Simon (prominent
in local politics in Manchester and a Liberal M.P. from
1923-4 and 1929-31), Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland (Minister
of Labour in the 1924-9 Conservative Government) and
Barbara Wootton (the economist).^
Most of the administrative work was carried out by
a small group consisting of Eleanor Rathbone, Mary Stocks,
Elizabeth Macadam, Eva Hubback, and the Society's official
secretaries - Olga Vlasto from 1924 to 1930,
1. Rathbone to Beveridge, 26/5/24, ibid.
2. Murray was Professor of Greek at Oxford; Slesser
was a Labour M.P. from 1924-29 ana Solicitor-General
in 1924; Balfour had a number of public activities
(e.g. a Kensington Borough Councillor, 1924-49).
3. Reports of the Family Endowment Society, 1925-30.
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Mrs. E.M.L. Douglas from 1928 to 1930 and Marjorie Green
from 1930.^ Mary Stocks (1891-1975) had been born into
a prosperous upper-middle class London family which had
Charity Organisation Society connections; like
Eleanor Rathbone, she worked for a time with a C.O.S.
committee and campaigned actively in the women's suffrage
movement. After graduating from the London School of
Economics in 1913 she became a part-time lecturer in
economics there, and in 1917 became one of the 'Equal Pay
and the Family' group. After moving to Manchester in 1924
(where her husband had become Professor of Philosophy) she
naturally took less part in the day-to-day manning of the
Family Endowment Society's affairs in London, but remained
one of Eleanor Rathbone's closest friends and allies in the
2
cause. Elizabeth Macadam had been a young social worker
in Liverpool when she first met Eleanor Rathbone in the
early 1900s; a strong friendship developed, with many
common interests such as feminism (in 1919 she became
Honorary Secretary of the National Union of Societies for
Equal Citizenship, and in 1923 joint editor of its organ,
the Woman's Leader) and the two women lived together;
although Elizabeth Macadam tended to keep in the background
in the movement for family allowances her emotional and
practical help to Eleanor Rathbone was considerable.
1. Ibid.
2. Mary Stocks: My Commonplace Book (1971), PP. 1-140,
148-164.
3. Stocks: Eleanor Rathbone (1949), pp. 58, 92-3, 109.
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Eva Hubback (1886-1949), like Mary Stocks, was from a
prosperous upper-middle class London family, and after
graduating from Cambridge in 1905 also worked for C.O.S.-
influenced bodies in London; an interest in feminism took
her into work for N.U.-S.E.C. from 1918, where she met
Eleanor Rathbone, and in the 1920s she worked in a number
of areas - in the various campaigns run by N.U.S.E.C.
(such as resulted in the 1925 Guardianship of Infants Act),
in the work of the Family Endowment Society (which she
joined in 1924), and as Principal of Morley College from
1927 until her death.^
All these women came from a class background that
2
blessed them with complete financial security. This
enabled them to devote themselves full time to the various
causes they supported, and also ensured that such causes
were financially self-supporting. Thus the Family Endowment
Society was largely financed by Eleanor Rathbone; the bulk
of each year's donations and subscriptions (amounting in
1930, for example, to just over £507)^ came from her own
4
pocket. In addition, the social and educational background
provided them with a myriad of connections in all areas of
public life;• even geographically they were close to the
5
centre of power.
1. Diana Hopkinson: Family Inheritance: a Life of
Eva Hubback (1954), pp. 28-126.
2. For example, at the time she went to Cambridge Eva Hubback
"had no need to earn her living, nor.... any intention of
doing so". Ibid., p. 48.
3. Report of the Family Endowment Society for 1930, p. 6.
4. Stocks, op. cit., p. 101.
5. In the 1920s ana 1930s the Society changed its headquarters
five times, but always stayed in London S.W.1.
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However, despite these inherited advantages the
leaders of the Family Endowment Society clearly felt that
because they were women their task would be an extremely
difficult one. Thus their aim was to get the idea of
family endowment discussed as much as possible, so that
hopefully other organisations would become interested,
espouse the cause and assist in leading the campaign.
Propaganda was al1-important, and was directed through
as many channels as possible. Lectures were given by
members (particularly the leaders) to as many audiences
that might care to listen; books and pamphlets were
continually sent free of charge to numerous organisations
(the Society liked to publish brief and inexpensive
pamphlets putting the family endowment case in different
ways); articles were written (in 1924-5, for example, at
least nineteen journals and twenty-one newspapers ran
articles on family allowances); meetings were held with
political parties; Parliament was lobbied each time a
bill with family endowment implications appeared; and
public figures were wooed whenever they displayed evidence
of sympathy to the cause.
Because the Society aimed at getting the principle
of family endowment accepted rather than any one particular
system it tried to present its case over a very wide front
1. Reports of the Family Endowment Society, 1925-30; and
Family Endowment Society; Monthly Notes^ Much of this
work was carried out by the leaders. ""The burden of
expense and the exhausting work of speaking continue to
fall on a few individuals", complained the 1926 Report
(p. 2), and other Reports constantly made pleas for more
contributions and active campaigning by members.
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to as many organisations as possible. This meant
dressing up the idea in language attractive to the
listener, and given that by the end of the 1920s family
endowment was a much-discussed topic, many different
organisations were beginning to take an interest in it
"as an appendage to their own aims", giving rise to a
certain amount of confusion. There began to develop the
situation (which was to be a feature of the family allowance
movement) where the idea became all things to all men.
Mary Stocks, whose Labour Party sympathies led her to
support a universal scheme financed out of taxation, by
1927 clearly rather regretted the way that the original
1918 'Equal Pay and the Family' scheme had become "embodied
in a host of projects, many of them drawn from contemporary
experience overseas, and supplying according to the vagaries
2
of individual political taste" many different versions.
Yet Eleanor Rathbone firmly believed that a pressure
group led largely by a few women would have no chance of
success if it presented its case in a narrow, over-defined
way such as might immediately alienate people who would
otherwise be amenable to gentle persuasion, and thus the
Society subtly altered its propaganda depending on who it
was trying to persuade.
1. 1927 Report, p. 2
2. Mary Stocks: The Case for Family Endowment (1927),
p. 41.
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To women's societies it stressed that political
freedom was not enough: economic equality must now be
achieved, and this could best come about by altering
the wage structure in favour of women and children,
thereby achieving in part the old feminist aim of payment
1
for motherhood. In her role as President of the National
Union of Societies for Equal Citizenship (1920-9)
2
Eleanor Rathbone stressed this aspect, and persuaded
the organisation to include a demand for family endowment
in its programme. Thus when pressing for aspects of
family endowment that represented economic justice to
women and children (such as higher allowances for widows
and orphans under a new contributory pensions scheme) the
language would be strongly feminist, angrily declaring that
"Parliament is still under the dominion of the tradition
that a woman is a kind of grown-up child, with no rights
but only privileges which can be given or withheld at the
4
discretion of her betters".
In its overtures to the main political parties the
Society trod very carefully. Labour supporters tended to
favour a universal scheme financed solely from taxation,
Liberals a contributory insurance one, and Conservatives
(the least interested of the three) inclined if anything
1. Ibid., pp. 36-9. E. Rathbone and M. Stocks:
Why Women's Societies Should Work for Family Endowment
(1925). '
2. N.U.S.E.C. pamphlet: National Family Endowment (1920)
3. Stocks: Eleanor Rathbone (19A9), pp. 115-8.
4. E. Rathbone: Memorandum on Widows', Orphans' and Old
Age Contributory Pensions Bill (1925), p. ToT
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towards the 'equalisation fund' type of system introduced
in private industry in Europe. Thus Eleanor Rathbone was
careful not to alienate any of these views: though she
favoured the first alternative, she would still advocate
the third as more practical in the short-term, and tried
to combine both by suggesting that the best course of action
would be "to make the State system a flat-rate one and secure
the necessary gradation by supplementary allowances from an
occupational pool for all the higher-grade occupations".
On the one hand she would allay the fears of trade unionists
who suspected that an industrial-financed scheme would be
2
used by employers to avoid across-the-board wage rises;
yet on the other hand she would emphasise to employers that
family allowances "would not involve a penny extra taxation
"5
nor any addition to the cost of production".
Family allowances were thus presented as a way of
achieving many things - they would lower the birth rate
amongst slum dwellers by enabling them to obtain roomier
4
accommodation, they could be used to maintain wage
differentials between skilled and unskilled workers (which
had been narrowing since the First World War), or they
£
could be a method of redistributing income. Indeed, the
1. Rathbone: The Disinherited Family (1924), p. 294.
2. Family Endowment Society pamphlet: Will Family Allowances
Mean Lower Wages? (n.d., probably 1925).
3. Letter to the Liverpool Evening Express, 14/11/22.
Eleanor Rathbone Papers, XIV. 3- 90.
4. E. Rathbone: Family Endowment in... its Bearing on the
Question of Population (F^ETTS,, pamphlet, 1924j.
5. Olga Vlasto: "Family Allowances and the Skilled Worker",
Economic Journal, 36, December 1926, pp. 577-585.
6. H.N. Brailsford: "The State and Family Allowances", in
W.H. Beveridge (ed.): Six Aspects of Family Allowances
(1927), pp. 17-20.
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only point upon which the Society stood firm was that
allowances should be paid to the mother. Apart from the
fact that this would tend to keep the allowance separate
from wages, the reason for this was the feminist one of
recognising women's rights. Direct payment to the mother
would help to rectify the existing situation in which
motherhood was "generally regarded not as a service
necessary to the community but as a service to an
individual man, a private luxury on which he may or may
2
not choose to spend his surplus income", and would
guarantee that the money would be wisely spent on the
children.
The Society supported almost any form of family
endowment, and consequently directed its campaign at
securing short-term results alongside the long-term aim
of a universal State scheme of child allowances in cash.
Even something as insignificant as the introduction of
separation allowances for married Indian Army Officers
was regarded as a step forward, another recognition of
the basic principle. Literally anything with family
endowment implications was made the object of a campaign.
In particular, this involved watching out for any bills in
the House of Commons that might be relevant, and attempting
to insert a family endowment clause. For example, in the
1. Rathbone: The Disinherited Family (1924), p. 265.
2. Stocks: The Case for Family Endowment (1927), p. 37.
3. Family Endowment Society: Monthly Notes, February 1925.
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Parliamentary session of 1924 considerable effort was
expended on an attempt to secure amendments in two bills.
The Society persuaded a group of M.P.s led by Francis Acland
to press for the insertion of a permissive clause in the
Agricultural Wages Bill to enable County Wage Boards to
require the payment of children's allowances in addition
to the statutory wage, the cost to be met out of a fund to
which employers would contribute according to the number of
1
workers they employed. And an attempt was made during the
passage of the Wheatley Housing Bill to direct local
authorities to differentiate rents according to family
size in the case of houses receiving the higher rate of
2
subsidy. Both failed, but set the pattern for subsequent
political campaigning: lobbying of M.P.s and organisation
of deputations would be accompanied by publication of
specialised pamphlets on the particular topic, with articles
and letters in the press. In all this Eleanor Rathbone
followed two rules: firstly,to campaign only for what was
achievable in practice at any one time, and never demand
4
too much; secondly, to get in early and lobby politicians,
civil servants, etc., while a proposal was still in the
initial stages of consideration when they would welcome
5
evidence and suggestions rather than resent criticism.
1. Report of the Familv Endowment Society for 1925, p. 2.
Hansard, Vol. 17b, 28/7/24, Col. 1781. ~
2. Report of F.E.S. for 1925, p. 2. Hansard, Vol. 173,
7/5/24, Cols. 417-8, and ibid., Vol. 176, 17/7/24,
Cols. 716-724.
3. For example, Rathbone's letter to The Times, 17/7/24,
on the 1924 Housing Bill.
4. "My practice was always to make up my mind what was the most
I had the chance of getting and to ask for first that or
perhaps 20 per cent more, to-leave a margin for bargaining."
Letter from Rathbone to Nehru, 28/8/41, quoted in Stocks:
Eleanor Rathbone (1949), p. 360.
5. Hopkinson, op. cit., p. 96.
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The best specific example of how the Society-
conducted its campaigning can be seen in its relationship
with Sir William Beveridge and, through him, its attempt
to get family allowances introduced into the mining industry.
Beveridge was Director of the London School of Economics
(from 1919 to 1937) and by the 1920s had established an
enormous number of personal contacts with public figures
through his experiences in journalism, the civil service
and academic life; he was thus exactly the kind of person
the Family Endowment Society were looking for, Eleanor Rathbone
-1
later referring to him as "my prize convert".
Beveridge had no doubt heard of family endowment
before 1924, and probably had a hazy notion of what it
involved. In September 1923 he had chaired a meeting of
the British Association in Liverpool on the role of women
in industry where Eleanor Rathbone and the economist
F.Y. Edgeworth had spoken in favour of family allowances,
and had been lukewarm towards their proposal on demographic
grounds and also because he "doubted whether there was any
conceivable ground for making any special concession to
2
women in industry". But by May of the following year he
was a wholehearted supporter: he had been given
The Disinherited Family to review for a journal, the
Weekly Westminster, and reading the book produced "constant
3
and total conversion" to Eleanor Rathbone's cause.
1. Speech for Family Allowances Reception, 13/11/45.
Eleanor Rathbone Papers, XIV. 3. 82.
2. Cutting from the Liverpool Daily Post, 18/10/24.
Beveridge Papers, XII..7.
3. Beveridge's epilogue to E. Rathbone: Family Allowances
(1949), p. 270.
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Immediately, the Family Endowment Society leaders
took notice. Three days after the review appeared
Eva Huhback wrote to Beveridge, congratulating him on
it and asking if the Society could use the L.S.E. for a
1
conference. Beveridge's reply was encouraging: reading
the book "has converted me to believing that something must
2
be done on your lines". The next approach came from
Eleanor Rathbone: could the Society reprint his review
as a pamphlet; and would he allow his prestigious name to
be placed on the Council list, and on the headed notepaper?
Beveridge agreed, "provided I do not have to do anything".
Inching her way forward, Eleanor Rathbone then asked him
to become the Society's President, emphasising that this
would not commit him to any particular scheme of family
endowment, but would simply provide them with a much-needed
cr C
important figurehead. Beveridge refused to go this far,
but enough friendly contact had been established for the
Council to realise that here they had a most valuable friend
and ally.
One of his first practical actions was to introduce
a family allowance system for teachers and senior admini¬
strators at the L.S.E. Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland (a Governor
of the School and a member of the Family Endowment Society
Council) actually seems to have thought of the idea around
1. Hubback to Beveridge, 13/5/24, Beveridge Papers,
lib. 23. (Part 3).
2. Beveridge to Hubback, 14/5/24, ibid.
3. Rathbone to Beveridge, 20/5/24, ibid.
4. Beveridge to Rathbone, 21/5/24, ibid.
5. Rathbone to Beveridge, 26/5/24, ibid.
6. Beveridge to Rathbone, 4/6/24, ibid.
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i
the same time, but it was Beveridge who was more
instrumental in persuading the Governors to introduce
what was one of the first privately-financed occupational
family allowance schemes in Britain. By 1927, two years
after their introduction, these allowances amounted to
£30 per annum per child from birth to the age of 13»
followed by £60 per annum to the age of 23 for children
p
in full-time education, and added just under 4% to the
■3
total salary bill.
Almost as soon as he put down The Disinherited Family
Beveridge began working out for himself a possible national
family allowance scheme, and drew up a plan for discussion
by a group of Liberals at Grasmere in June 1924. As a
convinced 'insurance man' he favoured a contributory scheme
covering those within the scope of health insurance, with
flat-rate contributions from employer and employed, and
payment to the mother: a total contribution of 2s.9d.
per week in respect of adult men and juveniles (is.Od. each
from employer and employee, 9d. from the State), and half
that rate for women, would produce an allowance of
1. Correspondence between Steel-Maitland and Beveridge,
21 and 22/7/24. Beveridge Papers, V. 1.
2. W.H. Beveridge: The London School of Economics and its
Problems, 1919-37 (1960), pp. 46-7. Beveridge had intro-
duced these because he "thought the Professors should be
free from financial worries even though they had children".
A typescript note on the administration of the system is
contained in L.S.E. Coll. Misc. 9. Beveridge and the
Family Endowment Society.
3. F.E.S. pamphlet! Memorandum on Family Allowances in
the Teaching Profession (1932).
87
3s.Od. per week for each child up to the age of 15 and
1
a margin for administration costs.
Soon after Beveridge discussed the scheme with other
Liberals and clarified his views still further, particularly
on the reasons for making the scheme an insurance-based one.
At first sight, it appeared odd to base family endowment on
such a foundation, since the essence of social insurance
was that only circumstances over which the individual had
no control (such as sickness, unemployment, old age,
industrial injury) could be covered; the decision to marry
and have children could be seen as a deliberate and avoidable
one. But Beveridge's justification was, firstly, that an
insurance-based scheme would be "a simple first step" before
the eventual introduction of a universal State scheme, in
that it could be easily attached on to the existing health
insurance machinery; secondly, at a time when the key to
industrial recovery lay in reducing costs (as he and most
other economists believed), such a scheme would achieve
its object "without imposing any fresh burden on industry
or on the taxpayer". To prevent possible injustice to
those who remained unmarried throughout their lives,
Beveridge suggested linking their contributions to pensions
2
so that in the end they received something back. It was
an interesting scheme for a number of reasons, not the least
1. Typescript of points for discussion by Beveridge,
11/6/24. L.S.E. Coll. Misc. 9.
2. Typescript Report of a Discussion on Family Allowances,
17/6/24, ibid.
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of which was that it showed how far the.original 1918
concept of family allowances as a method of redistributing
income from rich to poor could be altered into something
very different.
Throughout the 1920s the Family Endowment Society
leaders kept up close contact with Beveridge, calling upon
him whenever his name would be useful. In December 1924
they asked him to speak at a proposed conference on family
allowances and teachers' salaries; the conference was
cancelled, but Eleanor Rathbone asked him to put the case
2
to Lord Burhham privately. In October 1927 he organised
a conference at the L.S.E. (which produced the booklet
Six Aspects of Family Allowances) where six speakers looked
at the subject from six different points of view. In
January 1928 and May 1930 he helped the Society lobby the
T.U.C. and Labour Party over their report on family allowances.^
In October 1929 they asked him to be one of their witnesses
1. Beveridge saw his scheme as redistributing income
within the occupational group subject to compulsory
insurance, leaving the rest of society untouched.
Beveridge to Australian Royal Commission on Child
Endowment, 1/6/28, Beveridge Papers, IXb. 14.
2. Rathbone to Beveridge, 2, 12 and 15/12/24, ibid.
3. Apart from Beveridge, the speakers were R.A. Fisher
(the statistician, and prominent in the Eugenics
Society), V.H. Mottram (Professor of Physiology at
the University of London), H.N. Brailsford,
Joseph Cohen (a member of the International Labour
Office) and John Murray (Principal of University
College, Exeter).
4. Correspondence between Olga Vlasto and Beveridge,
6 and 12/1/28. Beveridge Papers, IXb. 14.
Rathbone to Beveridge, 22/5/30. L.S.E. Coll. Misc. 9.
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1
to the Royal Commission on the Civil Service. Three
years later there was another conference at the L.S.E.
2
under his auspices, and on many occasions during the
3
1920s the Society's leaders sought his advice.
The most interesting episode - and the most
revealing of the Society's aims and methods - came when
Beveridge was appointed to the Royal Commission on the
Coal Industry under the chairmanship of Sir Herbert Samuel.
The mining industry was a particularly fruitful ground for
a family allowance campaign. Nearly all European mining
industries had family allowance systems and by the mid-1920s
these were working quite successfully, welcomed by employers
and unions alike. More importantly, miners in Britain had
4
a high fertility rate relative to the rest of the population,
and the distribution of their children made them a partic¬
ularly suitable case in need of family allowances: 47% of
miners' children under 16 years of age belonged to house¬
holds with more than three dependent children, and a much
larger proportion were members of such households at some
stage in their childhood. Thus the Miners' Federation's
call for a minimum wage was seen by Eleanor Rathbone as
1. Correspondence between Vlasto and Beveridge,
18 and 29/10/29. L.S.E. Coll. Misc. 9.
2. Beveridge Papers, IXb. 19.
3. Much of this correspondence is contained in L.S'.E.
Coll. Misc. 9.
4. An average of 1.3 children per man, as compared with
0.9 for agricultural workers and 0.6 for teachers.
L.S.E. Coll. T. Vol. X. Coal Commission, 1923-6, p. 130.
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unrealistic, since to base this on a three-child family-
would still leave nearly half the children insufficiently
provided for at any one time, and would also be wasteful,
since 48% of miners had no children under 16; in fact,
only 9% of them had the supposedly 'average' family of
three children. Again, wage levels in the mining industry
were such as to cause great concern over the condition of
the children: using Rowntree's 'Human Needs' standard,
Eleanor Rathbone calculated from the table of miners' wages
in 1925 that 32.9% of their households, covering 66.5% of
the children, were below the so-defined poverty line. If
one took a mid-way point between this Human Needs level and
the much more austere poverty line calculated by Rowntree
in his 1899 study, this would result in a figure (at 1925
prices) of 35s.Od. for man, or man and wife, plus 5s.7d.
for each child. A family allowance of 5s.7d. per week could
be introduced into the mining industry without any additional
cost, simply by imposing wage cuts of 5s.10d. per week on
all male workers: the result would be that the lowest-paid
childless miners would still receive 35s.3d. per week, and
every miner's wife and child would be raised out of poverty.
The health of the children would benefit, industrial relations
would improve since the real cause of hardship was being
immediately met, and maternal mortality would probably
i
diminish.
1. Memorandum of Evidence by Miss Eleanor Rathbone, on
Behalf of the Family Endowment Society, to the Royal
Commission on the Coal Industry (1925;, pp. 2-9.
(Contained in ibid., pp. 112-9;. Eleanor Rathbone was
fond of pointing out that the maternal mortality rate
of 4.3 per thousand was over three times higher than the
fatal accident rate amongst miners (1.3 per thousand).
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The Family Endowment Society campaigned vigorously
in the years 1924-7 to get some sort of family allowance
system introduced into the mining industry. The Disinherited
Family included a brief outline of why the mining industry
1
was a suitable case, and in the same month as it was
published (March 1924) the pamphlet Family Allowances in
the Mining Industry was sent to all district secretaries
of the Mining Association and Miners' Federation, 1,500
2
collieries and the press. By 1925 speakers from the
Society were touring mining districts, discussing family
allowances with meetings of miners, who showed great interest
and enthusiasm "in striking contrast to the ostrich-like
attitude of the official representatives of the Miners'
Federation at the Coal Commission". In 1926 the Society
decided at its annual general meeting to concentrate on
the mining industry, and set up a special fund to finance
the distribution of information: 29,000 copies of
Family Allowances in the Mining Industry were sent out
to branches of the Miners' Federation; 100 copies of
The Disinherited Family were sent to miners' institutes
and libraries in mining districts; reprints of the
Society's Evidence to the Samuel Commission were also
made available; and in addition between March and October
1926 seventeen circulars and memoranda were despatched to
mine owners, mining directors, Miners' Federation branches,
Ll
M.P.s, libraries and the press.
1. Op. cit., pp. 279-280.
2. Report of F.E.S. for 1925, p. 3.
3. Ibid., for 1926, p. Ti
4. Ibid., for 1927, p. 2.
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Some interest was aroused among the mineowners.
On the 25th June 1925 the Central Committee of the Mining
Association discussed the question of the minimum wage in
the mining industry and concluded that a family allowance
-1
system would be cheaper than an all-round subsistence wage.
The South Wales and Monmouthshire Coalowners' Association
2
tried to introduce such a scheme in August 1925; the
miners chose to continue working on the old terms, but in
April 1926 the South Wales mineowners were still keen to
introduce a family allowance scheme of" 1s.Od. for the wife
and 4d. for each child as an alternative to a subsistence
•3
minimum wage. Whether this was directly due to Family
Endowment Society propaganda is not clear, but certainly
Scottish coalowners took notice of a speech made by
John Murray in November 1925 to the Glasgow Chamber of
Commerce, in which Murray stressed the advantages to
French employers of their family allowance schemes: "the
tone of French industry was better and friendlier and
4
production had been helped".
1. Memorandum: Revision of Wages Agreement, 25/6/25,
Scottish Record Office, S.R.O. CB 7/5/28.
2. Memorandum by South Wales and Monmouthshire Coalowners'
Association, 1/8/25, ibid.
3. Finlay Gibson (Secretary of South Wales and Monmouthshire
Coalowners' Association) to Robert Baird (Secretary,
Scottish Coalowners' Association), 15/4/26, ibid.
4. Press cutting of 13/11/25 (probably Glasgow Herald),
contained in ibid.
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The Society's most intensive campaigning was
directed at the Samuel Commission, which was set up in
September 1925 to investigate the whole range of economic
problems that had beset the British coal industry since
the relinquishment of Government control in April 1921.
Beveridge was appointed to the Commission, and throughout
its work he carefully shepherded the Family Endowment
Society's leaders through the protocol of submitting
evidence. Of his own accord he wrote to Eleanor Rathbone
on the 19th October 1925 discreetly point out that as a
Commissioner he was not permitted to make the first move
in inviting evidence from them, but he was expecting them
•1
to give evidence and they should do so. The Society had
in fact already written officially to offer evidence, and
Eleanor Rathbone was clearly delighted that Beveridge had
been appointed to the Commission since he would guarantee
2
them a sympathetic hearing. In December she and
Lord Balfour of Burleigh gave evidence to the Commission,
and thereafter Beveridge worked on his fellow-Commissioners
to persuade them to recommend family allowances in the final
Report.
Beveridge saw family allowances as a means of
facilitating the wage cuts he believed were essential to
make the British coal industry competitive on world markets
once the Government's subsidy ended in April 1926. As
1. Beveridge to Rathbone, 19/10/25. Beveridge Papers, lib.
24. (Part 2).
2. Rathbone to Beveridge, 21/10/25, ibid.
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opposed, to introducing longer hours while leaving wages
untouched (the only other alternative envisaged by the
Commission), wage cuts would be easier to restore once
prosperity returned and if accompanied by family allowances
-i
would not result in-undue hardship. Above all else, the
cost of the wages bill had to be reduced, and Beveridge
warned Eleanor Rathbone that unless she accepted this
presupposition in her evidence she would not be listened
to seriously; if, for example, she used Rowntree's
'Human Needs' standard as a desirable minimum "and add
42% so as to allow the present rating for skill, you get
above the present wages even before you have provided
your family allowances, and thus become obviously a mere
2
visionary". Together they agreed that it would be most
practical to take a standard mid-way between Rowntree's
'Human Needs' level and his 1899 York survey one, resulting
in figures of 51.70 shillings for a family of five and
54.20 for a man and wife, at 1925 prices (plus increments
'Z
for skill). A weekly allowance of 6s.Od. for each dependent
child up to the age of 14 would cost £286,000 per week, and
would result in an overall wages bill £105,000 less than at
present - a saving of 4-jjf%. Were this £105,000 distributed
1. Memorandum on Family Allowances and Minimum Wage in
Coal Mining Industry by Beveridge. L.S.E. Coll. T.
Vol. X, pp. 152-3.Lord Beveridge: Power and Influence
(1953), pp. 220-1.
2. Beveridge to Rathbone, 2/12/25. Beveridge Papers, VIII. 2.
3. Beveridge to Rathbone, 30/11/25, ibid. Memorandum on
Family Allowances and Minimum Wage in Coal Mining
Industry - Statistical Basis, L.S.E. Coil. T. Vol. X,
p. 145.
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equally to all miners as a flat-rate wage increase not
taking account of family size, then more than a quarter
1
of the children would be left below this poverty line.
Beveridge won his fellow-Commissioners over, and their
Report, published in March 1926, included a recommendation
of family allowances as a means of ensuring that wage-cuts
did not result in undue hardship. If wages were to be no
higher than subsistence level, then they would have to be
2
accompanied by family allowances. Family allowances the
Commission saw as "one of the most valuable measures that
can be adopted for adding to the well-being and contentment
of the mining population. If the total sum available for
workers' remuneration can be kept at the present level, the
allocation of a small part of this to children's allowances
will raise materially the general level of comfort; if the
full remuneration cannot be maintained, the harmful effects
of any reasonable reduction can be largely mitigated".
Thus did family allowances receive their first
Government-sponsored recommendation, albeit for a reason
that was anathema to most trade unionists, confirming the
1. Ibid., p. 147.
2. Report of the Royal Commission on the Coal Industry
H925) Cmd. 2600, (publ. 1926), pp. 160-2.
3. Ibid., p. 164. The Report (pp. 162-3) stipulated
that allowances should be paid so long as the father
remained on the books of any colliery or attached
to the industry during unemployment, and suggested
that absenteeism amongst single men would be reduced
because they would have to attend more regularly in
order to make up the percentage removed from their
pay to finance the family allowance system.
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suspicion of the anti-family allowances lobby in the
labour movement that allowances would be used by employers
as an alternative to wage-rises. In the aftermath of the
General Strike and the miners' lock-out the Report was
forgotten. Indeed, only two months after the Report was
published Eleanor Rathbone seems to have realised that
its proposal for family allowances was now of academic
1
interest only, and would not be implemented. But the
Society continued to campaign. In the summer of 1927 a
Family Endowment Society local organiser went on a tour
of two large mining districts to measure rank-and-file
feeling amongst miners about the question of family
allowances (i.e. their response to the propaganda the
Society had sent them over the previous three years and
the Samuel recommendation). Generally, the ordinary
miner was favourable, though not without suspicions
(in the aftermath of the lock-out) that family allowances
2would be used by the mineowners to weaken solidarity.
Certainly, the Society's campaign appears to have succeeded
with the leaders of the Miners' Federation, because from
the late 1920s onwards they were the strongest supporters
of family allowances within the trade union movement.
1. Rathbone to Beveridge, 12/5/26, Beveridge Papers,
VIII. 3.
2. Extract from Letter from Family Endowment Society
Organiser in Mining Districts, 8/8/27. L.S.E. Coll.
Misc. 9.
3. See, for example, statement by A.J. Cook in the 1930
T.U.C. debate on family allowances, Annual Report of
the T.U.C. for 1930. pp. 391-3.
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The campaign aimed at the miners set the pattern
for subsequent lobbying, and in the late 1920s and early
1930s the Society tried to get family allowances intro- .
duced in certain professions. This was very much in line
with Eleanor Rathbone's 'minimum possible advance' approach:
better to achieve a series of minor victories and hope that
occupational schemes would spread, than keep on campaigning
for a universal State-financed scheme which would only come
about in the very long run.
Thus in February 1930 the Society gave evidence to
the Royal Commission on the Civil Service. Preceding this,
there was the usual flurry of activity: meetings with
civil service organisations, articles in journals, a
conference, questionnaires sent out to European Governments
that ran family allowance schemes, and so on. In their
evidence, the Society's leaders pointed out that family
allowances existed in all European nations except Britain,
Turkey and Russia. At some point in their lives the
majority of civil servants were burdened with family
responsibilities, and there was considerable hardship
amongst the lower grades: out of 300,000 civil servants
in 1928 (nearly the total number), 50% were receiving less
than £3 per week and 75% less than £4; at 1927 prices,
Rowntree's 'Human Needs' level for a family of five was
£3.3s.6d.^
1. Report of F.E.S. for 1930, p. 3.
2. E.E.S. pamphlet: Memorandum on Family Allowances
Presented to the Royal Commission on the Civil Service
(1930).
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In its civil service campaign the Society also
suggested that family allowances for the professions might
have a eugenic effect by raising the birth rate of the white
collar occupations, quoting R.A. Fisher's warning that "in
about thirty years, more or less, with our present birth
rate, whatever is worth keeping in the genetic potentialities
of the upper and middle classes in England and Scotland, will
have been reduced to half its present quantity". This was
one of the first expressions in the Society's propaganda
of the eugenic fears that were growing at the time (discussed
fully in a later chapter), and as it directed its campaigning
at selected professions these pro-natalist reasons began to
take an equal place alongside the anti-poverty ones. Thus
when presenting the case for family allowances among the
clergy, the Society mentioned family hardship amongst those
with low stipends, but also under the heading "In the
Interests of the Community" suggested that the children
of clergymen "born of parents whose mental and moral
qualities are presumably above the average and reared and
educated in Christian homes, are a particularly valuable
addition to the population... unless something is done to
lessen the financial burdens of parenthood, the dis-eugenic
2
decline in the birth rate will continue".
1. Ibid.
2. F.E.S. pamphlet: The Case for Family Allowances
Among the Clergy (1933).
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But in addition to the tactical reasons and the
growing eugenic fears there was a third factor behind the
Society's decision to aim at specific occupational groups.
This was that in the aftermath of the 1931 economic crisis
in Britain any social reform as expensive as a universal
State-financed family allowance system would stand little
chance of being accepted by a National Government pledged
to keep public expenditure as low as possible. The 1931
crisis had also resulted in cuts in the salaries of certain
occupations, and thus by campaigning to get family allow¬
ances introduced into one such an occupation - the teaching
profession - the Society believed it was following the only
-1
policy likely to succeed. Mary Stocks expressed the
dilemma when she spoke at a conference organised by the
Society at the L.S.E. on 29th and 30th April 1932. She
was a supporter of a State-financed universal scheme as a
long-term aim, but in a situation "in which we have a
Government in power which, for better or for worse, has
declared war on the social services" the only hope was for
the adoption of family allowances in the professions or in
certain industries. She felt it was very unfortunate that
the trade unions had missed the opportunity of pressing for
«
family allowances on their own terms, letting the initiative
1. Marjorie Green: "Family Allowances in the
Teaching Profession", Family Endowment Chronicle, 1 ,
January 1932, pp. 31-3.
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pass out of their hands into those of the employers; hut
she supposed that an employers' scheme might he better
than none at all, and there was a chance of family allow-
ances being introduced in a few professions.
The 1930s were years of disappointment for the
Family Endowment Society, in which the promise of the
previous decade was not fulfilled. The Society's Annual
Report for 1933, for example, rather woefully stated that
"the most, perhaps, we can hope is that efforts, which
now seem fruitless, may yield results upon which we shall
he able to congratulate ourselves in some future Annual
2
Report". At the Society's A.G.M. that year Eleanor Rathbone
reviewed the progress made since she organised the 'Equal
Pay and the Family' group in 1917: there had been many
developments abroad, but in Britain "there had been more
thinking on the theory of family allowances than practical
experiment". There had been some advances - dependants'
allowances in unemployment insurance, rent rebates pro¬
portional to family size in some local authorities since
1930, the L.S.E. scheme, the interest shown by the labour
movement in the late 1920s - but for the moment the
campaign for family allowances was "in the trough of a
wave". She thought that the falling birth rate would
give strength to their case in the future, and expected
1. Stocks: "The Future of Family Allowances", ibid., 2,
May 1932, pp. 8-9.
2. Ibid.,3, July 1933, p. 3.
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that employer-financed industrial systems would probably
be how family allowances would begin to grow - though
she "looked forward to a State system, probably partly
1
contributory, as the end to aim at".
Faced with this bleak economic situation, the
leaders of the Family Endowment Society tended to devote
their time to other causes they regarded as of more
immediate importance - for example, the Children's Minimum
Council, which had Eleanor Rathbone as its Chairman and
2
Marjorie Green as its Secretary. In addition,
Eleanor Rathbone (now an M.P.) was devoting a lot of
her time to her many other activities, such as Indian
women. This, therefore, seems an appropriate point at
which to end this study of the composition, aims and
methods of the Family Endowment Society. Subsequent
chapters will examine in detail how the Society's leaders
campaigned on the main arguments that made up the case
for family allowances - arguments relating to child
poverty, the birth rate, unemployment relief - and how
those within the Government reacted to this campaigning.
1. ibid., pp. 1-2.
2. Ibid.,August 1934, p. 1.
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Throughout the inter-war years the most powerful
argument put forward for family allowances was the 'family
poverty' one. Under the existing wage structure, it was
claimed, mothers and children belonging to large families
in poor working class areas were suffering severe under¬
nourishment and poor health, since wages took no account
of family needs. In support of this argument there was
produced a vast amount of evidence which was repeatedly
presented to the Government. This chapter will examine this
evidence in detail, and consider the extent to which it forced
the Government to accept the need for family allowances.
For most of the 19th century Government concern over the
health of its citizens was confined to permissive environmental
sanitation legislation, with the 1875 Public Health Act the
most notable expression of this. By the beginning of the
20th century, however, the focus of attention was shifting
onto the physiology of the individual and the concept of
minimum human needs. There it was to remain throughout the
1920s and 1930s, becoming the subject of bitter and protracted
controversies over the duties of the State to guarantee these,
minimum needs for all its citizens.
The prime reason for this change was the concern over
national fitness increasingly felt by businessmen and poli¬
ticians after the 1870s. Growing international economic
1. J.M. Mackintosh: Trends of Opinion about the Public
Health, 1901-51 (1953), p. 6.
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competition forced into public debate the question of how
physically efficient the industrial workforce was, and after
the military humiliations of the Boer War this concern also
took on national defence implications. The Boer War medical
inspection scandal, which revealed that on average three out
of five soldiers attempting to enlist in the British army
were physically unfit, broke against a general atmosphere of
imperialist hysteria, with alarmist articles in the press
warning of national degeneration and racial decline. Such
was the public concern that Balfour's Conservative Government
was very reluctantly obliged to appoint an Interdepartmental
Committee on Physical Deterioration which in July 1904
published its fifty-three recommendations, many of which
2
related to the health of the nation's children. Repeatedly,
witness after witness testified to the Committee that most of
the major defects causing men to be rejected (bad teeth and
eyesight, retarded growth, general anaemia, heart disease)
had originated early in life. For example, Dr. Alfred Eicholz,
a school inspector, had made a special investigation of a
school in the deprived area of Lambeth, and concluded that
"90 per cent of the children there are unable, by reason of
their physical condition, to attend to the duties of school
in a proper way". A year earlier the Royal Commission on
Physical Training (Scotland) had reported that almost one
third of Edinburgh children had not enough to eat, with over
1. Bentley B. Gilbert: The Evolution of National Insurance
in Great Britain (1966), pp. 83-7.
2. Ibid., pp. 88-9.
3. Summary of Evidence Given Before the Physical Deterioration
Committee on the Question of the Feeding of Schoolchildren.
P.R.O. ED. 24/106.
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ten thousand in urgent need of medical attention; and in
1909 the Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws
confirmed this gloomy picture.
Military recruitment figures had a particularly
chilling authority because they applied to the country as
a whole, unlike poverty surveys that applied only to specific
areas, and so provided a total picture of physical deteriora¬
tion. Thus the conscription figures for the First World War
were disturbingly accurate, concluding that "of every nine
men of military age in Great Britain, on the average three
were perfectly fit and healthy; two were upon a definitely
infirm plane of health and strength whether from some dis¬
ability or some failure in development; three were incapable
of undergoing more than a very moderate degree of physical
exertion and could almost (in view of their age) be described
with justice as physical wrecks; and the remaining man was
2
a chronic invalid with a precarious hold on life".
This concern over industrial and military efficiency
provided the impetus behind the first halting steps taken by
the Government to improve the health of children. In 1906
was introduced the Education (Provision of Meals) Act which
empowered local education authorities to provide meals for
only 'necessitous' school children on condition that no
1. S. and V. Leff: The School Health Service (1959), p. 24.
2. Report upon the Physical Examination of Men of Military
Age by National Service Medical Boards, 1917-18 (1920)",
Cmd. 504, p. 4"!
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private funds were available (or if available, were
inadequate) and that the expenditure did not exceed a
-i
halfpenny rate. In 1907 there followed the Education
(Administrative Provisions) Act under which local education
authorities were to provide for the medical inspection of
2
children at certain times in their school career. And in
1919 there was established the Ministry of Health, which
liaised with the Board of Education on the question of the
health of schoolchildren, and on its own had responsibility
for such problems as infant and maternal mortality. The
atmosphere in which these reforms were introduced had a
profound influence on the way they subsequently operated,
and thus before considering the whole question of child
health in the inter-war years it is important to bear in mind
three points.
Firstly, it must be remembered that the Boer War
recruiting scandal was about industrial and military effi¬
ciency; the concept of 'health' was only really meaningful
in those terms. Thus Major-General J.F. Maurice's famous
Contemporary Review articles of 1902 and 1903"^ (which are
usually seen as the spearhead of the press campaign leading
up to the 1904 Commission) were based on the contention that
unless a society had enough fit men to defend itself it would
1. S. and V. Leff, op. cit., pp. 23-4. F. le Gros Clark:
A Social History of the School Meals Service (1964), p. 8.
2. Gilbert, op. cit., p. 130.
3. 'Mil.es' (J.F. Maurice): "Where to Get Men",
Contemporary Review, 81, January 1902, pp. 78-86, and
"National Health: a Soldier's Study", ibid., 83,
January 1903, pp. 41-56.
107
perish: "in some way or other", he wrote, "if our
complicated social organism is to work out its own improve¬
ment in security, there must be provided an adequate supply
1
of those who are to protect it". Maurice, in common with
other writers on the subject, also warned of the financial
wastage that resulted from national deterioration: if, for
example, after two years of service only two out of five men
wishing to enlist remained in the Army as effective soldiers,
then an "alarming proportion" of recruits "had involved the
2
State in considerable expense, but had given no return".
Thus it is hardly surprising that in the inter-war years,
when the militaristic fervour had waned, there was less
immediate concern over the health of future generations.
In the second place, these 'financial wastage' arguments
were the dominant ones behind the introduction of school meals
and medical inspection, and thus meant that the problem was
seen as an educational rather than an anti-poverty one. It
was thought to be a waste of educational resources if children
were too hungry or ill to concentrate on their lessons. This
was the line taken by nearly all the witnesses to the 1904
Commission and by a deputation to the Board of Education
from the very influential National League for Physical Edu¬
cation and Improvement. The League desired "that the children
of the poor should have the same chances in life as those of
the rich by having their bodies improved by feeding where
1. Ibid. (1903), p. 50.
2. Ibid. (1903), p. 41 .
3. Summary of Evidence, op. cit.
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necessary and by physical training, so that they may be able
to utilise, in the struggle for existence, the mental training
which the State has already decided to be necessary for every
child throughout the country". Similarly, the British
Medical Association, while chiefly concerned with preventing
national deterioration, also approached the problem "from the
point of view that every child, so far as he is hampered by
physical defects and thereby unable to obtain proper advantage
from the educational opportunities offered him by the community,
2
should be put in the condition to receive that education".
Although it is possible that Sir Robert Morant, the
enormously powerful Permanent Secretary at the Board of
Education (1903-11), and to a lesser extent Sir George Newman,
the Chief Medical Officer at the Board of Education (1907-35),
took a wider view at the time and also saw medical inspection
3
and school meals as a method of medical treatment, there is
no doubt that this narrowly 'educational' view became the
dominant ethos behind both measures. A second Education
(Provision of Meals) Act in 1914 improved opportunities for
expanding the service, but strongly re-emphasised the point
that feeding was to be regarded as an aid to learning rather
4
than a form of poor relief. Whatever his view may have been
in 1906-7, Newman in later life certainly supported the
1. Note of Deputation, 27/2/06, P.R.0. ED. 24/279.
2. Minute of a Deputation from the B.M.A. on Medical
Inspection of Schoolchildren in London, 27/6/11,
P.R.0. ED. 2A/282.
3. Argued by Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 123-6.
4. Ibid., p. 116. This view was, of course, deemed politically




'educational' view, and looking back to those years
asserted that "the school problem of malnutrition seemed
at that time to be insufficiently important or universal
2
to demand compulsory legislation". Throughout the 1920s
and 1930s both Ministry of Health and Board of Education
stuck to the line that milk and meals should be provided
only for those children in extreme need who were "unable
by reason of lack of food to take full advantage of the
education provided for them" and they "always resisted the
suggestion that the /Provision of Meals/ Act should be used
to relieve poverty as such". Both Departments thus refused
to accept any responsibility for child poverty in general,
and steadfastly maintained that this was the province of the
Poor Law Boards of Guardians (later the Public Assistance
Committees) or the Unemployment Assistance Board.
In addition to these two factors was a third - that the
Ministry of Health was at best a weak body. In spite of
great hopes that it would be given powers to tackle the
problem of sickness on a large scale, the actual establish¬
ment of the Ministry in 1919 was preceded by so much political
in-fighting that in its final form it was only a shadow of
4
what had originally been intended. For the twenty years
1. Annual Report of the Chief Medical Officer at the Board
of Education; The Health of the School Child, 1931. pT 6.
Even the School Dental Service was regarded in this way.
See ibid., 1932, p. 51.
2. Newman: The Building of a Nation's Health (1939), p. 329.
3. Memorandum on Milk in Schools, 13/12/33, P.R.O. ED/1367.
4. B.B. Gilbert: British Social Policy, 1914-1939 (1970),
pp. 98-132. See also, Frank Honigsbaum: The Struggle for
the Ministry of Health (1970). " ~~ " ~
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after its foundation it remained essentially a supervisory
body: action on any particular point tended to be initiated
by the issue of a circular advising local authorities, and
there were limited powers of compulsion. For example, when
discussing the poor condition of children's teeth and ways of
improving the situation, the Ministry of Health's Advisory
Committee on Nutrition in 1933 felt very limited by the fact
that the power of Government Departments to compel local
authorities to introduce better dental treatment was not
strong, and the latter could ignore a circular if they
2
wished. The standard approach of the Ministry of Health
was thus "to get a little new money, and then ginger them
^Fhe local authorities/ UP as much as we can by a circular
and any other possible way", hoping that this would
eventually produce results.
Along with this growing concern over national fitness
there was occurring the rapid development of the science of
nutrition. The last quarter of the 19th century had been
the zenith of environmental sanitation; at the turn of the
century came new discoveries in bacteriology; and thereafter
a shift of emphasis onto physiology and biochemistry gave rise
to detailed research on the importance of the individual's
1. Political and Economic Planning: Report on the British
Health Services (1937), pp. 29-30.
2. Minutes of the 4th meeting of the Advisory Committee,
12/2/34, P.R.O. MH 56/52.
3. Memorandum by Dame Janet Campbell, 4/10/30, P.R.O. MH 55/272.
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1
nutritional needs. Until about 1900 studies of nutrition
(or metabolism, as it was most commonly called) had been
limited to energy requirements, with an emphasis solely on
2
proteins, fats and carbohydrates. But with the discovery
of vitamins, amino acids and mineral elements, analysis of
food composition became more sophisticated, and at the same
time research began to uncover a growing list of 'deficiency
diseases' caused by faulty diet.
This process of discovery was immensely speeded up by
the First World War. On the one hand, the War demonstrated
the importance of food intake on military efficiency. Troops
could be made to withstand appalling conditions in the trenches
if their diets were adequate and well-balanced; evidence from
captured documents suggested that the rapid collapse of the
Turkish Army in 1918 in Palestine was due in part to inadequate
4 /
food, and a similar situation (in this case, the reduction of
cereal rations) led to the Italian defeat at Caporetto. On
the other hand, the disruption of food supplies and the
economic blockades brought about by the War provided nutri¬
tionists with positive evidence of the effects of prolonged
1. McGonigle and Kirby suggested that Rowntree's Poverty
(1901) would have received much greater attention from
the medical profession had they not been so concerned
with discoveries in bacteriology at the time.
G.C.M. McGonigle and J. Kirby: Poverty and Public Health
(1936), p. 22.
2. Henry C. Sherman: The Nutritional Improvement of Life
(New York, 1950), p. 15.
3. Ibid., pp. 30-2
4. Ministry of Health unpublished report: Minimum Food
Requirements: An Investigation into the Diet of an
Enclosed Monastery by H.E. Magee (1934), P.R.O. MH 56/41.
5. John Burnett: Plenty and Want (1966), p. 224.
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malnutrition on previously healthy populations: even a
neutral country like Holland, which suffered severe disruption
of its food supplies, was affected so that its tuberculosis
rate rose in the War period - thereby establishing a link
between malnutrition and tuberculosis.
By the early 1930s this 'newer knowledge of nutrition',
as it was quaintly called, was attracting a vast amount of
research in numerous journals and papers. One authority
estimated that in 1933 about five thousand papers describing
the results of original work appeared in the world's litera-
2
ture. Much of this work carried far-reaching social and
economic implications: medical scientists now realised the
prime importance of food intake as a measure of preventive
medicine, since "many of the commoner physical ailments and
defects could be reduced or even eliminated by proper feeding.
Indeed, it is probably no exaggeration to say that proper
feeding of the population of this country would be as revolu¬
tionary in its effect on public health and physique as was
the introduction of cleanliness and drainage in the last
century", as one eminent nutritionist put it. The political
implications were obvious: if nutrition was the most important
factor in public health, then it followed that the best weapon
1. Bulletin of the Committee Against Malnutrition,
May 1934, p. 9.
2. F.C. Kelly: "Fifty Years of Progress in Nutritional
Science", The Medical Officer, 16/2/35.
3. Memorandum by Dr. E. Mellanby (Secretary of the Medical
Research Council), 19/3/34-, P.R.O. ED 24/1374.
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in public health was to ensure proper feeding - from which
stemmed the further dangerous implication that this could be
only achieved if low-income groups such as the unemployed
had enough money with which to buy the necessary food.
Gradually, nutritional research in the 1920s and 1930s
began to show that a large number of important human activities
could be profoundly affected by diet. First of all, there
was the straightforward correlation between diet and physique.
One of the most famous studies of this was McCarrison's
investigation into the nutritive value of various regional
diets in India. He discovered that rats fed on the high-
protein diet of the Northern Indian warlike tribes (Pathans,
Sikhs, Baluchis, Rajputs) ended the experiment about 50%
heavier than those fed on the low-protein diet of the Madras
area; food-value differences corresponded exactly with the
differences between "the manly, stalwart and resolute races
of the north.... and the poorly developed, toneless and
supine peoples of the east and south". Corry Mann's 1924
experiment similarly showed a connection between diet and
growth: boys who were given extra amounts of milk daily for
one year grew 43% faster in height and 81% in weight than a
2
control group.
1. Robert McCarrison: "Problems of Nutrition in India",
Nutrition Abstracts and Reviews, 2, July 1932, pp. 1-8.
2. H. Corry Mann: Diets for Boys During the School Age (1926).
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Others investigated the link between nutrition and
intellectual performance. Seymour and Whitaker found that
young children who ate good breakfasts (porridge, fruit
juice, cocoa, eggs or fish, brown bread and butter) performed
significantly better in mental tests (as well as showing
increased weight, higher body temperature and resistance
to fatigue) than similar children starting the day with the
normal breakfast in poor working class homes (tea, bread and
• \ 1jam).
Lady Rhys Williams's experiments in the depressed
Rhondda Valley area pointed to nutrition's effect on maternal
mortality. In 1934, financed by the National Birthday Trust
Fund, she began a scheme to improve maternity services there;
yet during that year the puerperal death rate continued to
rise, reaching a figure of 11.29 per thousand births. Through¬
out 1935 the original scheme was supplemented by extra food
distributed through the maternity clinics, whereupon the rate
fell to 4.77 with only one death occurring amongst the mothers
2
who had received the extra nourishment. The famous 'Oslo
Breakfast' in Sweden, whereby every schoolchild could have a
breakfast high in the 'protective' foods, was claimed to have
3
a dramatic effect on child mortality rates. Nutrition also
1. A.H. Seymour and J.E. Whitaker: "An Experiment in
Nutrition", Occupational Psychology, 12, Summer 1938»
pp. 215-223.
2. Memorandum by Children's Minimum Council: Proposed
Provision for Additional Food, etc., for Mothers and
Children in Distressed Areas C1937), P.R.O. MH 55/b88.
3. Sir John Boyd Orr: Not Enough Food for Fitness (1937),
p. 8.
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affected tuberculosis: comparisons between standardised
respiratory tuberculosis rates for sixteen 'Depressed Area'
County Boroughs (with high unemployment, and therefore
insufficient feeding) and for the rest of England and Wales
(excluding London) revealed the former's rate of improvement
over five years to be twice as slow as the latter's.
Experiments also demonstrated that inadequate
nutrition could offset the beneficial effects of environ¬
mental improvement. McGonigle and Kirby illustrated this
in the case of housing: a low-income group of slum dwellers
in Stockton-on-Tees was rehoused in a new municipal estate
and then compared with a similar group still inhabiting the
slums; contrary to earlier theories on public health the
rehoused group's death rate rose (from 22.91 per thousand
to 35.55) despite their greatly improved living conditions.
The reason was that rents in the new area were almost double
those in the old (9s.Od. as against 4s.7fd.), and an analysis
of household budgets found the rehoused group to be suffering
from a far worse diet than the slum dwellers, since less
2
money was available for food. The same authors also showed
that much of the work of the school medical service could be
undone if children came from poor homes and consequently
suffered under-nourishment before their fifth birthdays;
1. Bulletin of the Committee Against Malnutrition,
May 1934, pp. 10-11.
2. McGonigle and Kirby, op. cit., pp. 108-129.
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these children would already be displaying serious health
defects by the time they entered school, and thus the school
medical service was changed from a preventive agency into
one "mainly concerned with the detection and correction of
1
established pathological conditions".
This was only a fraction of the nutritional research
carried out in the inter-war years. As they uncovered more
and more social implications raised by diet, medical
scientists unwittingly began to stray onto more and more
politically sensitive areas. In particular, when their
findings were put into practical application as a means of
measuring the extent of poverty, the science of nutrition
began to pose a serious political threat to the Government.
In his pioneering survey of the East End of London,
Charles Booth had calculated his poverty line fairly sub¬
jectively: the figure generally mentioned was an income
of 18s.Od. to 21s.Od. per week per family, but in addition
his investigators used their own judgement in deciding
2
whether a family was living below the line. Booth, there¬
fore, drew his poverty line without reference to nutritional
data, since these were not available at the time. In his
1899 survey of York, however, Seebohm Rowntree set the
1. Ibid., p. 81.
2. The criteria used by Booth are discussed in M.B. and
T.S. Simey: Charles Booth (1960), pp. 184-9.
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pattern for subsequent poverty surveys by making a precise
assessment of individual nutritional needs and then adding
to this estimates of minimum expenditure on such items as
rent, clothing, fuel, light, etc., to arrive at his poverty
line level. Rowntree's background as an industrial chemist
through his family's firm had given him a training in the
analysis of food composition, and he drew heavily on the
studies of the American nutritionist Professor W.O. Atwater
and others to arrive at his energy requirements of 3,500
2
calories per man per day.
By the time Rowntree published The Human Needs of Labour
in 1918 research into nutrition had developed rapidly, and
thus when he translated the 3,500 calories per man per day
plus 115 grammes of protein standard into cash terms and
arrived at a minimum human needs level of 35s.3d. for a
"Z
family of five (at 1914 prices) he was ushering in something
that was to be one of the most controversial political topics
of the inter-war years - the scientific minimum income level.
The social surveys that followed in the next twenty years
based their estimations of the poverty line on the growing
volume of nutritional research, and came up with disturbing
evidence of the extent of child poverty.
1. B.S. Rowntree: Poverty, a Study of Town Life (2nd ed.,
1902), chapter 4. The figure for a family of two adults
and three children, for example, was 21s.8d. - very close
to Booth's level.
2. Ibid., pp. 88-103. Asa Briggs: Social Thought and Social
Action, a Study of the Work of Seebohm Rowntree (1961),
pp. 32-3.
3. Rowntree, op. cit., pp. 123-9.
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In 1924 Professor A.L. Bowley and Margaret Hogg
carried out their 'Five Towns Survey' (Northampton,
Warrington, Bolton, Reading and Stanley), calculating
their poverty line according to Rowntree's 1899 level.
They found that 8% of working class families in the week
of investigation were living below this line, and this
included 11.3% of all children under fourteen; however,
if their survey had been extended over several years, then
the proportion of children passing through poverty at some
point in their lives would have been nearer 16.6%. In
1928 a research team based at the L.S.E. and directed by
Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith began a second survey of London,
on the lines of Charles Booth's, and published the result
in nine volumes. The East London volume showed that in the
week of investigation 16% of children were in poverty, and
11% of families. Both of these surveys attempted to measure
the reduction in poverty in comparison to earlier surveys,
and were thus fairly optimistic in their conclusions;
Bowley's, for example, pointed out that the total number
of children in poverty had nearly halved between 1912-14
and 1923-4.4
But with the worsening of the depression in the late
1920s and early 1930s each poverty survey that was published
began to reveal disturbing information about the extent of
1. Bowley and Hogg: Has Poverty Diminished? (1925), pp. 17-18.
2. Ibid., pp. 24-5.
3. The New Survey of London Life and Labour, Volume 3 (1932)
pp. 83, 89.
4. Bowley and Hogg, op. cit., p. 18.
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child poverty. The Southampton survey found that 21%
of working clas.s households surveyed were below the poverty
line, that in fully 34% of the working class families with
dependent children the head of the family had insufficient
income to keep his wife and children of school age above the
poverty line without assistance from supplementary earners,
and out of 761 schoolchildren surveyed, 232, or just over 30%,
were in families below the poverty line. In 1934 was also
published Caradog Jones's Merseyside survey, which found that
nearly one child out of four in working class families
surveyed was living in an overcrowded home, and a similar
proportion was living below the poverty line. Two years
later Boyd Orr published his findings showing that half the
population of Britain was living on a diet incapable of
producing perfect health; he deliberately set this nutri¬
tional standard at an optimum rather than a minimum level,
but even when he divided the population into six groups
according to family income the result indicated that about
20 to 25% of the child population was in the lowest group,
4
receiving a diet.that was inadequate in all respects. Two
more surveys were published in 1938: in Liverpool, the
Pilgrim Trust found that of the 97 families studied who had
two or more children under fourteen years of age, 83 were
in poverty; and the Bristol survey found that 44.3% of
1. P. Ford: Work and Wealth in a Modern Port (1934), p. 200.
2. Ibid., p. 120.
3. D. Caradog Jones: The Social Survey of Merseyside, Vol. 1
(1934), pp. 172-3.
4. J. Boyd Orr: Food, Health and Income (2nd ed., 1937), p. 27.
5. Pilgrim Trust: Men Without Work (1938), p. 111.
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all persons in poverty were children, concluding that
"if any form of remedy could be devised to raise to a
higher level those families which contain three or more
children and fall below the (poverty) line 76% of
child poverty would be abolished". Finally, in his 1936
York survey Rowntree found that nearly half the persons in
primary poverty were children under fourteen years of age,
and of these, 61% were in families where there were more
2
than three children.
These poverty surveys were just the tip of the ice¬
berg as far as the overall picture was concerned, for in
addition to them there was carried out in the inter-war
years a vast number of investigations by doctors, medical
officers, social scientists and nutritionists into the
health and dietary of infants, school children and mothers.
Essentially the problem was not that severe poverty was
evenly distributed throughout the population without regard
to age, sex or location, but that it was mainly confined to
mothers and children in large families in the depressed
areas. For example, the L.S.E. East London survey of 1928
showed that while 11.0% of families were living in poverty,
13.9% had incomes of 10s.0d. to 20s.Od. above the poverty
line, and 64.2% had incomes of 20s.Od. and more above the
1. H. Tout: The Standard of Living in Bristol (1938),
pp. 39-40.
2. B. Seebohm Rowntree: Poverty and Progress (1941),
pp. 117, 115.




poverty line. Similarly, the Bristol survey found that
the average working class family enjoyed a standard of
living that was more than 100% above its minimum needs.
In addition, the inter-war years undoubtedly saw great
overall advances in the diet and standard of living of the
population in general: consumption of the protective
foods rose by nearly 50% per head of population between
1919 and 1939, and Boyd Orr estimated that whereas in 1930
only one half of British families were adequately fed, by
4
1939 this had risen to two-thirds.
Thus it was towards the plight of mothers and
children in the depressed areas that many nutritionists,
social scientists, etc., turned their attention. This
'family poverty lobby', as it can conveniently be called,
mostly consisted of individuals acting in an unco-ordinated
way, but also was spearheaded by several organisations.
Many of the poverty surveys referred to already were
sponsored by universities. Often, organisations funded
research: for example, Margaret Balfour and Joan Drury's
investigation of motherhood and nutrition in Tyneside and
Durham was financed by the Council of Action for Peace and
1. New Survey, etc., Vol. 3, p. 91.
2. Tout, op. cit., p. 24.
3. Discussed by Burnett, op. cit., chapter 12.
4. J. Boyd Orr: "Nutrition and the Family", in
Sir James Marchant (ed.): Rebuilding Family Life in the
Post-War World (1945), p. 43.
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A
Reconstruction, and Boyd Orr carried out his 1936 investi¬
gation under the auspices of the Rowett Research Institute
2
in Aberdeen and the Agricultural Marketing Boards. Some
belonged to political organisations: Dr. Somerville Hastings,
who carried out his own enquiry into the nutrition of London
schoolchildren, was President of the Socialist Medical
Association and was a Labour M.P. from 1923-4- and 1929-31.^
In addition, minimum nutritional levels were drawn up by
bodies like the League of Nations, International Labour
Office and Medical Research Council. But what characterised
the family poverty lobby most of all was that it was composed
of vastly different types of people. At the one end of the
scale were private individuals like the young Richard Titmuss,
working in an insurance office by day and in the evenings
collecting the statistical information on poverty, nutrition
and mortality that was eventually published in Poverty and
Population (1938). At the other were eminent authorities
like V.H. Mottram, Professor of Physiology at the University
of London, who used his knowledge to arrive at a minimum wage
£
figure of 4ls.8d. for a family of five in 1927. In between
1. M. Balfour and J. Drury: Motherhood in the Special Areas
of Durham and Tyneside (1935), p.
2. Lord Boyd Orr: As I Recall (1966), pp. 114-5.
3. Hastings examined 53 children of unemployed fathers and
judged 33 to be under-nourished and 31 to be under-weight.
See letter to The Lancet, 25/3/33.
4. Also from 1945-59.
5. Margaret Gowing: "Richard Morris Titmuss", Proceedings
of the British Academy, 61, 1975, pp. 403-4.
6. Y.H. Mottram: "The Physiological Basis of the Minimum Wage",
The Lancet, 22/10/27.
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were a vast number of ordinary medical officers of health,
scientists, doctors, etc., who witnessed every day in the
course of their work the serious effect the economic depression
was having on mothers and children, and voiced their concern
in journals like The Lancet, The Medical Officer, the
Journal of Hygiene, Public Health and the British Medical
Journal. Indeed, it is hardly possible to open one of these
journals in the 1930s without seeing somewhere a discussion
of child malnutrition.
Two pressure groups were particularly important. In
March 193^- a group of doctors met in London and formed the
Committee Against Malnutrition to publicise the problem and
bring it to the Government's attention. The Committee agreed:
"that there exists in this country widespread undernourishment
among the families of the unemployed and low paid workers;
that this must inevitably lead to a steady deterioration in
the physical standards and the health of the population, and
of this deterioration there are already signs; that the last
thing upon which a community must economise is the nutrition
of its working class". Throughout the 1930s the Committee
campaigned for higher unemployment allowances, better school
medical inspection, more free milk and meals for schoolchildren,
family allowances and a national food policy, and included
in its membership people like F. le Gros Clark, J.B.S Haldane,
1. Bulletin of the Committee Against Malnutrition,
March 193^, p. T7
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Sir F. Gowland Hopkins, Boyd Orr, McGonigle, Mottram,
1
Julian Huxley, J.R.Marrack and Professor S.J. Cowell.
The other important pressure group, the Children's Minimum
2
Council, will "be examined in detail later.
What particularly concerned the family poverty lobby
was the situation in the chronically depressed parts of
Britain where whole communities had been dependent upon a
single industry; with the decline of that industry had
come mass unemployment, and large numbers of families
having to live on unemployment pay for extended periods.
When compared with the nutritionally-assessed poverty lines,
these unemployment benefit and assistance levels were shown to
be seriously inadequate in relation to the needs of large
families. Caradog Jones, for example, illustrated the income
■5
shortfall thus:
Poverty Unemployment Liverpool public
Man, wife and; line benefit assistance scales
1 infant 27s.7d. 28s.Od. 22s.Od.
1 infant,
2 schoolchildren 37s.7d. 32s.Od. 29s.Od.
2 infants,
3 schoolchildren 46s.2d. 36s.Od. 35s.Od.
Clearly, if a family containing more than three children
was forced to live for several years on unemployment benefit
1. Ibid., 1934-9.
2. Other less important organisations were the Save the
Children Fund, the Ten Year Plan for Children and the
Next Five Years Group.
3- Caradog Jones, op. cit., p. 150. The figures relate to 1929-30.
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or public assistance its members would suffer malnutrition
and a deterioration of health. In addition, there were
many families in which the employed wage-earner brought
home an income little higher than these amounts, or in some
i
cases even lower. The family poverty case for family
allowances was thus based on the contention that widespread
malnutrition existed amongst working class mothers and
children such as could only be alleviated by an alteration
of the wage system in accordance with family needs. The
remainder of this chapter will examine in detail how this
evidence of malnutrition was presented to the Government
(and in particular, the Ministry of Health) and how the
Government reacted.
From the outset, the whole debate over child poverty
in Britain in the inter-war years was clouded by a failure
on all sides to define accurately what constituted malnu¬
trition. Despite the volumes of research, there was much
confusion over assessment methods and minimum standards.
At one extreme, Boyd Orr chose an optimum level that produced
"a state of well-being such that no improvement can be effected
by a change in the diet", and found half the population
(including three quarters of the children) below this level.
1. For example, the Pilgrim Trust (op. cit., p. 202)
quotes such weekly wages as: restaurant porter - 20s.Od.;
night watchman - 20s.Od.; window cleaner - 24s.Od.
2. J. Boyd Orr: Food, Health and Income (2nd ed., 1937),
p. 11 .
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At the other extreme, a leading medical journal could
publish a paper purporting to show that a man could live
on 960 calories per day. Between the two were many different
opinions. Rowntree, in the second edition of The Human Needs
of Labour (1937) put his minimum nutritional requirements at
the precise level of 3,400 calories per day for a man, 2,800
2
for a woman and 2,210 for a child under fourteen years.
This was also the figure reached by the British Medical
■3
Association, Medical Research Council and League of Nations.
Yet the Week-End Review's 1933 "Hungry England" committee
(chaired by Professor A.L. Bowley, and including V.H. Mottram)
came out with a figure 400 calories lower.^ The Army's peace¬
time ration for soldiers was 2,812 calories plus 2-j^d. for
freely-chosen food (bringing the total to just over 3,000
calories); on the other hand, convicts fared better with
5
an allowance of 4,200 calories when on normal heavy labour.
The diet of a group of monks was found to produce 2,914
calories per day, yet a typical West End club's menu
contained 5,148 calories in its three meals - twice as much
7
as would have been needed by its sedentary members.
1. A.F. Dufton: "Food For Thought", The Lancet, 26/12/36.
2. Rowntree, op. cit., p. 70.
3. See, for example, B.M.A.: Report of Committee on
Nutrition (1933), p. 8.
4. Week-End Review, 1/4/33.
5. Rowntree, op. cit., p. 71.
6. Ministry of Health unpublished report: Minimum Food
Requirements: An Investigation into the Diet of an
Enclosed Monastery by H.E. Magee (1934), P.R.O. MH 56/41.
7. Rowntree, op. cit., pp. 75-6.
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Many doctors refused to commit themselves to such
rigid definitions, however. Like health, they pointed out,
nutrition varied greatly from person to person, and from
day to day. If there was 'primary' malnutrition due to
faulty-diet then there was also 'secondary' malnutrition
which arose from other causes (such as diseases of the
respiratory, circulatory or endocrine systems). Nutrition
was essentially a process of change, and could not be
assessed in strict dietary terms; malnutrition was a term
which was "suffering from the vagueness of expression which
is the inevitable result of too rapid attraction of public
2
interest". The counting of calories had become a "fetish"
with some nutritionists, maintained Professor E.P. Cathcart,
and such an approach took no account of the many other
physical and psychological factors that might influence
4
how food was absorbed by the body. Not surprisingly, this
was the official view adopted by the Ministry of Health,
whose officials viewed with alarm the growing challenge
from the family poverty lobby. Sir George Newman argued
that nutrition was not solely the product of dietary defi¬
ciency, and that it was not possible to measure it precisely
anyway: "no simple test has been found", he wrote, "... the
1. See, for example, Dr. Robert Hutchison in
British Medical Journal, 23/3/35-, and Dr. H.E. Magee
in ibid., 2/2/35.
2. Magee in Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine,
28, 1935, p. 713.
3. Statement by Cathcart in report of a meeting on 6/2/34-,
P.R.O. MH 56/56.
4. Cathcart: "Nutrition and Public Health", Public Health,
48, May 1935, p. 286.
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nutrition of an individual is a process, a variable clinical
syndrome, not a static, fixed or measurable feature".
Newman's successor as Chief Medical Officer at the Board
of Education, Sir Arthur MacNalty, also took this line:
nutrition, he maintained, depended as much on secondary
'exogenous' factors ("upon adequate sleep, proper and
uncrowded housing, sunlight, fresh air, exercise and even
happiness") as on the primary 'endogenous' ones which could
2
be clinically tested. In addition, the Ministry's medical
advisers always stressed that ignorance of food values was
as crucial a factor as anything else, since many people
"did not know how to buy the right type of food and, what
was equally important, did not know how to prepare and cook
it"; educating the public in food values was thus seen as
"the most effective weapon to attack the problem of malnu¬
trition" . ^
Research was undertaken into methods of assessment
in the hope of arriving at some kind of cast-iron 'nutri¬
tional index', but without success. Many approaches were
5
suggested: blood haemoglobin could be measured; Quetelet's
formula used height divided by weight, expressed as a
1. Newman: The Building of a Nation's Health (1939), p. 336.
See also The Health of the School Child, i"933, p. 14.
2. The Health of the School Child, 1935, pp. 13-14-, 27.
3. H.E. Magee in Public Health, 48, May 1935, p. 291.
4. Memorandum by H.E. Magee, 29/8/33, P.R.O. MH 56/53-
5. Magee to J.C. Carnwath, 18/10/33, ibid.
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percentage, and when applied to existing school medical
inspection results showed a definite correlation; Emerson's
'zones of weight' used optimum weights for different heights
2
as a standard of normality; the American 'A.C.H.' method
7
measured arm, chest and hip width; and numerous physical
efficiency tests were tried, such as the Romberg test (where
children had to stand steadily for fifteen minutes with their
. 4
eyes closed). Yet these clinical tests were all open to
criticism if one took the view that nutrition was dynamic,
not static, and varied from person to person. Height-weight
indices, for example, would produce an incorrect result in
the case of the protein-starved, carbohydrate-surfeited child
5
whose bulky, flabby body would pass as normal, and the
rachitic child whose low stature was pathological but would
g
be judged malnourished.
Once again, the Ministry of Health spokesmen were
adamant that no reliable clinical tests for child nutrition
7
had been discovered. But the family poverty lobby came back
immediately with the point that if this was so, how could the
1. Victor Freeman: "Weights, Heights and Physical Defects
in School Children", The Medical Officer, 18/8/34.
2. C.E. McNally: Public Ill-Health (1933), pp. 80-1, 83-5.
3• The Medical Officer, 24/2/34.
4. Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine, 28, 1935,
p. 717.
5. Letter in The Medical Officer, 20/1/34.
6. W.R. Dunstan: "Malnutrition and Weightage", ibid.
The drawbacks of such tests are discussed in
F. le Gros Clark (ed.): National Fitness (1938),
Chapter 8 (by W.E. le Gros Clark). "
7. See, for example, The Health of the School Child, 1937,
p. 20-1.
131
Ministry of Health maintain that child malnutrition hardly
existed? In particular, how could the Ministry of Health
and Board of Education be so confident in the methods used
in the medical inspection of schoolchildren? Might it not
be the case that school medical officers were seriously
underestimating the extent of child malnutrition? Through¬
out the 1930s there was bitter controversy on this point.
The 1908 Schedule of Medical Inspection had outlined
a fourfold division of health categories - 'good', 'normal',
'subnormal' and 'bad' - and school medical officers placed
children into these categories according to vague general
criteria which were supposed to include "the facts as to
height and weight, condition of skin and mucous membrane,
nervous balance, freedom from deficiency defect, general
2
well-being". Since no accurate clinical test existed,
the child was assessed not on the basis of "a hypothetical
or academic standard of nutrition but whether the child's
nutrition was such as debarred it from receiving full
advantage from its education". Gradually school medical
officers changed the fourfold classification into the
registration only of (a) children requiring treatment,
and (b) children requiring to be kept under observation,
4but in 1935 the original system was re-established.
1. Ibid, 1935, p. 11.
2. Newman, op. cit. , p. 334.
3. Ibid.
4. The Health of the School Child, 1935, pp. 11-12.
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According to the Ministry of Health and Board of
Education, the figures obtained from school medical
inspection proved conclusively that child malnutrition
had all but disappeared by the 1930s. Thus in reviewing
the progress of the nation's health Newman could assert
with great satisfaction that "in the early years of
medical inspection (1908-12) bad and severe under-nutrition
(malnutrition) affected quite commonly 10-15 per cent of
the children in the elementary schools. The school reports
show that it now rarely exceeds 1 per cent. In London in
1912 the proportion of children with subnormal nutrition
was 12.8 per cent. By 1934 it had been reduced to 4.6
per cent, and the cases of 'malnutrition' formed less than
1 per cent". Official pronouncements by both Departments
constantly painted a rosy picture of a child population
unharmed by the effects of the economic depression: for
example, in 1935, 1936 and 1937 the proportion of school¬
children classified as suffering from 'bad' nutrition
(malnutrition) was said to be a mere 0.6% to 0.7%.
But were these official figures reliable? There
were many critics of the Ministry of Health who suggested
that the criteria by which children were assessed were so
vague and meaningless that by basing health statistics on
1. Newman, op. cit., p. 335.
2. The Health of the School Child, 1937, p. 12.
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them the Ministry was practising a form of deception,
wilful or otherwise. For a start, the period of inspection
was very short. Each child had three six-minute examinations
during its school life - a total of only eighteen minutes -
and shortage of staff meant that (in 1935) the ratio of
medical officers to children was 1 : 7,140. Medical
officers thus had neither the time nor the criteria to
assess nutrition properly. As early as 1911 the B.M.A.
had complained about this: in a deputation to the Board
of Education Dr. Christopher Addison had voiced their con¬
cern over the "exceedingly inadequate" inspection methods
of the L.C.C., and pointed out that "probably at least one-
2
half of the defects which exist are certainly over-looked".
Yet this system remained in force throughout the 1930s.
Far more serious was the criticism that the inspection
methods used were so subjective as to be almost worthless.
A medical officer had to rely on his own judgement and
experience, which could be affected by many factors. Most
commonly, doctors tended to fix their standard of normality
at the average for their area: 'normal' in an economically
depressed area like South Wales would be a lower standard then
in prosperous Buckinghamshire. McNally cited the instance of
a medical officer who moved from a country district of
Bedfordshire to South Wales and by applying his accustomed
standards produced child malnutrition figures so alarming
1. The Health of the School Child. 1935, p. 73.
2. Minutes of B.M.A. deputation, 27/6/11, P.R.O. ED 24/282.
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1
that a special enquiry had to be made, and whenever tests
were carried out in which medical officers from different
areas independently assessed a single group of children,
2
startingly different verdicts were returned. The most
striking illustration of this came from R. Huws Jones's
experiment into the reliability of four medical officers'
subjective impressions: not only was there a great variation
in their assessments (in only 36% of all children examined
did all four doctors agree, and in 28% each doctor gave an
opinion which did not tally with any of the other three),
but also each was highly inconsistent in his own judgement,
for when the experiment was repeated one week later one
doctor changed his assessment in 20% of the cases examined,
and the other three in from 27% to 31% of cases. In addition,
all the doctors found more children 'excellent' on the second
occasion, showing that their standards had been set by the
first experiment. Somerville Hastings pointed out that if
'normal' nutrition was confused with the regional 'average'
by medical officers year after year, with even only 5% of
the children being placed below the average each year, then
"a very considerable divergence from the normal may in fact
4
exist after a period of years". Critics maintained that
1. McNally, op. cit., p. 29.
2. F. le Gros Clark, op. cit., pp. 132-4. Le Gros Clark
conducted a survey of school medical officers' definitions
of 'normal' and found that the majority took this to mean
'average'. Ibid., pp. 127-130.
3. R. Huws Jones: "Physical Indices and Clinical Assessments
of the Nutrition of Schoolchildren", Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society, 100, 1938, pp. 1-52.
4. Letter in The Lancet, 25/3/33. This could, of course, also
work the other way. The Health of the School Child, 1935,
(p. 130) maintained that standards of 'normality' had risen
since 1926 as a result of rising average standards.
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due to this woeful inaccuracy, the school medical service
was failing in its duty as an agency of preventive medicine.
As one of its medical officers lamented, "we are still dealing
with, and endeavouring to cure, conditions in children whose
causes we, as a service, can do little or nothing to cure".
The reaction of the Ministry of Health and Board of
Education to this criticism was one of resentment and defensive-
ness. Both Departments steadfastly clung to the narrowly
'educational' view that their responsibility for child wel¬
fare extended no further than making the child fit enough to
take advantage of the education provided for him; this was
what one six-minute medical inspection every three years was
designed to ensure. But behind this outward rationale lay
another more fundamental reason, and this was that the Ministry
of Health was clearly terrified of the political and economic
repercussions that would follow if they ever announced publicly
a minimum subsistence level in cash terms, stating that all
those receiving an income below that level were likely to be
malnourished. For this would lay the Government wide open to
the demand that unemployment benefit and assistance rates be
brought up to that level, and, more importantly, that the
Government introduce some form of statutory minimum wage.
To a Conservative-dominated National Government, dedicated
to free enterprise and fiscal retrenchment, this was something
1. Henry Herd: "The School Medical Service", Public Health,
48, January 1935, p. 125.
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to be avoided at all costs, since it would involve an
unprecedented State intervention into a vast number of
low-wage industries; in addition, most economists (and in
particular, the Treasury) in the 1930s still saw the key to
Britain's economic recovery in keeping export prices as low
as possible, which meant keeping wage costs at a minimum.
Officials and advisers at the Ministry were thus acutely
sensitive about the whole malnutrition controversy, and
always tried to avoid direct confrontation, choosing instead
to meet criticism with a plethora of evasive arguments
designed to divert attention away from this politically-
explosive topic.
At the centre of the controversy was Sir George Newman,
the enormously influential Chief Medical Officer at the Board
of Education and Ministry of Health. Newman was born in 1870
of a Quaker family, and after his medical training worked
as Medical Officer for Bedfordshire (1897-9) and Finsbury
(1900-7). In 1907 he became the first Chief Medical Officer
at the Board of Education, and in 1918 took over the same
post in the Local Government Board (which in 1919 became
part of the Ministry of Health), in succession to
1
Sir Arthur Newsholme. Newman was a remarkably successful
civil servant, with an enormous array of acquaintances in
2
public life. Undoubtedly, his contribution to public health
1. Newman Diaries, 1907-12.
2. The bound collection of his papers in the Wellcome
Institute Library, while not very instructive on other
points, does at least show how extensive were his contacts.
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in the years until his retirement in 1935 was enormous.
"No living man has done more to improve those /health/
conditions than you have", Lloyd George told him, and on
his retirement The Medical Officer paid tribute by asserting
that he had "raised the public health of this country to a
level which few other countries have attained and which,
2
when he went to the Ministry, seemed hardly attainable".
Bentley Gilbert's account of the establishment of the
Ministry of Health shows that Newman began his career with
great plans for developing a comprehensive system of pre¬
ventive medicine, on which he had been much influenced by
the Webbs, and he brought to the fairly mundane subject of
public health an imaginative approach, political pragmatism
and flair for public relations that set him well above the
usual senior civil servant: for example, he turned official
reports into interesting and readable documents by the use of
4
a lively presentation and literary style.
However, by the early 1930s Newman was nearing the end
of his career and was clearly out of touch with new develop¬
ments in nutrition. This was perhaps understandable, since
1. Newman Diaries, 8/2/33.
2. Ibid., 30/11/35.
3. Gilbert: British Social Policy, 1914-1939 (1970),
Chapter 3, esp. pp. 105, 210.
4. See, for instance, his interesting 'civil service'
account of how and why social policies come about in
The Health of the School Child. 1932, p. 6.
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his specialism had been bacteriology, but when added to
the general apprehension that prevailed within the Ministry
of Health over the economic implications of minimum subsist¬
ence it meant that Newman displayed a particularly stubborn
and resentful attitude towards the criticisms of the family
poverty lobby.
He was adamant that although the British people had had
to live through a long period of economic depression and mass
unemployment, "so strong had been their physical defences
that the stability of the national health had not yet been
materially affected. There was as yet no evidence of wide¬
spread physical impairment, of increasing sickness, or of
-i
rising mortality". Thus when criticised by doctors such
as George McGonigle, Medical Officer of Health for Stockton-
on-Tees, who found, for example, that death rates among the
unemployed were higher than among the employed (thereby
concluding that the unemployment was affecting national
health), Newman reacted angrily. All of McGonigle's
criticisms were just "stunts", he maintained, and came
from someone who was "socialistically inclined".
Newman's attitudes were shared by senior civil
servants in the Ministry of Health, and by those in the
1. Report of Presidential Address by Newman to the
Conference of the National Association of Maternity and
Child Welfare, Newman Diaries, 5/7/33.
2. McGonigle and Kirby, op. cit., p. 267.
3. Memorandum by Newman, 17/1/34, P.R.O. MH 56/56.
139
higher echelons of the B.M.A. Boyd Orr's autobiography
relates how, when he was engaged in the food consumption
survey that resulted in Food, Health and Income, he encoun¬
tered strong opposition from those in authority. In 1933
he and McGonigle were invited to give a radio broadcast on
the extent of malnutrition and the need for a food policy
based on the health needs of the population but "we were
told that this would not be in keeping with the ethical
standards of the medical profession, and that we would be
brought before the British Medical Council and probably have
our names removed from the Medical Register"; McGonigle had
to give way, but since Boyd Orr had no intention of ever
1
practising medicine again he ignored the threat. When
the Government discovered what was contained in Food, Health
and Income they tried to prevent its publication (since the
research for it had been undertaken with the co-operation of
the Ministry of Agriculture), but by a policy of carefully-
judged leaks to the press Boyd Orr was able to ensure that
2
it reached the eyes of the public.
1. Lord Boyd Orr: As I Recall (1966), pp. 115-6.
The Newman Diaries (9/4/33) contain the cryptic note
"deputation from the B.M.A. on MacGonigle (sic) and
disqualification", but Boyd Orr implies that the threat
came from senior civil servants.
2. Ibid., pp. 116-7. It was published by Macmilian and Co.,
whose Chairman was Harold Macmillan - M.P. for
Stockton-on-Tees, McGonigle's province.
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This great fear of what might follow if they
acknowledged the existence of widespread malnutrition
meant that officials within the Ministry of Health went
to great lengths to disprove the allegations of their
critics.
The first line of defence was, of course, to quote
the official school medical inspection figures - but since
the Ministry strongly denied that any accurate test of
malnutrition existed, critics were easily able to point out
that these figures were therefore useless. A second line
of defence was to maintain that in the absence of nutritional
tests death rates were the only reliable index, and these
showed great improvement overall. For example, in the Commons
on 20th June 1934 Sir Hilton Young, Minister of Health,
pointed out that "the general death-rate of the nation shows
an encouraging downward tendency, and that downward tendency
is the best proof positive we could have of the general
maintenance of national health and physique", and went on
to emphasise the steady fall in infant mortality. But,
maintained critics, if standardised death rates were
examined then there were grounds for serious disquiet:
the differences in death rates between the depressed areas
and the rest of the country were greatest in the case of
2
children; since 1900 the decline in mortality rates from
1. Hansard, Vol. 291, 20/6/34, Cols. 391-2.
2. New Statesman, 23/11/35.
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tuberculosis (a disease associated with malnutrition) among
adolescents and young adults had been much slower than in
1
other age groups; infant mortality was related to over-
2
crowding; and there was a positive relationship between
low incomes and high death rates. Critics pointed out
that army recruiting figures showed the effect the economic
depression was having: the proportion of men rejected in the
Home Counties was 32% but in East Lancashire it was 58%^
Thirdly, the Ministry of Health maintained that even if
malnutrition did exist, it was not related to income. In
1933 the London County Council Education Committee examined
1,281 schoolchildren, aged about ten, in a poor area, and
found only 6.5% "poorly nourished": the proportion of poorly
nourished among those whose parents were on unemployment
benefit was 5.3%, among those on public assistance 7.5%, and
among those in full time employment 7.6%. The Ministry's
officials and advisers found this most gratifying, and
regretted that the L.C.C. Report was not published: it
proved, said Dr. J.C. Carnwath, that "there is a basic
percentage (? 5%) of malnutrition, 'the ineducible remnant
of the malnourished', which is found equally in all strata
1. Bulletin of the Committee Against Malnutrition,
May 1934, p. 5.
2. R.M. Titmuss: Poverty and Population (1938), p. 224.
3. McGonigle and Kirby, op3 cit., p. 273.
4. Titmuss, op. cit., pp. 66, 69, 132.
5. L.C.C. Education Committee Report: Nutrition of
School Children, 13/11/33, P.R.O. MH 56/53.
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of society and is due apparently to individual idiosyncrasies
-i
affecting assimilation and growth". The Permanent Secretary
of the Ministry of Health, Sir Arthur Robinson, "found this
interesting - malnutrition is ignorance quite as much as
insufficient resources and it is the ignorance on which I
2
want to organise the attack". The Ministry and Board of
i
Education accordingly decided to conduct a similar enquiry
using the same doctor, R.H. Simpson of the L.C.C. school
medical service, and send him to different parts of the
country. Clearly, the Ministry hoped for a conclusive
report showing that no link existed between malnutrition
and income status. On the 28th November 1933 Dr. H.E. Magee
went to Leeds and visited Simpson at work, examining 85
children in one day: only 12% of these were found to be
under-nourished, but many of them were in families enjoying
an income above the level of poor relief, thus proving, said
Magee, "that malnutrition is as much a question of ignorance
3
as of £.s.d.". Magee wanted Simpson's final report to show
4
unequivocally that unemployment did not cause malnutrition,
and must have been very disappointed when the report eventually
appeared, for in it Simpson merely discussed at length the
impossibility of measuring child malnutrition exactly, and
1. Carnwath to Sir Arthur Robinson, 6/12/33, ibid.
2. Robinson to Sir Hilton Young, 18/12/33, ibid.
3. H.E. Magee to J.C. Carnwath, 28/11/33, ibid.
4. Magee to Carnwath, 16/1/34, ibid.
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1
the unreliability of existing medical inspection figures.
The report was not published, and throughout the 1930s the
Ministry of Health steadfastly maintained that education
in food values, methods of cooking, avoidance of waste, etc.,
was the best way of ensuring that malnutrition was avoided.
Critics, however, argued that such an approach was
both unpleasantly moralistic, and deliberately avoided the
real issues. It "cast an undeserved slur upon the capacity
of the working-class housewife", said McGonigle, and was
designed to obscure the truth that the unemployed man or
low-wage earner simply did not have enough money, after
payment of rent, fuel, light, clothing, etc., with which
2
to purchase sufficient food. Such advice was often so
unrealistic as to be absurd. For example, in 1937 the
Ministry of Health Advisory Committee on Nutrition recom¬
mended that every nursing or pregnant mother should have
two pints of milk per day, and children a pint and a half;
for a family of five this would have cost about I4s.0d. per
week - a figure way outside what most working class families
could have afforded: if this advice was obeyed, Titmuss
calculated, about 22,000,000 people would not have sufficient
money left with which to purchase other essential food such
1. Board of Education Nutrition Inquiry, 1933-34:
Report (Confidential)" ibid.
2. G.C.M. McGonigle: Nutrition; the Position in England To-Day
(1936), p. 10.
3. J. Boyd Orr: Not Enough Food for Fitness (1937), p. 5.
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as fresh vegetables, fruit, eggs, cheese, butter, fish
and meat. In addition, the Government were at the same
time indulging in a programme of widespread food destruction
as a method of raising retail prices and benefiting the food
2
producing industries. Thus in the 1930s "one Government
department was educating and advising the public to make a
wise and wide choice of foods, while another was restricting
the production and entry of foods in the country".
Perhaps the best single example of how the Ministry
of Health tended to fend off criticism was the question of
whether malnutrition had any influence on infant or maternal
mortality. This was an important aspect of the family poverty
case for family allowances, because raising the economic
status of mothers and children was seen as a way of lowering
these death rates.
Maternity and child welfare services had existed before
the First World War in Britain mainly on a voluntary basis,
but as a result of the 1915 Notification of Births (Extension)
Act and the 1918 Maternity and Child Welfare Act, Treasury
grants became available to local authorities and voluntary
4
societies to enable them to improve services. Infant
1. Titmuss, op. cit., p. 247.
2. J. Boyd Orr: As I Recall (1966), p. 117-8,
S. Leff: The Health of the People (1950), pp. 132-3.
3. Leff, op. cit., p. 133. In the 1930s Leff was a member
of the Committee Against Malnutrition.
4. P.E.P., op. cit., p. 90.
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mortality had shown a continuous decline, from 142 deaths
per 1,000 live births in 1881-90 to 56 per 1,000 in 1936-8
(figures for England and Wales), a success story that was
hailed "by Newman as "one of the greatest single achievements
2
in Preventive Medicine which have marked modern times". The
1930s saw great improvements in maternity services: in 1932,
33% of all expectant mothers were receiving ante-natal super¬
vision under local authorities, and by 1937 this had risen to
■x
54%; in 1930 there were 2,400 maternity beds in 152 insti¬
tutions in England and Wales (not including the voluntary
maternity hospitals), and by 1937, 6,700 beds in 558 insti-
4
tutions; the number of infant welfare centres rose from
650 in 1918 to 3,580 in 1938, and the number of ante-natal
clinics from 120 in 1918 to 1,795 in 1938.^
But if infant mortality was "a measure of man's ability
and willingness to control his environment", as Titmuss put
it, was enough of an effort being made? Critics thought
not. McNally denied that the Ministry of Health through
the local authorities deserved much credit: the main reasons
for the fall in infant mortality rates were related to techno¬
logical improvements, such as the reduction of horse traffic
since the turn of the century (which had reduced the number
1. R.M. Titmuss: Birth, Poverty and Wealth (1943), p. 88.
2. Newman, op. cit., p. 312.
3. Ibid., p. 310
4. Ibid.
5. Titmuss, op. cit., p. 33. The figures also relate to
England and Wales.
6. Ibid., p. 11.
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of germ-transmitting flies in cities and thereby lowered
the incidence of epidemic diarrhoea amongst infants).
Others pointed to the high number of defects found in
children that survived to the age of five: of 741 pre¬
school children attending child welfare centres in
Stockton-on-Tees, 49.8% suffered from unsatisfactory diet,
43.0% from bone conditions, 27.0% from dental decay, 31.2%
from anaemia, 36.7% from bronchitis and 39.0% from diarrhoea
and a Board of Education found that over 50% of children
3
never attended these infant welfare centres.
In addition, critics pointed to the failure of the
maternal mortality rate to fall as indicating that much
more could be done. In the decade 1881-90 the annual rate
had been 4.7 maternal deaths per 1,000 live births in
England and Wales; it fell to 4.03 in 1911-15 and to 3.90
in 1921-5; but thereafter rose, until it reached 4.60 in
4
1934, and then it dropped to 3.08 in 1939.
There was considerable doubt in medical circles over
the exact reasons for this. For a start, maternal mortality
was not related to social class. A Ministry of Health
1. McNally, op. cit., p. 113.
2. G.C.M. McGonigle and P.L. McKinlay: "An Investigation
into the Effects of Certain Factors Upon Child Health and
Child Weight", Journal of Hygiene, 32, October 1932, p. 472.
3. The Health of the School Child, 1931. p. 42.
4. Newman, op. cit., pp. 282, 307, 311.
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investigation in 1935 found the following distribution:
Class, by husband's occupation Percentage of






Puerperal sepsis, for example, occurred more frequently among
2
middle class women than working class. In 1928 a Depart¬
mental Committee on Maternal Mortality was set up by
Neville Chamberlain, Minister of Health, to look into the
problem, and in their Final Report (1932) the Committee
stated that there were four major causes of maternal deaths:
lack or failure of ante-natal care (15.3% of cases), errors
of judgement by doctors or midwives (19.1%), lack of delivery
facilities (3-7%) and negligence by the patient (e.g. failure
to follow medical advice properly) (7.7%). But this still
left 54.1% of cases in which there was no obvious preventable
factor, and there was great puzzlement over this high
residue of unaccountable deaths. Kingsley Wood, Minister
of Health from June 1935, expressed bewilderment that the
maternal mortality rate should have shown no improvement
in 1931-4 while in the same period the number of ante-natal
clinics increased by 20% and the number of women attending
1. Ministry of Health unpublished report:
Maternal Mortality Investigation (1935),
P.R.O. MH 55/264.
2. Sir Comyns Berkeley: "Factors in Maternal Mortality",
The Medical Officer, 21/1/35.
3. Ministry of Health: Final Report of Departmental
Committee on Maternal Mortality and Morbidity (T^32),
p. 23.
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them by 23%» the number of maternity beds increased by
10% and the number of women admitted to them by 30%.
Newman attributed this paradox to the increase in recorded
deaths owing to more accurate certification after 1931, the
spread of abortion, greater use of operative intervention
in childbirth (which shortened the period of labour but
increased fatalities), the failure by mothers to use
available maternity services, and the neglect of many
local authorities in high-mortality areas to take any serious
2
preventive measures. And there were many other theories put
forward: eugenists, for example, claimed that by lowering
the death rate of infants, medical science had allowed girls
of 'defective stock' to survive; for genetic reasons these
were unfit for childbirth, and their increasing survival at
birth resulted in no improvement in maternal mortality
figures a generation later.
In the midst of this confusion many in the family
poverty lobby insisted that the nutrition of the mother
was an important factor. Lady Rhys Williams's 1935-7 experi¬
ment in South Wales (already referred to)showed that supple¬
menting the diets of Rhondda mothers lowered maternal mortality
dramatically: among the extra-diet mothers the maternal death
rate was only 1.63 per 1,000 live births (with only one death
1. Speech to a deputation from the Standing Joint Committee
of Industrial Women's Organisations, quoted in
The Medical Officer, 3/8/35.
2. Newman, op. cit., pp. 311-2.
3. G. Pitt-Rivers: "The Problem of Maternal Mortality",
Eugenics Review, 26, January 1935, pp. 273-9.
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from puerperal sepsis), but among a similar group not
receiving the supplementation it was 6.15 (with 46 deaths
from sepsis). Balfour and Drury quoted the growing
volume of evidence that adequate nutrition was very
important for the pregnant woman, and showed that in
Tyneside and Durham wives of men who were unemployed or
2
in receipt of low wages were receiving insufficient food.
Research showed that maternal mortality was influenced by
the shape of the mother's pelvis - which in turn was a
product of healthy nutritional development in girlhood.
Thus surely the best way to reduce this 54.1% of cases in
which there was 'no obvious preventable factor' was to
ensure that mothers had enough income with which to purchase
protective foods?
The Ministry of Health published two important Reports
on maternal mortality in 1932. One was an enquiry by three
women doctors, Dame Janet Campbell, Isabella Cameron and
Dilys Jones, into areas with high maternal mortality, and
it appeared to come out quite strongly in favour of the
view that malnutrition was an important factor in the areas
1. Titmuss, op. cit., pp. 153-4. 10,384 mothers received
the extra food and 18,854 did not.
2. Balfour and Drury, op. cit., pp. 4-17.
3. Kathleen Vaughan: "Maternal Mortality and Its Relation
to the Shape of the Pelvis", Proceedings of the Royal
Society of Medicine, 23, November 1929 to April 1930,
pp. 191-6. Dr. Vaughan sent this and another two research
papers on the same subject to the Ministry of Health in
1930 and 1934, but they aroused little interest amongst
officials. P.R.O. MH 55/687.
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surveyed (the West Riding of Yorkshire, Lancashire and
Wales). Poverty and unemployment were influential factors,
said the Report; nutrition played "a more important part
in maternal morbidity than is generally realised. Some
degree of malnutrition is fairly widespread among all women
in these towns". Yet the Report's analysis of the causes
of malnutrition was that it resulted more from incorrect
choice of food than insufficient purchasing power: mal¬
nutrition was "due mainly to ill-balanced dietaries and
ignorance of food values and cookery, as well as the lack
of more expensive but important foods, such as meat, eggs,
fruit and green vegetables. There is much anaemia, indi¬
gestion and constipation in the women attending ante-natal
2
clinics". In the section on the West Riding, the Report
maintained that although the mothers must have experienced
"a period of poverty and some degree at any rate of mal¬
nutrition" their general health was not markedly below
the average, and all that was said on the question of
income available for food was that "the dietary of the
people on the dole and earning low wages is necessarily
limited and monotonous. There is ignorance of food values
and money is seldom spent to the best advantage". Among
the many suggestions made (such as the educating of public
1. Ministry of Health: Reports on Public Health and
Medical Subjects, No.~lo8: High Maternal Mortality in
Certain Areas (1932), pp. 3, 8.
2. Ibid., p. 8.
3. Ibid., p. 52.
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opinion, the training of girls in hygiene, the maintenance
of a healthy environment, improved ante-natal services, etc.)
nowhere was there a suggestion that the economic status of
1
the mother should be raised.
Similarly the Final Report of the Departmental
Committee also played down the importance of malnutrition.
Although it attributed the low maternal mortality rate in
Holland to better pelvic development in Dutch women, which
2
in turn was a product of better nutrition, and admitted
that in high-mortality areas of Britain poverty and unemploy-
ment were severe, nevertheless it maintained that "malnu¬
trition and the indirect effects of poverty do not in them¬
selves explain the high maternal death rate which has in
fact persisted in these areas for many years during periods
of prosperity as well as adversity, for well-nourished as
4
well as for ill-nourished women", and in its recommendations
5
made no further mention of the question.
From 1934 onwards, as the controversy over malnu¬
trition intensified, the Ministry dug its heels in further,
and firmly resisted any claims by critics that maternal
mortality would improve if working class mothers had incomes
1. Ibid., pp. 21-3.
2. Final Report, op. cit., pp. 60-1.
3. Ibid., pp. 92-8.
4. Ibid., p. 98.
5. Ibid., pp. 134-140. The P.R.O. file for the Departmental
Committee (MH 55/266) contains little of interest.
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sufficient for their nutritional needs. In September 1934
the T.U.C. passed a motion expressing concern over the
effects of prolonged economic depression on the nutrition
of the population, and in November Walter Citrine (the T.U.C.
General Secretary) wrote to Sir Hilton Young pointing out
that unemployment benefit and assistance levels were too
low and that more free milk and meals should be provided
i
for mothers and children. In his reply, Young strongly
denied that maternal mortality would be improved if local
2
authorities supplied more milk and meals, but the Ministry
realised that more would be needed to meet such criticisms.
The Labour Party and T.U.C. were clearly beginning an inten¬
sive campaign against the Government on the issue of maternal
mortality and it was important that together the Ministry and
Conservative Central Office should prepare "counter-propaganda"
for this.^
Thus a second enquiry into areas with high mortality
rates was set up, with the express intention of proving no
connection between maternal deaths and malnutrition.
Sir Arthur Robinson warned that the topic had recently been
raised more and more in the House of Commons, and that "this
4
was largely "political" and needed watching". The Ministry
1. Citrine to Young, 30/11/34-, P.R.O. MH 55/217.
2. Young to Citrine, 27/12/34,- ibid.
3. A.N.. Rucker to Sir Arthur Robinson, 15/11/34,
P.R.O. MH 55/265.
4. Note by Robinson, 6/4/35, P.R.O. MH 55/264.
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secured the services of Sir Comyns Berkeley, a
distinguished consultant obstetrician, as an adviser,
and in April 1935 he wrote to one of the investigators,
Dr. Barbara Macewen, outlining the aims of the enquiry:
"in view of the political situation", it was important
that a quick preliminary report be produced showing (if
warranted by the evidence) that malnutrition and bad housing
had no effect on maternal mortality; "Sir Robinson (sic)
was very pleased with this idea and said that if it was
feasible the Minister of Health (and the Government) would
be most happy to make such an announcement and that it would
be most useful for their purpose. I don't say that we shall
find this to be the case, but if you and your colleagues
would not mind 'calling off' your visits for a time we
might be able to ascertain whether such an opinion was
justified, so far as we had got it, and I'take it that with
such an announcement the Minister would not worry much about
<1
the time taken thereafter".
By August the preliminary Report was ready, and
Robinson wrote to Sir Kingsley Wood suggesting that since
the purpose of it was political, it might be best to delay
publication "unless some strong agitation arises during the
recess or when the House reassembles. In that event it might
2
serve as a stop gap". The Report maintained that "the
1. Berkeley to Macewen, 5/4/35, ibid.
2. Robinson to Wood, 2/8/35, ibid.
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evidence obtained in the towns was to the effect that,
as a class, expectant and nursing mothers are not poorly
nourished", and although it agreed that "where means are
straitened it is the mother who denies herself for the sake
of the children", it suggested that where women did not
obtain sufficient food for their needs this was due "in
some cases to ignorance of the resources available, to
shiftlessness, or to pardonable pride".
The Report remained unpublished, but information
from it went towards two further Reports published in 1937,
one for certain areas in England and another for Wales. As
might be expected, both repeated the standard arguments.
Such experiments as had been done on nutrition and death
rates were too unrepresentative for general conclusions to
2
be drawn; facilities existed for the supply of extra
nourishment to expectant mothers, but many mothers did not
utilise these services properly; a precise assessment of
malnutrition in pregnant women was beyond the scope of the
Report, but the general opinion was that malnutrition due
4
to insufficient food was rare. This was•the line taken with
all deputations on the subject to the Ministry - as when, for
example, a maternal mortality committee of women under the
1. . Typescript of Report: Maternal Mortality Investigation,
ibid.
2. Ministry of Health: Report of an Investigation into Maternal
Mortality, 1937. Cmd. 5422, p. 121.
3. Ibid., p. 123.
4. Ibid., p. 124. Ministry of Health: Report on Maternal
Mortality in Wales, 1937, Cmd. 5423, pp. 93-4. ~
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leadership of Mrs. May Tennant met Kingsley Wood on the
23rd November 1937 to complain that the recently-published
Reports said nothing about malnutrition's influence on
childbearing. Throughout the 1930s the Ministry of Health
always rejected such arguments.
Thus the Government regarded the challenges of the
family poverty lobby primarily as a political threat, to be
dealt with as such; meeting criticisms with counter-
propaganda was more important than really finding out the
true extent of malnutrition in Britain.
This approach dominated the Ministry of Health and
Board of Education's investigations into not just maternal
mortality but the whole question of the condition of the
people. In the winter of 1927-8, for instance, the Board
sent a team of doctors to South Wales to find out what
effect the depression was having on children, led by the
same Dr. Eicholz who had given evidence to the 1904 Physical
Deterioration Committee. The Report concluded that while
the footwear and clothing of the children was generally bad,
the overall picture was that there was no evidence of physical
p
deterioration or malnutrition. Lord Eustace Percy,
President of the Board of Education, found the Report
1. Papers contained in P.R.O. MH 55/679.
2. Board of Education Report: Children: Physical Condition
in Welsh Mining Areas (1928), P.R.O. MH 55/691, published
as Report on investigation in the Coalfield of South Wales
and Monmouth, (1929), Cmd. 3272, pp. 6-7.
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"very encouraging", and suggested to Neville Chamberlain,
Minister of Health, that the only action needed was perhaps
a 50% grant to the local authorities concerned to help them
extend their school meals and child welfare provision, and an
appeal for private subscriptions (through the Save the
Children Fund) with which more clothing could be bought.
2
Newman likewise felt reassured, and concluded that there
■5
was "no need for exceptional action". Yet the investigation
upon which these confident conclusions were based was hardly
a vigorous one. Eicholz's team spent only seven days in
South Wales, merely taking evidence from school medical
officers (an approach that would have produced little more
than could have been gleaned anyway from the school medical
inspection returns), and underneath the surface confidence
there was unease: the general view of medical officers was
that the worst victims of the depression were pregnant
mothers, and one medical officer (from Aberdare) took the
view that "we are 'on the brink' and cannot safely count
upon the present maintenance of good health for any length
/1
of time in the future". Clearly, those connected with the
problem at local level felt puzzlement that no firm evidence
of malnutrition had been found, and wondered if that was
1. Percy to Chamberlain, 16/1/28, P.R.O. MH 55/280.
2. Memorandum by Newman, 17/1/28, ibid.
3. Memorandum by Newman, 21/2/28, P.R.O. MH 55/691.
4. Board of Education Report, ibid. The published version
(Cmd. 5272, p. 6.) does not include this, and merely mentions
that the generally optimistic view on the part of local
doctors was often "accompanied by reservations indicating
surprise at the absence of ill-effects and apprehension
that the inevitable sequel of the prolongation of such
conditions must be a deterioration of physique".
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more a sign of inadequate medical inspection methods than
anything else; for example, two officials of the Welsh Board
of Health were evidently uneasy that "whilst there must be
a considerable amount of undernourishment and suffering in
districts like the Rhondda, it has to be admitted that so
far as we have been able to gather, there has been no
striking evidence of malnutrition among the children under
three".^
In 193^-5 a similar enquiry was made into conditions
in Sunderland and Durham. A Sunderland doctor, G.F. Walker,
had written to The Times on the 11th December 193^- criticising
Newman's latest Annual Report On the State of the Public Health,
maintaining that he and other local doctors were convinced
that "a substantial and progressive" deterioration of public
health was taking place in Sunderland, and accusing the
Ministry of Health of complacency. Questions were asked in
the House of Commons, and on the 15th December the controversy
grew when a letter by Dr. W. Grant, Medical Officer of
Health for Easington, Durham, was published in The Times,
disagreeing with Walker and maintaining that his own personal
experience indicated no evidence of malnutrition. The Times
devoted part of its editorial to a support of Grant's
position: he and "the great majority of other qualified
observers" were of the opinion that unemployment had not
1. D.L. Williams and H.E. Jones to Newman, 8/2/28, ibid.
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damaged public health; Walker's opposite conclusions were
based on experiences that "differed from that of a body of
witnesses which includes practically the whole personnel of
-i
the health service of this country". The Ministry of Health
immediately put an enquiry into action, and in April 1955
2
published a White Paper disproving Walker's allegations.
As regards children, "clinical observations" found only
~z.
2.2% malnourished in Sunderland, and 1.3% in County Durham.
But as in the case of the 1927-8 South Wales enquiry,
the Ministry's method of investigation was simply to use the
vague and inaccurate school medical inspection methods;
as the White Paper admitted, "our investigation has been
extensive rather than intensive, and our conclusions, other
than those based on official statistics, should, therefore,
be regarded as approximate rather than as of scientific
accuracy: for example, where numbers and percentages
relating to conditions of nutrition are given, it is unlikely
that any two observers would arrive at precisely the same
4
figure". Critics pointed out that the enquiry team had
spent only 17 days inspecting over 4,600 people, which must
have meant an average time of less than five minutes per
1. Press-cuttings, etc., contained in MH 61/9.
2. Report of an Inquiry into the Effects of Existing
Economic Circumstances on the Health of the Community
in the County Borough of Sunderland and Certain Districts
of County Durham, (April 1955), Cmd. 4886. ~
5. Ibid., p. 41.
4. Ibid., p. 5.
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person - a fact which, commented the Committee Against
Malnutrition drily, "sheds some light on the mentality and
methods acceptable to the Ministry of Health and Board of
Education, but none on the health of the people of Durham".
In private, officials in the Ministry of Health and
Board of Education were less confident than they appeared in
public. For example, in 1934 an investigation had been
carried out into conditions in Tyneside, County Durham,
Lancashire and South Wales. Once again, the impetus came
not from within the Government but because outside pressures
made such an enquiry "politically necessary". By July 1934
the investigations were complete, and after reading them
Sir Hilton Young admitted in a meeting with the President of
the Board of Education and the Minister of Labour that "the
reports as a whole, and especially that of South Wales,
seemed to him to give cause for grave disquiet. They indi¬
cated that the effects which were to be expected as the
result of a long depression were beginning to be shown. In
particular, there was cause for anxiety about the state of
nutrition of children and young persons, especially boys,
between the ages of 14 and 18". The unpublished Report
found the condition of infant children disquieting, and
1. Bulletin of the Committee Against Malnutrition,
July 1935, pp. 39-40.
2. Sir Arthur Robinson to Newman, 21/2/34, P.R.O. MH 79/331.
3. Note of meeting, 12/7/34, P.R.O. MH 79/337.
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pointed out that in South Wales the death rates in the age
group fifteen to twenty-five had actually increased. In
private, some of the Ministry's medical advisers were very
uneasy about the validity of the school medical inspection
figures upon which the Government's confident statements
were based. "We have for a long time been very doubtful as
to the value of the statistics of malnutrition received
annually from S.M.O.'s", one of them wrote in 1933, "... the
returns for the whole country are published in the C.M.O.'s
Reports and attract considerable attention, but we know that
they are compiled from individual figures which will not bear
2
detailed examination".
Perhaps the best example of this public confidence
and private unease is to be found in the Ministry of Health's
Advisory Committee on Nutrition. The idea of a committee of
eminent nutritionists to furnish expert advice had been
suggested by Dr. Edward Mellanby in a British Medical Journal
article and a meeting with Newman in late 1927. Throughout
1930 the Ministry worked on the idea, and eventually on the
4
28th January 1931 the Committee held its first meeting. ' Its
object was to disseminate information to the public, investi¬
gate the problem of how to measure malnutrition, decide on
minimum nutritional levels, and advise the Government on
particular points.
1. Typescript Report, ibid.
2. Memorandum by C.W.M., 9/11/33, P.R.O. MH 56/53.
3. Memorandum by Newman, 6/12/27, P.R.O. MH 56/43.
4. Correspondence in ibid. The Committee Chairman was
Major Greenwood and the other members were Dr. G.F. Buchan,
Professor E.P. Cathcart, Sir Frederick Gowland Hopkins,
Miss Jessie Lindsay, Professor Edward Mellanby and
Professor V.H. Mottram.
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From the start, the Committee's work was made almost
impossible by the Ministry's absolute veto on any translation
of minimum nutritional levels into cash terms, and its insis¬
tence that malnutrition hardly existed. The Committee's
first publication was The Criticism and Improvement of Diets
(1932), in which it outlined suitable minimum diets on the
level of 3,000 calories per man per day. The pamphlet was
fairly innocuous, but already there was apprehension within
the Ministry; one of the Committee members, Professor
E.P. Cathcart, feared the economic implications, since
"the diet recommended.... is something much better than the
average working man can afford", and Cathcart was "afraid
that if it is embodied in an official document it may be
seized upon by transitional beneficiaries and others as a
•1
yard stick to measure what their allowances should be".
The Committee considered investigating minimum cash levels,
but in view of the "wide and possibly embarrassing reper¬
cussions" decided to confine themselves to general statements
2
of principle.
Several of the Committee, on the other hand, were
clearly unhappy about this - most of all, its Chairman.
After only two years of working within these restrictions,
Greenwood was complaining of the Committee that "I do not
think that its recommendations have done much more than tell
the Ministry what they already knew and were actually doing
1. J.C. Carnwath to Newman, 1/12/31, P.R.O. MH 56/51.
2. Carnwath to Newman, 4/4/33, P.R.O. 56/40.
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1
their best to implement"; a few months later he was
pointing out to his colleagues that the Ministry's veto
meant "that having laid, down certain principles they can
hardly refrain from expressing an opinion upon the appli¬
cation of those principles without laying themselves open
to another charge (one, perhaps, as damaging as that of
meddling outside their sphere) viz., of behaving like the
'scientists' of the comic papers, i.e. of only being
interested in a subject so long as it i_s of no practical
2
importance". Greenwood also wondered whether physiological
indices were really sensitive enough to measure long-term
physical deterioration: in a memorandum of the 12th December
1932 he pointed to the situation in Germany, where economic
conditions had been deplorable without showing any appreciable
changes in death rates among adults or height-weight indices
among children, and feared that malnutrition might show
itself in the form of a sudden deterioration at the end of
a long period of deprivation, as occurred in Germany at the
end of the First World War; he warned that this might well
happen in the depressed parts of Britain. Similarly,
Dr. Mellanby argued strongly against Newman, maintaining
4that malnutrition was widespread, ' and pointing to the fact
that a recent examination of 1,000 London children under the
age of five revealed 70% to have widespread dental caries.
1. Memorandum by Greenwood, 12/12/32, P.R.O. MH 56/52.
2. Memorandum by Greenwood, 15/7/33, P.R.O. MH 56/48.
3. Memorandum by Greenwood, 12/12/32, P.R.O. MH 56/52.
4. Minutes of the 7th meeting of the Advisory Committee,
7/6/34, P.R.O. MH 56/53.
5. Minutes of the 4th meeting of the Advisory Committee,
12/2/53, P.R.O. MH 56/52.
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These internal tensions came to a head in the winter
of 1933-4. In November 1933 the B.M.A.'s Committee on
Nutrition published a Report in which they recommended
3,400 calories plus 50 grammes of protein per man per day
1
as a level of minimum requirements. A year earlier, the
Ministry of Health Advisory Committee had recommended 3,000
2
calories plus 37 grammes of protein as its minimum, and
immediately a fierce controversy arose. The B.M.A. Report
was widely published in the press, and much of the comment
was adverse: newspapers, for example, carried reports of
interviews with housewives who claimed that the suggested
diets were monotonous and unrealistic.
But the real controversy centred on the fact that the
B.M.A. had not only fixed its minimum higher than the Ministry
of Health's Advisory Committee, but had also included specimen
diets and costed them. Critics immediately asked the question:
if a respectable body like the B.M.A. arrived at a higher
figure than the Ministry, then had the latter chosen the lower
level and avoided naming a cash minimum in order to avoid
exposing the inadequacy of unemployment benefit and assistance
rates? It was doubly unfortunate for the Ministry that the
publication of the B.M.A. Report was followed closely by the
1. B.M.A.: Report of Committee on Nutrition (1933), p. 8.
The Committee Chairman was Dr. E. Le Fleming, and its
membership included Sir Robert Hutchison, Professor
V.H. Mottram, Dr. G.P. Crowden and Dr. G. McGonigle.
2. The Criticism and Improvement of Diets (1932), pp. 5-7.
3. British Medical Journal, 9/12/33.
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lengthy discussions in Parliament on the 1934 Unemployment
Bill, in which the question of minimum needs was frequently
raised. For example, on the 30th November 1933 Arthur Greenwood
(in the Second Reading of the Unemployment Bill) pointed out
that according to the B.M.A. a man, wife and three children
needed to spend £1.2s.6-^d. per week on food alone - yet the
maximum rate of unemployment benefit for such a family was
then £1.9s.3d., leaving the absurdly inadequate sum of
6s.8-§d. for a week's rent, coal, lighting, clothing, etc.
The Ministry's raw nerve had been touched, and
officials reacted quickly. A meeting was arranged between
representatives of the two bodies to try and arrive at some
face-saving compromise, and the Ministry took stock of the
situation. Sir Arthur Robinson and Sir George Newman believed
that the B.M.A. Committee had been composed of people who
were not true experts in nutrition, and suspected that the
Report's conclusions had been engineered by that "promising
2
labour politician", Dr. McGonigle. Clearly, there was
great alarm within the Ministry over possible consequences.
Newman urged Robinson to prevent any meeting between the two
bodies, as this would "involve the Ministry in a far-reaching
economic issue, which is most important to avoid - an issue
which might easily affect wages, cost of food, doles, etc.",
1. Hansard, Vol. 283, 30/11/33, Col. 1110.
2. Robinson to Young, 11/1/34, P.R.O. MH 56/56. Memorandum
by Newman, 17/1/34, ibid. Note of meeting, 11/12/33,
P.R.O. MH 56/43.
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and went on to re-state his conviction that the population
1
was generally well-nourished. By then, however,
Sir Hilton Young had decided that a meeting would have
to be held, but issued a strong warning to Mellanby, who
was to attend it, that "there can be no discussion of the
translation of diets into money values or of the application
in practice of the scientific principles at issue", on the
intriguing basis that "these are administrative and not
2
scientific questions". Greenwood also warned that a
3
discussion of cash levels would be political dynamite.
In February the two sides met, and quickly agreed
on a face-saving formula: the two calorie levels were to
be part of a sliding scale, ranging from 3,400 to 4,000 cal¬
ories for a man engaged in heavy work, and 3,000 to 3,400
calories for moderate work, down to 900 to 1,000 calories
5
for a child aged one to two years. Yet the incident
greatly damaged the public reputation of the Advisory
Committee, and eventually led to Greenwood's resignation
on the 11th July 1934. He had been deeply unhappy about the
restrictions placed on the Committee, and had pressed for
some economists to be included in its membership in order
1. Memorandum by Newman, 17/1/34, P.R.O. MH 56/56.
2. Young to Mellanby, 11/1/34, ibid.
3. Memorandum by Greenwood (n.d., probably January 1934), ibid.
4.- Ministry of Health: Nutrition: Report of Conference
between Representatives of the Advisory Committee on
Nutrition and Representatives of a Committee Appointed
by the British Medical Association (1934), p. o.
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to produce recommendations on family budgets; he had felt
the inadequacy of his work for the Ministry most keenly when
the Week-End.Review of the 1st April 1933 had gone ahead on
the basis of the Advisory Committee's nutritional recommenda¬
tions and calculated the cost of such a diet as 17s.5d. per
week for a man, wife and two children; in particular, he
had felt unhappy about the number of controversial issues the
2
Committee had had to deal with, and over having to cope
with such intense criticism from some sections of public
• • 3
opinion.
Thus ended the first Advisory Committee on Nutrition,
on a somewhat ignominious note. On the 30th May 1935,
however, a second Advisory Committee was appointed under
4
the new Chairmanship of Lord Luke of Pavenham.
The reasons for this appear to have been twofold.
Firstly, the Government had for some time realised that
the method of calculating the cost-of-living index needed
revising: it was still based on a working class budgetary
survey carried out in 1904, and was coming in for increasing
1. Memorandum by Greenwood, 15/7/33, P.R.O. MH 56/48.
2. Letter of resignation from Greenwood to Young, 11/7/34,
P.R.O. MH 56/40.
3. For example, the Daily Herald of 11/1/34 pointed out that
the Advisory Committee's publication Diets in Poor Law
Children's Homes (1932) had recommended 4s.6-#d. as the
weekly cost of feeding a child, yet unemployment insurance
child allowances were only 2s.Od. The paper criticised
Greenwood strongly for tolerating this anomaly. Press
cutting in MH 56/56.
4. Ministry 'of Health: Advisory Committee on Nutrition,
First Report (1937), pp. 2,4. Apart from Luke there were
seventeen members (including some civil servants) and
amongst the medical representatives were Boyd Orr, Meilanby,
Gowland Hopkins and Cathcart.
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criticism from employers, trade unionists, economists,
and the like; for example, in 1931 the newly-formed
Economic Advisory Council recommended an overhaul of the
2
index, but owing to the economic situation this was
postponed. Secondly, by 1935 the Ministry of Health were
clearly becoming concerned over the intensity of the mal¬
nutrition controversy, and realised that public opinion
would soon demand an official enquiry into the subject.
Again, the Economic Advisory Council had had an influence
here, for on the 30th June 1934 the Council's Committee
on Scientific Research published a Report in which it
made out a clear case for improving the nutrition of the
population and recommended the establishment of a strong
3
committee to investigate the problem.
Clearly, what the Ministry of Health wanted was a
new Advisory Committee that would be sufficiently repres¬
entative in composition to be acceptable to public opinion,
yet one which would still be under their control.
Sir Hilton Young thus recommended to the Cabinet on the
1. Memorandum by the Minister of Labour: Proposed Enquiry
into the Working-Class Expenditure, and Revision of the
Basis of the Official Cost-of-Living Index (n.d., probably
December 1935). P.R.O. MH 79/345-
2. Report of Committee of Economic Advisory Council.
Committee on Revision of Cost-of-Living Index-Number,
13/2/31, C.P. 16(36), P.R.O. CAB 2A/259.
3• Economic Advisory Council. Committee on Scientific
Research, Second Report, The Need for Improved Nutrition
of the People of Great Britain, 30/6/34, C.P. 185(34),
P.R.O. CAB 24/250.
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30th January 1935 that the Advisory Committee be recon-
stituted, and nearly five months later it held its first
2
meeting. The initial work of the Committee was directed
at a survey of national food consumption on the basis of
information provided by the Market Supply Committee, and
it found that about one-third of the people in the sample
were receiving a calorie intake below the B.M.A. recommended
level of 3,4-00 calories per day, and about two-thirds were
below the B.M.A. minimum protein intake level of 50 grammes
"5
per day.
The Report was kept confidential, but Boyd Orr went
ahead and, using the Market Supply Committee's data, published
his own Food, Health and Income in early 1936.^ Immediately,
a political row broke out within the Departments concerned,
and (as already mentioned in this chapter) the Government
did everything it could to prevent its publication. At the
first meeting of the Advisory Committee following publication
of Boyd Orr's work, on the 30th March 1936, it was discussed:
Boyd Orr defended the limited data upon which his conclusions
had been based, saying that it had given a true approximation
of the situation, and Mellanby backed him up; but civil
1. Cabinet 6(35)11, P.R.O. CAB 23/81.
2. Minutes of 1st meeting, 13/6/35, P.R.O. MH 56/49.
3. Advisory Committee on Nutrition, Interim Report on
Food Consumption Statistics, 18/10/35, P.R.O. MH 79/344.
4. There were many similarities between the two reports,
e.g. the classifying of the population according to
weekly food expenditure.
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servants argued equally strongly that the book's conclusions
were not accurate. Eventually it was decided to refer
sections of the book to various Government Departments for
1
analysis.
By then, however, the Government had decided to launch
a comprehensive survey of family budgets. On the face of it,
this does appear to indicate a slight change of heart, and
a willingness to investigate the incidence of malnutrition
among the population. There is no doubt that senior civil
servants and Ministers viewed the steady stream of evidence
from the poverty surveys with alarm, and wanted the Government
2
to test their accuracy. But beyond that, the determination
to avoid any announcement of a Government-approved minimum
nutritional level was as strong as ever, and the launching
of the new family budget enquiry was a very reluctant
concession to political pressure.
In the first place, the Advisory Committee had been
asking for more accurate data on food consumption, income
distribution, nutrition, etc., to be collected by Government
Departments and "both on merits and on political grounds it
will be in our judgement impossible to refuse this request",
1. Minutes of 6th meeting, 30/3/36, P.R.O. MH 56/49.
2. See, for example, The Proposed Enquiry into Working-Class
Expenditure and Revision of the Basis of the Official Cost
of Living Index Number. Memorandum by the Minister of
Labour, 30/1/36, C.P. 19(36), P.R.O. CAB 24/259.
171
i
said four Ministers. There was a danger that the results
of such a new enquiry by the Advisory Committee might be
used as political propaganda, Ministers realised, especially
as regards the condition of low-income families with a large
2
number of children; in particular, it might be used to
3
provide evidence of the need to raise low wages. But
existing data from private poverty surveys and the like was
already being used in this way, and soon public opinion would
4
demand some sort of official action. Therefore the terms
of reference of the new enquiry should be carefully worded
so that it confined itself primarily to a new calculation
of the cost of living index (for which there was a need),
rather than questions of nutrition "which would create the
5
maximum of difficulty". If the terms of reference were so
drawn up, argued Ernest Brown, the Minister of Labour, then
the evidence produced could not be used as political propa¬
ganda; the published family budgets would merely show
"how various totals of expenditure are divided among partic¬
ular items; they will not show what expenditure is necessary
to provide an adequate standard of maintenance".
1. The Cost of Living Index Number. Note by the Ministers
of Agriculture, Health and Labour and the Secretary of
State for Scotland, 21/2/36, C.P. 55/36, CAB 24/250.
2. Ibid.
3. Memorandum by the Minister of Labour, 30/1/36, op. cit.
4. The Cost-of-Living Index Number. Memorandum by the Minister
of Labour, 21/2/36, C.P. 55(3b), P.R.O. CAB 24/2b0.
5. Ibid.
6. Memorandum by Minister of Labour, 30/1/36, op. cit.
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In this way, the Government managed to steer the
Advisory Committee away from the sensitive question of
minimum cash needs. The Committee's First Report,
published in 1937, accordingly interpreted its terms of
reference as "to indicate in what direction changes in the
nation's diet are desirable rather than to show how these
changes can be brought about by economic or political
-1
action", and devoted most of its space to a general
summary of national food consumption and recommendations
2
on food values. The cost-of-living enquiry was launched
in May 1936 with the appointment of a separate committee
(including representatives of the National Confederation of
Employers' Organisations, the T.U.C. General Council, the
Co-operative Movement and retail traders, as well as statis-
-z
_
ticians and civil servants), and in 1937-8 about 31,000
household budgets were collected, analysed, and the results
published in the Ministry of Labour Gazettes of December 1940,
January 1941 and February 1941.^" No attempt was made,
however, to analyse food expenditure by income group, and
households of the long-term unemployed living on unemploy-
5
ment assistance were specifically excluded. The enquiry
thus made no attempt to measure the extent of inadequate
feeding in the population.
1. Ministry of Health: Advisory Committee on Nutrition,
First Report (1937), pp. 5-6.
2. Ibid., pp. 9-26.
3. Ministry of Labour Gazette, 48, December 1940, p. 300.
4. Ibid., pp. 300-5; ibid., 49, January 1941, pp. 7-11, and
February 1941, pp. 28-31.
5. Ibid., December 1940, p. 300.
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Given this determined opposition within the Government
to all the evidence of malnutrition, particularly in the
case of children, it is hardly surprising that the main child
poverty pressure group of the 1930s, the Children's Minimum
Council, achieved very little.
The Children's Minimum Council was the organisation
through which Eleanor Rathbone and some of the Family Endow¬
ment Society members participated in the overall family
poverty campaigning of the 1930s. It began in early 1934
under the name of the Children's Minimum Organising Committee,
1
holding its first public conference on the 15th February.
Eleanor Rathbone seems to have been the main driving force
behind it, and with Eva Hubback and Marjorie Green also
very active in the day-to-day administrative work, it
2
obviously had close links with the Family Endowment Society.
The Council's leadership included M.P.s such as Francis Acland,
Robert Boothby, R.D. Denman, Sir Edward Grigg, Harold Macmilian
and Duncan Sandys; and also nutritionists such as Boyd Orr,
Sir Francis Gowland Hopkins, Sir Robert McCarrison and
Dame Janet Campbell (who had retired from service with the
Ministry of Health in 1933). It was avowedly non-political,
and had affiliated to it many different organisations, such as
1. Invitation to conference, P.R.O. MH 55/275. The name was
changed in 1936, but for convenience it is hereafter
referred to as 'Council'.
2. Marjorie Green was secretary of both organisations, and
the Society was formally affiliated to it.
3. Invitation to conference, op. cit., and Report of the
Children's Minimum Council for Year Ending 30th June 1938,
Eleanor Rathbone Papers XIV. 2. 7. (5).
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the Save the Children Fund, the Nursery Schools Association
of Great Britain, the National Baby Week Council, the Fabian
Society, the Women's National Liberal Federation, the London
Teachers' Association, the Association of Head Mistresses,
the National Association of Schoolmasters, the Workers'
Educational Association, the National Council for Equal
Citizenship, the Women's Co-operative Guild, the Industrial
-i
Christian Fellowship and the Catholic Social Guild. Thus
its leaders could with justification claim that the Council
2
represented several million supporters.
The pressure group methods of the Council bore all
the hallmarks of an Eleanor Rathbone campaign. Important
public figures were made Vice-Presidents and called upon
whenever appropriate, and there were frequent appeals to
3
such people for donations. Much use was made of the press,
and short pamphlets were regularly published summarising
4
the Council's case. Campaign methods were forceful and
imaginative: for example, on the 30th March 1938 guests
were invited to a lunch at the L.S.E. based on what the
average unemployed family would eat as the main meal of
their day, and after that sobering experience they listened
5
to speeches from Council leaders.
1. Full list of affiliated organisations in 1934 contained
in letter to the Prime Minister, 27/2/34, P.R.O. MH 55/275.
2. Speech by Eva Hubback in Note of Deputation to Prime
Minister from the Children7s Minimum Committee, 12/3/34,
P.R.O. PREM 1/165.
3. See, for example, the letters sent in 1939 to various
people in Eleanor Rathbone Papers, XIV. 2. 7. (11).
4. For example, Marjcrie Green: Evidence on Malnutrition
(C.M.C. pamphlet, September 1934).
5. Invitation, menu, etc., in P.R.O. MH 55/688.
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The Council had both short-term and long-term aims.
On the one hand, it put pressure on Government Departments
during the implementation of the 1934 Unemployment Act to
ensure that levels of unemployment benefit and assistance
(particularly in the case of large families) would be
1
calculated in accordance with the B.M.A. minimum standard.
This was seen by Eleanor Rathbone as very much in line with
her tactic of getting in early with suggestions while
2
proposals were still in the melting-pot. On the other
hand, the Council aimed at securing official recognition
of the extent of child poverty, and the introduction of
appropriate remedial measures.
This latter aim contained a number of proposals, the
most important of which was that the Ministry of Health
should set down an official minimum needs scale, which
3
would then be used as a basis for unemployment allowances,
and any wage-earning household whose income was below that
level should have milk and meals provided free for its
4
children. In addition, there were demands for higher
child allowances for the unemployed, rent rebates propor¬
tional to family size, free milk for infants and expectant
1. Eleanor Rathbone: Memorandum on the Scale of Needs
Suitable for Adoption by the Unemployment Assistance
Board in Assessing Assistance to Applicants Under Part II
of the Unemployment Act, 1934 (C.M.C. pamphlet, July 1934).
This is dealt with more fully in a subsequent chapter.
2. E. Rathbone in speech to Liverpool School of Social
Science, 24/1/35, Eleanor Rathbone Papers, XIV. 3. 19.
3. Speech by Eleanor Rathbone in deputation from C.M.C. to
Minister of Health, 23/3/34, P.R.O. MH 55/275.
4. "A Children's Minimum", British Medical Journal, 4/1/36.
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or nursing mo.thers, free milk for children in State-aided
schools, and an end to the situation where, in the midst
of widespread poverty, the food-producing industries had
a surplus of such valuable foods as milk, bacon, eggs, fish,
etc., and were destroying large quantities of them in order
to keep up prices.
The Family Endowment Society's involvement was
natural, since apart from aiming to raise the family
allowance component in unemployment benefits and assist¬
ance, the C.M.C. were also demanding 'family endowment in
kind'. If unemployment child allowances could not be
raised to realistic levels without overlapping onto wages,
then family assistance should be granted in kind, not cash:
Eleanor Rathbone "recognised that the relationship between
unemployment assistance and wages had to be borne in mind,
and in the circumstances some other form of assistance was
2
necessary to meet the large scale under-nutrition", and
therefore pointed out that "the provision of supplementary
nourishment, given whenever it is needed, would safeguard
the health of the mothers and children without disturbing
the relationship of wages and unemployment pay".
1. Invitation to conference, 15/2/34, op. cit. On the
last point, the Council also maintained that increased
food consumption would benefit agriculture.
2. Speech in deputation to Minister of Labour, 25/2/37,
P.R.O. MH 55/688.
3. C.M.C. pamphlet: Memorandum on Proposed Provision for
Additional Food, etc., for Mothers and Children in
Distressed Areas (1937).
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From the start, the attitude of Ministers and senior
civil servants to the Council's activities was one of
hostility. The Ministry of Health received an invitation
to the 15th February 1934 conference, and sent along
Lord Balniel as an observer; in a short and cynical note
Balniel summed it up as "a number of disappointed spinsters
representing 'many millions of mothers' advocated all the
old demands for free milk, etc., for nursing mothers,
1
etc., etc." Indeed, the only point of concern to the
Ministry was that one of the speakers at the conference
was a London County Council Assistant Medical Officer,
Dr. Barbara Tchaikowski, who should be quietly told not
2
to get involved in such a campaign.
Soon after this inaugural conference the C.M.C.
requested an audience with the Prime Minister,
Ramsay MacDonald, and when permission was given, sent
in a list of four demands: firstly, that a daily ration
of clean, fresh milk should be made available to all
children attending State-aided schools, and for younger
children through the public health departments; secondly,
that it should be made compulsory for local authorities to
provide school meals for children who, by reason of the
1
poverty of their parents, were inadequately fed; thirdly,
1. Balniel to A.N. Rucker, 15/2/34, P.R.O. MH 55/275.
2. Rucker to Sir Arthur Robinson, 16/2/34, ibid.
3. C.M.C. to Prime Minister, 27/2/34, ibid.
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that unemployment child allowances be substantially
increased; and fourthly, that rent rebates should be
granted where family income was insufficient to meet
1
needs.
The deputation met MacDonald on the 12th March.
But two days earlier the Ministry of Health had already
rejected their proposals. Compulsory school meals for
needy children would cost over £4,000,000 per annum as
compared with existing expenditure of about £560,000,
and such an increase could only be contemplated if wide¬
spread child malnutrition could be shown to exist - which
school medical inspection returns of only 1.07% malnourished
in 1932 clearly did not; besides "much malnutrition is due
2
to delicacy, not poverty", the Ministry maintained.
Criticism of the 2s.Od. unemployment child allowances on
the grounds that it was insufficient for the maintenance
of a child was "largely due to misapprehension. A
dependant's allowance is not paid specifically for the
maintenance of a child; it is only one of the constituents
making up the payment to the unemployed man.... it would be
going about the matter in quite the wrong way if the Bill
attempted to specify any particular figure as the right
1. Summary of C.M.C. proposals, ibid.
2. Ministry of Health Memorandum: Compulsory Provision
of Meals for School Children. 10/3/34, P.R.O. PREM 1/165.
3. The Bill that became the 1934 Unemployment Act.
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amount for maintaining a child in all circumstances. A
child is maintained, not by itself, but as part of a family.
It is impossible to determine how much is needed for main¬
taining a child without taking account of the requirements
of the rest of the family and indeed of the whole circum-
stances of the particular case". In addition, claimed
the Ministry, public assistance scales compared favourably
with the B.M.A. minimum - and in any case, once again it
was a mistake to try and isolate the needs of particular
2
members of the family. Finally, on the question of rent
rebates the Ministry pointed out that since housing was
essentially a local authority responsibility the Government
could not at the present stage adopt any attitude other than
3
one of "benevolent neutrality".
In the face of this inflexible attitude, the C.M.C.
deputation achieved nothing. Sir Edward Gigg and Eva Hubback
introduced the deputation; Sir Francis Acland then made out
the case for more milk consumption, beneficial both to
children and to British agriculture; Mrs. Eleanor Barton
maintained that mothers in Britain were convinced that
widespread malnutrition existed; and Robert Boothby accused
1. Ministry of Health Memorandum (n.d., probably 10/3/34),
P.R.O. PREM 1/165.
2. Ministry of Health Memorandum: Proposal 3
(n.d., probably 10/3/34), ibid.
3. Ministry of Health Memorandum: Proposal 4
(n.d., probably 10/3/34), ibid.
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the Government of being completely out of touch with the
realities of life in poor areas of the country and of
deliberately limiting food supplies while many children
were not getting enough to eat.
In the course of a rambling and evasive reply,
2
Ramsay MacDonald said very little of substance. He
repeatedly assured his visitors that he shared their
concern: "the matter is under consideration", he said,
asking them "to co-operate with the Departments concerned"
and not to make the malnutrition controversy "the subject
of stunts". MacDonald then left, and after the Ministers
of Labour and Health made their points (based on the
pre-arranged replies), they promised that if the C.M.C.
sent deputations to them on specific points they would be
•5
sympathetically considered.
The first department to be lobbied was the Ministry
of Health, on the 23rd March 1934. Eleanor Rathbone
reiterated her plea that the Ministry should come out
into the open and declare a minimum needs level in cash
terms, and asked for consideration of her rent rebate
1. Note of deputation, ibid.
2. "When he received a deputation he avoided straight
issues and was discursive or incoherent", Thomas Jones
later wrote of MacDonald. Jones: A Diary with Letters
(1954), p. xxvii.
3- Note of deputation, op. cit.
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scheme; Eva Hubback asked that some form of compulsion
should be introduced to force all local authorities to
provide milk for children under five years of age, and
nursing or expectant mothers. But from the evidence
available, this aroused little reaction from the Ministry,
and exactly the same fate befell a deputation to the
2
Ministry of Labour three days later.
The Council kept up its activities throughout the
period mid-1934 to early 1937, collecting influential
support, producing articles and letters in the press, and
holding meetings throughout the country. Requests were
repeatedly sent in to Government Departments, but elicited
little response. For example, on the 21st July 1936 the
Council wrote to the Prime Minister, once again pointing
out the need to raise unemployment child allowances; the
reply they received merely referred them to a recent
Commons debate on the Unemployment Assistance Board
regulations.
In 1937, however, there was renewed activity. On
the 25th February Eleanor Rathbone led a deputation to the
Ministry of Labour which included Duncan Sandys, Eva Hubback,
Gertrude Williams and Dr. Margaret Balfour - each of
1. Note of deputation, 23/3/34, P.R.O. MH 55/275.
2. Eleanor Rathbone Papers, XIV. 3. 6.
3. Correspondence in P.R.O. MH 55/688.
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whom presented a different aspect of the Council's case,
with particular reference to the need for extra milk and
i
meals for mothers and children in the depressed areas.
In the deputation's oral evidence, Eleanor Rathbone pointed
out that over a third of the maternity and child welfare
authorities with unemployment rates of over 25% provided
no free milk to children between the ages of three and five,
and asked that the forthcoming Special Areas Bill remedy
this. Lady Williams and Dr. Balfour spoke about how their
/ J
own experiments (in the Rhondda and Tyneside areas respect¬
ively) showed the importance of nutrition for healthy child-
2
bearing. Once again, these demands elicited little response
civil servants pointed out that local authorities were
doing all that was necessary and that "the strong Advisory
Committee on nutrition were continuing their labours and
would no doubt advise the Minister (of Health) from time
3
to time as they found themselves able to reach conclusions".
In private, officials refused to admit the validity of the
Council's empirical evidence: experiments such as the
Tyneside one were, they maintained, based on samples too
small, or methods too limited, for reliable conclusions
4
to be drawn.
1. The Council's proposals were published in the pamphlet
Memorandum on Proposed Provision for Additional Food,
etc., for Mothers and Children in Distressed Areas (1957)
This was sent to all M.P.s in February 1957.
2. Note of deputation, 25/2/37, P.R.O. MH 55/688.
3. Ibid.
4. Memorandum on the C.M.C. evidence (n.d.), ibid.
183
Later in the year, on the 27th July, yet another
deputation was sent to the Ministry of Health. All the
evidence on the nutritive value of milk was quoted, and
the Council asked that the Minister of Health consider
the provision of cheap milk (at 1-J-d. per pint) for all
infants and expectant or nursing mothers in families below
a certain income limit. In the course of a vague reply
the Minister of Health, Kingsley Wood, merely promised
to call to the attention of the local authorities the
2
value of milk. Finally, on the 27th March 1939 another
3
deputation was sent to the Board of Education.
One of the few actions taken by the Government in
the 1930s positively to improve the nutrition of the nation's
children was the 1934 'Milk in Schools' scheme whereby
schoolchildren could purchase one third of a pint of milk
1 4
at a cost of O-jg-d. each day. Yet this and other efforts to
improve milk consumption in the 1930s were not the result
of.pressure from groups like the Children's Minimum Council,"
but were primarily aimed at improving the milk industry.
After its establishment in 1923, the Natural Milk Publicity
Council realised that the expansion of the milk market was
1. Note of deputation, 27/7/37, and C.M.C. Memorandum:
Milk for Mothers and Children under Five (1937), ibid.
2. Note of deputation, ibid.
3. Eleanor Rathbone Papers, XIV. 2. 7. (12).
4. Bulletin of the Committee Against Malnutrition,
March 1936, p. 8. ~
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largely dependent on greater consumption by children,
and used the growing volume of nutritional research to
persuade local authorities to provide more milk for
2
children. The complex situation in the 1930s over the
question of agreed prices, surplus produce, Government
subsidies, etc., in the milk industry cannot be gone into
here, but essentially the Government, while realising that
l±
increased milk consumption would improve public health
(Britain having an extremely low level of milk consumption -
only 0.385 pints per head per day), saw their duty to
British agriculture as more important, and the only
solutions contemplated were ones that would adjust market
forces slightly by means of the price mechanism. Thus
suggestions by the Children's Minimum Council that free
milk should be provided for certain very low income-groups
were never treated seriously.
The failure of the Children's Minimum campaign
is an appropriate point at which to conclude this survey
of the family poverty case for family allowances. This
chapter has shown how the evidence of poverty and malnu-
1. Board of Education Memorandum: Provision of Milk
for Schoolchildren (April 1934). P.R.O. ED 24/1367.
2. F. le Gros Clark: A Social History of the School
Meals Service (1964), p. 43.
3. For a full explanation, see the Bulletin of the
Committee Against Malnutrition. January 1939, pp. 57-9,
and ibid., March 1936, pp. 1-8.
4. Memorandum: Milk and Human Health, 10/5/34,
P.R.O. ED 24/1367.
5. Bulletin of the Committee Against Malnutrition,
March 1936, p. 4. "
6. Evidence contained in P.R.O. ED 24/1367.
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trition in large families slowly grew in the inter-war
years, reaching a peak in the mid-1930s. This evidence
was presented to the Government in many different ways by
many different people, backed up by a wealth of medical
and nutritional data. Yet at no time did the Government
admit its validity, and it steadfastly denied that there
was any real need to raise the economic status of mothers
and children. On the surface, there were a number of
reasons for this: the uncertainty over exactly what consti¬
tuted malnutrition, the differing opinions on whether low
income groups were inevitably malnourished, the persistence
of the narrowly 'educational' view as regards the scope of
the school medical service, the financial constraints
imposed by prevailing economic orthodoxy, and so on. Yet
these reasons concealed the basic explanation, which was
that the Government was clearly terrified of admitting that
minimum nutritional needs could be expressed in cash terms,
for to do so would open the way to demands that a large
section of the working class, whether unemployed or in
full time work at low wages, should have their incomes
brought up to such a level. This was something to be
resisted at all costs, and resisted it indeed was up to
the outbreak of the Second World War. Whether Ministers
and senior civil servants knew of conditions in the
186
depressed areas and chose to ignore them, or whether
they were in fact ignorant of such conditions all along,
is not really clear; in either case, it is evident that
they made little effort to find out. Perhaps in conclusion
it is appropriate to quote the revealing incident that
occurred when Sir John Boyd Orr was summoned to meet
Kingsley Wood, Minister of Health, prior to the publi¬
cation of Food, Health and Income: Boyd Orr recalled that
"he wanted to know why I was making such a fuss about
poverty when, with old age pensions and unemployment
insurance, there was no poverty in the country. This
extraordinary illusion was genuinely believed by Mr. Wood,
who held the out-of-date opinion that if people were not
actually dying of starvation there could be no food
deficiency. He knew nothing about the results of the
research on vitamin and protein requirements, and had
never visited the slums to see things for himself".
1. Lord Boyd Orr: As I Recall (1966), p. 115.
CHAPTER FOUR: FAMILY ALLOWANCES AND THE BIRTH RATE.
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In addition to the family poverty argument, the case
for family allowances in the inter-war years rested on
another pillar of support - the demographic argument. The
former was always the more easily-demonstrated, resting as
it did on a wealth of empirical data from poverty and nutri¬
tional surveys; Beveridge, for example, insisted that his
advocacy of family allowances in 1942 was "almost entirely"
on economic grounds as opposed to demographic.
Nevertheless, the idea that family allowances would
encourage parents to produce more children was an important
feature of the campaign, particularly in the late 1930s and
early 1940s. Pro-natalist arguments have always been closely
associated in the public mind with family allowances, and this
is more than simply a legacy of the Speenhamland System applying
to Britain alone, since it occurs in all advanced industrialised
countries where concern over a falling birth rate coincided
with the introduction of family allowance systems.
Many modern writers on family allowances have deeply
regretted this pro^-natalist emphasis. George and Walley have
suggested that the indifference shown by successive British
Governments towards family allowances since 1945 can be
attributed to the disappearance of the (erroneous) demographic
1. W.H. Beveridge: "Children's Allowances and the Race",
in The Pillars of Security (1943), p. 14.
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1
argument. Similarly, Vadakin has complained of the
pro-natalist argument as applied to Canada that "when
combined with the widespread misconceptions concerning
over-all population problems which are held by many people,
53 produces an attitude towards family allowances which is
not only lacking in perspective but which quite often precludes
2
a fair appraisal of such programmes as a child welfare measure".
Yet so influential have these pro-natalist misconceptions
been that modern authorities have also felt it important to
discuss them, and eventually disprove them. Bernice Madison
has shown that in spite of predictions to the contrary made
before their introduction, family allowances in Canada have
■3
had no measurable influence on the birth rate, and studies
for that country by Vadakin and Willard have also made this
4
point. Similarly, Heer and Bryden have concluded that
family allowances in the Soviet Union have had little effect
5
on fertility. The whole question of whether economic
inducements in general can 'bribe' parents to produce more
1. V. George: Social Security, Beveridge and After (1968),
p. 193; Sir John Walley: Social Security: Another British
Failure? (1972), pp. 183-7.
2. James C. Vadakin: Family Allowances, an Analysis of their
Development and Implications (Miami, 1958), p. 91.
3. Bernice Madison: "Canadian Family Allowances and their
Major Social Implications", Journal of Marriage and the
Family, 26, May 1964, pp. 139-141. There were forecasts
that a predominantly Catholic province like Quebec would
experience a birth rate rise greater than a predominantly
non-Catholic one like Ontario, but this did not happen.
4. James C. Vadakin: Children, Poverty and Family Allowances
(New York, 1968), pp. 95-101; Joseph Willard: "Some
Aspects of Family Allowances and Income Redistribution in
Canada", Public Policy (Cambridge, Mass.), 4, 1954, pp. 190-232
5. David Heer and Judith Bryden: "Family Allowances and
Fertility in the Soviet Union", Soviet Studies, 18,
October 1966, pp. 153-163.
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children is an extremely complex one, but most authorities
have agreed that such small payments as are made under
-1
existing family allowance schemes can have little effect.
Still, despite the lack of any firm evidence either
way, there remain legitimate hypothetical questions: if
family allowances were higher, and represented the full
cost of maintaining a child, would the birth rate then be
affected? Even if they do not raise the birth rate, might
not family allowances prevent its decline? Might they
also contribute to population growth indirectly by lowering
infant and maternal mortality? Since the whole subject of
population growth is rife with uncertainty, it is inevitable
that much confusion should be attached to the pro-natalist
case for family allowances, and that this confusion should
be a feature of many writings on family allowances. To give
but one example, in the September 194-8 issue of Population
Studies an authority on French family allowances maintained
that one of their functions in that country was to raise
the birth rate in order to ensure the successful working
of the overall social security system: according to his
argument, "the benefits which the social security scheme
assures to its members - particularly old-age pensioners,
1. For general discussions of this, see: Vincent Whitney:
"Fertility Trends and Children's Allowance Programmes",
in Eveline Burns (ed.): Children's Allowances and the
Economic Welfare of Children (New York, 1968), pp. 123-139;
Judith Blake: "Are Babies Consumer Durables?",
Population Studies. 12, March 1968, pp. 5-25;
Margaret Wynn: Family Policy (1970), pp. 275-295;
Introduction by Daniel P. Moynihan in Vadakin, op. cit.
(1968), pp. xiv-xvi.
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whose support is one of the most onerous burdens - are
obtained by redistributing the contributions paid... If
the ratio of aged to working population changes, the share going
to the aged will also have to be altered, either by lowering
the pension rate or by postponing the age at which a pension
is due... It is therefore necessary that the population
pyramid should stand on as broad a base as possible, and it
thus becomes evident that incentives to a high birth rate
are important to the social security scheme.... Social security
provides pro-natalist policy with a basis which has some
scientific claims, acceptable to all social classes, and the
1
importance of this point of view can hardly be over-emphasised".
Yet the article concluded with a statement that while family
allowances had "certainly contributed" to the recent rise in
France's birth rate, by themselves they were not capable of
2
solving France's population problem. In common with many
authorities on family allowances, this writer appeared to be
pronouncing two completely contradictory verdicts on the
pro-natalist argument.
Evidently, therefore, the real question to be answered
in a historical study of the development of family allowances
is not whether they have affected birth rates, but how one is
1. J. Doublet: "Family Allowances in France",
Population Studies, 2, September 194-8, p. 229.
2. Ibid., p. 239. Further confusion is added when one turns
to the very next issue of the same journal and finds
another expert flatly denying that family allowances in
Belgium have had any pro-natalist effect. E. Susswein:
"Family Allowances in Belgium", ibid., December 1948, p. 290.
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to 'measure' the pervasive influence of the erroneous belief
that they do. Bearing this in mind, this chapter will attempt
to disentangle the confused jumble of claims and counter-claims -
many of them resting on the flimsiest of evidence - that made
up the demographic case for family allowances in the inter-war
years in Britain.
Between the late 1870s and the early 1940s Great Britain,
along with most other European countries, experienced a
progressive fall in her annual birth rates. In the 1870s the
annual average rate of population growth was 1.30%; in the
early 1900s it was 0.98%; and by the 1930s it had fallen to
0.44%.^ The crude fertility rate (the birth rate per 1,000
population) fell from 35.3 in 1876-80 to 28.3 in 1901-5 and
2
15.3 in 1931-5, which meant that the average number of
children per family fell from about 5.5 or 6 in the 1870s to
2.2 in the 1930s. Of course, at no time did there take place
an actual decline in numbers: the population of Great Britain
increased from 23.1 million in 1861 to 46.6 million in 1941.^"
But by the late 1930s the declining birth rate was beginning
to arouse considerable alarm among social scientists and
demographers, since it appeared likely that very soon the
population would not be replacing itself: the natural increase
(the excess of births over deaths) had fallen steadily from
4.6 million in 1901-11 to 1.2 million in 1931-41.^
1• Current Trend of Population in Great Britain, May 1942,
Cmd. 6358, p.
2. Ibid., p. 8.
3. Report of the Royal Commission on Population, June 1949,
Cmd. 7695, p. 251
4. Ibid., p. 8.
5. Ibid., p. 9.
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These statistics, familiar to every social historian,
caused great puzzlement in the 1930s because the fall in
fertility had taken place alongside many improvements in
living standards which, on the face of it, appeared conducive
to larger families. Infant mortality in England and Wales
fell from 153 per 1,000 live births in 1871-5 to 58 in 1937
and maternal mortality from 6.9 per 1,000 births in 1874
-i
to 3.2 in 1937. Rowntree's poverty surveys indicated that
the proportion of the working class population of York living
2
in primary poverty fell from 15.4-6% in 1899 to 6.8% in 1936.
_ 3
Real wages probably rose by between 70% and 90% from 1866-1936.
In addition, there were great improvements in public health,
housing, sanitation, diet, and so on. From a Malthusian
point of view, this should have resulted in a rising birth
rate.
Even today there is much disagreement among demographic
historians over the exact causes of the post-1870 fertility
decline. While there is no doubt that contraception was
increasingly employed after the 1870s, there is still uncer¬
tainty over what prompted couples to limit their families.
The most common explanation is that the last quarter of the
19th century saw a fundamental change of attitude on the part
of married couples towards the production of children: the
1. Sir George Newman: The Building of a Nation's Health (1939),
pp. 282, 311, 314.
2. B.S. Rowntree: Poverty and Progress (1941), p. 451.
3. John Burnett: Plenty and Want (1966), p. 226.
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'Great Depression' of 1873-96 first implanted in the minds
of middle class parents the desire to reduce family size in
order to make the economies necessary if their overall
standard of living was to be maintained; thereafter, for
middle class parents expenditure on educating their children
rose as entry into the professions increasingly came to be by
competitive examination, and for working class parents the
restrictions on child labour and introduction of compulsory
elementary education turned their children from producers
of wealth into passive consumers; and thereafter, by a
process of 'social capillary', contraceptive information
1
gradually passed down the social scale.
Any adequate explanation must bear in mind the 1949
Royal Commission's point that the picture is one of "a complex
web, rather than a chain, of cause and effect... it would be
exceedingly difficult to trace how they acted and re-acted
2
on each other or to assess their relative importance", and
even if this cautious approach is followed many awkward
questions remain: how much importance must be given to the
1877 Bradlaugh-Besant trial as a cause? If the 'demographic
1. For a detailed account of this explanation, see
Neil Tranter: Population Since the Industrial Revolution
(1973), pp. 108-129; Peter Fryer: The Birth Controllers
(1965), pp. 177-181; J.A. Banks: Prosperity and
Parenthood (1954); Report of the Royal Commission on
Population, op. cit., pp. 33-43.
2. Report of the Royal Commission on Population, op. cit., p. 38.
3- The fact that the trial occurred exactly at a point when
couples must have been wanting to limit their families has
always intrigued historians. A similar trial in Sydney in
1888 was followed by the first fall in the Australian birth
rate. G.F. McCleary: Race Suicide? (1945), p. 42.
195
transition' explanation relates the fall in fertility to a
certain stage of industrialisation, then why did agricultural,
semi-feudal France experience a decline probably as early as
1
the 1770s? Has the process of 'social capillary' been
2
greatly over-estimated? The existence of many such puzzling
problems makes the whole question of the fall in fertility
z
m Britain one that must be approached with great caution.
If social scientists and demographers of the 1970s are
still puzzled by aspects of the decline in the birth rate, then
those of the 1920s and 1930s were many times more so. Immedi¬
ately after the First World War there was a brief period when
fear of overpopulation was in vogue: J.M. Keynes had popular¬
ised this in his book The Economic Consequences of the Peace
(1920) and for a time the theory had a certain attraction as
A
an explanation of mass unemployment. However, in 1933 the
1. R.R. Kuczynski: "World Population", in T.H. Marshall (ed.):
The Population Problem (1938), p. 108. In addition, there
is the question of whether political entities like 'France'
can be meaningfully isolated for the purpose of demographic
analysis: D.E.C. Eversley: "Population. Economy and
Society", in D. Glass and Eversley (eds.): Population
in History (1965), p. 27.
2. Argued in Diana Gittins: "How the Coitus was Interrupted",
New Society, 30/9/76.
3. A famous example of the danger of not doing so can be found
in A.J.P. Taylor: English History, 1914-45 (1965), pp. 165-6,
where Taylor wrongly argued that family limitation was
primarily achieved by sexual abstinence, and concluded:
"The historian should bear in mind that between about 1880,
when limitation started, and 1940 or so, when the use of the
sheath at any rate became more general in all classes, he has
on his hands a frustrated people. The restraint exercised in
their private lives may well have contributed to their lack
of enterprise elsewhere".
4. See controversy between Keynes and Beveridge on this point
in The Economic Journal, 23, December 1923, PP- 447-486, and
in Economica, 4, February 1924, pp. 1-20.
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birth rate reached its lowest-ever point, and thereafter there
began to develop growing concern over the long downward trend.
Essentially, the 'population panic' of the 1930s centred
on three main fears. Firstly, there was the prospect of an
actual population decline setting in at some not-too-distant
date. Dr. Enid Charles caused considerable alarm by her
prediction in 1938 that if fertility and mortality rates
continued to fall as they had done in the previous decade,
the population of England and Wales would be reduced to
one-tenth its present size over the next century; and even
if fertility and mortality remained constant at 1933 levels,
the population would be halved in this time. David Glass
made a less pessimistic forecast in 1937: soon a .peak level
would be reached, and after a transitional period of slow
decline the population would fall off at the rate of 24%
every generation, reaching 15% of its present size in just
2
over two centuries. To illustrate this d&nger, demographers
evolved the concept of the 'net reproduction rate' - a net
reproduction rate of 1 equalled the exact replacement rate -
and showed that in the period 1935-8 the annual number of
births was about one-fifth below what was necessary to replace
the previous generation.
1. Enid Charles: "The Effect of Present Trends in
Fertility and Mortality upon the Future Population of
Great Britain and Upon its Age Composition", in
Lancelot Hogben (ed.): Political Arithmetic (1938),
p. 103.
2. D.V. Glass: "The Population Problem and the Future",
Eugenics Review, 29, April 1937, p. 41.
3. Report of the Royal Commission on Population, op. cit.,
p. 60-1. After the War the net reproduction rate was
rejected as unreliable. Ibid., p. 62.
197
The prospect of a declining population attracted much
attention in the popular press in the late 1930s, with
sensationalist articles on deserted villages, empty factories,
over-crowded old people's homes, and so on. In addition,
in a period of growing international tension and emerging
colonial independence movements, it was hardly surprising
that there should have been aroused considerable concern
over the fact that this fertility decline wqs only happening
in countries peopled by the white European races. Asiatic
and African races were (as far as could be estimated)
increasing their numbers rapidly, and in view of this
Duncan Sandys, the Conservative M.P., warned in 1937 that
"unless the population trend in Great Britain and Western
Europe alters, the Dominions, in order to maintain their
population, may be forced to seek emigrants from Asiatic and
Eastern European countries where the decline in population
is not so imminent. Apart from the cultural aspect and
the weakening of Imperial ties it would involve them in all
the difficulties consequent upon the importation of cheap
labour accustomed to a substantially lower standard of life...
A great Empire whose population is not only declining but
is also on an average growing older is particularly vulnerable
to attack". These fears were not Dnly the province of those
on the political right: even a left-wing scientist like
Lancelot Hogben could warn that "sooner or later any
Government, Socialist or otherwise, will have to face the
1. Hansard, Vol. 320, 10/2/37, Col. 494.
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task of raising fertility or to accept a downhill retreat
to racial extinction", and Beveridge declared that soon
the question would have to be faced of "how far the unequal
adoption of birth control by different races will leave one
race at the mercy of another's growing numbers, or drive it
2
to armaments and perpetual aggression in self-defence".
This gave rise to a second area of concern - that in a
period of decline, the age-distribution of the population
would change, with an increasing proportion of old people
having to be supported by a declining proportion of
'producers' (those aged between fifteen and sixty-four).
Dr. Enid Charles estimated that whereas in 1935 64% of the
population of England and Wales was aged between fifteen and
sixty, and 12.5% aged over sixty, by the year 2000 these
-7.
proportions would have changed to 49.6% and 46.5% respectively.
Such an inbalance would bring about profound economic changes.
1. L. Hogben: "Planning for Human Survival" in
G.D.H. Cole, et al: What Is Ahead of Us? (1937), p. 172.
2. W.H. Beveridge, op. cit. (1923), p. 474. Of course, had
the birth rate remained at its pre-1870 level possibly
even worse problems would have been created: by the 1960s
the population would have doubled, and by the year 2100
it would have reached the astronomical figure of 460 million.
As the 1949 Royal Commission pointed out, this growth
"would have been slowed down by the Malthusian forces of
famine and disease". Report of the Royal Commission on
Population, op. cit., p. 9. See also D.C. Marsh:
The Changing Social Structure of England and Wales,
1871-1961 (1965), p. 12~! Some contemporary writers, like
Dean Inge, even thought a smaller population might be
advantageous. G.F. McCleary, op. cit., p. 108.
3. D.V. Glass: The Struggle for Population (1936), pp. 12-13.
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There would have to be increased public expenditure on
social services to old people (more hospitals and old age
pensions, for example); the decline in the. ratio of pro¬
ducers to consumers would retard economic expansion; unem¬
ployment would rise; taxation would have to be increased
and living standards would fall; there would be rises in the
costs of those public services that depended for their own
charges on serving a mass public (such as gas, electricity,
telephones, etc.).
The third major cause for concern was the phenomenon
of differential fertility. The decline in the birth rate
began in the upper middle class and slowly permeated down
the social scale, with the result that fertility became
inversely related to social class. Thus the 1911 Census for
Scotland showed that the average number of children for
certain occupations was: crofters, 7.04; coal, shale and
ironstone miners, 7.01; general labourers, 6.29; domestic
servants, 4.84; clerks, 4.38; teachers, 4.25; physicians
2
and surgeons, 3-91. From such statistics on fertility
1. J.M. Keynes: "Some Economic Consequences of a Declining
Population", Eugenics Review, 29, April 1937, pp. 13-17;
G.F. McCleary: Population: Today's Question (1938),
pp. 168-9; R.M. Titmuss: Poverty and Population (1938),
pp. 19-32. W.B. Reddaway, however, made the point that
to raise the birth rate would create a large number of
non-productive (and hence 'expensive') dependants at
the lower end of the age-scale. Reddaway: The Economics
of a Declining Population (1939), pp. 234-5.
2. J.C. Dunlop: "The Fertility of Marriage in Scotland: a
Census Study", Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 77,
February 1914, pp. 275-7. Dunlop was Superintendent of the
Statistical Department of the Office of the Registrar-General
for Scotland. For a similar study relating to England, see
T.H.C. Stevenson: "The Fertility of Various Social Classes
in England and Wales from the Middle of the Nineteenth Century
to 1911", ibid., 83, May 1920, pp. 401-432.
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distribution it appeared that the population was being
increasingly recruited from the lowest social classes,
and if, as many eugenists argued, the lowest social classes
were also the least intelligent, then obviously 'national
intelligence' was declining. Raymond Cattell, for example,
maintained that it was just such a process that had caused
the decline of the Roman and Greek civilisations, and cal¬
culated that if existing trends continued, in 300 years half
1
the population of Britain would be mentally defective. This
trend was already in evidence, eugenists argued. They claimed
that the incidence of mental deficiency was growing at an
2
alarming rate; thus, not only was society becoming increas¬
ingly burdened with an ever-expanding 'social problem group'
at the bottom, but also it was gradually losing its 'best
stocks' at the top. Leonard Darwin warned that "the differ¬
ential birth rate will in the long run prove to be one of
the greatest of all impediments to social progress".
It is hardly surprising that in this atmosphere of
alarm and pessimism many mistaken theories were put forward
to explain past population trends and predict future ones.
The more extreme of these suggested that mysterious and
1. R.B. Cattell: The Fight for Our National Intelligence
(1937), pp. 1-3, 43.
2. A common claim was one such as Sir Bernard Mallet's that
between 1906 and 1929 the number of mental defectives
increased by 35% while the population only increased by
14%. Mallet (President of the Eugenics Society) to
Neville Chamberlain (Minister of Health), 18/2/29,
P.R.O. MH 58/103.
3. For an outline of this concept, see C.P. Blacker (ed.):
A Social Problem Group? (1937).
4. Leonard Darwin, in introduction to Cattell, op. cit., p. ix.
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deep-seated "biological changes had taken place in the
physiology of individuals in industrialised societies,
caused by such factors as the increased use of artificial
fertilisers, food preservatives, soap, etc., and so per¬
vasive had these theories become by the 1940s that the
Royal Commission felt it necessary to set up a special
Biological and Medical Sub-Committee to look into the
1
question of declining reproductive capacity. However,
most commentators realised that the decline in fertility
had been voluntary: as early as 1905-6 the Fabian Society
had conducted an investigation of 316 middle class marriages,
taken from all parts of Britain, and had found that 242 were
2
limiting their families. It was the cause of this voluntary
limitation that was so baffling. Professor Raymond Pearl,
the biologist, drew an analogy with the behaviour of fruit-
flies and suggested that human beings also slowed down their
3
breeding when a certain degree of overcrowding was reached.
The eminent economist G. Udny Yule attributed it to changes
4
in price levels. Beveridge singled out the increased avail-
r
ability and reliability of contraceptives after 1880. Others
invented their own causes, like Dr. John Brownlee's "race
S 7
physiology" or Raymond Cattell's "social melancholia",
1. Report of the Royal Commission on Population, op. cit.,
pp. 1, 31-2.
2. Sidney Webb: The Decline in the Birth-Rate (1907), pp. 10-12.
3. McCleary, op. cit. (1945), p. 45.
4. G. Udny Yule: The Fall in the Birth Rate (1920), p. 39.
5. W.H. Beveridge: "The Fall of Fertility Among European
Races", Economica, 5,: March 1925>, p. 20. In fact, the
vulcanisation of rubber (making mass manufacture of
reliable contraceptives possible) had been discovered in
the 1840s.
6. John Brownlee: "The Present Tendencies of Population
in Great Britain With Respect to Quantity and Quality",
Eugenics Review, 17, July 1925, p. 75.
7. Cattell, op. cit., pp. 146-158.
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until by the end of the 1930s two population experts
could list numerous bizarre 'explanations' that had been
put forward at various times: "fear of another world war;
the inadequate wages paid to the working man; the cost and
difficulty of obtaining domestic servants; the craze for
amusement and pleasures; the 'pace' of modern life; over¬
indulgence by the modern girl in athletics; the danger of
dying in childbirth; the increase in homosexuality among
men; the selfishness of the modern girl; the demoralising
1
influence of towns".
That politicians shared this bewilderment is well
illustrated by the February 1937 House of Commons debate on
Ronald Cartland's motion warning that the tendency of the
population to decline could well constitute "a danger to
the maintenance of the British Empire and to the economic
well-being of the nation", and calling on the Government
2
to institute an enquiry. Speaker after speaker expressed
ignorance of the causes of the declining birth rate, and
various bizarre explanations were suggested: F.A. Broad
blamed the high cost of -housing, the Government spokesman
(R.A. Hudson) vaguely referred to a "psychological factor"
and R.A. Pilkington even attributed it to the increased
number of women entering public life, like "lambs straying
^5
out into the jungle".
1. C.P. Blacker and D.V. Glass: Population and Fertility
(1939), p. 6.
2. Hansard, Vol. 320, 10/2/37, Col. 482.
3. Ibid., Cols. 515-6, 530, 504.
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Of course, many experts and non-experts in the inter-
war years realised that the explanation lay in the general
'rising standard of living' argument later developed by
J.A. Banks in Prosperity and Parenthood (1954), an(i that
reversing the trend was probably outwith man's control.
Nevertheless, in the generally alarmist atmosphere it was
inevitable that family allowances should be seized upon as
a possible means of raising the birth rate. The remainder
of this chapter will outline the pro-natalist arguments for
or against family allowances as expressed by eugenists,
•population experts and the Family Endowment Society leaders.
Finally, the response of the Government to these arguments
will be considered.
The eugenics movement in Britain grew directly, if
slowly, out of Social Darwinism and owed much to the pion-
2
eering work of Francis Galton. Born in 1882, Galton was
a cousin of Charles Darwin, and after the publication of
the latter's The Origin of the Species in 1869 he began to
apply his mind to the possibility of substituting social
3
controls for natural selection in shaping human evolution.
Galton investigated the pedigrees of famous families and
1. See, for example, Francois Lafitte: "The Work of the
Population Policies Committee", Eugenics Review, 31,
April 1939, pp. 49-53, and speech by J. Morgan Jones
in Hansard, Vol. 320, 10/2/37, Cols. 522-3.
2. Eugenic■ideas can be traced back as far as Plato's
Republic.
3. L.C. Dunn: "Cross Currents in the History of Human
Genetics", in Adela S. Baer (ed.): Heredity and Society
(New York, 1973), p. 21. There is as yet no adequate
published history of the British eugenics movement.
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concluded that those qualities that caused men to become
leaders in society were primarily inherited; in addition,
nations or races owed their position in the 'scale of
civilisation' to innate biological qualities - negroes,
1
for example, being a "sub-race". Galton concluded from
these and other experiments that by selective breeding
the innate qualities of a nation could be improved or,
2
for that matter, impaired.
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century
Galton's ideas began to attract a growing band of disciples,
and the eugenics movement took shape. As they directed their
research into more and more areas, these early eugenists began
to give to the movement the two features that were to charac¬
terise it over the next half century - a profound pessimism
and a highly conservative outlook.
Darwin's writings had contained a hint of this
pessimism. For example, at one point he stated that
whereas man's early evolution had selected the 'fit' at
the expense of the 'unfit', now civilised man by his intro¬
duction of social reforms had checked this healthy process
of elimination: "we build asylums for the imbecile, the
maimed, and the sick; we institute poor-laws; and our
1. Nicholas Pastore: The Nature-Nurture Controversy
(New York, 1949), p. 22.
2. Mark Haller: Eugenics (New Brunswick, 1963), pp. 9-10.
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medical men exert their utmost skill to save the life of
every one to the last moment.... Thus the weak members of
civilised societies propagate their kind. No one who has
attended to the breeding of domestic animals will doubt that
this must be highly injurious to the race of man". Galton
and Darwin had corresponded privately on this topic and had
2
exchanged ideas on how it might be counteracted, but until
the 1880s this particular implication in evolutionary theory
was ignored by the many who called themselves Social
Darwinists and the prevailing interpretation tended to
be the optimistic Lamarckian one that characteristics
acquired during the life of an individual could be passed
on to future generations. ^
Galton, however, specifically rejected Lamarck's
theories and instead maintained that the natural tendency
of civilised races was to decline in innate ability unless
positive steps were taken to control the breeding of certain
5
sections of the population. The generation of eugenists
1. Darwin: The Descent of Man (1871), quoted in ibid., p. 4.
2. Gertrude Himmelfarb: Victorian Minds (1968), p. 326.
3. As Himmelfarb has shown, Social Darwinism could be used to
justify many apparently contradictory doctrines - laissez-
faire, socialism, racism, anti-racism, pacifism, imperialism,
etc. Ibid., pp. 314-332.
4. For a brief account of how these ideas influenced the
Liberal Party, see Peter Fraser: Joseph Chamberlain (1966),
pp. 2-3.
5. In Hereditary Genius (1869) Galton investigated the
fertility of English judges who had lived between 1660 and
1865. Of the 31 who had gained peerages (thus being the
most worthy, according to Galton), 12 had become extinct.
The English race had therefore lost 12 families from which
it could have gained many subsequent leaders, he argued.
C.P. Blacker: Eugenics: Galton and After (1952), p. 59.
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after Galton increasingly stressed this pessimistic inter¬
pretation: the British race was not only losing its stock
of 'great men' but was becoming increasingly burdened with
a 'social problem group' at the bottom who bred recklessly
and made up the bulk of paupers, criminals, lunatics, deaf
mutes, feeble-minded, etc.
Thus according to A.F. Tredgold, between one-fifth and
one-quarter of the total workhouse population were "mentally
affected and quite unfitted to be at large"; at least 20%
of the criminal population were mentally defective; and of
all the feeble-minded in the country, no less than two-thirds
2
were being supported by the general public. These members
of the 'social problem group' were said to be breeding at an
alarming rate: according to Tredgold the average number of
children in 'mentally degenerate' families was 7.3 as against
"2j
4.63 for the general population, and Karl Pearson claimed
1. A full explanation of why the eugenics movement became
increasingly pessimistic would need to be lengthy and
complex. However, it is worth noting two points. Firstly,
this pessimism coincided with, and was no doubt influenced
by, fundamental changes in British society after circa. 1870:
the onset of the 'Great Depression'; increased economic
rivalry with Germany and the U.S.A.; the decline in the
birth rate; colonial and international rivalry; concern
over national fitness; growing awareness of poverty and
social problems; and, in particular, the rise of working
class political power. Secondly, the concept of a 'social
problem group', 'submerged tenth' or 'residuum' was also
to be found in other contemporary observers like
Charles Booth or the Salvation Army leader William Booth,
and has appeared in one form or other in literature on
social problems ever since.
2. A.F. Tredgold: "The Feeble-Minded", Contemporary Review,
97, June 1910, p. 719.
3. Ibid., p. 721.
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that the figures for tuberculosis sufferers was 5.7 and
-]
for albinotics was 5.9. Leonard Darwin calculated that
the cost to the community of such people was fully
£48,000,000 per annum, and maintained that if they were
not allowed to reproduce in future, the 'fit' members of
society would gain enormously through reduced taxation,
higher wages and increased industrial efficiency. The
connection between mental deficiency and pauperism appeared
to be proved by such statistics as the fact that of 122,000
certified idiots and lunatics in England and Wales recorded
on the 1st January 1906, 91% were paupers;^ and eugenists
were fond of quoting pedigrees of criminals, feeble-minded,
consumptives, etc., to prove that the 'social problem group'
5
was rapidly expanding.
By the early twentieth century, eugenics was attracting
the interest of a wide spectrum of political opinion, and
the question of how the 'desirable' sections of society could
1. Mrs. R.J. Hawkes: What is Eugenics? (1910), p. 4.
2. Leonard Darwin: An Address on Practical Eugenics (1914),
p. 13. Darwin (1850-1943) was President of the Eugenics
Society from 1911-28 and the son of Charles Darwin.
3. Leonard Darwin: Eugenics and National Economy (1913),
pp. 13-14. ••
4. George Whitehead: Socialism and Eugenics (1911), p. 10.
This is explained by the fact that lunacy was only
officially registered on a very few occasions, application
for Poor Relief and criminal arrest being two of them.
5. For example, the Jukes sisters, born in America in the
1760s, were said to have produced by the early 20th century
830 known descendants, the majority of whom were criminals
or paupers; the total cost to the community was calculated
at £260,000. W.C.D. and C. Whetam: The Family and the
Nation (1909), p. 69.
6. In general, the eugenics movement was deeply conservative,
and opposed State intervention into social problems. See,
for example, Karl Pearson: The Groundwork of Eugenics (1909),
p. 20. But at this time it also attracted some socialists.
See George Whitehead, op. cit., and Sidney Webb: Eugenics
and the Poor Law (1909) (L.S.E. Coll. Misc. 181).
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be encouraged to raise their birth rates was being
increasingly discussed. This was part of the movement's
general demand for measures that would favour the 'best
stocks' and in fact reverse the doctrine of 'the survival
of the fittest' by replacing it with 'the survival of the
best'. "We must face the paradox", wrote Professor R.A. Fisher,
"that the biologically successful members of our society are
to be found principally among its social failures, and equally
that classes of persons who are prosperous and socially
successful are, on the whole, the biological failures, the
unfit in the struggle for existence". Thus Sidney Webb saw
that the task of eugenists was "deliberately to manipulate
the environment so that the survivors may be of the type
2
which we regard as the highest", while others went further
and suggested that such agents of social mobility as scholar¬
ships and competitive entry into the professions should be
abolished. On this analysis, the 'best' sections of the
community were thus automatically equated with the highest
L\.
social classes.
Inevitably, the idea of family endowment was suggested.
The Whethams wanted "a satisfactory system of selective public
endowment of parenthood" for those in all classes who produced
1. R.A. Fisher: The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection
(1930), p. 222.
2. Webb, op. cit., p. 5.
3. W.C.D and C. Whetham, op. cit., pp. 190-4.
4. Lancelot Hogben, in a memorable phrase, summed up eugenics
as "the pastime of decking out the jackdaws of class
prejudice in the peacock feathers of biological jargon".
L. Hogben: Dangerous Thoughts (1939), pp. 53-4.
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healthy and strong offspring to be administered by trustees
"who should look solely to the probably quality of the off-
-1
spring" and greatly extended tax relief for families. The
psychologist William McDougall suggested that the State should
introduce a family allowance system for the "best elements" in
2
society, such as senior civil servants. Thus by the time the
Family Endowment Society began campaigning in the 1920s, much
3
interest was being shown by the Eugenics Society.
This interest was tempered by a good deal of caution,
however. The 1920s saw the concept of the 'social problem
group' gain probably its widest acceptance. The brief over¬
population scare and the existence of long-term mass unemploy¬
ment seemed to give crddence to the idea of a rapidly-expanding
residuum of 'unemployable degenerates'. Eugenists argued that
by the late 1920s the number of mental defectives in England
and Wales alone had reached a total of 300,000; over half of
these owed their condition to heredity, and if they could be
prevented from having children then in three generations their
1. W.C.D. and C. Whetham, op. cit., pp. 202, 215-6.
2. William McDougall: "A Practicable Eugenic Suggestion",
Sociological Papers, 1906, pp. 74-80. For another early
semi-eugenic advocacy of family endowment, see G.A. Gaskell:
Social Control of the Birth-Rate and Endowment of Mothers
(1890).
3. The Society had been founded in 1907 as the Eugenics
Education Society, and two years later its Eugenics Review
was launched. For brief but interesting histories of the
Society and its organ, see Eugenics Review, 60, September
1968, pp. 142-175. For the purpose of this chapter the
Review has been taken as representing a fair cross-section
of eugenic opinion in Britain.
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1
number would be cut by one half. One of the most pain¬
staking attempts to provide scientific justification for
the 'social problem group' concept was E.J. Lidbetter's
research project, spread over twenty-five years, into the
family histories of Poor Law applicants: Lidbetter constructed
intricately detailed tables of pedigrees and case-histories to
prove his contention that a large proportion of those on Poor
Law relief came from a self-perpetuating class at the bottom
of the social scale, and that the cause of their poverty was
?
hereditary weakness. Few eugenists went as far as
Professor E.W. MacBride, who suggested that the unemployed
should be sterilised, but most agreed that the long-term
unemployed were, as the Eugenics Review put it, a "standing
4
army of biological misfits", and voluntary sterilisation did
attract wide support in the late 1920s and early 1930s as a
drastic solution to the problem of how to decrease the number
of mental defectives.
Not surprisingly, therefore, many eugenists saw a
universal family allowance scheme as precisely- the reverse
of what they were advocating. Such a scheme would not appreciably
raise the living standards of the higher social classes,
1. Pamphlet from the Committee for Legalising Eugenic
Sterilisation (n.d., probably 1929), P.R.O. MH 58/103, and
Parliamentary Committee on Sterilisation: The Sterilisation
of Mental Defectives (1932), p. 12, P.R.O. MH 58/104A.
2. E.J. Lidbetter: Heredity and the Social Problem Group,
Vol. I (1933) and "The Social Problem Group as a Public
Charge", in C.P. Blacker: A Social Problem Group? (1939),
pp. 152-161. Lidbetter was a Poor Law Officer from 1898-1930
and conducted his research in his spare time.
3. Pastore, op. cit., p. 167.
4. Eugenics Review, 15, April 1933, p. 5.
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Leonard Darwin argued, and since only the lowest classes
would allow their birth rates to be influenced by monetary
1
considerations, universal family endowment would be dysgenic.
The economist Professor A.C. Pigou expressed commonly-held
fears when he argued in 1923 that since the First World War
the 'best' sections of society had suffered financially in
comparison with the rest: there had been a narrowing of
income differentials between skilled and unskilled workers,
and between the professions and the working class in general,
and Pigou warned that universal family allowances would
2
exacerbate this. Thus whenever the subject was mentioned
in the Eugenics Review in the early 1920s it tended to be
3
viewed with suspicion. The New South Wales scheme, for
example, received sarcastic condemnation because it did most
for poor working class families: "the 'cult of incompetence'
4
could hardly go further!" was the Review's verdict.
However, eugenists were keenly interested in family
endowment for the higher social classes. Although their
political conservation generally made them suspicious of
State intervention, they did believe that the Government
5
should introduce measures to counteract differential fertility.
1. Darwin, op. cit. (1914), p. 10, and "Some Birth Rate Problems",
Eugenics Review, 12, January 1921, pp. 283-4.
2. A.C. Pigou: Eugenics and Some Wage Problems", in
Essays in Applied Economics (1923), pp. 80-91.
3. See, for example, C.V. Drysdale: "A Guiding Principle for
Practical Eugenic Reform", Eugenics Review, 14, July 1922,
p. 113.
4. Ibid., p. 134.:
5. Leonard Darwin: "Population and Civilisation", Economic
Journal, 31, June 1921, p. 195.
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One way of achieving this was a system whereby family
1
allowances were proportional to parental income, and when
the Eugenics Society published its statement of aims in 1926
2
this was included. Another way was through generous exten¬
sions of income tax child rebates, and the Society campaigned
for this throughout the inter-war years: when these rebates
3
were raised in 1928 the Society claimed this as a victory,
but one of its members warned that much more needed to be
done, since "in thirty years, with their present birth rate,
L\.
the upper and middle classes will be halved". A third way
was through occupational family allowance schemes for the
professions: Beveridge's L.S.E. system gained the Society's
approval, and they wanted the Government to encourage the
5
development of similar schemes.
Thus when Eleanor Rathbone delivered a talk to the
Society on the 12th November 1924, she was not unfavourably
received. Aware of her audience's opinions, she suggested
that a graded family allowance system, related to parental
income, would be best;^ in reply, Leonard Darwin was strongly
1. Eugenics Review, 16, July 1924, p. 153.
2. Ibid., 18, July 1926, p. 98.
3. The Society said it had been "largely responsible for
the first rebates and since their introduction /had/
been almost alone in frequent petitions for their
increase". Ibid., 20, July 1928, p. 75.
4. R.A. Fisher: "Income-tax Rebates", ibid., p. 79.
5. Ibid., p. 81.
6. Eleanor Rathbone: "Family Endowment in its Bearing on
the Question of Population", ibid.. 16, January 1925,
pp. 274-5. The article (pp. 270-5) was published as a
Family Endowment Society pamphlet.
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in support of this, while warning that if, on the other
hand, family endowment was seen as a means of helping the
poorest (or "least efficient types"), it would have to be
firmly resisted by eugenists. "Family allowances", he went
on, "being immediately beneficial, are almost certain to be
introduced into this country sooner or later; and the
eugenist must consider whether in place of merely opposing
this reform, it would not be wiser to endeavour to insure
2
that the tiller of maternity is turned in the right direction".
In the following discussion, opinion was fairly equally divided
for and against: Sir Lawrence Jones, for example, maintained
that work-incentives would be destroyed (since people would
produce children to maximise their income) but
Professor R.A. Fisher dispelled fears that over-population
would result.
Fisher was a member of the Family Endowment Society and
a strong supporter of occupational family allowances for the
professional classes; in the 1920s and 1930s he was probably
the most interested of all eugenists. Soon after its publi¬
cation, he gave The Disinherited Family a favourable write-up
4
m the Eugenics Review, and in many subsequent speeches and
1. Ibid., pp. 277-8.
2. Ibid., p. 278.
3. Ibid., pp. 280-3.
4. Ibid., July 1924, pp. 150-3. He deplored the strongly
feminist language of the book, but concluded that '
(subject to the income-grading principle) family
allowances "might constitute the most effective social
achievement yet designed for benefiting the human
race".
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writings advocated family allowances as a possible means
1
of counteracting differential fertility.
Between 1925 and 1932 very few references to family
allowances appeared in the pages of the Eugenics Review. In
the latter year, however, the Eugenics Society set up a
Family Allowances Sub-Committee with Fisher as Chairman and
a membership of seven that included Eva Hubback,
Professor Julian Huxley and Dr. C.P. Blacker (the Society's
General Secretary). This Committee was formed with a view
to publicising the need for eugenic family endowment, and
there were plans for co-operating with the Family Endowment
Society; but apparently it enjoyed only a brief existence,
2
for little evidence survives of its activities. The
Committee did at least produce a memorandum on family
allowances which it submitted to the Council of the Society
(presumably for consideration as part of the Society's
official policy), but the memorandum was apparently
rejected.
1. See, for example, two pamphlets by Fisher contained in
Eugenics Society Library file A 11/1: The Overproduction
of Food (reprinted from The Realist, July 1929), pp. 56-60,
and The Social Selection of Human Fertility (Herbert Spencer
Lecture, Oxford, 1932), pp. 24-31. As with most other
writers, Fisher was very ambiguous about the precise pro-
natalist effect of allowances though he advocated them for
pro-natalist reasons. In the former article (p. 60) he
wrote that family endowment was "the only agency which seems
at all capable of checking the present tendency of many
European peoples to decline in numbers; although its power
of doing so much still be regarded as doubtful and, if
effective, its action will certainly be slow".
2. The Eugenics Society Annual Report for 1932-3, P. 2,
mentions the Committee's appointment and personnel, but no
evidence of any subsequent activity can be found in the
appropriate volumes of the Review.
3. A later volume of the Review (29, April 1937, p. 12)
mentions this very briefly, but gives no reason for the
Council's decision.
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The reason for this lack of interest in family
allowances may partly have been that in the early 1930s
the eugenics movement in Britain probably reached a peak
of social conservatism. The Review for these years contains
many extreme ideas, such as the establishment of a eugenic
colony in South America where 'racially pure' Europeans
could form a model community, and increasing support for
2
the voluntary sterilisation of mental defectives. Britain
was most certainly not immune from the kind of ideology that
was being developed in Nazi Germany, and quite a number of
eugenists in these years cast approving eyes at European
fascism.^
However, from about 1934- onwards attitudes became
more liberal. As the full implications of Nazi eugenics
began to be understood, the Society began to stress positive
eugenics (encouragement of 'desirable' parenthood) as against
/ N 4
negative (such as sterilisation of 'the unfit'). The growing
number of social surveys in Britain produced irrefutable
evidence that the causes of poverty were primarily economic
1. C. Wicksteed Armstrong: "A Eugenic Colony", ibid., 25,
July 1933, pp. 91-7.
2. The whole of the April 1934 (Vol. 26) issue of the Review
was devoted to voluntary sterilisation.
3- The Review, while condemning the persecution of the Jews,
approved of Hitler's opposition to the Roman Catholic Church
in Germany, which it considered "subversive" for opposing
Nazi eugenic policies. Ibid., 25, July 1933, pp. 77-8.
4. The movement for voluntary sterilisation in Britain was of
course enormously set back by the revelations that in Nazi
Germany sterilisation was practised on those suffering from
such 'hereditary' disorders as schizophrenia, manic depression,
severe alcoholism, Huntington's chorea, epilepsy, blindness,
etc. See Eliot Slater: "German Eugenics in Practice",
ibid., 27, January 1936, pp. 292-3.
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1
rather than hereditary. Again, in the 1930s the eugenics
movement came under savage attack from left-wing scientists
like Professor Lancelot Hogben and J.B.S. Haldane, who
ridiculed its claims to scientific accuracy while liberally
employing such' decidedly unscientific terms as 'dregs',
'social misfits', 'unsound stock', etc.; such critics viewed
eugenics as little more than an elitist pseudo-science designed
to justify class differences: Hogben, in his brilliantly
sardonic style, called the movement "an organisation of a
small section of the professional class with a strongly
conservative bias directed to restrict the further extension
of educational opportunities. . It has drawn its personnel and
funds from the childless rentier - twentieth-century Bourbons
2
who have earned nothing and begotten nothing". Lastly, in
the late 1930s the Eugenics Society gained an influx of young
liberal-minded members like Richard Titmuss, David Glass and
Francois Lafitte, who viewed the Society merely as a conven¬
ient organisation through which to publicise the population
problem. These new members took an active part in the Society's
affairs (Titmuss, for example, edited the Review in 1942) and
1. A notable exception was D. Caradog Jones's The Social
Survey of Merseyside (1934), Volume III of which ended with
chapters on 'sub-normal types', the chronically unemployed,
the problem of differential fertility, etc., and displayed
a very eugenic analysis of social problems. Ibid., pp.
343-547. Caradog Jones concluded (p. 546) that "all the
evidence seems to support the theory.... that in any
large centre there exists a 'Social Problem Group', the
source from which the majority of criminals and paupers,
unemployables and defectives of all kinds are recruited".
Eugenic ideas were also to be found in the publications of
the ostensibly independent research body Political and
Economic Planning. See P.E.P.: Report on the British
Health Services (1937), pp. 21, 313-8.
2. Hogben, op. cit. (1939), p. 57. See also, J.B.S. Haldane:
Heredity and Politics (1939), especially pp. 104-127.
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wrote articles for the Review in which a pro-State inter¬
vention, 'environmentalist' analysis of social problems would
1
be somewhat ingenuously cloaked in mildly eugenic language.
As a result of these combined influences the Society's
attitudes softened. In 1938, for example, it co-operated
with the research organisation Political and Economic Planning
to form a Population Policies Committee "for the purpose of
surveying the social and economic conditions which discourage
2
the replacement of eugenically sound stocks" - the sort of
'environmental' approach that would have been unthinkable ten
years earlier.
Naturally, in this changing atmosphere attitudes to
family allowances changed too. In 1934- the Eugenics Society
published another statement of aims: family allowances received
a favourable mention, but only if of the equalisation fund
method; any flat-rate, State-financed system was seen as
3
"wholly dysgenic". However, such reservations were diminishing.
In 1933, for example, the psychologist Professor William McDougall
1. For example, a 1942 article by Titmuss and Lafitte on
"Eugenics and Poverty" was in fact an enthusiastic review
of Rowntree's Poverty and Progress and mentioned heredity
not at all. Op. cit., 33, January 1942, pp. 106-112. Two
more liberalising factors came in the persons of
Dr. Maurice Newfield, who edited the Review from October
1933 to 1949, and Dr. C.P. Blacker, who was General
Secretary from 1931 to 1952. Both steered the Society
away from the policies of the older, more conservative
members (many of whom had died by the 1930s anyway).
2. Ibid., 30, April 1938, p. 4.
3. Ibid., 26, July 1934, p. 135.
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repeated the pro-natalist case for family allowances that
-1
he had first put to the Sociological Society in 1906. As
in 1906, McDougall still expressed great faith in the ability
of a family allowance system to raise birth rates and wanted
one in which payments would be proportional to parental income
so that the highest social classes with the least children
2
would benefit most. But he no longer insisted that family
allowances should be confined only to the professional classes
(as he had in 1906), he quoted with-approval several statements
by Eleanor Rathbone, Eva Hubback and Marjorie Green, and he
concluded with the glowing words: "Family allowances are so
obviously just, so economically expedient, so politically
advantageous, so powerful to promote the aims of the humani¬
tarian and the feminist, that in a world racked with economic
distresses and discontents, a world of rapidly falling birth¬
rates, a world deeply concerned to effect radical changes
in its economic system, we may confidently expect to see them
universally instituted in one form or another in the immediate
future".^
The spread of the family endowment principle into many
areas of social policy by the 1930s led eugenists to demand
that the principle be applied to wage- and salary-earners as
1. In National Welfare and National Decay (1921), pp. 195-201,
McDougall had also suggested eugenic family endowment for
the professions only.
2. William McDougall: "Family Allowances as a Eugenic
Measure", Character and Personality (Durham, N. Carolina),
2, December 1933, p. 114.
3. Ibid., p. 115.
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well; frequent complaints were made on the lines that the
Government provided "family endowment for paupers and unemploy-
ables, and none for those working; while, at the same time, we
penalise procreation among the more effective sections of the
population by means of crushing taxation". By the middle
1930s the general concern over the birth rate and the more
liberal trend within their movement was causing eugenists
to view the prospect of universal family allowances with
decreasing suspicion, and when R.B. Cattell still insisted
in 1937 that a scheme should be restricted to the higher
2
occupational groups, his viewpoint was unrepresentative of
the trend of opinion within the Eugenics Society.
Thus by the mid 1930s the eugenic case for and against
family allowances had merged into the general demographic case
which was being put forward by various social scientists,
economists and population experts with increasing urgency.
This latter group generally supported family allowances and,
being either indifferent towards the eugenics movement or
openly opposed to it, had no fears that a flat-rate universal
scheme would 'encourage the poor to breed recklessly'.
In the 1920s, little interest was shown by population
experts in family allowances. Much of the discussion on family
allowances in that decade centred on the wages question, and
the birth rate arguments were of minor importance. Concern
1. Eugenics Review, 25, July 1933, p. 91.
2. Cattell, op. cit., pp. 116-9.
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was expressed that a scheme might exacerbate the 'over¬
population problem' of the early 1920s: Paul Douglas, for
example, mentioned this as a possible objection to a family
allowance scheme, maintaining that "the great problem for
Western civilisation, and Eastern too for that matter, is
-i
how to limit population, and not how to expand it". But
mostly there were doubts over whether family allowances would
2
really influence the birth rate either way: J.H. Richardson
approved of the principle for the lowest paid, but pointed
out that "its value in the case of other groups of workers
depends to a large extent on its effects on population,
regarding which there is at present little satisfactory
evidence".
However, by the mid 1930s the increasing general concern
over the population problem attracted interest in family
allowances among liberal-minded social scientists, demographers,
politicians, etc. Probably the start of this new concern can
be fixed at the year 1936 when there were published three
important books publicising the problem - D.V. Glass's
The Struggle for Population, R.R. Kuczynski's Colonial
L\. _
Population and A.M. Carr-Saunderd^s World Population. In
1. Paul Douglas: "Some Objections to the Family Wage System
Considered", Journal of Political Economy (Chicago), 36,
October 1924, p. 691.
2. Professor R.A. Fisher pointed out that the French industrial
systems had had no measureable effect, though they might have
slowed down the rate of fertility decline. R.A. Fisher:
"The Effect of Family Allowance on Population", in
W.H. Beveridge (ed.): Six Aspects of Family Allowances
(1927), p. 11.
3. J.H. Richardson: A Study on the Minimum Wage (1927), p. 121.
4. On the 28th and 29th September 1936 The Times carried two
articles on the population problem that aroused much interest.
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the following year the Sociological Review devoted an
issue to population problems, and in its pages G.F. McCleary
expressed the view increasingly held by social scientists
that "the public is at last beginning to realise that the
population question is of such importance, that compared
with it most of the topics that fill the newspapers sink
1
into insignificance".
The most important practical expression of this concern
was the formation of the Population Investigation Committee
in 1936. This was a research body under the Chairmanship of
2
Professor Carr-Saunders which used the offices of the
Eugenics Society for its headquarters and received a grant
from the Society, but was technically independent from it.
Some informal co-operation was obtained from several
Zj.
Government Departments, but apart from that no help was
forthcoming from official sources. The Committee's aim was
to co-ordinate research and investigate possible remedies
for the population problem, and economic inducements to
1. Sociological Review, 29, July 1937, p. 310.
2. The other members were (in 1937) Lord Horder,
Dr. C.P. Blacker, Eva Hubback and Professor Julian Huxley
(representing the Eugenics Society), J. Eardley Holland
(British College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists),
H.D. Henderson (Royal Economic Society), Dr. Stella Churchill
(Society of Medical Officers of Health), Dr. L.S. Penrose
(Medical Research Council), Sir Charles Close (British
Population Committee), Professor Lancelot Hogben,
Colin Clark and T.H. Marshall. D.V. Glass was the full-
time Research Secretary.
3. The Society donated £500 in 1937. Other prominent donors
were Lawrence Cadbury (£200 over two years) and
Seebohm Rowntree (£50). "Population Investigation
Committee First Annual Report", Eugenics Review, 29,
January 1938, p. 243.
4. Ibid., p. 240-1.
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parenthood such as family allowances were included on its
agenda. Although the evidence from European family allowance
schemes indicated that they were having no effect on birth
rates, the pro-natalist case for family allowances was
attracting more support than ever before, and in 1938
another independent research committee was formed. This
was the Population Policies Committee (jointly supported by
the Eugenics Society and P.E.P.) and its terms of reference
included the study of family allowances.
This latter Committee was clearly in favour of family
allowances as an anti-poverty measure; but on their pro-
natalist effect it maintained that only if family allowances
were introduced as part of a much wider population policy
could results be expected: "Family endowment in the sense
solely of cash allowances cannot be regarded as a panacea for
the population problem", wrote Lafitte: "A clearly thought-
out population policy will probably include cash allowances
in some shape or form among its measures, but it will include
them as one element in an integrated system of measures rather
1. The Population Investigation Committee had been briefly
preceded by a Positive Eugenics Committee sponsored by the
Eugenics Society alone. The latter body had commissioned
D.V. Glass to study foreign family allowance schemes, and
his report was published as The Struggle for Population
(1936). Glass concluded (pp. 87-8) that they were not
influencing fertility but pointed out that nowhere did
they come near to covering the cost of maintaining a child.
2. The Committee's Chairman was Professor N.F. Hall and its
membership consisted of Blacker, Carr-Saunders, Glass,
Caradog Jones, Eva Hubback and E.M.H. Lloyd (from the
Eugenics Society) and H.C. Emmerson, Max Nicholson and
S.K. Ruck (from P.E.P.). Francois Lafitte was Secretary.
Eugenics Review, 30, July 1938, p. 129.
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1
than as the main plank of its programme". With equal
firmness, Lafitte insisted that such a population policy
should be accompanied by social reforms to ensure that
"every child that is brought into the world is guaranteed
an adequate basic minimum of food, clothing, shelter and
2
medical care".
By the end of the 1930s, therefore, the general
pro-natalist case for family allowances had absorbed the
eugenic case (for and against), and was frequently being
expressed in the same breath as the anti-poverty case by
social scientists who saw the population problem as part of
a much wider social problem needing drastic economic remedies.
Glass wrote that "if there is to be any significant increase
in the birth-rate, the major part must come from the working-
class. Consequently, no action is likely to have a permanent
influence unless it provides conditions in which the working-
class is able to bring up children without thereby suffering
3from economic and social hardship"; Carr-Saunders called
4
for future social policies to be much more family-orientated;
and Hogben maintained that only a new socialist approach to
5
the State and the family would achieve an upturn in fertility.
These writers denied that family allowances alone would be pro-
natalist. Yet by this time the pro-natalist misconceptions
were so strong that their words went unheeded.
1. F. Lafitte: "The Work of the Population Policies Committee",
ibid., 31, April 1939, p. 49.
2. Ibid., p. 55.
3. Glass, op. cit., (1936), p. 91.
4. A.M. Carr-Saunders: World Population (1936), pp. 256-7.
5. Hogben, op. cit., (1937), pp. 178-192.
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So far this chapter has shown how in the inter-war
years the demographic case for (and against) family allow¬
ances was presented in a bewildering multitude of ways,
often overlapping onto very dubious eugenic topics such as
sterilisation. Because of this confusion, it was then (as
now) extremely difficult to trace any thread of consistency
running through the many claims and counter-claims that were
made. If this creates great problems for the modern researcher,
it inevitably created even greater ones for the Family Endow¬
ment Society. As a small pressure group led principally by
women, its leaders felt obliged to try and attract support
for their cause from as many sections of public opinion as
possible, and in doing so they tended to alter their view¬
point according to what sort of audience they were addressing.
When applied to the pro-natalist and demographic arguments this
technique only served to confuse issues even further.
The 'Equal Pay and the Family' group of 1917-18
considered the population question and decided that family
endowment could only have a beneficial effect: it would
redress differential fertility by raising the birth rate of
the professional and artisan classes, and lowering it among
"those classes of the community where there is at present
1
no check but the physical capacity of the parents". This
tended to be the attitude of the Family Endowment Society
through the 1920s. Family allowances would raise the economic
1. K.D. Courtney, e.t al: Equal Pay and the Family (1918),
pp. 31-4.
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status and self-respect of the lowest classes,' and thereby
also raise them out of the sort of mentality that produced
large, unplanned families; in any case, the lowest classes
were having the maximum number of children that was physically
possible, and therefore cash payments would not make them
any more prolific; and, finally, the birth rates of the
1
middle and upper Glasses might be raised. Thus when
addressing the Eugenics Society in 1924, Eleanor Rathbone
mentioned the known connection between overcrowding and high
fertility and suggested that family endowment, "by making it
more possible for families to obtain accommodation proportionate
to their size, might then be expected to reduce the birth-rate
2
among the slum-dwellers". As a final point, the Society
tended to emphasise that since its aim was to get the
principle of family endowment accepted, any criticism over
possible effects on the quality and quantity of population
growth should result in the adjustment of any proposed scheme
(e.g. from a universal flat-rate one to one with graded payments)
rather than the complete abandonment of the principle. As in
other aspects of their campaign, the Society were very careful
not to alienate any one section of opinion on the birth rate
issue.
1. For an outline of this view, see Mary Stocks:
The Case for Family Endowment (1927), pp. 73-83.
2. E. Rathbone: Family Endowment in Its Bearing on the
Question of Population (1924), p. 2.
3. E. Rathbone: The Disinherited Family (1924), p. 232.
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Eleanor Rathbone, however, was not unconscious of
eugenic arguments, and in her discussion of these she
undoubtedly added an element of confusion. In 1917 she
deplored the fact that the lowest classes were producing
the most children, warning that "hence we are as a nation
recruiting the national stock in increasing proportion from
those who have sunk into the lowest strata because they are
1
physically, mentally or morally degenerate". In
The Disinherited Family she appeared to contradict herself,
for while disagreeing with the eugenists' conception of 'bad
stock' she still could declare that "on the whole the elements
in the working class who are restricting their families (in
whatever way they do it) represent the cream, and those who
2
are not practising restriction the dregs". Again, in a
letter to The British Weekly in 1924 she declared it impossible
to say whether family allowances would raise the quantity of
the population, but then said that its quality would be
improved "by encouraging the thrifty, ambitious artisan and
professional classes to have more children and by making
possible to the unskilled workers those higher standards with
regard to housing, orderly living and the status of women,
which are the best antidote to excessive and dysgenic breeding".-'
1. E. Rathbone: "The Remuneration of Women's Services",
Economic Journal, 27, March 1917, p. 66.
2. Op. cit., p. 239.
3. Press cutting of 17/5/24 in Beveridge Papers XII.' 6.
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This confusion was made worse when, in the early 1930s,
the Family Endowment Society leaders decided to campaign for
occupational family allowance schemes in certain professions,
for now they began to stress the pro-natalist arguments more
and more. Although this new strategy was forced on them
primarily because of the post-1931 economic crisis which
made the prospect of universal family allowances very remote,
the Society's leaders, in trying to attract the maximum support
for their cause, maintained that family allowances in the
teaching profession, civil service and clergy were necessary
in order "to preserve the qualities of eugenic value in the
i
salaried and professional classes". Typical of this increas¬
ingly pro-natalist eugenic line was that put forward by
R.A. Fisher in the Society's Family Endowment Chronicle in
1931: Fisher agreed that family allowances in France had
had no effect on the birth rate, but still maintained that
they were "the most powerful available means of preserving
among civilised peoples those innate qualities which make
2
civilisation possible"; he declared that since differential
fertility was caused by the social promotion of the less
reproductive strains in society, family allowances given to
any class in society "will tend progressively to raise the
birth-rate of all classes above it, by preventing the
preferential promotion into these classes of relatively
1. Eva Hubback and Marjorie Green: "Family Endowment: a
Proposal for Constructive Eugenics in England",
Eugenics Review, 25, April 1933, p. 3^.
2. Fisher: "The Biological Effects of Family Allowances",
Family Endowment Chronicle, 1, November 1931, p. 21.
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infertile strains; and will tend in like manner to lower
the birth-rate of all classes below it by preventing the
1
preferential demotion of the more infertile". Clearly,
arguments were now becoming hopelessly confused.
The population panic of the middle and late 1930s
encouraged the Family Endowment Society's leaders to move
away from these eugenic claims and stress the value of
family allowances as a means of effecting an overall
quantitative increase. Indeed, in 1936 Eleanor Rathbone
even went so far as to say that "the factor most likely to
force the adoption of family allowances will be the approach¬
ing steady and steep decline in the population, which threatens
to become a menace to white-, civilisation and especially to
2
the Anglo-Saxon races". Whereas in the 1920s they had had
to dispel fears that family allowances would raise the birth
rate of the lowest classes, now they were in the position of
virtually saying the reverse.
The Society's leaders never actually came out with an
unequivocal declaration that family allowances would be
pro-natalist; it is important to remember this. But they
did create that impression by their increasingly frequent
1. Ibid., p. 24. See also, Fisher: "Family Allowances",
Eugenics Review, 24, July 1932, pp. 87-95. Fisher's view
that infertility caused social promotion was a latter-day
version of Arsene Dumont's "social capillary" theory and
was, in a simple sense, the correct explanation turned on
its head. His theory was purely speculative, and
unsupported by any convincing evidence.
2. 1936 Circular Letter to Constituents, p. 3, contained in
Eleanor Rathbone Papers XIV 3. 4.
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mentioning of the population problem as one (out of
several) reasons why family allowances should be intro¬
duced, and their claims that family allowances would remove
-i
at least part of the economic obstacles to parenthood.1 Thus
at no point in her Family Allowances (1938) did Marjorie Green
openly state that family allowances would raise the birth
rate; but .at the same time she maintained that a declining
population would be one of the consequences of a wage system
2
that took no account of family needs. Similarly, when
writing in the Sociological Review of July 1937, Eva Hubback
admitted that European family allowance schemes had not been
pro-natalist, but pointed out that they had not covered the
real cost of rearing children and insisted that if any scheme
was to achieve demographic results in Britain it would have
to provide adequate payments; for the professional classes,
this could 'only be achieved by grading payments in relation
to parental income. Some prominent supporters of the Family
Endowment Society inevitably interpreted this wrongly, and
abandoned caution: speaking in the House of Lords, for
example, Viscount Samuel confidently declared that a family
allowance scheme was "the principle measure that can be
adopted on the economic side to deal with this problem of
1. For example, in Eleanor Rathbone's The Case for Direct
Provision for Dependent Families through Family Allowances
(F.E.S. pamphlet, 1938), under the heading "The Uses of
Family Allowances" the same amount of space was given to this
as was given to the anti-family poverty case.
2. Op. cit., pp. 20-22.
3. Hubback: "Family Allowances in Relation to Population
Problems", op. cit., 29, July 1937, pp. 281-4.
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1
the decline in parenthood". Without fully intending to,
the Family Endowment Society's leaders had contributed to
the growing misconception that cash allowances would raise
the birth rate.
Finally, there must be considered the extent to which
the demographic case for family allowances made an impression
on the Government in the period 1918-39.
Eugenic aspects of the case appear to have had no
influence at all. Indeed, eugenic ideas in general were
regarded with great caution by the Ministry of Health (the
Department most relevant). The cause which eugenists worked
hardest at to win Government acceptance was that of voluntary
sterilisation, and it therefore serves as an interesting
example of the Government's attitude.
Throughout the 1920s the idea of voluntary sterilisation
for mental defectives attracted growing support from eugenists:
they claimed that it would allow defectives to lead more
normal lives instead of having to be segregated in asylums,
and would in time reduce the financial, administrative and
2
social burden they imposed upon society. In 1928 the Eugenics
Society and other interested organisations decided to lobby
1. Hansard (Lords), Vol. 113, 21/6/39, Col. 612.
2. The Eugenics Review saw voluntary sterilisation as "an
added liberty, a humane and honourable alternative for
hereditarily afflicted men and women who to-day have no
choice except between celibacy or the risk of transmitting
their defect". Op. cit., 26, April 193^, p. 3- The
Eugenics Society was always opposed to compulsory
sterilisation.
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the Government, requesting that some sort of official
commission be set up to investigate the possibility of
1
legislation for voluntary sterilisation: the Society even
2
published a draft Bill in the Review. Campaigning continued,
with the Society setting up, in 1929, a special Committee for
Legalising Eugenic Sterilisation. This Committee published
a pamphlet, 10,000 copies of which were sent out between the
3
1st July and 1st December 1930 alone to various organisations;
and in-1931 a private member's motion was unsuccessfully intro-
4
duced into Parliament.
In June 1932 this campaigning achieved something when
the Government appointed a Departmental Committee on Steri¬
lisation under the Chairmanship of L.G. Brock, Chairman of the
5
Board of Control. The Brock Committee's Report unanimously
recommended the legalisation of voluntary sterilisation for
mental defectives, those suffering from transmissible hereditary
disorders and those believed likely to transmit hereditary
6
disorders, subject to various safeguards. Thereafter,
pressure was exerted on the Ministry of Health to implement
the Brock proposals, but nothing resulted.
1. See letters from various organisations, including the
Eugenics Society, to Neville Chamberlain, Minister of Health,
contained in P.R.0. MH 58/103.
2. Op. cit., 20, October 1928, pp. 166-8.
3. C.P. Blacker: "The Sterilisation Proposals", ibid., 22,
January 1931, p. 240. A copy of the pamphlet is contained
in P.R.O. MH 58/103.
4. The motion was introduced by Major A.G. Church and sought
leave to introduce a Bill providing for the voluntary
sterilisation of mental defectives. The motion was defeated
by 167 votes to 89. Hansard, Vol. 255, 21/7/31, Cols. 1250-6.
5. Material relating to the appointment of the Committee is
contained in P.R.O. MH 58/104a. The membership included
Professor R.A. Fisher.
6. Report of the Departmental Committee on Sterilisation, 1934,
Cmd. 4485, p. 574
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The Ministry of Health appear to have been mildly
interested in voluntary sterilisation, but realised that
public opinion was against it and that therefore any legis¬
lation would be politically impossible. Sir Arthur Robinson,
for example, wanted much more investigation into the sterilisation
of mental defectives: he found it "repugnant to common sense
that, if a mentally deficient parent or parents on the average
produces or produce similar children, the State should allow
them to continue to do so and thereby throw on the next gener¬
ation problems of segregation or supervision which this gener¬
al
ation has conspicuously failed to solve". But the Ministry
were well aware of the strength of opinion in some quarters.
The Labour Party saw sterilisation as merely an obscuring of
the real problem - bad environmental conditions - and maintained
that the apparent increase in mental deficiency was in fact
2
really due to better registration. The Churches were sus-
3
picious, with the Roman Catholic Church steadfastly opposed.
Thus when several organisations joined together to send a
deputation to the Ministry of Health in 1935 asking that the
Brock proposals be implemented, they were told that too large
a section of public opinion was against them and that therefore
4
the Government would be unable to introduce an appropriate Bill.
1. Robinson to Chamberlain, 18/4/29, P.R.O. MH 58/103.
2. Labour Party Research and Information Department. Public
Health Advisory Committee. The Causes and Prevention of
Mental Deficiency (July 1929), contained in ibid., and
speech by Dr. H. Morgan (Labour) in Hansard, Vol. 255,
21/7/31, Cols. 1252-6.
3. Eugenics Review, 22, January 1931, p. 246.
4. Note of Deputation, 23/5/35, P.R.O. MH 58/100. The
organisations were the County Councils Association, the
Association of Municipal Corporations, the Mental Hospitals
Association and the Joint Committee on Voluntary Sterilisation
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Beyond this, there is no evidence of Government
interest in eugenic causes - particularly in a matter like
occupational family allowance schemes to encourage births in
the professional classes. Indeed, on the general issue of the
trend of population the Government's attitude was one of
indifference. Certainly, they did respond to Ronald Cartland's
1937 House of Commons motion by introducing the 1938 Population
(Statistics) Act which extended the scope of the particulars
which could be asked for upon the registration of a birth,
stillbirth, death or marriage. But the Government evidently
regarded the population panic of the late 1930s with scepticism,
and thought that the alarmist projections of future birth rate
2
trends were not to be taken seriously. Little was known about
the exact causes of the decline in fertility, they maintained,
and in this situation no claims could be made for a remedy like
family allowances.
1. Contained in Parliamentary Papers, 1937-8, iv, pp. 147-166.
According to the Financial Memorandum preceding the bill, this
new information was necessary in order "to provide the
statistical evidence needed for the practical consideration
of the problems in regard to the future population of Great
Britain to which the decline in the birthrate has given rise".
A brief but very interesting account (partly based on General
Register Office papers and partly on personal recollection)
of the campaign by demographers in the late 1930s to get the
Government to introduce better birth registration, which
resulted in the 1938 Act, is contained in D.V. Glass:
Numbering the People (1973), pp. 170-180.
2. See Note (undated, unsigned) prepared by Registrar General's
Department in preparation for Cartland's motion in P.R.O.
MH 58/311. In January 1935 the Minister of Health,
Sir Hilton Young, did suggest to his Cabinet colleagues that
an extra census in 1936 might be desirable "because of its
utility as a basis for national planning in such matters as
housing", but this was rejected on grounds of economy.
Cabinet meeting of 16/1/35, Cabinet 4 (35), P.R.O. CAB 23/81.
3. Memorandum: "Optimum Population" (n.d., probably 1937),
P.R.O. MH 58/311. This was also in preparation for Cartland's
motion. Curiously, the Ministry of Health seem to have
imagined that if the forthcoming debate produced a demand for
family allowances it would come from Labour M.P.s.
234
One area of public policy in which the Government did
appear to display concern over the falling birth rate, and
showed an interest in family endowment as a remedy, was that
of income tax child rebates. For most of the 1920s these
stood at £36 per annum for the first child and £27 each
for subsequent children, amounting in 1927-8 to a total of
£39,510,893.^ In his 1928 Budget the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, Winston Churchill, raised them to £60 and £50
respectively, justifying this on the grounds that "the
burden of bringing up a family of young children weights
very heavily upon the smaller class of Income Tax payer....
the notable decline in the birth rate since the War is a
convincing witness of the burden upon parents who have young
children depending upon them". Churchill went on to state
that "the expenses of maternity are a serious problem for all
small Income Tax payers", but apparently he did not consider
those expenses so serious for the low wage earner, for in a
panegyric on the family endowment principle (citing with
approval the ancient Roman system) he made no mention of the
2
desirability of family allowances for all. As in 1909, this
form of family endowment was welcomed unquestioningly by M.P.s;
only Hugh Dalton expressed the hope that some day child allow-
ances would be enjoyed by all income groups.
In 1931 these allowances were cut to £50 for the first
child and £40 each for subsequent children, but no mention
1• Report of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue for 1929,
Cmd. 5500, pp. 67, 70.
2. Hansard, Vol. 216, 24/4/28, Cols. 871-2.
3. Ibid., Vol. 219, 27/6/28, Cols-. 642-4.
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was made of the birth rate until 1935, when Neville Chamberlain
fixed them at £50 for all children, and justified this by-
saying: "I must say I look on the continued diminution of
the birth-rate in this country with considerable apprehension...
I have a feeling that the time may not be far distant....when
the countries of the British Empire will be crying out for
more citizens of the right breed, and when we in this country
shall not be able to supply that demand". Allowances were
yet again increased the following year to £60 for each child,
and such comments as M.P.s made on the subject tended to
2
reflect the growing concern over the birth rate.
However, such confidently pro-natalist sentiments were
not so forthcoming from Government spokesmen whenever both
Houses of Parliament discussed the possibility of family
allowances for all. Whenever Eleanor Rathbone's supporters
asked for an official enquiry into universal family allowances
they encountered a wall of indifference. Admittedly, these
demands related to the economic rather than the demographic
case, but the Government's view, as outlined by Lord Templemore
in the House of Lords in June 1939, was that family allowances
would have as little effect on the British birth rate as they
4
had had on European ones. Some Ministers like Kingsley Wood
1. Ibid., Vol. 300, 15/4/35, Col. 1634.
2. For example, speech by Sir F. Sanderson, ibid., Vol. 320,
9/2/37, Col. 214. By 1939 the total paid out in child tax
rebates was £87,409,449 per annum. Report of the
Commissioners of Inland Revenue for 1939, Cmd. 6099, p. 53-
3. See, for example, Hansard, Vol. 337, 29/o/38, Cols. 1899-1900.
4. Hansard (Lords), Vol. 113, 21/6/39, Cols. 643-4.
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did. at times voice concern, but repeatedly the Government
reaffirmed its view that only when more was known about the
exact causes of the decline in the birth rate could any claims
2
be made for such economic inducements as family allowances.
This chapter has tried to show that the demographic case
for family allowances in the inter-war years had its origins
in a much wider concern over the falling birth rate that was
spearheaded by the eugenics movement. Concern over the quality
and quantity of population growth was expressed in many
different ways, with many different remedies (most of them
highly speculative) being suggested. Family allowances were
one of these, and they received support (and opposition) for
a bewildering variety of reasons. It is, in short, very
difficult to trace any consistency in the pro-natalist argu¬
ments, for three outstanding reasons.
Firstly, the most serious obstacle to rational discussion
was the lack of reliable census data. Until the 1938 Population
(Statistics) Act, birth registration did not include the age
of the mother, the duration of the marriage and the birth
order of each child; this made the calculation of accurate
specific fertility rates impossible. Many of the pro-natalist
claims and counter-claims were thus based on the flimsiest of
hypotheses. Despite their pretensions at founding a new science,
1. Hansard, Vol. 324, 8/6/37, Cols. 1607-1611 and ibid.,
Vol. 329, 29/11/37, Cols. 1717-8.
2. For example, statement by R. Bernays (Parliamentary Secretary
to the Ministry of Health) in ibid., Vol. 344, 28/2/39,
Cols. 1088-9.
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eugenists were particularly prone to vague, unscientific
language that at times bordered on the absurd.
Secondly, it is important to remember that the debate
on family allowances and the birth rate took place mainly
in a few esoteric journals or books, and was conducted by
2
a small social and intellectual elite. In spite of the
fact that many population experts strongly doubted that
family allowances would act in a pro-natalist. way, it was
inevitable that such impressions as the public may have
gained from this debate must have created a popular mis¬
conception to the contrary. Professor R.A. Fisher certainly
attested that from his own experience the ordinary man in
the street thought of family allowances primarily as a
■3
demographic measure.
Thirdly, many of the participants in the debate were
highly inconsistent in their attitudes. Beveridge, for
example, firmly stated in his 1942 Report that the pro-
4
natalist arguments were relatively unimportant, yet in
1. A good example of this is R.B. Cattell's The Fight for
Our National Intelligence (1937), which concluded with a
plea for eugenic pro-natalist measures (pp. 108-129).
This work, which was awarded the D.Sc. by London University,
contains such statements as: "Porteus's findings of the
low average mental capacity in South American half-breeds
has some connection with that sensitiveness to ordered
Government which makes every form of government so soon
irksome to the population of those parts". Ibid., p. 51.
2. Membership of the Eugenics Society, for example, was about
650 in 1938. Eugenics Review, 30, April 1938, p. 11.
3- R.A. Fisher: "The Biological Effects of Family Allowances",
Family Endowment Chronicle, 1, November 1931, p. 21.
4. See chapter 7, pp. 442-3, 480-1.
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the inter-war years he too indulged in a certain amount
of speculation. When he first 'discovered' family allow-
ances in 1924 he viewed them as a demographic measure,
and later on he maintained that his aim in introducing
the London School of Economics family allowance scheme had
been "to remove some of the obstacles to academic infer-
2
tility": indeed, he even boasted to Professor William
IVLcDbugall in 1933 that it had helped produce forty
"little economists". Admittedly, this last remark was
probably made in jest, but it does serve to illustrate how
difficult it is trying to discern what family allowance
supporters like Beveridge really believed.
Whatever the confusion surrounding the demographic
and eugenic case for family allowances in the inter-war
years, however, one fact of vital importance stands out
quite clearly; and that is that at no point did the
Government show even the slightest amount of interest in
it.
1. In 1924, when giving evidence to the Birth Control
Committee of the National Council for Public Morals,
Beveridge "said that if we wanted to check the present
dysgenic tendency in Britain it seemed likely that we
should, in the near future, have, on the one hand, to
reconsider the official attitude towards birth control,
and, on the other hand, to supplement the wage system by
a scheme of family allowances". Press cutting from
Manchester Guardian, 16/12/24, in Beveridge Papers
XII 7.
2. Beveridge to Sir John Clapham, 23/3/37, ibid., IXb 24.
3. McDougall, op. cit. (1933), p. 101.
239
CHAPTER FIVE: FAMILY ALLOWANCES AND GOVERNMENT UNEMPLOYMENT
POLICY.
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Although the family poverty and pro-natalist
arguments for family allowances made little impression
on the Government in the inter-war years, there was one
area of social policy where the family endowment principle
did become increasingly important. This was in the various
income-maintenance policies towards the unemployed, and
this chapter will show how the recognition of family needs
in Government unemployment policy gradually developed in
the inter-war years until it finally pointed to the need
for family allowances in wages.
The original scheme of State unemployment insurance
took no account of family needs. Under the 1911 Act, only
about 2\ million men out of a total male workforce of about
10 million were covered, and these belonged to trades which
were particularly subject to periodic (and hence predictable)
fluctuations of prosperity - building, construction work,
shipbuilding, mechanical engineering, ironfounding, vehicle
1
construction and sawmilling. Because the unemployment
experienced in these industries was almost always short-
term, benefits were intended to be no more than a small sum
to supplement the personal savings or private insurance which
thrifty and prudent workers were expected to have accumulated.
At a rate of 7s.Od. per week for adult men over the age of
eighteen, and 3s.6d. for youths of seventeen to eighteen
1. Report of the Unemployment Insurance Committee, 1927,
(Blanesburgh Report), p. 9"! Prior to 1911, trade union
unemployment schemes had covered about 1-g- million
workers. Eveline Burns: British Unemployment
Programmes, 1920-38 (Washington, 1941), p. 3.
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(women being excluded), benefits in no way represented
subsistence, being about one-third of the average wage
1
of the lowest regularly-paid city worker. With a six day
'waiting period', a rule of only one week's benefit per
five contributions, a minimum qualification of at least
ten contributions, and the period of benefit limited to
only 15 weeks in any benefit year, the scheme was obviously
based on actuarial principles rather than any concept of
need.^
During the First World War, unemployment in Britain
dropped to an insignificant level. Thus although the
extension of insurance to munition workers under the 1916
National Insurance (Part II, Munition Workers) Act raised
the number of insured persons to nearly 4 million by July
1918, there was a rapid fall in the amount paid out in
benefit - with the result that the insurance fund showed
4
a healthy balance of £15,000,000 at the end of the War.
With the ending of the War, however, came the first rude
shocks to the system, and thereafter Government policies to
maintain the unemployed were plagued with problems.
1. Bentley Gilbert: British Social Policy, 1914-1959 (1970),
pp. 52-3. ~
2. Looking back in 1927, the Blanesburgh Report noted that
a 1913 investigation showed that of the claimants who
did not succeed in obtaining benefit the great proportion
failed only because they had not been unemployed for six
days; only 1% had exceeded the term of benefit, and there
was no supplementation of income by the Poor Law or any
other source. "These facts", it concluded, "are a notable
tribute to the prudence, self-reliance and self-respect of
the insured workers as a whole". Op. cit., p. 10.
3. Gilbert, op. cit., p. 55.
4. Percy Cohen: The British System of Social Insurance (1931),
p. 115.
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The full story of the breakdown of unemployment
insurance in the years after the First World War is an
extremely complex one, and has been well told by a number
of writers. What particularly concerns this study, however,
is the way that out of the jumble of temporary expedients,
ad hoc solutions and last-minute compromises that consti¬
tuted unemployment policy in these years there quietly
emerged two vitally important principles that, once intro¬
duced, proved impossible to remove thereafter and eventually
by the late 1930s created a need for family allowances. The
first was the recognition of family needs via the payment
of dependants' allowances for the unemployed; the second
was the State's commitment to supporting the able-bodied
unemployed at some sort of subsistence level separate from
2
the Poor Law.
Both had their origins in the system of out-of-work
donation introduced on the 25th November 1918. This had
begun as a scheme of relief for ex-servicemen unable to
find jobs on demobilisation, but with the sudden ending of
the War, and in the absence of any proper plans for an
enlarged unemployment insurance scheme to ease the trans¬
ition from war to peace, it was hurriedly extended to
1. Percy Cohen: Unemployment Insurance and Assistance in
Great Britain (1938), pp. 19-37, and The British System
of Social Insurance (1931), pp. 115-148. Mary Barnett Gilson:
Unemployment Insurance in Great Britain (1931), pp. 3-63-
Eveline M. Burns, opT cit., pp. 35-110. Gilbert, op. cit.,
pp. 51-97.
2. Derek Fraser: The Evolution of the British Welfare State
(1973), p. 170.
3• Final Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Scheme
of Out-of-Work Donation, 1919, Cmd. 305, p. 3.
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civilians as well. Since the original military out-of-
work donation scheme had been based on separation allowances,
both it and the civilian scheme included child allowances:
in addition to benefits of 29s.Od. per week for men and
25s.Od. per week for women there were payments of 6s.Od.
per week for the first child under fifteen and 3s.Od. for
each subsequent child. Thus with no realisation of the
implications the Government hurriedly included in the out-
of-work donation scheme these two glaring violations of the
1911 concept of unemployment insurance, and by doing so
created further difficulties. Instead of introducing a
completely re-organised system to meet the needs of the
able-bodied unemployed, Lloyd George's Coalition Government
stumbled through a series of short-term solutions to meet
each sudden crisis as it arose.
There were two reasons for this policy of expediency.
Firstly, there was an understandable lack of appreciation on
the part of politicians of the extent to which unemployment
was a product of long-term economic changes speeded up by
the War, and hence an unwillingness to see mass unemployment
as anything other than a temporary phenomenon. In the
immediate post-war years, after all, the ordinary insurance
scheme seemed to be working quite successfully: by the end
of 1920 the insurance fund had accumulated a balance of over
£21,000,000, despite the fact that benefits had been raised
1. These were the rates from 12/12/18. Ibid., p. 4.
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-i
in 1919 without any corresponding increase in contributions.
This healthy financial situation undoubtedly reinforced the
view prevailing in the Government that the basic 1911 system
could still work by grafting onto it various temporary exten¬
sions of benefit. Thus every extension of out-of-work donation
tended to be viewed by the Cabinet as "an emergency and temp¬
orary arrangement to meet the altogether exceptional condi¬
tions produced by the War", necessary to bridge the period
2
before a re-organised insurance plan could be introduced.
Viewed alongside the financial stability of the main insurance
system, the cost of £21,653,057 for the civilian out-of-work
donation scheme, and £40,000,000 for the military one, seemed
a reasonable price to pay to meet this apparently temporary
situation. Even after the attempt at reorganisation through
the 1920 Unemployment Insurance Act, continuing high unemploy¬
ment was seen by the Cabinet as "abnormal, due to exceptional
4
circumstances, and greatly aggravated by the Coal Strike".
Even as late as 1930 the Cabinet were still convinced by a
memorandum from the Minister of Labour that "the exhaustion
of the Unemployment Fund is due to an abnormal and unfore¬
seeable increase in unemployment, which is world-wide in
5
character". Indeed, it was really only after the 1931
economic crisis that Governments accepted that mass unemploy¬
ment was long-term.
1. Blanesburgh Report, p. 11.
2. Cabinet meeting of 6/11/19, Cabinet 3(19), P.R.O. CAB 23/18.
3. For the period November 1918 to November 1919.
Blanesburgh Report, pp. 10-11.
4. Cabinet meeting of 1/6/21, Cabinet 46(21), P.R.O. CAB 23/26.
5. Cabinet meeting of 26/3/30, Cabinet 17(30), P.R.O. CAB 23/26.
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The second reason for the many extensions of insurance
was the political impossibility of throwing destitute unem¬
ployed ex-servicemen onto private charity or the hated Poor
Law: not to provide a special scheme of insurance for these
men might cause them to express their resentment in violent
political demonstrations. Between the 25th November 1918
and the 31st March 1921 military out-of-work donation was
•temporarily' renewed four times for this reason. It had
been due to expire on the 24th November 1919, but the
Cabinet decided that unemployed ex-servicemen could not
be left without any means of subsistence over the winter
months, and agreed to a further period at slightly lower
rates which were closer to what was being contemplated for
-1
the eventual re-organised insurance scheme. Four months
2
later there had to be another extension, until July 1920.
By then the situation had actually worsened, and the
Minister of Labour, Thomas Macnamara, was being warned by
numerous ex-servicemen's organisations not to attempt any
cuts in out-of-work donation. Even without these warnings,
Macnamara was well aware of the dangers: without another
renewal, about 60,000 ex-servicemen would have no income,
and of these about half were located in eleven principal
cities. If they joined forces with other sections of the
unemployed there would be created in the big cities the
1. Cabinet meetings of 5, 6 and 7/11/19, Cabinet 2, 3 and
4(19), P.R.O. CAB 23/18.
2. Cabinet meeting of 22/3/20, Cabinet 15(20), P.R.O.
CAB 23/20.
3. Letters from these organisations contained in T 161/41
(S.2585).
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sort of politically volatile situation that would he
"eagerly exploited by the Socialist organisations which
pass from Passivism and Conscientious Objection to ardent
advocacy of the claim of the ex-Fighter with the greatest
1
ease". In addition, public opinion would not tolerate
2
these men having to apply to the Poor Law. By September
the growing industrial troubles threatened further danger.
A large body of destitute ex-servicemen, Macnamara warned
his Cabinet colleagues, could form "a discontented nucleus
which might be utilised by the extremists in any serious
industrial troubles".^ Thus in February 1921 the 330,000
ex-servicemen on the dole were incorporated into the main
insurance scheme, but only at the expense of raising all
adult men's benefit to 20s.Od. per week (the level of
military out-of-work donation), thus putting a severe
A
strain on the finances of the unemployment fund.
Meanwhile in the previous August the Government had
introduced the 1920 Unemployment Insurance Act, which
extended coverage to over 11,000,000 workers in all trades
except agriculture, private domestic service, railway workers
and certain categories of public employment. It introduced
new regulations, such as a minimum of twelve contributions,
1. Cabinet Memorandum by Minister of Labour:
Out of Work Donation (17/7/20), ibid.
2. Cabinet Memorandum by Minister of Labour:
Out of Work Donation (24/7/20), ibid.
3. Cabinet meeting of 30/9/20, Cabinet 53(20), P.R.O. CAB 23/22.
One must remember, of course, that the Russian Revolution
had taken place three years earlier.
4. Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 78-9.
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fifteen (later increased to twenty-six) weeks' benefit
in any insurance year, and the rule of one week's benefit
to every six contributions. The 1920 Act formed the basis
for subsequent unemployment insurance legislation, and was
a somewhat unrealistic re-assertion of the 1911 principles:
benefit was still seen as a small 'tiding-over' sum (and
trade unionists who could afford it were encouraged to join
voluntary insurance schemes), contributions were kept low,
and it envisaged unemployment essentially as a short-term
phenomenon. Perhaps the most striking illustration of the
Act's optimism is that it made allowance for an unemployment
rate of only 5.32%; in the years immediately following,
the annual average rate of unemployment in the insured
trades was 12.7% (1922), 11.0% (1923), 10.0% (1924) and
p
11.0% (1925). Not surprisingly, within eight months of
the passage of the 1920 Act the solvency of the insurance
fund had been destroyed.
It was against this confused background of one crisis
rapidly leading to another, with the Government always one
step behind, that there occurred an event of crucial impor¬
tance to the movement for family allowances - the intro¬
duction of dependants' allowances into the main unemployment
insurance scheme. Several historians have seen this as an
3
important family endowment principle which, by violating
1. R.C. Davison: The Unemployed: Old Policies and New
(1929), pp. 97-9.
2. Blanesburgh Report, p. 12.
3. For example, C.L. Mowat: Britain Between the Wars
(1966 edition), p. 128.
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the actuarial basis of unemployment insurance and
introducing the concept of need, led to the situation in
the 1930s where benefits for men with large families
frequently equalled or exceeded what they would have
received in wages, thus providing a powerful argument
for the introduction of family allowances in wages.
To an extent, the introduction of dependants'
allowances certainly was an important milestone. But it
should be remembered that by 1921 there had been three
recent instances of family endowment in Government policy
in child tax allowances, separation allowances and out-of-
work donation; and in addition, dependants' allowances
were hardly the sole violation of the insurance principle
in these years, since the whole structure of unemployment
insurance in the 1920s and early 1930s was based on endless
'temporary' extensions of benefit rights for which there
was no actuarial justification.
Given the policy-making chaos of the years 1918-21,
it is not surprising that no clear picture emerges of
exactly when it was decided to introduce these allowances.
Lord Aberconway's Committee of Inquiry looked at the family
allowance component in out-of-work donation (termed
"supplementary donation") and concluded that "inasmuch as
the payment of donation is dependent on the loss of wages
and the rates of wages do not vary according to the size of
the worker's family, it appears to us that it is out of place
249
and leads to undesirable results to include an allowance
for children in the rate of donation". In the course of
the Committee's evidence-taking there was some discussion
of whether compensation for unemployment should take account
2
of family needs, if wages did not; but the main objection
came from a representative of the Ministry of Labour, who said
that supplementary donation involved too much extra adminis-
"5
tration.
However, it is likely that Government Departments did
not worry too much about the extra administration involved,
nor paused to think about the implications, since at the time
it seemed likely that out-of-work donation would quickly end
and the main insurance scheme revert to the principles of
1911. The Ministry of Labour simply followed the administra¬
tive precedents of service pay separation allowances, and
since their policy was to administer the original out-of-work
4donation scheme "in a generous spirit", without being too
dependent upon rigid regulations, they tended to overlook
such anomalies as two child allowances being paid at the same
time (for example, from the donation scheme and a service
widow's pension).
1. Final Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Scheme
of Qut-of-Work Donation, 1919. Cmd. 505, p. 9.
2. Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Committee of Inquiry
into the Scheme of Out-of-Work Donation, 1919, Cmd. 4Q7,
paras. 1548-52, p. 83.
3. Ibid., paras. 511-3, p. 25.
4. T.W. Phillips to A. Bowers, 17/1/19, P.R.O. PIN 7/14.
5. Memorandum by T.W. Phillips, 4/4/19, ibid.
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The immediate impetus behind the introduction of
dependants' allowances appears to have come from the
Prime Minister, Lloyd George. Throughout 1920-1 the
Cabinet had become increasingly concerned about the
political and economic consequences of mass unemployment.
Schemes for reviving trade and providing relief works for
the unemployed were under discussion, and there was a
realisation that at its existing low benefit levels,
unemployment insurance was not going to be acceptable
to ex-servicemen. A Cabinet Committee on unemployment
had been established on the 7th September 1920, and on
the 13th September 1921 a deputation of London Labour
mayors was received by Sir Alfred Mond, Chairman of the
Committee. The mayors wanted the Government to introduce
a comprehensive and generous scheme of non-Poor Law relief.
Unemployment was a national problem, they argued: the
State had asked men to fight in the War and now it should
guarantee them adequate maintenance while out of work; in
addition, ratepayers in high-unemployment areas were bearing
the brunt of supporting the unemployed and also enduring
2
iinancial hardship as a result.
The mayors received little satisfaction from Mond,
and therefore decided to visit Lloyd George, who was on
1. Minutes of this Committee contained in P.R.O. CAB 27/114.
2. Cabinet Committee on Unemployment. Notes Taken of a
Deputation of London Mayors, exc., on 16th September 1921,
Lloyd George Papers, F/196/7/7.
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holiday at Gairloch in Scotland. Owing to a serious tooth
infection, Lloyd George refused to see them; "but they
insisted on waiting, and after four days were granted an
A
audience. The period of waiting can hardly have softened
the mayors' conviction that the Government was doing vir¬
tually nothing to help the unemployed, and the deputation
was fairly acrimonious. The mayors repeated what they had
told Mond, and added vivid descriptions of the intensity of
political feeling amongst the unemployed: the Mayor of
Hackney (Herbert Morrison) warned that "there is a bitter
feeling and a sheer lack of faith in the whole of the
institutions of the State which is growing among these bands
of hungry and desperate men. As time goes on the leadership
of unemployed organisations will tend to be rather distinct
from the organised Labour Movement, and the leadership may
get into hands which cannot be looked upon with ease, having
regard to the possibilities of the situation The
important thing to note is that it is not only the extreme
2
men who tend that way, but our best people". In reply
Lloyd George maintained that his Government had done more
for the unemployed than any other, and said that financing
a national relief plan such as contemplated by the mayors
would put an impossible burden on national finances; but he
agreed that the existing rates of unemployment benefit were
inadequate, and promised to give the matter consideration.
1. Peter Rowland: Lloyd George (1975), p. 543.
Bernard Donoughue and G.W. Jones: Herbert Morrison,
Portrait of a Politician (1973), p. 49.
2. Report of a Meeting Between the Prime Minister and London
Labour Mayors at Gairloch. September 22nd, 1921,
Lloyd George Papers F/19o/7/o.
3. Ibid. A brief account of the deputation is given in
Lord Morrison: Herbert Morrison, an Autobiography (1960),
pp. 84-5.
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Unemployment was discussed at Gairloch over the next
ten days (several members of the Cabinet being present),
and among several proposals eventually agreed upon (extra
grants for public works schemes, for guaranteeing the
repayment of loans by companies who needed capital, for
-1
improving the exports credit scheme, etc.) was the one to
set up a special temporary distress fund to finance the
payment of dependants' allowances in the main unemployment
insurance scheme: this suggestion was put to the Cabinet
Committee on Unemployment by Lloyd George on the 6th October,
and they decided to set up a small Relief of Distress
2
Committee to investigate its feasibility.
The Relief of Distress Committee met in an atmosphere
of growing alarm over the political threat posed by the
unemployed. Throughout September, while Lloyd George was
in Scotland, the Minister of Labour, Thomas Macnamara, was
reminding his Cabinet colleagues of the serious situation
that lay ahead. On the 17th September he warned that the
coming winter would see between 1 and 1-g- million unemployed
having to live solely off unemployment benefit - a situation
which would give the Communists "an opportunity the like of
3
which they have not yet had". The Home Office were closely
monitoring the activities of the organisers of demonstrations
1. Rowland, op. cit., p. 543-4.
2. Minutes of Cabinet Committee on Unemployment, 6/10/21,
Lloyd George Papers F/196/7/14. The Chairman was
Sir Robert Munro (Secretary of State for Scotland) and
membership consisted of three junior Ministers and six
civil servants.
3. The Unemployment Problem: Memorandum by the Minister of
Labour. 17/9/21. P.P. 5517. P.R.O. CAB 24/128.
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by the unemployed (even to the extent of opening their
mail and infiltrating their organisations), and were
warning the Cabinet of the threat that was posed. The
Cabinet Committee on Unemployment were by early October
fully aware of the dangers: something would have to be
done for the unemployed, many of whom had served in the War
and would rebel against any attempt to force them onto the
2
Poor Law; without some positive action, "the Government
might find themselves in the position of having alienated
the whole of the working classes, who might sweep away all
parties, put in their own people, and in the first flush of
their success undertake experiments which would endanger the
"5
life of the community".
Faced with this urgency, the Relief of Distress
Committee took little time in coming to a decision. The
only alternative discussed was whether the emergency distress
provision should be made in kind - for example, by coupons
Ll
exchangeable for food, or by soup kitchens run by Boards
of Guardians (who would receive a Government grant). But
this would be administratively complex, and would have
1. Directorate of Intelligence (Home Office): Proposed
Date of Monster Unemployed Demonstration, 26/9/21,
C.P. 3337. and Report on Revolutionary Organisations
in the United Kingdom. 6/10/21. C.P. 3380. P.R.O. CAB 24/128.
2. Minutes of Cabinet Committee on Unemployment, 6/10/21,
Lloyd George Papers, F/196/7/14.
3. Cabinet Unemployment Committee. Conclusions of Meeting
on 6/10/21, P.R.O. CAB 27/114.
4. Cabinet Unemployment Committee - Memorandum by the
Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour,
13/10/21, C.O. 283, P.R.O. CAB 27/120.
5. Relief of Distress Committee. Suggested Distress Fund
(Note by the Ministry of Labour).10/10/21, P.R.O.
CAB 27/149.
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insufficient guarantees against fraud. Dependants'
allowances could simply copy the out-of-work donation
1
system. On the 11th September the Committee therefore
decided to recommend the setting up of a temporary distress
fund for six months only, the finance of which would be
kept quite separate from the main insurance fund, with
different cards and stamps: contributions of 2d. each
from employer and employee, and 3d. from the State (with
reduced rates for women, boys and girls) would provide
5s.Od. per week for a wife and 1s.0d. per week for each
dependent child. On the 19th October, Lloyd George (in
the course of a long statement on new unemployment measures)
3
announced the introduction of the allowances.
In the first meeting of the Relief of Distress
Committee, it was said that the scheme of dependants'
allowances had been suggested by Lloyd George himself "who
thought that the Unemployment Benefit was clearly inadequate
4
in the case of a married man with a family". Yet the idea
of family endowment in unemployment benefit had already
become very familiar to all through out-of-work donation,
1. Ibid.
2. Cabinet: Report of Relief of Distress Committee, 11/10/21,
C.P. 3391, P.R.O. CAB 24/128. '
3. Hansard, Vol. 147, 19/10/21, Col. 93. The wife's
allowance could also be paid in respect of an invalid
husband, or the housekeeper of an unmarried man or
widower with young children dependent upon him; the
child allowance was for each dependent child under
fourteen years of age (or sixteen if in fulltime education).
Ministry of Labour: Report on National Unemployment
Insurance to July 1923 (1923), p. 63. ' ~
4. Cabinet. Relief of Distress Committee. Conclusions of
a Meeting on 11/10/21, P.R.O. CAB 27/149.
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and there is no doubt that civil servants had already-
considered it. In the House of Commons earlier in 1921,
for example, Macnamara had hinted that the Government had
i
weighed up the idea quite some time before.
Outside the Government, pressure had been coming for
some time from the labour movement for higher benefits and
dependants' allowances. A special T.U.C.-Labour Party
Conference in January 1921 had discussed a motion calling
for benefits of 50% of average earnings, with an additional
10% for a dependent wife and 5% for each dependent child
2
under the age of sixteen (subject to an income limit),
and eventually had recommended benefits of 40s.0d. per
week for each householder, 25s.Od. per week for single men
or women, and additional allowances for children. In
addition, militant political bodies like the National
Administrative Council of Unemployed were also demanding
4
dependants' benefits throughout 1921.
1. Hansard, Vol. 138, 23/2/21, Col. 1001. In P.R.O. PIN 1/3
there are some papers which show that as early as 1914
the Treasury had considered extending the scope of income
tax downwards, using the machinery of the 1911 Act, with
rebates for wives and children. This may have been what
Sir Horace Wilson was referring to in 1939 when he said
that "proposals for family allowances had been made at the
beginning of the war of 1914-18, but had had to be
abandoned because of Trade Union opposition". Extract
from Minutes of 11th Meeting of the Ministerial Committee
on Economic Policy, 7/12/39, P.R.O. CAB 89/22.
2. T.U.C. and Labour Party: Unemployment Insurance,
(n.d., probably 1921).
3. T.U.C. and Labour Party: Resolutionsto be Discussed at
the Special Conference of the Trades Union Congress and
the Labour Party, 27th January, (n.d., probably 1921).
4. C.P. 3337, 26/9/21, op. cit.
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In the House of Commons, the question of differentiation
between married and single unemployed men had been discussed
for some time. On the 17th February 1921 Labour M.P.s had
pressed for a recognition of family needs in unemployment
benefit, and had found the Government not unsympathetic.
Their opposition was based more on the practical problems
involved than on any objection in principle: levying a
flat rate contribution on single and married people alike
meant that the State was contracted to pay only flat-rate
benefits; if employers had to pay higher contributions
for married men they might try to discriminate against
them. The question of family benefits thus enjoyed much
discussion during the debate on the Unemployment Insurance
Act (1920) Amendment Bill (which brought the 330,000
ex-servicemen into the general scheme), and although insis¬
ting that the administrative problems were overwhelming
Macnamara did acknowledge that it was "commonsense" for
2
married men to receive more. Later, J.R. Clynes, the
Labour leader, moved an amendment demanding benefits of
40s.0d. per week for the head of a family, 25s.Od. for
adults other than a head, and 5s.Od. for dependants, main¬
taining that this was the absolute minimum that families
could live on. Several speakers insisted that the proposed
new benefits of 18s.0d. per week for men and 15s.0d. per week
for women were desperately inadequate, and there were strong
1. Hansard, Vol. 138, 17/2/21, Col. 336.
2. Ibid., 23/2/21, Cols. 1001-2.
3. Ibid., 24/2/21, Cols. 1198-1203.
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1
demands for child allowances - all of which Macnamara
met hy insisting that this would destroy the fund's solvency,
2
though he did agree to raise men's benefits to 20s.Od.
Discussion of dependants' benefits thus did not revolve
round the principle of family endowment - which was generally
accepted by all sides - but over how high such benefits
should be. While Macnamara absolutely refused to deviate
from the insurance principle, Labour speakers (following
their maxim 'work or maintenance') demanded family-related
benefits based on need, insisting that in a period of mass
unemployment it was cruel to fix benefits according to
actuarial calculations: if the Government could pay
£60,000,000 to the railway companies as compensation for
State control during the War, then they ought to be able to
find the money with which to shore up the insurance fund and
pay decent benefits; the Government were proposing to pay
only 15s.0d. per week to an unemployed man, yet were prepared
to pay £1.19s.1d. to maintain a lunatic in an asylum or
4
£1.10s.0d. to maintain a prisoner. Thus when the intro¬
duction of dependants' allowances was debated on the
1st November 1921 the family endowment principle was once
again little commented on, and the only criticism was over
1. For example, ibid., Cols. 1223-7.
2. Ibid., Cols. 1239-40. Since this brought adult men's
benefits up to what ex-servicemen had been getting, it is
likely that Macnamara had decided beforehand to give way
on this point if pressed.
3. Ibid., Vol. 143, 15/6/21, Col. 483.
4. Ibid., Col. 464. This was during the debate on a Bill
to reduce benefits from 20s.Od. to 15s.Od. per week for
men.
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the level of the allowances: several Labour M.P.s tried
to introduce amendments to raise them, the last of which
(demanding child allowances of 2s.Od.) was opposed by only
two speakers and was defeated by the relatively narrow margin
of 145 votes to 112.^
There is no doubt that dependants' allowances were
attractive to the Government for reasons of economy. Given
that they were under great political pressure in the autumn
of 1921 to raise benefits all round, yet at the same time
saw that the fund was paying out over £1,400,000 per week
2
in benefits and getting badly into debt, the Government
viewed dependants' allowances as a much cheaper alternative
to all-round increases in benefits or special grants to
3
Boards of Guardians.
Politically, dependants' allowances were also attrac¬
tive in as much as they prevented hundreds of thousands of
families from having to fall back onto the Poor Law. This
would be popular both with the unemployed themselves and
with ratepayers in economically depressed areas (who could
express their feelings in a General Election). Macnamara
admitted that these were "the main considerations" that led
the Government to continue dependants' allowances beyond
1. Ibid., Vol. 147, 1/11/21, Cols. 1626-70.
2. Ministry of Labour: Report on National Unemployment
Insurance to July 1925 (1925), P. 65.
3. Cabinet. Relief of Distress Committee. Conclusions of
a Meeting on 11/10/21, P.R.O. CAB 27/149.
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1
their original six-month period and until June 1923.
But, in addition, continuation of the allowances was also
seen by the Cabinet as a way of facilitating a possible cut
in the main benefit levels. On the 8th March 1922 Macnamara
reminded his Cabinet colleagues that a large proportion of
unemployment benefit would expire in a month's time, and a
2
Cabinet Committee was formed to recommend changes. On the
22nd March the Committee presented its Report, recommending
a continuation of dependants' allowances at the same level
along with a drastic cut in main benefits down to 12s.Od.
for a single man and 10s.0d. for a single woman.^ But in
discussion "warnings were given of the risk of grave dis¬
turbance if this course was adopted", and benefits remained
Ll
unaltered.
The intention had been to keep the dependants'
allowances system financially separate from the main fund,
so that when 'normal' conditions returned they could be
wound up. The Unemployed Workers' Dependants' (Temporary
Provision) Act, 1921, (to give it its full title), had
stipulated that allowances were to operate only for six
months from the 10th November 1921. As already indicated,
the decision to continue them was made in March 1922, and
1. Hansard, Vol. 152, 29/3/22, Col. 1376.
2. Cabinet meeting of 8/3/22, Cabinet 16(22), P.R.O. CAB 23/29.
3. Cabinet meeting of 22/3/22, Cabinet 20(22), ibid. In
terms of purchasing power, this would have been lower
than the 1911 level of benefit.
4. Ibid.
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the following month they were formally amalgamated with
the main scheme. However, for a year the policy of the
Government was still to regard them as temporary, to be
2
continued only as long as the fund remained in debt.
In early 1923, however, the decision was taken to make
3
them permanent, and by the 1923 Unemployment Insurance
4
Act this was enacted. In 1924 the child allowance was
raised to 2s.Od. per week, and the scope of the scheme was
enlarged; the wife's allowance was raised in 1928 to
7s.Od. per week, raised again in 1930 to 9s.Od., and
lowered in 1931 to 8s.Od., with the child allowance
5
remaining unchanged.
Thus dependants' allowances were introduced into
the main unemployment insurance system with little contro--
versy. Such evidence as has survived indicates that at the
time civil servants did not think deeply about their impli¬
cations . The only existing Treasury file, for example,
simply deals with machinery for administering the separate
£
distress fund. As in their administration of out-of-work
donation, the Ministry of Labour simply followed the
1. P. Cohen, op. cit., p. 119.
2. Memorandum by the Minister of Labour, 30/1/23,
P.R.O. PIN 3/12.
3. Cabinet meeting of 14/2/23, Cabinet 9(23), P.R.O. CAS 23/45.
4. Blanesburgh Report, p. 67.
5. Ibid., and Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance,
Final Report, 1932, Cmd. 4185, p. 20.
6. P.R.O. T 161/191 (S.17960), Unemployed Workers'
Dependants Fund, 1921. Similarly, the Government
Actuary's Report briefly summarises the financial details.
Unemployed Workers' Dependants (Temporary Provisions) Bill.
Report by the Government Actuary on the Financial Provisions
of the Bill, 1921, Cmd. 15^91
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precedents established by separation allowances; for
example, allowances were paid to common-law wives on the
basis that this had been War Office policy in the First
1
World War. Most published accounts of this period either
2
say nothing about why dependants' benefits were continued,
or else briefly make a statement on the lines of Bakke's
that "at the end of the six months this type of benefit had
proved itself so valuable that it was continued".
Evidently the Government's desire to keep as many
able-bodied off the Poor Law as possible, plus the tendency
to see every new policy as a temporary expedient, meant that
the implications of dependants' allowances were little dis¬
cussed in the years 1918-22. In addition, an even more
important point was that with main benefits at 15s.0d. per
week for men and 12s.0d. per week for women (except for a
\ A-
short period in 1921), there was no danger that an unemployed
man with a large family might receive more in benefit than in
wages. In 1923, for example, the Minister of Labour,
Sir Montague Barlow, was questioned on this point in
Parliament and replied that the Ministry of Labour knew of
no cases where earnings for a full week in the insured
5
occupations were lower than rates of benefit.
1. Blanesburgh Report, pp. 68-9.
2. See, for example, 1932 Royal Commission, op. cit., pp. 21-2.
3. E. Wight Bakke: Insurance or Dole? (New Haven, 1935), p. 242.
4. 1932 Royal Commission, op. cit., p. 20, gives a table for
the changes in the rates of benefit.
5. Hansard. Vol. 163, 4/5/23, Cols. 1794-5.
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But in late 1923 and 1924 the possibility in theory
that an unemployed man with a large family might be
financially better off when out of work began to be con¬
sidered by civil servants. The impetus behind this came
from the drastic re-thinking of the nature and purpose of
social insurance that took place during the 'all-in
insurance' discussions of those years.
There were two long-term reasons behind the all-in
insurance activity. Firstly, due to the piecemeal way in
which they had developed, there were many'anomalies in the
administration of the social services. Workmen's compen¬
sation was run by insurance companies, employers' mutual
insurance companies and establishment funds; old age pensions
by the Customs and Excise Department, and paid through the
Post Office; unemployment insurance by employment exchanges,
trade unions and other industrial associations; health and
maternity insurance by approved societies; burial insurance
by insurance companies, collecting societies, friendly
societies and the Post Office. It was universally recog¬
nised by social administrators that these anomalies needed
to be removed, and hence the all-in insurance activity of
1923-4 has often been seen as a precursor of the Beveridge
Report.^
1. J.L. Cohen: Social Insurance Unified (1924), p. 46.
2. Sir John Walley: Social Security: Another British Failure?
(1972), p. 40-1.
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Secondly, the Ministry of Labour had realised that
the relief of the able-bodied unemployed was too large a
problem to be dealt with by locally-elected Boards of
Guardians: they wanted some kind of new assistance scheme
introduced alongside a strictly-administered unemployment
insurance system, and seem to have had in mind the kind of
central agency that appeared ten years later as the Unem-
_ -i
ployment Assistance Board. Something had to be found that
was not, on the one hand, a caricature of unemployment
insurance, based on endless extensions of benefit regard¬
less of the individual's contribution record that would
destroy the solvency of the insurance fund and eventually
make the system indistinguishable from public assistance,
and on the other hand a harshly deterrent Poor Law that
would be resented by men who were unemployed through no
fault of their own.
The Ministry of Labour appear to have contemplated
such a reorganisation for some time. One of the topics
discussed in 1923-4, that of insurance by industry, had been
considered by them at least as far back as 1918, and event¬
ually rejected on the grounds that it would go against the
2
cardinal insurance principle that risks should be pooled.
The Ministry kept the matter under consideration, clearly
1. Ibid., pp. 47-50.
2. Memorandum by Ministry of Labour, May 1918, P.R.O. PIN 3/8.
A memorandum by Sir Alfred Watson of 19/11/23 also mentions
that the Ministry had been considering insurance by
industry for some time. See P.R.O. PIN 1/1.
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seeing it as a possible future policy once unemployment
fell: both Thomas Macnamara and (after 31st October 1922)
Sir Montague Barlow, when Ministers of Labour, sounded out
the opinions of employers and trade unionists on the
subject, and an official Report was published in
February 1923.^
The all-in insurance activity of 1923-4 had quite
a number of aspects. At the same time as the Ministry of
Labour was considering insurance by industry there was
appointed (on the 17th March 1922) a committee of civil
servants under Sir Alfred Watson to investigate the possi¬
bility of amalgamating health and unemployment insurance,
and of reducing the cost of the latter. Almost a year
later another interdepartmental committee was set up to
survey public assistance administration, and investigate
Sidney Webb's charge that it had many serious gaps and
4
anomalies.
1. For example, the Ministry rejected an inter¬
departmental proposal for unification of health and
unemployment insurance specifically on the grounds
that it would hinder the development of insurance by
industry. Memorandum (n.d.) from Sir Alfred Watson
to Neville Chamberlain and Sir Montague Barlow,
P.R.O. PIN 1/1.
2. Report on the Possibility of Developing Unemployment
Insurance by Industries,1923, Cmd. 1613."
3. Interdepartmental Committee on Health and Unemployment
Insurance: First and Second Interim Reports, 1922.
Cmd. 1644, and Third Interim Report. 1923, Cmd. 1821.
The Second Interim Report (pp. 9-10) rejected combined
cards for health and unemployment insurance. A few
papers of the Watson Committee can be found in P.R.O.
PIN 1/1.
4. Interdepartmental Committee on Public Assistance
Administration. Report of the Committee on the
Co-ordination of Administrative and Executive
Arrangements for the Grant of Assistance from Public
Funds on Account of Sickness, Destitution and
Unemployment, 1923, Cmd. 20lTT The Report (pp. 74-167)
gives a useful survey of existing social services.
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Reorganisation of social insurance also became a
popular political topic. With the ending of Lloyd George's
Coalition in October 1922, British politics more or less
returned to normal, and all three parties began to look
round for social policy reforms that would be electorally
1
popular. The Conservative Party appear to have taken
the lead in this respect, with both Chamberlain and
Baldwin showing an interest. The former wanted some
kind of plan to end the existing administrative chaos in
2
insurance, hoping that such an espousal of social reform
would "attract wide attention and peg out our claim to the
ground before the others have had time to get in".
Similarly, it has been asserted that the appointment of
the Anderson Committee of top-rank civil servants to
investigate all-in insurance was largely Baldwin's
creation: social reform was much on his mind in 1923-4,
and the Committee's appointment was one of his "first
actions" on becoming Prime Minister in May 1923, according
4
to his biographers.
However, the real impetus behind the establishment •
of the Anderson Committee appears to have come from within
1. J.L. Cohen, op. cit., pp. 11-13. Cohen makes the
interesting point that public discussion of all-in
insurance was also going on in other countries, and
that the I.L.O. investigated it. Ibid., p. 14.
At this time Beveridge was associating himself with
the Liberal Party and working on the ideas he published
in Insurance For All and Everything (1924).
2. Keith Feiling: Neville Chamberlain (1947), p. 132.
3. Letter from Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 23/3/24,
quoted in Iain Macleod: Neville Chamberlain (1961), p. 106.
4. Keith Middlemas and John Barnes: Baldwin (1969), p. 284.
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the Ministry of Labour, and in particular from its
1
Permanent Secretary, Horace Wilson. Baldwin's interest
seems to have been very half-hearted: the idea was brought
to his attention in April 1923 by a pamphlet sent to him
by an ex-Liberal M.P., T.T. Broad, which he turned over
2
to the Ministry of Labour for consideration. However,
Baldwin only got round to appointing the Anderson Committee
on the 13th December 1923 - nearly seven months after he
had become Prime Minister, and hardly an indication of
great energy. To add to the confusion, he had by then
lost an election - on the 6th December - but stayed in
office long enough to receive an interim report from the
Committee. Thereafter, the Conservatives continued the
L
work in private, through a Committee led by Chamberlain,
and eventually channelled their ideas into a plan for
pensions reform that made up the basis of the 1925 Widows',
5
Orphans' and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act.
Whatever confusion there may have been over its
appointment, the Anderson Committee's records show that
civil servants were beginning to turn their minds towards
the problems that were to plague unemployment policy in
1. Walley, op. cit., p. 47. Walley gives an interesting
account of the Anderson Committee's appointment.
Ibid., pp. 40-1, 47-8, 52-3, 57-62.
2. T.T. Broad to the Prime Minister, 17/4/23, P.R.O. PIN 1/1.
3. Anderson to Baldwin, 8/1/24, P.R.O. PIN 1/2.
4. Some of this Committee's papers are contained in
P.R.O. PIN 1/4.
5.. Chamberlain and Churchill combined the findings of the
two Committees in drawing up their pensions plan.
Cabinet meeting of 26/11/24, Cabinet 64(24), P.R.O.
CAB 23/49.
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the 1920s and 1930s - in particular, the need to keep the
i
status of the unemployed man with a large family 'less
eligible' than an equivalent man in fulltime work.
The members of the Anderson Committee realised that
"as soon as political and industrial conditions permit",
some drastic reorganisation of social services to the
1
unemployed would have to be undertaken. It was impossible
to allow a large section of the population to remain semi¬
permanently on the Poor Law, for three reasons: firstly,
2
the unemployed themselves would not tolerate it; secondly,
there was the problem that in some areas Boards of Guardians
were deliberately paying over-generous relief and making it
more profitable for men with large families to remain
unemployed; and thirdly, many Boards of Guardians were
demanding that the relief of all the able-bodied unemployed
should be made a charge on national finances. Yet to solve
the problem by endless extensions of insurance benefit would
mean that "the stigma now attaching to the Poor Law Relief
might, in course of time, also attach to discretionary
unemployment benefit if such benefit were derived from a
/.i
fund not resting on an independent contributory basis".
1. Memorandum by Sir Arthur Robinson and Horace Wilson,
14/1/24, P.R.O. PIN 1/1.
2. Note of a Discussion at the Ministry of Health on
29/11/23, 8/12/23, ibid.
3. Memorandum by Lord Eustace Percy, (n.d., orobably late
1923), P.R.O. HLG 30/32.
4. Memorandum by Robinson and Wilson, 14/1/24, cp. cit.
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Therefore, what the Anderson Committee civil
servants were groping towards in 1923-4 was some scheme
of relief for the able-bodied unemployed and their
dependants that would carry the stigma-free advantage of
insurance benefit without having to be actuarially sound.
In order to achieve this, it would be necessary to classify
the unemployed into three distinct groups. At the top would
be those whose contribution record entitled them to unemploy¬
ment benefit under the new and strictly-administered insurance
scheme. Below them, the long-term unemployed would be paid
uncovenanted benefits out of a separate 'distress fund', the
solvency of which would be guaranteed by the Treasury;
applicants to this section would have to prove that they were
"genuinely seeking work and unable to find it", and in dealing
with them the Minister of Labour would have new enlarged
powers to discretion "to refuse benefit in order to eliminate
'unemployables' and persons to whom benefit is a temptation
2
to remain in idleness". At the bottom of this three-tier
system would be the Poor Law; the future of this was very
much under discussion, and there were plans to abolish it,
but until then (having had the able-bodied unemployed removed
from its scope) it would be left to deal with categories like
the old, the sick, the widows, etc., - in other words, "that
residuum of misfortune, improvidence and unfitness which
defies classification".
1. Minutes of Meeting of the Anderson Committee, 5/1/24,
P.R.O. PIN 1/2.
2. Memorandum by Robinson and Wilson, 14/1/24, op. cit.
3. Memorandum by Lord Eustace Percy, op. cit.
269
This, however, would create a problem. In any such
reorganisation the whole relationship between wages, benefit
rates and public assistance would need to be clearly defined.
In solution to this problem, the Anderson Committee evidently
had in mind a three-tier classification of the unemployed
that would go beyond mere administrative demarcation and
would also have an economic and moral component too. A
three-tier structure of less eligibility would be established,
each level having a different degree of social stigma attached
to it. Before the Committee even met, T.W. Phillips (the
Principal Assistant Secretary to the Ministry of Labour)
outlined his Department's view that "a person in receipt
of insurance benefit should be less well off than a person
in receipt of wages and that a person disentitled to benefit
should be less well off than a person receiving benefit.
Whereas the old poor law held that the condition of the
man relieved must of necessity be less eligible than that
of the man maintaining himself, a second intermediate grade,
that of the insured man, should ultimately be introduced".
Thus if the principle of insurance as a stigma-free
payment was to be preserved, the unemployed man on relief
2
must be made to feel worse off than his insured counterpart.
One way of achieving this might be to introduce a labour
test which could be disguised as re-training, "but for a
large proportion of the applicants it is essential that it
1. Note of a Discussion at the Ministry of Health on
29/11/25. 8/12/25. on. cit.
2. Ministrv of Labour Memorandum (n.d., probably December 1925),
P.R.O. PIN 1/2.
270
should be unattractive and if possible that it should be
generally regarded as carrying a social stigma". There
was concern that under the existing system in many economi¬
cally depressed areas, the unemployed were receiving unem¬
ployment benefit and Poor Law assistance simultaneously,
resulting in the destruction of the insurance principle
and payments which frequently came near to, or exceeded,
2
prevailing low wage rates.
The principle of dependants' allowances appears to
have been unquestioningly accepted by the Anderson Committee.
Indeed, they even decided that in the new scheme for the
able-bodied unemployed child allowances might be raised to
1s.6d. per week and extended in scope to cover all children
under the age of sixteen maintained by the applicant, whether
they were his 'natural' children or not. However, in the
surviving papers of the Committee there is evidence that the
implications of such a policy were just beginning to be seen.
For example, Sir Arthur Robinson (the Permanent Secretary at
the Ministry of Health) and Horace Wilson warned that if
child allowances were raised above 1s.6d. "the possible
interaction of benefit and wages in low-paid employment
would have to be taken into consideration. It would probably
not be possible so to increase dependants' benefit without
1. Memorandum by Mr. Francis (n.d., probably October 1923),
P.R.O. HLG 30/32. Francis was Assistant Secretary at
the Ministry of Health.
2. Ministry of Labour Memorandum (n.d.), op. cit.
3. Minutes of Meeting of the Anderson Committee, 5/1/24,
op. cit.
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at the same time revising the scale of benefits to a man
and wife".
The evidence left by the all-in insurance activity
of 1923-4 is interesting for a number of reasons, but what
concerns this study is the way that it marks the first
expression of concern over the problem that was to grow in
the 1920s and 1930s and eventually point the way to family
allowances in wages - the impossibility, in a low-wage
economy, of preserving less eligibility while public opinion
demanded that benefit and assistance levels take some account
of varying family needs.
For the whole of the 1920s, however, this remained by
and large a theoretical problem, and not a practical one.
When Lloyd George had originally announced the introduction
of dependants' allowances he had said that they would be
subject to a maximum limit of 9s.Od. per week," but evi¬
dently this was an economy measure rather than one for
preserving less eligibility, for in the face of Parlia¬
mentary opposition Macnamara later agreed to remove this
Ll
upper limit. Three years later, when looking back on
this, Macnamara maintained that the figure of 1s.0d. per
week per child was "all we could do at the time", given
1. Memorandum by Robinson and Wilson, 14/1/24, op. cit.
2. For example, the way civil servants appear to have realised
far sooner than politicians that mass unemployment was not
going to be a temporary phenomenon. The Anderson Committee's
widows' pensions proposals, for instance, were partly
designed with the aim of withdrawing widows from the
labour market. See Memorandum on Widows' Pensions in
P.R.O. PIN 1/3.
3. Hansard. Vol. 147, 19/10/21, Col. 93.
4. Ibid., 26/10/21, Cols. 934-942, and 1/11/21, Col. 1671.
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the state of the fund, and implied that he would have liked
the figure to he higher. In 1927 the Blanesburgh Commission
looked at the question of benefit rates and re-affirmed that
a cardinal principle of an insurance scheme was that "it
should provide benefits definitely less in amount than the
general labourer's rate of wages, so that there may be no
2
temptation to prefer benefit to work", but went on to
discuss the problem of how far benefits should be needs-
related. Indeed, the only instances of less eligibility
becoming a practical problem in the 1920s are to be found
in certain parts of the country where Boards of Guardians
made public assistance payments in excess of prevailing
4
low wage rates, particularly in the case of large families.
However, by the early 1930s the problem of preserving
less eligibility was beginning to be realised in Government
circles. The reason for this was, quite simply, the rise
in the real value of benefits. Between 1920 and 1930 the
rate of unemployment benefit received by an adult man with
a wife and two children doubled, from 15s.0d. to 30s.Od.;
yet at the same time the cost of living fell by about 43%,
and, more importantly, the money value of wages fell by about
1. Ibid., Vol. 173, 20/5/24, Col. 2065.
2. Blanesburgh Report, p. 31.
3. Ibid., p. 38.
4. In particular, in Poplar, Chester-le-Street, Bedwellty
and West Ham. Because this practice was not widespread,
and because an account of it would need to be complex,
it has been thought best to omit it from this study.
For an account, see B. Keith-Lucas: "Poplarism",
Public Law. Spring 1962, pp. 52-80.
273
1
33%. By the early 1930s, therefore, an unemployed man
with a large family was receiving in benefit an amount
that came close to low wage levels. The danger foreseen
by the Ministry of Labour in 1923-4 was becoming a reality.
After the creation of the Unemployment Assistance Board
(U.A.B.) and the Unemployment Insurance Statutory Committee
(U.I.S.C.) by the 1934 Unemployment Act, it grew until it
became a problem that dominated unemployment policy.
The events leading up to the 1934 Unemployment Act
2
need only a brief summary. The insurance scheme had been
kept going by various extensions of benefit through
'uncovenanted', 'extended' and 'transitional' benefits,
with the result that by 1934 the fund had a debt of
£105,780,000, and the U.I.S.C. was set up as a financial
watchdog to administer a new, strictly actuarial insurance
4
scheme under which this debt would eventually be paid off.
The Public Assistance Committees since 1930 had been
administering both Poor Law relief and 'transitional
payments' (to over 1,000,000 unemployed who had exhausted
their insurance rights); the latter was Treasury-financed,
and in several areas the P.A.C.s had been granting such
1. 1932 Royal Commission, op. cit., p. 20.
2. The events were complex, and for a full account see
Eric Briggs and Alan Deacon: "The Creation of the
Unemployment Assistance Board", Policy and Politics,
Vol. 2, No. 1, 1973, pp. 43-62; John D. Millett:
The Unemployment Assistance Board (1940), pp. 17-44;
Burns, op. cit., pp. 111-147; Gilbert, op. cit.,
pp. 162-179.
3. See Burns, op. cit., p. 47, for details of how each operated.
4. W.H. Beveridge: The Unemployment Insurance Statutory
Committee (1937), pp. 24-5.
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payments on avery generous scale. The U.A.B. was founded
in order to bring such quasi-relief payments under central
fiscal control, and, ostensibly, to remove the sensitive
question of needs-related, means-tested payments from
political controversy. Most historians have attributed
the origins of both the U.A.B. and the U.I.S.C. to the
events of 1930-4, but clearly what was established in
1934 was a three-tier system of relief, stigma and less
eligibility almost exactly as suggested by the Ministry
of Labour ten years earlier.
The establishment of the Unemployment Assistance
Board in 1934 was one of the most controversial episodes
in the history of British social policy. The rationale
behind it was that the administration of relief to the
long-term able-bodied unemployed could best be carried
out by a centralised agency, independent of the Government
yet responsible to it, according to clearly-defined regula¬
tions. These regulations could be amended in Parliament,
but thereafter the Board would be immune from Parliamentary
criticism, and would administer means-tested, needs-related
relief without the interference of party politicking at
national or local level.^ Thus the Minister of Labour
1. Briggs and Deacon, op. cit.
2. Gilbert, for example, (op. cit., p. 178) gives
Chamberlain and Sir Horace Wilson the credit, saying
that they were working on plans for the U.A.B. in 1932.
3. Millett, op. cit., pp. 35-7, 48.
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would be rid of the burden of being, in effect, chief
relieving officer for the nation, with Parliament as a
glorified Board of Guardians. The Board was thus a direct
2
forerunner of today's Supplementary Benefits Commission.
But critics maintained that this "taking relief out
of politics" was really a way of removing the question of
relief from democratic control. The Board, they argued, was
designed to impose a bureaucratic tyranny over the unemployed,
and its avowed independence was a sham. It was only inde¬
pendent in as much as it shielded the Minister of Labour
from awkward criticism; in reality, it was as much under
Treasury control as any other Government Department. When
M.P.s tried to find out exactly what the Board's position
was vis-a-vis Parliamentary criticism, the result was
3
embarrassing uncertainty on the part of the Government.
The Board, complained one M.P., "is responsible to no one
and appointed by the Government for several years is
out of the control of this House and sits in Olympian calm
Zi
away from the realities of life". Perhaps the most hated
aspect of the Board was its household means test, which
forced 'employed members of a household to leave home in
order that an unemployed member could then attest that the
household had no resources and thus qualify for relief.-
1. A.M. Carr-Saunders: "The Unemployment Assistance Board",
Political Quarterly, 7, 1936, p. 542.
2. There were many similarities, such as the appeals tribunal.
See Tony Lynes: Unemployment Assistance Tribunals in the
1950s (unpublished paper to University of Edinburgh
Conference on Supplementary Benefit Appeal Tribunals,
December 1974).
3. Hansard, Vol. 297, 12/2/35, Cols. 1803-7.
4. Ibid., Col. 1796.
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These contradictions were acutely felt by the Board's
members. The Chairman was Sir Henry Betterton (the previous
Minister of Labour) who was given the title Lord Rushcliffe,
and the other members were Sir Ernest Strohmenger (Deputy
Chairman), Violet Markham, Professor H.M. Hallsworth,
Thomas Jones, M.A. Reynard, and five Departmental repres-
i
entatives.. Looking back in later life, Violet Markham
admitted that "the idea that the Board could be taken out
of politics and do its work in cloistered calm was of course
ridiculous. Unemployment was the burning question of the
day and it was calculated to burn the fingers of anyone who
2
touched it", and it is clear that privately the Board's
members felt very uneasy over their exact constitutional
status. For example, at one of their regular meetings in
early 1935 Thomas Jones "expressed the general feeling of
the Board by saying that in no circumstances should the
Board be swayed by political considerations.... The Board
was specifically created as a non-political body in order
to remove the administration of the Means Test from the area
of politics.... /and/ should not allow itself to be stampeded
or yield to political pressure". Yet less than a month
later, the members were agreeing that "the Board was an
instrument of Government and could not act in the last
resort contrary to the policy of the Government.... in the
1. For their background, see Millett, op. cit., pp. 46-8.
2. Violet Markham: Return Passage (1953), p. 194.
3. Minutes of the 22nd meeting of the U.A.B., 30/1/35 to
1/2/35, Violet Markham Papers, Box 27.
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end the Government must have its way". These internal
tensions came to a head in the notorious 'standstill'
incident of January and February 1935, from which the
2
reputation of the Board never recovered.
Probably the greatest area of conflict between the
Board and its critics was over its scales of relief. As
indicated in previous chapters, it was on this point that
Eleanor Rathbone and her supporters drew on the rapidly-
expanding volume of nutritional research into minimum
human needs and campaigned vigorously for these relief
scales to be drawn up in accordance with some publicly-
announced nutritional minimum. The Board's scales were,
after all, supposed to be needs-related, and implicit in
this was the commitment not only to base them upon a
scientific estimate of healthy physical subsistence, but
also to ensure that applicants would be kept healthy and
fit enough to return to work whenever the country's economic
position improved. Thus when introducing the 1934 Unemploy¬
ment Bill in the House of Commons Sir Henry Betterton, the
Minister of Labour, assured M.P.s that "we have to provide
that there shall be an opportunity for men to keep fit for
employment". Clause 34 of the Bill charged the U.A.B.
with the promotion of the welfare of the unemployed, and,
1. Minutes of the 26th meeting, 26/2/35 to 28/2/35, ibid.
2. For an account, see Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 182-8, and
Millett, op. cit., pp. 46-76.
3. Hansard. Vol. 283, 30/11/33, Col. 1089.
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said Betterton, "you cannot promote the welfare of a man
unless you take into account his physical requirements".
During the passage of the Bill, however, the Government
remained studiously vague over exactly how these needs would
be calculated. To a deputation from the Children's Minimum
Council Betterton insisted that he would calculate need in
2
accordance with recent nutritional research, but in
Parliament he was less definite. At one point Eleanor Rathbone
tried to introduce an amendment to the Bill that would commit
the Board to a concept of need that would cover a "reasonable
amount" for rent, plus "the minimum requirement of healthy
physical subsistence" for the applicant and his dependants.
"If every item of the applicant's means and resources is to be
taken into account, let every item of his needs be also taken
into account", she suggested, and asked that the Board's
scales be calculated on "a basis which is fully worked out
and clearly laid down by Parliament"; above all, the meaning
L\.
of 'need' should be precisely defined.
In reply, Betterton assured her that her amendment
was unnecessary: the Board was committed to maintaining
the unemployed at a healthy physical subsistence level, and
1. Ibid., Vol. 286, 26/2/34, Col. 786. A similar assurance
was given in the Board's first Annual Report. Report of
the Unemployment Assistance Board for 1935, Cmd. 3177, p. 6.
2. C.M.C. pamphlet: Observations on the Draft Unemployment
Assistance Regulations, 21/7/36, and Eleanor Rathbone in
Hansard, Vol. 289, 9/5/34, Cols. 1218-9.
3. Hansard, Vol. 286, 26/2/36, Col. 767.
4. Ibid., Col. 771.
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the spirit of her amendment was implicit in the Board's
regulations. This reply seems to have satisfied most
M.P.s, for throughout the many debates on the 1934 Bill
there was little mention of this point again. Some
speakers realised that the assistance scales would have
to be lower than insurance benefit (which the Government
admitted to be below subsistence, since it was still based
on the 1911 concept), but most critics concentrated their
attacks on the household means test and the Board's
immunity from Parliamentary control. Eleanor Rathbone,
however, was far from satisfied. As already indicated,
she began an intensive campaign through the Children's
Minimum Council to influence the Board while they were
still discussing proposed scale rates: in addition to
deputations to Government Departments, the C.M.C. sent
many requests to the Board asking that they announce
publicly the scientific basis for their scales,"' and made
L
sure that this campaigning received maximum publicity.
But all this activity elicited virtually.no response
whatsoever from the Board's members, save for a feeling of
1. Ibid., Col. 785-8.
2. For example, speech by Arthur Greenwood in Hansard,
Vol. 283, 30/11/33, Col. 1108-1110.
3. U.A.B. Memorandum No. 14, 30/8/34, Violet Markham
Papers, Box 29. Marjorie Green to Thomas Jones,
17/9/34 and 11/10/34, P.R.0. AST 7/32. Other letters
from the C.M.C. are contained in Violet Markham Papers,
Box 47.




mild irritation. In their private discussions they
began to grope towards the only definition of 'scientific
minimum subsistence' that was open to them. Like the
Ministry of Health, they well realised the consequences
that would follow if they assessed minimum needs too
highly, and thus it was decided that science would have
to take second place to three all-important criteria -
Treasury limitations, unemployment benefit levels and,
2
most important of all, low wage rates. At the fourth
meeting of the Board, on the 22nd, 24th and 25th July 1934,
Wilfred Eady (the Board's Secretary and a Ministry of
Labour official) quickly warned of the wages problem:
although they could supplement insurance benefit in
exceptional cases, they must not touch on wages, since
"it would obviously have been a very dangerous principle
if the Board had accepted any responsibility for the subsidy
of low wages to wholly employed persons". Sir Ernest Strohmenger
followed by maintaining that even if under-nourishment existed
in Britain, particularly among children, there was little
evidence that it was confined to the households of the
unemployed: "in other words, under-nourishment might well
prove to be a matter not so much of inadequate allowances
1. "I understand the Children's Minimum and Mrs. Hubback
are advancing yet again on the Unemployment Assistance
Board with yet another memo", wrote Violet Markham to
Sir George Newman. "They keep saying you are such a nice
man but somehow they don't seem to like your figures and
are pained at your conclusions. How rare is the mentality
that can face facts honestly when they don't square with
the person's preconceived ideas." Markham to Newman,
18/10/34, Violet Markham Papers, Box 43.
2. This was realised at the time by a few M.P.s. See
Millett, op. cit., p. 51.
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as of bad use of income. It was very important that the
Board should have this clearly in mind because they could
-i
not accept responsibility for general malnutrition".
Thereafter, discussion centred on the question of
exactly how far below wage rates the Board's scales should
be. One suggestion, for example, was that they should be
anchored just below the levels of unskilled wages recognised
by local Trades Councils. All members "recognised that
where there was a large family the scale came very near to,
if it did not exceed, the earnings of low paid workers", and
that therefore the problem was essentially one of keeping
these 'overlap' cases to a minimum by arriving at the most
appropriate scale levels. As Sir Ernest Strohmenger warned,
to provide large children's allowances "on the lines
suggested by Miss Rathbone leads to the dilemma of either
cutting across wage levels or of establishing a very low
2
scale for childless couples". Eventually, the Board
decided on the latter, and cut the married couple's allow¬
ance from 24s.Od. to 22s.Od.^
This, therefore, was how the U.A.B. calculated
scientific minimum subsistence: "the provision of allow-
4
ances to meet need must be conditioned by wages".
1. Minutes of the 4th meeting of the U.A.B., 23, 24 and
25/7/34, ibid., Box 27. The Ministry of Health maintained
that general malnutrition was the Board's responsibility.
2. Minutes of the 5th meeting, 31/7/34, ibid.
3. U.A.B. Memorandum No„ 13: Suggested Amendments of Basic
Scale. 30/8/34. ibid.. Box 29.
4. Statement by Professor Hallsworth, Minutes of 6th Meeting,
13/9/34, ibid., Box 27.
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Professor Hallsworth warned his fellow members of the
dangers of touching on wage levels; the Board's scales
"would be taken as representing the official standard of
minimum subsistence over the whole country. The Board
would be operating largely in areas whose wages are
subject to world conditions. It would be a grave matter
if the scale prevented any adaptation of the wage level
which economic circumstances might require". In other
words, fixing the scales too high might make it impossible
for industry to impose wage cuts in the future if these
became necessary. Eady firmly told the other members that
there was "no scientific standard for the calculation of
all the needs to be covered by the Board; the matter was
one of social convention and expediency. The Office had
1
therefore proceeded on the principle of less eligibility".
Previously, he had circulated two memoranda on this point,
warning of the "mischievous social consequences" if wage
levels were exceeded, and reassuring his colleagues that
the Government had foreseen this problem: the Act's
stipulation was that scales should be calculated "by
reference to" and not "in accordance with" the applicant's
needs - a legalistic difference that was designed to over¬
come this very difficulty and shield the Board from adverse
2
criticism. Low wages had to be accepted as an unavoidable
1. Minutes of 6th meeting, ibid.
2. U.A.B. Memorandum No. 9: Memorandum on Draft Regulations
by W. Bady, 19/7/54, ibid., Box 29. ~~
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feature of industrial life; to make the unemployed
better off than the employed "would be resented not only
by employers but, more strongly, by other workpeople".
In any case, the Ministry of Labour claimed, by the
standards of most nutritional research the Board's scales
2
were adequate for households with fewer than three children.
Given this method of assessing need, it was hardly
surprising that the Board refused to take up the challenges
of the Children's Minimum Council. When answering its
critics it claimed on the one hand that its scales were
based on the findings of the B.M.A., the Ministry of
Health Advisory Committee on Nutrition, the Merseyside
Survey and the New Survey of London; yet on the other
hand it was careful to qualify this by asserting that there
was as yet "no absolute criterion or scientific basis of
need".^
When the Board eventually published its scales
and put them into operation they were criticised fiercely
by groups such as the C.M.C. as being manifestly inadequate,
4
and a betrayal of Betterton's original promises in Parliament.
1. U.A.B, Memorandum No. 13: Suggested Amendments of
the Basic Scale, 30/8/34, ibid.
2. U.A.B. Memorandum No. 14: A 'Scientific Basis' for the
Assessment of Needs, 30/8/34, ibid.
3. Annual Report of the U.A.B. for 1935, Cmd. 5177, p. 33.
4. Eleanor Rathbone seems to have realised all along that
this would happen. She predicted that Betterton would be
unable to keep his promises, and that less eligibility
would be the deciding factor. Hansard, Vol. 289, 9/5/34,
Col. 1220.
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In 1936, for example, the C.M.C. pointed out that using
the B.M.A. nutrition standard, the Merseyside Survey's
estimate of expenditure on clothing, light and fuel, and






and 1 child 29s.0^d.
Man, wife
and 3 children 40s.0d.
Man, wife







To empirical criticism such as this the Board either
refused to reply, or else invented the most convenient
excuse. For example, in discussion with the C.M.C. they
defended their policy of reducing allowances for children
in households of more than five members (by the sum of
1s.0d. each) by maintaining that with such an increase in
numbers there was not an equivalent increase in costs:
clothes could be passed on to younger children, for
2
instance. But in private they admitted that "the scaling
down of children's allowances where there are three or more
children is desirable because the graduated scale for
children originally proposed, if allowed to operate fully,
1. "A Children's Minimum", British Medical Journal, 4/1/36.
2. Ibid.
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would quickly produce for the family of normal size
allowances in excess of the wage rate, and thus necessi¬
tate the application of the 'stop' clause.... too frequent
application of this clause is likely to create dissatis¬
faction".''
The Board's position was hopeless. Having decided
to follow the principle of less eligibility, all that could
be done in the face of hostile criticism was retreat along
prepared lines, and its members were instructed on what
these should be. Critics should first be told that no
scientific calculation of minimum needs was possible.
Then, if they persisted, they should be told that if mal¬
nutrition did exist it was not confined to the households
of the unemployed. The final defence against criticism such
as Rowntree's contention that a family of five needed 53s.Od.
a week for the maintenance of health and efficiency was
for the Board to wash its hands of all responsibility:
"the best line of reply", members were told on this point,
"is probably that if this were true, the Unemployment Assis¬
tance Board is a relatively small member of a food company
and that in order to bring this doctrine about the general
wage structure of the country would have to be revolutionised"
1. U.A.B. Memorandum No. 15, op. cit. In 1936, however,
this 'scaling down' policy was abandoned.
2. U.A.B. Memorandum: Note on the Basis of the Board's Scale
May 1937, P.R.O. AST 7/337.
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It was precisely such a wage revolution that
Eleanor Rathbone and her supporters believed they were
campaigning for, and having had no success in getting the
Board to raise its scales during 1934 and 1935 they changed
their line of attack: from 1935 onwards the Family Endow¬
ment Society and the Children's Minimum Council, realising
the Board's quandary, began to campaign for the whole
problem to be tackled at the wages end, by family allow¬
ances .
This new approach elicited a more favourable reaction
from the Board's members, for now the problem of overlap with
wages was beginning to exacerbate a situation about which
they felt growing unease. As the economy began to pick up
after 1934 the problem of the long-term unemployed assumed
increasing importance. Would these men be able and willing
to return to work once the economy had completely recovered?
Would they refuse to enter jobs with wages only slightly
higher than what they had been receiving from the Board?
Unemployment began to fall steadily from 1936, and in the
following year the Board estimated that nearly 20% of its
1
male applicants had settled down to life on the dole.
"What cumulative consequences are likely to pile up for
the nation in a few years time", warned Violet Markham,
"if the dole habit spreads and grows and the theory of money
for nothing becomes an established practice amongst the
2
younger generation?".
1. U.A.B. Memorandum: Some Observations by Miss Markham on
the Long-Term Policy and Problems of the Board Arising out
of the Annual Report, 1937, Violet Markham Papers, Box 51.
2. Ibid.
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What the Board feared was not so much the
numerical incidence of these overlap cases as their
disproportionate effect on the work ethic of future
generations. After all, in 1937 only about 6% of the
Board's applicants received allowances within 4s.Od.
of their normal wages; and only 1.3% of male and 3.5%
of female applicants received allowances equal to or
above their normal wages. But since these cases occurred
chiefly in households with a large number of children,
evidently the Board members feared that an increasing
number of young married unemployed would regard large
families as a way of maximising their income and also pass
on the 'dole habit' to their children.
Furthermore, there was another serious long-term
problem. By industrial standards, many of the Board's
applicants were relatively old: 45% of those between the
ages of eighteen and sixty-four were over forty-five years
old, as compared with only 27% of claimants to insurance
benefit, and thus it would be extremely difficult for
these men to be re-absorbed into industrial life once
2
prosperity returned. This had been exacerbated by the
changing age-distribution of the British population: in
1901, out of every 1,000 people 149 had been aged between
1. Annual Report of the U.A.B. for 1957, Cmd. 5752,
pp. 6, 81-2.
2. Annual Report of the U.A.B. for 1956, Cmd. 5526, p. 5.
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forty-five and sixty-five, but by 1935 this proportion had
risen to 223. The Board's Annual Report for 1936 contained
a passage on this very theme, reflecting the 'population panic'
of the 1930s and warning that these older men would need a
long period of re-training and industrial acclimatisation
before they became efficient workers. In a situation like
this, any reluctance on the part of the younger, fitter men
to return to work would be disastrous.
Of course, those with a first-hand knowledge of the
plight of the unemployed found exactly the opposite to be
the case. Bakke, for example, discovered no evidence that
the will to work was being destroyed, and gave as an example
the instance of a job advertised in Birmingham for two men
with their own bicycles, with wages of only £2 per week:
2
nearly one thousand men tried to apply for it. Admittedly,
the hopeless task of searching out work when none was avail¬
able often caused the long-term unemployed man's state of
mind to progress "from optimism to pessimism, from
1. Ibid. Violet Markham later recalled of the Board's
applicants that "the majority were elderly men who
lacked either aptitude or adequate industrial
experience to make them worth while to an employer".
Return Passage (1953), p. 201. Critics of the Board
strongly objected to this pessimistic view, and to
the notion that men were 'too old' at the age of
forty-five. Joan S. Clarke: The Assistance Board
(1941), p. 8.
2. E.W. Bakke: The Unemployed Man (1933), PP. 137,
253-6, 263-270.
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pessimism to fatalism", as Beales and Lambert put it.
But this usually happened only after months or years of
fruitless searching: Max Cohen, for example, tramped the
streets daily from nine to five o'clock in his "compelling
2
desire to find work".
However, by the late 1930s those in the upper strata
of British society were evidently thinking differently,
and were sharing the Board's fears. In the House of Lords
the Bishop of Winchester was warning about the erosion of
3
work-incentives" and during a debate on population problems
the Archbishop of York talked of "the obvious evil in the
recruiting of the population largely from the unemployed
ranks, and from those who are content to remain unemployed'?.
Again, in 1938 The Times asserted that "there are hundreds
and thousands of young men who do not show any disposition
to bestir themselves to get out of unemployment into
employment there is a slackness of moral fibre
and of will as a muscle salutary action is beyond
dispute the breakdown of morale can only be made
5
good by applying compulsion".
1. H.L.Beales and R.S.Lambert: Memoirs of the Unemployed
(1934), p. 26. The book (pp. 55-262) is a series of
autobiographical case-studies illustrating this progression.
2. Max Cohen: I Was One of the Unemployed (1945), P. 86.
3. Hansard (Lords), Vol. 110, 7/7/38, Cols. 629-631.
4. Ibid., Vol. 113, 21/6/39, Col. 639.
5. The Times, 22/3/38, quoted in Theo Barker (ed.):
The Long March of Everyman (1975), p. 215.
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What form of compulsion should he used? Having
done little in the way of job-creation or re-training
schemes over the previous fifteen years, it was obviously
going to be difficult, if not embarrassing, for the
Government to introduce such measures now. The Board
decided that as a first step they should analyse in
detail exactly what sort of person constituted the hard¬
core unemployed, together with their reasons for being
unemployed, in order to see if there were any "obstacles
of an individual or personal character" that might prevent
them from being re-absorbed into industry. Applicants
who were thought to have become resigned to their lot were
to be encouraged to enlist in re-training programmes, and
in certain cases encouragement was to be accompanied by a
2
stopping of an allowance if the applicant refused to comply.
One way of producing an incentive to work was by
family allowances in wages. After 1935 the Board's Annual
Reports began to show an increasing awareness of this.
After only a year of operation, they claimed that men
with large families showed "little disposition to take
' work or hold it when it is given to them". The whole
problem of the relationship between wages and assistance
raised "wider issues" which the Board felt "should be
1. Annual Report of the U.A.B. for 1958, Cmd. 6021, p. 3.
2. Ibid., pp. 48-50.
3. Annual Report of the U.A.B. for 1955, Cmd. 5177, p. 12.
291
-i
examined on the widest basis in the near future". In
1938 there came an even stronger statement about the
difficulties raised by this, difficulties which had "far
reaching implications and obviously raise questions of
very serious social consequences which go beyond the
problems which the Board alone are in a position to
2
solve".
In private, members of the Board were taking a
growing interest in family allowances. In May 1938 the
Children's Minimum Council sent them a memorandum making
out the case for family allowances as the only way of
solving the overlap problem without having to resort to
"the negative and inhuman device of keeping down unemploy-
ment pay". This time, their arguments fell on more
receptive ears. In reply, Violet Markham admitted that
the memorandum stated "very clearly a problem with which
4
we are all familiar", and such evidence as can be gleaned
from her private papers suggests that her mind was working
along these lines. For her, the problem of the unemployed
was part of the general problem of the low-wage group, and
she felt particular concern over "the employed man with a
large family and a low wage who is obliged to struggle on
1. Ibid., p. 13.
2. Annual Report of the U.A.B. for 1937, Cmd. 3732, pp. 5-6.
3. Memorandum by the Family Endowment Society to the
Unemployment Insurance Statutory Committee, sent by
Marjorie Green (C.M.Cl) to Violet Markham, 6/5/38,
Violet Markham Papers, Box 43.
4. Markham to Green, 12/5/38, ibid.
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1
without any assistance from the State". In the face of
this, she told Paul Cadbury, "many of us who are concerned
with unemployment are feeling more and more that whatever
differences of opinion there may be in the method of appli¬
cation, the principle of family allowances is the only way
2
out of the morass in which we find ourselves".
Officially, the Board had no power to recommend
anything as drastic as family allowances, being a supposedly
independent body with limited terms of reference. In fact,
the Board was pretty closely controlled by the Ministry of
Labour and the Treasury, and thus it is likely that when
4
they opened a file on family allowances in June 1938
and began gathering information, the ground was being pre¬
pared for possible future schemes based on the European
equalisation fund method. In September 1938 the Board
began writing to firms in Britain that already operated
5
their own family allowance schemes, asking for information.
Exactly what was being planned remains a mystery.
This gradual acceptance of the need for family
allowances by the U.A.B. was at the same time being mirrored
in the experiences of the Unemployment Insurance Statutory
1. Markham to Elsie Jones, 12/10/38, ibid.
2. Markham to Cadbury, 11/7/39, P.Rio. AST 7/390.
3. "The Board are obviously very interested in the question
because of its reactions on their own work; but they have
no legal power to take any practical action in regard to
it." Lord Rushcliffe to W. Elphinston (Church Assembly),
31/10/38, ibid.




Committee. The Committee's prime task was to pay off
the unemployment insurance fund's debt at a rate of
£5,000,000 per annum, and they were required to report
on the condition of the fund not later than February each
year (or at any other time, if necessary) and having
reviewed the financial situation they could recommend
any changes in benefit and contribution levels, and ways
of paying off the fund's debt. In arriving at a decision,
the Committee sought advice on the likely level of future
unemployment from the Economic Information Committee of
the Economic Advisory Council (represented by H.D. Henderson
and then received deputations from interested organisations
like the National Confederation of Employers' Organisations,
the T.U.C. and - inevitably - the Children's Minimum Council
Ostensibly, the Committee was an impartial body
independent of direct Government control, with its actions
being dictated solely by the state of the fund. In pracxice
however, its independence was as much of a myth as the
U.A.B.'s and, as with the Board, there was the usual
"uncanny coincidence" between what the Government wanted
2
and what the Committee finally recommended. Like the
U.A.B., it was designed to shield the Minister of Labour
1. Report of the Unemployment Insurance Statutory
Committee for 1934, p. 2. The Chairman was
Sir William Beveridge, and the members were A.L. Ayre,
A. Digby Besant, Captain C.C. Craig, Arthur Shaw,
Miss K.J. Stephenson and Mary Stocks, with three civil
servants. The debt was to be paid off by 1971.
2. J.C. Kincaid: Poverty and Equality in Britain (1973), p
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from the embarrassing task of resisting Parliamentary
and. public pressure for higher benefit rates, and in
addition was as much at the mercy of the Treasury as were
conventional Government Departments. The reduction of
contributions by 1d. in July 1936, for example, had been
preceded by an increase of 1d. in the contributions from
employers and employees for old age pensions - a move
-i
which saved the Treasury some £2,000,000. Again, the
reduction in 'waiting time' from six days to three
(introduced in 1937) was designed to cut the number of
applicants who might apply for unemployment assistance
during this period of no income (which could be up to a
fortnight in practice, since benefit was paid at the end
of the week), and thus widen the scope of insurance
(33% Treasury-financed) over assistance (100% Treasury-
financed).
However, having Beveridge as Chairman undoubtedly
prevented the U.I.S.C. from falling completely under
Treasury and Ministry of Labour influence, since he was
well versed in the tactical nuances of intra-Governmental
3
politicking. For example, the Treasury had originally
pressed for a reduction of contributions in June 1935,
just before the publication of the Committee's Second Report
1. Gilbert, op. cit., p. 180.
2. Ronald C. Davison: British Unemployment Policy, the
Modern Phase Since 1930 (1938). pp. 53-4. Gilbert (op. cit.
pT 180) makes the interesting point that this was in contra
to the Treasury's attitude in the 1920s when assistance
was financed from the rates; then they always campaigned
for longer waiting periods.
3. Beveridge always strenuously denied that the Committee was
a mere rubber stamp for the Ministry of Labour. Beveridge,
op. cit., p. 34-5, and Power and Influence (1953), p. 225.
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which recommended, instead that the surplus be used for
■1
the raising of children's allowances. Somewhat uncon-
vincingly, the Treasury officials claimed that their case
rested "on social grounds", maintaining that contributions
were already at "an emergency level" such as would cause
hardship if pension contributions were raised in seven
p
months' time. Beveridge cleverly retorted by using
arguments that the Treasury could hardly have opposed:
a reduction in contributions, if followed by a sudden
economic depression, would endanger the solvency of the
Fund; and without an increase in child allowances the
U.A.B. might have to supplement the benefit of large
families, "and such a development would not be good for
the Treasury".
However, direct pressure from Government Departments
was less of a problem for the Committee than the indirect
effect their actions had on other areas of social policy.
It was here that problems arose. When it was first esta¬
blished, the Committee's main worry seemed likely to be the
repayment of the fund's debt; but owing to the decrease in
unemployment each year the reverse happened, and the problem
was how to dispose of a growing surplus.
1. Report of the U.I.S.C. for July 1935, p. 17.
2. Minutes of the U.I.S.C. for 20 and 21/6/55, Beveridge
Papers, VIII. 4. The T.U.C., as Beveridge knew, took quite
the opposite view, insisting that the working man was quite
willing and able to pay higher contributions in order to
receive higher benefits. See Minutes of the U.I.S.C. for
9/1/56, ibid. (All the U.I.S.C. minutes are contained in
Beveridge Papers VIII. 4.)
3. Minutes of the U.I.S.C. for 20 and 21/6/55.
A
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Essentially, the Committee's task was to steer a
path through a very tricky middle ground. On the one hand,
they had to keep benefit levels above assistance scales;
apart from being in line with Treasury policy of avoiding
supplementation by the U.A.B., there was the political
necessity of ensuring that applicants to a contributory
scheme should always be better off than those receiving
means-tested, tax-financed, discretionary payments. As a
true 'insurance man', Beveridge characteristically saw this
as a cardinal principle, "not because he thought the appli¬
cant for assistance was a less deserving case but because
the recipient of benefit had contributed for it", and the
rest of the Committee agreed. However, this posed great
problems. The Government still adhered to the 1911 principle
that insurance benefit was a supplement to savings, and
should not represent full maintenance. Any criticism of
benefit levels met with this response: they were dictated
by the solvency of the fund, not the needs of the individual.
Yet at the same time benefits had to be kept above the U.A.B.
1. Minutes of the U.I.S.C. for 7/2/35.
2. For example, the Ministry of Labour maintained that
criticism of the 2s.Od. dependant's benefit in unemploy¬
ment insurance on the grounds that it was not possible
to maintain a child on that amount was "largely due
to misapprehension the real position is that 2s.Od.
has been thought to be the largest sum in respect of
each dependent child which the finances of the insurance
scheme enabled it to pay as a supplement to the basic
rate of benefit". H.C. Emmerson (Ministry of Labour)
to Sir Clive Wigram (the King's Private Secretary),
6/6/34, P.R.O. AST 7/85. This, of course, protected
the U.I.S.C. from the full force of 'nutritional'
criticism.
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scales - which the Government insisted were needs-related.
This contradiction was further heightened every time the
U.A.B. raised its scales, for on these occasions the
Committee had to do likewise, all the time maintaining
the fiction that such increases were solely due to the
fund's improved financial condition.
On the other hand, benefits had to be kept below
wages. Again Beveridge justified this in 'insurance' terms:
"unemployment benefit was intended to be an insurance
against loss of wages, and in other forms of insurance it
was never the practice to over-insure", he frequently
1
reminded his colleagues on the Committee. However, this
vital principle that 'the indemnity should never be allowed
2
to exceed the loss' proved increasingly difficult to uphold.
As the fund annually displayed a continuing surplus it
became increasingly impossible for the Committee to resist
pressure for higher benefits - which in turn made it harder
and harder to keep benefits below wage levels. The fact
that this occurred exclusively in families with a large
number of children pointed to the obvious solution - the
adjustment of wages to family size.
1. Minutes of the U.I.S.C. for 20/11/36 and for
13 and 14/1/38. 1 ,
2. Report of the U.I.S.C. for July 1933, p. 18.
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The first Report of the Committee, for the year
1934, was very cautious. With benefits at 17s.0d. per
week for a man, 15s.0d. per week for a woman, and
dependants* allowances of 9d.0d. for a wife and 2s.Od.
for each child, a surplus of £12,417,185 had been achieved,
-1
but the Committee felt it was too early to make any changes.
They merely outlined five possible ways this surplus could
be disposed of: a reduction in contributions (favoured by
the National Confederation of Employers' Organisations),
an increase in child allowances (favoured by the T.U.C. and
the Children's Minimum Council), an increase in the adult
man's benefit rate, an extension of the period of entitlement
2
to benefit, and a reduction in the fund's outstanding debt.
These were generally the options throughout the 1930s, and
deciding between them was by no means easy.
Beveridge was, of course, a staunch supporter of
Eleanor Rathbone, and with Mary Stocks on the Committee the
question of family endowment was obviously going to get
sympathetic consideration. However, Beveridge was aware of
the problems of introducing too great an element of needs-
assessment into insurance; unemployment benefit he regarded
as "an extension of wages", and since "the composition of
the family is not taken into account in determining rates of
wages.... it was, therefore, a question whether it should be
1. Report of the U.I.S.C. for 1934, p. 3.
2. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
299
A
taken into account in determining rates of benefit".
Higher child allowances were being strongly demanded by
both the T.U.C. and C.M.C., and thus in its special mid¬
year Report of July 1935 the Committee attempted a compro¬
mise: a rise of 1s.0d. per week in the child allowance
was to be subject to an upper benefit limit of 4ls.0d.
per week (equivalent to the rate for a man, wife and five
2
children). This, the Committee maintained, was vital.
Without it, cases of overlap would become much more
common: an unskilled labourer with a wife and six
children, normally earning 40s.0d. per week, would be
4s.Od. better off when unemployed. A wage-stop might be
a better idea, but since contributions took no account of
wages then neither should benefit. Families with more
than five children could receive supplementation from the
U.A.B. - but only if they underwent the Board's means test
and proved they had no resources.
This upper limit was rejected by Ernest Brown,
Minister of Labour, on the grounds that such a recommend-
4
ation was outside the Committee's terms of reference, and
thereafter the problem of overlap began to loom larger and
larger. In their end-of-1935 Report the Committee called
1. Minutes of the U.I.S.C. for 7/2/35.
2. Report of the U.I.S.C. for July 1935, pp. 17-18.
3. Ibid., p. 18.
4. Hansard, Vol. 305, 24/10/35, Col. 471. The real reason
may have been Treasury opposition to any change that might
raise the cost of assistance.
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for a thorough investigation of the relations between
wages, benefits and assistance, and in their first hint
at family allowances they warned that "the growing direct
provision for families, under unemployment insurance and
assistance, is beginning to raise acutely the general
problem of dependency under a wage system which makes no
-i
similar provision".
In their private discussions, the Committee members
were beginning to grasp the magnitude of their problems.
By the end of 1935 the fund was making an embarrassingly
healthy profit of £290,000 per week, and every indication
was that this would continue. How should it be spent?
The easiest way out would be to leave benefits alone
and concentrate on extending the scope of insurance as against
assistance. Naturally, both the Treasury and the Ministry of
Labour saw this as the best course, but both Departments
realised that it would not be possible to spend rather more
than £17,000,000 in this way over the next seven and a half
years. Similarly, it would be politically very unpopular
to devote the growing surplus solely to a reduction in
the debt repayment period: such an action would benefit
2
not the workers of the 1930s but their sons.
1. Report of the U.I.S.C. for 1935, pp. 28-9.
2. Note of a Discussion on the Unemployment Insurance Fund
by the Ministry of Labour. 25/11/36, P.R.O. PIN 7/216.
301
The T.U.C. pressed strongly for higher benefits in
their deputations to the Committee. They firmly rejected
the idea that insurance benefit should always be higher
than assistance scales, since such a differentiation
implied a differentiation of status, and they believed
there should be "no distinction between the two classes
as citizens.... the persons coming within the scope of
Part II of the Act were decent citizens and should be
treated as such". They wanted child allowances of at
least 5s.Od. per week, and indeed were even more insistent
1
in this demand than were the Children's Minimum Council. .
They were quite prepared to see contributions raised to
finance this, and opposed the Committee's recommendation
2
in the 1935 Report that contributions should be lowered:
the proposed reduction of 2d. would cost the equivalent
of raising the adult man's benefit by 4s.Od., they argued,
and this would be much more popular. The National
Confederation of Employers' Association wanted contri¬
butions lowered until they reached a level of 6d. per
week for each party, as opposed to 9d# in 1936.^ But
this, the Committee knew, could not seriously be presented
1. Statement by J.L. Smyth (T.U.C.), Minutes of the
U.I.S.C, for 7/2/35. See also Minutes for 9/1/36.
The T.U.C. had recommended to the Royal Commission
on Unemployment Insurance benefit rates of 20s.Od.
for a man, 10s.0d. for a dependent wife and 5s.Od.
for each dependent child.
2. Report of the U.I.S.C. for 1935. pp. 28-9.
3. Minutes of the U.I.S.C. for 9/T/36.
4. P.eport of the U.I.S.C. for 1936, p.' 17.
302
as providing a great saving to industry: Arthur Shaw
pointed out that a 1d. reduction in contributions would,
for example, only save a shipbuilding firm a paltry £43
•i
out of the cost of building a £90,000 vessel.
Ultimately, all decisions were dominated by the
need to preserve less eligibility. The T.U.C. saw that
the real problem was that "in so far as wages are so low
that the rate of benefit is above them the question is not
whether benefit is too high but whether wages are not too
low". But beyond that, they were as perplexed as the
Committee. They agreed that it would probably be wrong
if benefit exceeded a man's normal wage; but to enforce
this by a wage-stop would cut across the insurance principle
of equal benefits for equal contributions. Even if a wage-
stop was fixed fairly high it would still leave unsolved
2
the problem of what to do with large families.
Perhaps the most interesting discussion of the
problem took place on the 20th November 1936, when the
Committee met three members of the U.A.B. - Lord Rushcliffe,
Wilfred Eady and J. Graham (the Board's Deputy Finance
Officer). Beveridge had invited them to discuss three
crucial points: the relationship between benefit and
1. Report of the U.I.S.C. for 1935, p. 30. This was
a special appendix written by Shaw in dissent to the
Committee's majority recommendation.
2. Statement by J.L. Smyth, Minutes of ttie.-^U.I.S.C. for 9/1/36.
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assistance, the consequences of an extension of benefit,
and whether a wage-stop could be operated by the U.I.S.C.
The Board were concerned that the fund's continuing solvency
would result in public demands for higher insurance benefit,
which in turn would force them to raise their scales and
exacerbate their own overlap problems. Characteristically,
the Board were most sensitive about any criticism that might
be made about their scales: if the Committee justified
future increases by reference to the fund's surplus there
would be no danger; "but if it were done because 26s.Od.
was considered to be insufficient for a man and wife it
would raise the issue whether the rates of unemployment
assistance were adequate", Eady warned, and pointed out
that "a good deal depended upon what was said". Beveridge,
however, assured them that he "would not give as the reason
any consideration of need and certainly not one that would
-i
embarrass the Unemployment Assistance Board".
Beveridge wanted to know if the Board had any ideas
on how a wage-stop might be introduced into insurance, but
no ideas were forthcoming. After outlining the difficulties
of a wage-stop - notably that of assessing the 'normal'
wages of a long-term unemployed man - Eady made the
surprising admission (surprising in view of the Board's
public concern over the disincentive effect of overlap)
that in his opinion the wage-stop had little practical
1. Minutes of the U„I.~S.C. for 20/11/36.
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effect as an inducement to seek work: "there was little
evidence that a difference of 2s.Od. or 3s.Od. between
allowances and wages deterred large numbers from taking
work - the satisfaction of employment was measured by other
1
considerations in addition to the amount of wages".
This meeting had solved none of the Committee's
problems. Accordingly, the question of higher benefits
was shelved for another year, and the 1936 Report came
out in favour of widening the scope of insurance: the
waiting period was reduced from six to three days and
the period of benefit for certain contributors was
2
extended.
Within the Ministry of Labour there was growing
concern that long-term unemployment might be destroying
the will to work. A general enquiry was made in 1935, and
it concluded that reluctance to seek work because of high
benefit was not extensive; mostly refusal of jobs offered
arose out of the nature of the work or its inconvenient
location. In any case, instances of families with more
than five children (which is where the danger of overlap
was thought to begin) made up only about one-ninetieth
1. Ibid.
2. Report of the U.I.S.C. for 1936, p. 18.
3. Ministry of Labour Memorandum: Enquiry as to Whether
Difficulty Has Arisen in Low Wage Areas in Getting Men
with High Weekly Rates of Benefit to Take Employment,




A second enquiry was made in 1936, in response to
allegations made by a Glasgow naval recruiting officer
that the unemployed young men there preferred idleness to
2
work. The allegations were not based on any firm evidence,
but clearly it was something the Ministry of Labour felt
very concerned about, for they set about a nationwide
enquiry into the problem. The replies indicated that the
most common reason for turning down a job was its distance
from home, and there was no mention of large families as
a cause. Where people had settled down to life on the dole,
it was "the result of long unemployment and hopelessness, and
not so much deliberate idling as a dangerous lassitude
which is the result of social environment and irregular
employment over many years", and this was especially true
in Glasgow.^
By 1937 the Committee were very concerned that, as
Mary Stocks put it, "a man might find that he could do his
4
duty to his family better by losing his job". Thus during
1. Ministry of Labour Memorandum: Claimants With Families in
Which There Are More than Five Dependent Children, (1935),
ibid. Report of the U.I.S.C. for 1935, p. 38. Out of
an average of 920,201 claims at any one time in 1935,
10,000 had more than five dependent children.
2. Report on the Shortage of Artificer Applicants for Entry
into the Royal Navy in the Glasgow Area by
Commander H.T. Strawbridge, 21/8/36, P.R.O. PIN 7/167.
3. Memorandum by the Minister of Labour, (n.d., probably 1936),
ibid.
4. Minutes for 14 and 15/1/37.
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that year yet another investigation was made, with
applicants being asked to state their weekly wage when
last in employment. The results, which were published
in the 1937 Report, showed that average benefit rates
for men, including dependants' allowances, were only
two-fifths of median wage-rates - 24s.6d. as against
55s.6d. However, there was great inequality of wage-rates,
ranging from less than I4s.0d. to over 100s.0d. per week
in the case of men, and less than 12s.Od. to over 60s.0d.
per week in the case of women. As with the Board, the
problem of overlap was numerically small: only 2.3% of men
and 5-2% of women were as well or better off when on benefit
than in employment. But, again like the Board, it was a
problem the Committee felt would have dangerous long-term
repercussions. Of the men on 4ls.0d. benefit, 10% were
as well or better off than when in employment, but of those
-i
on 50s.Od. benefit the proportion was over one-third.
The Committee were being pressed on all sides to raise
child allowances by 1s.0d. per week, but to do this would
increase the incidence of overlap by a third; and in the
case of large families, even more: at the 4ls.0d. rate of
benefit it would rise from 10% to 25%.^
To Beveridge this was complete anathema. Again and
again he repeated his dislike of 'over-insurance', and in
the 1937 Report finally suggested that there were only two
1. Report of the U.I.S.C. for 1937, pp. 20-1.
2. Ibid., p. 25.
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possible remedies - a wage-stop or else family allowances
-1
in wages. The former had been rejected by the Minister
of Labour in 1935. A recommendation of the latter was way
outside the Committee's terms of reference; but nevertheless
recommend them they did, on the grounds that "if the wage
system made allowance for dependency, the main objection
2
to further increases in rates of benefit would be removed".
The issue could no longer be dodged: with a growing surplus
in the fund, benefits would have to be raised soonr or later,
and the whole question of family dependency considered in
toto.
In the event, the Committee did manage to avoid the
problem for another year. Despite pressure from the T.U.C.
for further increases, the 1938 Report simply recommended
that the annual surplus be used to reduce the outstanding
debt by £6,000,000 per annum instead of £5,000,000.^ The
following year the Committee relented and raised child
allowances to 4s.Od. per week for the first two children
4
and 3s.Od. for every other. By then, however, the out¬
break of war had changed everything.
By the late 1930s, therefore, both Government bodies
dealing with the able-bodied unemployed had 'come round to
a virtual recommendation of family allowances. The family
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Report of the U.I.S.C. for 1938, pp. 3, 8.
4. Report of the U.I.S.C. for 1959, p. 12.
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endowment principle had merged into unemployment insurance
for a number of reasons: hurried administrative expediency
in the case of out-of-work donation; the political threat
posed by the unemployed in the case of the 'temporary'
introduction of dependants' allowances in 1921; and there¬
after, family-adjusted benefits were seen as a relatively
inexpensive way of mitigating the worst hardship, since
such a system was cheaper than across-the-board benefit
rises. By the 1930s, however, the rise in the real value
of benefits turned into a reality what some civil servants
in the early 1920s had discussed in theory - the problem
of preserving less eligibility in the case of unemployed
men with large families, in a low-wage economy. By the
late 1930s both the U.A.B. and the U.I.S.C. were urgently
insisting that the problem could only be solved at the
wages end.
This, however, raised acutely controversial issues
and brought to head the two conflicting and irreconcilable
attitudes that have always dogged the history of family
allowances. To those on the political left, this call for
family allowances by the U.A.B. and U.I.S.C. merely obscured
the real issue, which was that many industries were paying
grossly sub-standard wages. Both bodies, they maintained,
had followed a policy of less eligibility for fear of
provoking a confrontation with industry. If rates of
benefit and assistance were raised to nutritionally-
defensible levels then the resultant enormous number of
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cases where it was more profitable to be unemployed than
in work would simply demonstrate how many wage-rates were
below minimum human needs. This was the line taken by most
Labour M.P.s present in the Commons on the 25th March 1938
1
when unemployment insurance was discussed. Aneurin Bevan
accused the U.I.S.C. of being a body "which regards it as
its first duty to protect the wage system", and said it
was very serious that many workers were receiving wages
lower than insurance benefit, which everybody admitted was
inadequate; rates of benefit had been fixed low for agri¬
cultural workers, for instance, because if they were higher
2
then agricultural wages would have to be raised. Another
Labour M.P., George Tomlinson, said that if the Lancashire
cotton industry continued to decline, then the majority of
weavers there (numbering between 90,000 and 100,000 adults)
would soon be on a wage less than unemployment benefit.
One economist who investigated this point was
Juergen Kuczynski. Using official Ministry of Labour
figures for 1935, Kuczynski compared wage levels with
Rowntree's 1937 'Human Needs' standard of 53s.Od. per week
for a man, wife and three children, emphasising that in
arriving at this figure Rowntree had pared down minimum
needs to a most spartan level and had allowed for no
luxuries. The result showed that, for example, about
1. Although this debate concerned the fate of 14 million
insured workers and their dependants, at one point a
count had to be taken to see if the necessary quorum of
40 Members was present. Hansard, Vol. 333, 25/3/38,
Col. 1553.
2. Ibid., Cols. 1532-3, 1537.
3. Ibid., Col. 1568.
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two-thirds of the weavers in the cotton industry needed a
rise in weekly fulltime earnings of 33% or more in order
to come up to Rowntree's minimum. The proportion of
workers in various industries who earned wages below this
level was: coal mining, 80%; railways, 25%; building, 50%;
textiles, 40% of men and 50% of women; clothing, 12% of
men and 35% of women. In all, 4,000,000 adult male
workers and 2,000,000 adult female workers earned less
than the Rowntree minimum, which, including their dependants,
2
made a total of 10,000,000 people. Yet, maintained
Kuczynski, although in the period 1931-8 unemployment
benefit in real terms had fallen, and real wages had risen
by only 5%, industrial production per employed worker had
risen by fully 20%. Viewed in this light, family allow¬
ances were a way of perpetuating this system. They would
raise the wages of married men just enough to shore up
the principle of less eligibility, and the real issue of
wages vis-a-vis profits would be neatly avoided.
On the other hand, supporters of family allowances
argued that overall wage-rates were a separate issue. The
situation in the late 1930s gave extra weight to their view¬
point, argued throughout the inter-war years, that the
three-child minimum wage would be both wasteful (in the
1. Juergen Kuczynski: Hunger and Work (1938), pp. 26, 107.
2. Ibid., pp. 108-9.
3. Ibid., p. 129.
4. For an expression of this view, see Socialist Party of
Great Britain: Family Allowances: a Socialist Analysis
(1943), pp. 9-12.
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case of families with fewer than three children) and
inadequate (for families with more than three). The real
problems of the U.A.B. and U.I.S.C. occurred in very large
families, and to try and solve the difficulty by basing a
minimum wage on a family of great size was ridiculous,
Duncan Sandys argued; the obvious solution was family
1
allowances in wages. Mary Stocks deplored the situation
where "a man's economic environment should be so adjusted
that the obviously remunerative course is a course which
must in the end demoralise him as a worker and destroy his
normal family status as a breadwinner - a course which
involves him in the dirty business of wangling out of his
job and in the nerve-breaking tedium of enforced idleness",
and likewise saw family allowances as the only way of
2
raising the 'floor' of wages above the 'ceiling' of relief.
By the end of the 1930s this latter view was being
supported by many politically middle-of-the-road social
investigators. There was a growing consensus that a
complete reorganisation of the social services was long
overdue, and (especially interesting in the light of the
Beveridge Report only a few years later) several writers
suggested that some sort of statutory commission should be
set up to do this, since these services had "grown up in
a very piecemeal way, without much regard either for
1. Hansard, Vol. 333, 25/3/38, Col. 1544.
2. Mary Stocks: The Floor of Wages and the Ceiling of Relief
(Family Endowment Society pamphlet, n.d., probably 1937),
Interestingly, in this pamphlet Mary Stocks also argued
against the Children's Minimum Council case that there
should be a declared national minimum needs level.
312
consistency of principle or for the effect of one service on
another". But, argued P.E.P., "the failure of the wage-
system to take any account of the disparities in family
responsibilities is one of the greatest obstacles to further
2
extensions of social provision". Raising low wages might
be one answer, "but such a step would be quite impracticable,
because it would dislocate the whole structure of differential
rewards for skill, lay an impossible tax on many industries
exposed to international competition, and would, moreover,
increase rather than diminish the contrasts in standards of
living between workers in the same occupations with and without
wives and children to maintain"; an attractive alternative
would be a limited family allowance scheme of 5s.Od. per week
for each child after the third, which would cost £7 million
per annum. The Pilgrim Trust discussed the connection
between large families and poverty, found that about two
in five persons dependent solely upon unemployment assistance
were being forced to live "at a level that cannot be defended
except on grounds of maintaining the wage incentive", and
concluded that family-adjusted wages were the most appropriate
4
answer. If benefit and assistance rates were raised any
5
higher, it was argued, then unemployment would increase;
1. Political and Economic Planning: Report on the British
Social Services (1937), p. 12. For a similar view, see
Seebohm Rowntree: "Family Allowances", Contemporary Review,
143, September 1938, p. 292, and P. Ford: Incomes, Means
Tests and Personal Responsibility (1939), ppu 74-5.
2. P.E.P., op. cit., p. 31.
3. Ibid., pp. 166-7.
4. Pilgrim Trust: Men Without Work (1938), pp. 113, 209.
5. Ibid., p. 113.
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an unemployed man could only be given full compensation for
loss of employment if at the same time the State assumed new
draconian powers of compulsion to ensure labour mobility and
work-incentives. The choice, maintained Gertrude Williams,
was "between the retention of a certain degree of personal
freedom and a relatively inadequate subsistence for the
unemployed on the one hand, and adequate maintenance and
2
virtual slavery on the other".
To this section of opinion, therefore, family allow¬
ances in wages were the' only way of ensuring adequate main¬
tenance for the unemployed without destroying the work
incentives and labour mobility essential to the successful
running of a free-market economy; in any reorganisation of
the social services family allowances would have to be intro¬
duced. To those on the political left, however, the real
issue was capitalism's unwillingness or inability to pay
decent wages; and family allowances were to be resisted at
all costs, since they were simply a means of letting employers
'off the hook'. In its own way, this dilemma of the late
1930s was very similar to the dilemma faced by the 1Speenhamland'
magistrates in 1795. They had managed to introduce a crude
family allowance system as a means of avoiding having to
introduce a statutory minimum wage. In the late 1930s it
remained to be seen whether, given the opposition of the
trade unions, the Government could do the same.
1. Ford, op. cit., pp. 69-70.
2. Gertrude Williams: The State and the Standard of Living
(1936), p. 302.
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ABROAD; PRIVATE AND OTHER SCHEMES.
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The Attitude of Political Parties
In the inter-war years the movement for family allow¬
ances in Britain contained many different shades of political
opinion. In campaigning essentially for the principle of
family endowment to be accepted in as many areas of Govern¬
ment policy as possible (although family allowances in wages
was the ultimate objective), Eleanor Rathbone and the Family
Endowment Society tried to present their cause in a number
of different ways so as to attract maximum support. Thus
at the one extreme family allowances could be seen by some
sections of the labour movement in the late 1920s as part
of an exclusively socialist approach to the family that
followed the maxim 'from each according to his ability to
each according to his or her (family) needs' and redistri¬
buted wealth from rich to poor; yet at the other extreme
some Conservative politicians in the late 1930s could see
family allowances in imperialist, almost racialist terms
when they advocated them as a pro-natalist measure designed
to ensure the continuation of the 'white races'. In short,
the attitude 'of political parties towards family allowances
in the inter-war years provides a fascinating example of
how one particular social policy can be perceived in
entirely different ways by different social groups.
Since the general discussion of family allowances
in Britain in the 1920s (as in other countries) was part of
a much wider discussion on the whole question of the minimum
31 6
wage it is not surprising that the keenest interest in
1
that decade should have been shown by the labour movement.
Within the Labour Party there was a long-standing interest
in the welfare of mothers and children, which in the early
1920s was tending to show itself in demands for mothers'
(or, more accurately, widows') pensions; and a logical
outgrowth from this was the cause of family endowment.
The main impetus behind this activity came from the
Independent Labour Party, which had long been interested
in the question of the minimum wage. After the fall of the
first Labour Government in 1924 the I.L.P. took upon itself
the task of acting as an ideological ginger-group within
the Labour Party, in an attempt to push it towards a mili-
tantly socialist but constitutional programme of aims, and
for the remainder of the 1920s it was very influential on
Party thinking. The I.L.P.'s fear was that the Labour
Party would all-too-easily shed its radical inclinations
once it regained office, and wanted the Party to commit
itself to a truly socialist programme which it would have
1. "There seems to be a growing interest in Family
Allowances in the House of Commons - mainly, I must
admit, in the Labour ranks", Eleanor Rathbone wrote with
cautious optimism in 1930. Rathbone to Beveridge,
6/3/30, L.S.E. Coll. Misc. 9.
2. For example, in February 1924 the Labour M.P. Charles Dukes
introduced in the Commons a motion favouring the principle
of pensions "to all widows with children, or mothers whose
family breadwinner has become incapacitated, such pensions
to be provided by the State and administered by a Committee
of the municipal or county council wholly unconnected with
the Poor Law". The House passed the motion. Hansard,
Vol. 169, 20/2/24, Cols. 1884-1925.
3. Arthur Marwick: "The Labour Party and the Welfare State
in Britain, 1900-1948", American Historical Review
(Richmond, Virginia), 73, December 1967, p. 393.
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to implement when in power. Thus from 1924 onwards the
I.L.P. gradually evolved the policy programme which became
known as 'Socialism in Our Time', officially endorsing it
at its 1926 Annual Conference. Socialism in Our Time was
a wide-ranging strategy covering such subjects as the public
ownership of banks and credit institutions, the nationalisation
of coal, electricity supply, transport and land, parliamentary
reform, unemployment policy, the reorganisation of agriculture -
but most important of all, a proposal for a 'Living Wage'
2
augmented by family allowances.
The Living Wage policy was developed over the period
1924-6 by a committee chaired by the economist J.A. Hobson,
and including H.N. Brailsford, Arthur Creech Jones and
Clifford Allen. Brailsford was probably the most instru¬
mental in getting the committee to adopt family allowances.
He had been a member of Eleanor Rathbone's 1917-18 'Equal
Pay and the Family' group, and in 1918 published his own
plea that the socialist principle of 'to each according to
4
his needs' be applied to wages and the family. Throughout
the 1920s he was a member of the Family Endowment Society's
Council, and was responsible for forging links between the
1. I.L.P. Annual Conference Report for 1926, pp. 76-87.
2. Ibid., pp. 76-8; G.D.H. Cole: A History of the Labour
Party from 1914 (1948), pp. 197-8; Ralph Miliband:
Parliamentary"Socialism (1973), p. 152.
3. Robert E. Dowse: Left in the Centre (1966), p. 130.
4. H.N. Brailsford: "Equal Pay and the Family Wage", in
A Share in Your Motherland (1918), pp. 9-17, esp. p. 13.
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I.L.P. and. the F.E.S. On the 18th August 1924, for example,
Eleanor Rathbone spoke to the I.L.P. Summer School at Scar¬
borough, during a day devoted to the question of the minimum
1 2
wage, and was quite well received. Brailsford edited the
I.L.P. journal, the New Leader, from 1922 to 1926 (in which
-z
year he was forced to resign from the Party)J and during
his editorship it carried a number of articles warmly
4
supporting family allowances, by himself and others.
Family allowances came to be a crucial part of the I.L.P.'s
Living Wage programme.
The Living Wage policy was based on two justifications:
first, the ethical case against the amount of inequality and
suffering caused by the existing maldistribution of income;
and second, the economic case (owing much to J.A. Hobson's
earlier analyses of underconsumption) that higher wages would
raise purchasing power, which would in turn stimulate industry
5
and result in a fall in unemployment. A minimum wage should
be established after detailed enquiries had been made to
medical authorities, housing experts, housewives, etc.,
regarding the exact level of expenditure necessary "to
1. Sxammer School programme in New Leader, 1/8/24.
2. "The women members of the school seemed to be
overwhelmingly in her favour, but Dollan
complained that the scheme had been presented in a
Liberal-bourgeois framework which laid it open to the
deepest suspicion". Ibid., 22/8/24.
3. Dowse, op. cit., pp. 125-6.
4. See, for example, articles in New Leader by Brailsford
(9/10/25), Hugh Dalton (15/1/25), Ernest E Hunter
(30/1/24) and Mary Stocks (17/4/25).
5. H.N. Brailsford, et al.: The Living Wage (1926), pp. 8-12.
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satisfy the requirements, first of health and. efficiency,
and then of the cultural life" for a man and wife, and to
1
this figure should be added child allowances.
The precise monetary level of the Living Wage v/as
never properly defined, and it remained a statement of
principle rather than an exact figure. In addition, there
was some ambivalence over the question of whether industry
really would be able to pay out the total necessary to
establish the Living Wage - a point frequently made by
opponents of the minimum wage principle at a time when
prevailing economic orthodoxy saw the solution to Britain's
economic difficulties in wage reductions that would reduce
costs and hence make exports more competitive on world
markets. Thus, on the one hand, Brailsford could insist
that "in fixing it /the Living Wage_7 we demand that the
customary reference to 'what the industry can pay' shall be
2
ruthlessly disregarded", yet on the other hand some I.L.P.
members maintained that the Living Wage's exact amount would
have to be dictated by how much could be creamed off indus¬
trial profits without inflicting long-term damage (such as
preventing investment in new plant). Such contradictions
were gleefully seized upon by those on the right wing of the
1. Ibid., p. 31 .
2. H.N. Brailsford: Socialism for Today (1926), p. 77.
3. I.L.P. pamphlet: The Living Income (n.d., probably 1929),
p. 4. To further confuse matters, Brailsford on one
occasion maintained that in demanding the Living Wage he
was "asking for the impossible". Quoted in Dowse, op. cit.,
p. 130.
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Labour Party who resented the I.L.P.'s influence, but
essentially the concept of the Living Wage was more of a
rallying-cry aimed at challenging the basic assumptions of
capitalism than a precise cash level.
However, there was more substance to the I.L.P.
proposal for family allowances. The scheme was to be fin-*
-i
anced "out of direct taxation of high incomes", and allow¬
ances (paid through the Post Office) were initially to cover
2
working class parents or guardians. The cash figure quoted
most often was 5s.Od. per week for every working class child
under or of school age, but other amounts were sometimes
suggested: 5s.Od. was "the lowest figure which would be
worth considering", and the I.L.P. maintained that "if we
can cut down armaments and the National Debt, one might talk
of 6s. or 7s. weekly for each child".^ The high cost of such
schemes should be no deterrent, the I.L.P. maintained, and
when on one occasion there was a suggestion that allowances
should cease after the fourth or fifth child this was not
for reasons of economy but in order to prevent "undesirable
5
multiplication of families".
1. Statement by P.J. Dollan, Labour Party Annual Conference
Report for 1926, p. 274.
2. Ibid.; Ernest E. Hunter: Wages and Families (1928), p. 5;
H.N. Brailsford: Families and Incomes: the Case for
Children's Allowances (1926), pp. 11-12.
3.. Ibid. This would cost £125,000,000 per annum.
4. I.L.P. pamphlet: Labour's Road to Power (n.d., probably
1926), p. 7. On one occasion Brailsford (Socialism for
Today (1926), p. 79) suggested a figure of 7s.od. per week
at a cost of £210,000,000 p.a.
5. H.N. Brailsford, et al.: The Living Wage (1926), pp. '22-3.
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In order to allay trade union fears family allowances
would have to be clearly defined as "an addition to wages
and not a method of redistributing existing wages". Thus
there could be no countenancing of a scheme financed by an
equalisation fund (or industrial pool, as it was commonly
called) or by contributory insurance, since both of these
methods would merely redistribute income within the working
class rather than chanelling it from rich to poor. An
2
insurance-based scheme such as the one proposed by J.L. Cohen
would, Brailsford maintained, impose a crushing burden of
weekly contributions on groups like agricultural workers who
only earned in the region of 30s.Od. per week. European
private industrial schemes were viewed with the greatest
suspicion on the grounds that they had weakened trade union
solidarity and been used by employers as a weapon of indus-
4
trial warfare. The Australian system of minimum wage-fixing
(with tentative attempts to introduce family allowances) was
5
seen as a possible model, but even this was considered suspect
since it merely passed the cost on to the (working class)
consumer in the form of higher prices - thus probably neutra¬
lising any beneficial effect the family allowances might have
had.5
1. Hunter, op. cit., p. 7.
2. In Family Income Insurance (1926) and in W.H. Beveridge (ed.):
Six Aspects of Family Allowances (1927), pp. 20-1. In the
former (pp. 44-5), Cohen suggested twelve possible insurance
schemes, each with different levels of contribution and
allowance. For example, providing 6s.Od. per week for each
child under sixteen years of age would cost £160,000,000,
which could be financed by 1s.8d. per week from the worker
(plus contributions from State and employers).
3. Brailsford in ibid. (1927), p. 19.
4. A. Creech Jones: "Family Income - a Trade Union View",
Socialist Review, August 1926, p. 29.
5. See, for example, E. Hunter in New Leader-of 30/1/24 and
5/6/24.
6. Brailsford: Socialism for Today (1926), pp. 78-9.
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The case for family allowances was inextricably linked
to the case for the Living Wage. Apart from recognising
the rights of women and children, giving some much-needed
financial assistance to the working class mother ("the
most sweated worker of today", as Dorothy Jewson put it),
and paving the way to equal pay for equal work between the
3
sexes, family allowances were seen as the first stage in
a drastic redistribution of income under socialism, which
ultimately would involve a complete reorganisation of
industry. An important element in the case was an
'underconsumption' argument that bore J.A. Hobson's trade¬
mark and anticipated Keynesian economics: family allowances
with the Living Wage would raise the purchasing power of the
poor and create a demand in the home market that would
revitalise industry by forcing it to turn away from the
disrupted foreign markets and declining domestic sectors
of coal, cotton, shipbuilding, iron and steel. The domestic
market would thus become the pacemaker for economic recovery,
and in addition the cost of food imports would be cut by the
introduction of a new agricultural policy that would result
5
in better feeding of the population. The Living Wage-
family allowances policy was thus "the only fundamental
1. Minnie Pallister: "The Justice of Family Allowances",
Socialist Review, June 1926, pp. 40-2; I,L.P. Annual
Conference Report for 1926, p. 80.
2. Dorothy Jewson: Socialists and the Family (1926), p. 4.
3. Labour's Road to Power, op. cit., p. 8.
4. Families and Incomes, op. cit., pp. 5-6. Although the
I.L.P. were often rather vague on the question of exactly
how this process would take place, in The Living Income/
op. cit., pp. 4-11, there is a clear outline of the stages
envisaged.
5. Socialism for Today, op. cit., pp. 113-6; The Living Wage,
op. cit., pp. 8-12, 42-3.
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1
method of tackling unemployment", since it would "create
a vast new internal market. It would make a demand that
would get every factory busily working to supply the needs
2
of the home population". Finally, this new prosperity in
3
industry would automatically produce higher wages.
Viewed in retrospect, the Living Wage programme stands
out (along with Lloyd George's plan of 1928 and the 1930
Mosley Memorandum) as one of the few examples of constructive
and bold economic thinking in the inter-war years. At the
time it was taken up with great enthusiasm by the I.L.P.,
and according to one reliable authority was vigorously
L\
pushed "at thousands of public meetings" in the 1920s.
If this is true, then the cause of family allowances must
have reached a wide audience. The Family Endowment Society
tried as best it could to capitalise upon this wave of
interest, severely handicapped though it was by.a lack of
finance and membership. In the year '1929-30 speakers from the
Society toured the Northern and Midland areas of England: 64
towns were visited, over 1,200 interviews were held with
trade union officials, representatives of political parties,
prominent individuals, etc., and in all 105 meetings were
5
held; and the Society published a pamphlet specially
designed to allay fears within the labour movement by
1. Hunter, op. cit., p. 5.
2. New Leader, 22/5/25.
3. Hunter, op. cit., p. 5.
4. Dowse, op. cit., p. 225.
5. F.E.S. Annual Report for 1930, P. 2.
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quoting several statements made by foreign trade union
leaders to the effect that in those countries family allow-
1
ances had not lowered wages nor weakened union solidarity.
From the I.L.P.'s point of view, the all-important
ultimate aim was to persuade the Labour Party and the T.U.C.
to accept Socialism in Our Time and make it the future
programme of a united labour movement.. This was no easy
task, for the more conservative labour leaders displayed
an open hostility towards I.L.P. influence. Ramsay MacDonald,
for example, viewed their proposals as far too radical and
Utopian, and feared that, if adopted, Socialism in Our Time
would become an electoral millstone round the Labour Party's
neck, alienating the large number of moderate Party supporters;
and Ernest Bevin strongly resented what he considered unwarranted
2
interference in wage questions. Many trade unionists shared
Bevin's feelings, family allowances arousing in them the sort
of gut-reaction expressed by Rhys Davies when he said that
they were "based on the assumption that the average working
class father and husband was devoid of feelings of responsi¬
bility for his wife and children, and /were'7 a confession
that the married man could not, either by personal qualities
or Trade Union organisation, secure an adequate income to
maintain himself and his family". At a time when the trade
1. F.E.S. pamphlet: Trade Union and Labour Opinion
Favourable to Family Allowances (1928)
2. Dowse, op"! cit. , pp. 134-5; Cole, op. cit., pp. 198-9;
Alan Bullock: The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, Vol. I
(1960), pp. 389-390.
3. Labour Party Annual Conference Report for 1930, p. 176.
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union movement was extremely vulnerable (in the aftermath
of the General Strike) fears of possible wage reductions
were deep-seated, and many trade unionists were convinced
that if introduced, family allowances would immediately be
followed by employers' demands that wages be cut accordingly.
Finally, it must be remembered that there was a strong lobby
of opinion within the labour movement that regarded extensions
of services in kind to mothers and children as having far
greater priority over cash allowances.
Nevertheless, despite this formidable phalanx of
opposition the I.L.P. worked hard in the period 1925-30 to
get their plan accepted. A Labour Family Allowances Committee
was formed, and on the 23rd March 1929 it organised a confer¬
ence for representatives of trade unions, co-operative socie-
2
ties, trade councils, etc. Strong support also came from
women's organisations in the labour movement. The Women's
Co-operative Guild had been interested in the concept of
"a minimum for the family" ever since 1919 and by the mid
1920s this had evolved into an enthusiastic support for
1. See, for example, Manchester and Salford Trades Council
pamphlet: The Demand for "Family Allowances" (1930).
2. Invitation to Labour Family Allowances Committee
Conference, 25/3/29. The Committee consisted of
Mrs. J.L. Adamson, John Beard, J.L. Cohen, G.D.H. Cole,
Hugh Dalton, Mrs. Agnes Dollan, Ernest Hunter,
Arthur Creech Jones, Joseph Jones, George Lansbury,
J.M. Marcus, R.H. Pott, J.J. Tinker, Ben Turner and
Ellen Wilkinson.
3. In 1919 this concept tended to consist of three elements -
widows' pensions, motherhood endowment and a State Bonus
scheme. A motion in favour of all three was passed at the
Guild's Annual Congress in June 1919. Women's Co-operative
Guild Annual Report for 1919-20, pp. 2, 5, 12, 28. "
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1
family allowances. A rather cautious interest was shown
2
by the Women's Trade Union Conference, but the National
Conference of Labour Women passed several favourable motions.
7
In 1927 they approved the principle of a State-run scheme;
in 1929 "by an overwhelming majority" they passed a resolution
urging the Labour Party "to proceed as quickly as possible"
4
in formulating a scheme; and in 1930 family allowances
were again recommended as one out of several ways of
5
achieving equal pay between the sexes. As in the Labour
Party, discussions reflected the power-struggle that was
taking place between the I.L.P. and the right wing of the
Party: in 1931, for example, the I.L.P. women delegates
tried to introduce a motion committing the Conference to
the Living Wage, which was defeated. But, as far as can
be gathered, grass-roots opinion within the Labour Women's
7
movement was very much in favour of cash family allowances.
1. Widows' pensions, motherhood endowment and the State
Bonus continued to be supported at Guild Annual Congresses
in the early 1920s. See: ibid, for 1920-1. pp. 20-1;
for 1921-2. p. 26; for 1924-3, p. 17. At the 1925 and
1926 Annual Congresses motions were passed in favour of
a State-run family allowance scheme. Ibid, for 1925-6,
p. 18, and for 1926-7, p. 17. The Guild also set up a
small committee which investigated family allowances and
summarised the main arguments for and against. Women's
Co-operative Guild: Notes for the Study of Family
Allowances (n.d., probably 1925).
2. Notice of First Annual Women's Trade Union Conference for
1926. pp. 4-10.
3. National Conference of Labour Women Report for 1927, pp. A
4. Ibid, for 1929, pp. 64-5.
5. Ibid, for 1930, pp. 42-54.
6. Ibid, for 1931, pp. 88-9.
7. See letters from readers in The Labour Woman, 1/9/30,
pp. 137-8.
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■ However, the labour movement was run by men, and
success for the I.L.P.'s plan could only come if the main
Labour Party and T.U.C. Annual Conferences voted in its
favour. At the 1926 Labour Party Conference the I.L.P.
member P.J. Dollan proposed a motion in favour of family
allowances, and the Conference agreed to set up a committee
of investigation. This enquiry, in fact, became part of
a general investigation by a T.U.C. General Council and
Labour Party Executive Joint Committee, set up in July 1927,
2
to examine all the I.L.P. Living Wage proposals.
In 1928 this Joint Committee published an Interim
Report in which it summarised, from the point of view of
the labour movement, the main arguments for and against
family allowances vis-a-vis further services in kind. The
Interim Report began by confirming that there was general
agreement within the labour movement that some sort of
special provision was needed for the nation's children
and that both family allowances and better social services
were highly desirable, but the question was one of priorities.
After summarising the evidence of witnesses (including
Eleanor Rathbone, Mary Stocks, Professors D.H. Macgregor and
Alexander Gray, J.A. Hobson and J.L. Cohen), it considered
the familiar arguments for and against, and outlined possible
schemes. The I.L.P. scheme would, if applied to the insured
population, cost about £125 million per annum, and the
1. Labour Party Annual Conference Report for 1926, pp. 274-5.
The voting was 2,242,000 in favour and 1,143,000 against.
2. Ibid., for 1927, pp. 51-2.
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question was whether this sum (which amounted to more than
one-third of existing expenditure on all social services)
might not be better spent expanding existing welfare provision.
For example, even if only £60 million was available (equivalent
to a 2s.6d. per week cash allowance for every child up to the
age of fifteen), might this not be better spent doubling the
existing expenditure on education, housing and public health?
The Report concluded by pointing out that in contrast to the
enormous expenditure needed for family allowances, only
about £70 million to £80 million would be needed to make the
public health and educational services "almost complete"
-i
in terms of the Labour Party's existing plans.
Once the Interim Report was published, the T.U.C.
General Council circulated it to member unions, together
with a questionnaire, and the results were published in the
1929 Annual Report. To the question "are you in favour of
further financial provision being made for children",
fifty-three unions (with an aggregate membership of
2,127,965) answered in the affirmative, and two unions
(membership 366,514) in the negative; of these fifty-three
unions, nineteen (membership of 1,146,774) favoured this
being achieved by cash allowances, and thirty-three
(membership of 980,786) preferred extensions of social
1. T.U.C. General Council and Labour Party Executive:
Joint Committee on the Living Wage: Interim Report on
Family Allowances and Child Welfare (parts I-III)
(1928), esp. pp. 11, 16, 17-27, 31, 37.
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1
services. In view of this somewhat inconclusive result,
the Joint Committee were asked to investigate the matter
further and make a firm recommendation.
Meanwhile, I.L.P. members were continuing to raise
the subject of family allowances at Labour Party Conferences.
At the 1927 Conference the Living Wage was debated, and out
of seven speakers who participated five were strongly in
2
favour of family allowances. At the Conference of the
following year Dorothy Jewson of the I.L.P. moved that the
Joint Committee's Interim Report be referred back to the
Executive so that the latter might make a decision on
whether family allowances should be included in the Party's
election programme, but when Arthur Henderson, the Chairman,
explained to her that the Joint Committee would be reporting
soon she withdrew her motion. In 1929, however, Dorothy Jewson
forced the Conference to debate the issue by introducing a
motion: "by far the most important work in the country is
the bearing of children", she maintained, and put forward
the I.L.P. case that apart from greatly relieving family
poverty, especially in the depressed areas, child allowances
would raise purchasing power (thus boosting the economy) and
1.' T.U.C. Annual Report for 1929, p. 258. A breakdown
of these figures is not available, but presumably the
large membership unions who voted for cash allowances
(the nineteen unions with a total membership of
1,146,774) would be composed of the more unskilled
workers who would have had the largest families.
2. Labour Party Annual Conference Report for 1927,
pp. 216-221. ;
3. Ibid, for 1928, pp. 167-8.
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would actually strengthen trade union solidarity during
industrial disputes "because children would be paid whether
the man was in work or not". The ensuing debate vividly
illustrated the conflict of view within the labour movement.
Ernest Bevin wanted no discussion until the Joint Committee
had finally reported, and was clearly hostile to the whole
2
Living Wage programme. Other speakers wanted child welfare
services developed first, and felt that the enormous cost
of family allowances made them a political impossibility.
(A Labour Government was by then in power, it must be
remembered). Yet an equal number of speakers (notably
Herbert Smith of the Miners' Federation, and I.L.P. repres¬
entatives) supported the motion enthusiastically.^
Clearly, Labour Party leaders were well aware of the
anti-family allowance feeling in the trade union movement
(or, perhaps more accurately, certain influential sections
of its leadership): in winding up the debate Arthur Henderson
(who had been in favour of family allowances at the 1927
Conference) made a very lukewarm speech suggesting that the
matter be looked into further, with no decisions being made
in the meantime, and somewhat unconvincingly maintaining that
the Party had made "splendid progress" and had "done magni¬
ficent educational work" on the subject over the previous
4
two years.
1. Ibid, for 1929, pp. 159-160.
2. Ibid., p. 161.
3. Ibid., pp. 161-8.
4. Ibid., pp. 168-9.
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In addition, it is highly likely that trade union
leaders such as Ernest Bevin who remained deeply suspicious
of the Living Wage/family allowances programme were working
hard behind the scenes during 1929-30 to get the whole
subject dropped from public discussion-, or at least post¬
poned indefinitely. Eleanor Rathbone certainly believed this
was going on: in May 1930 she collected the signatures of
her more influential supporters on a letter which was sent
to the T.U.C. General Council and Labour Party Executive,
asking that the Joint Committee's Final Report (in which, it
was known, family allowances had been recommended by a
A
majority) be published without further delay. This covert
opposition by Bevin and others ensured that when the Final
Report was eventually published in 1930 the opponents of
family allowances had their way.
2
The Majority on the Committee (nine members) favoured
cash allowances as "the most valuable step that can now be
taken to further the welfare of the nation's children".
Allowances of 5s.Od. per week for the first child and 3s.Od.
per week for each subsequent child were recommended, payable
only to those not receiving income tax child rebates, and
the scheme would have to be Exchequer-financed rather than
by equalisation funds or contributory insurance. The
1. Rathbone to Beveridge, 22/5/30, L.S.E. Coll. Misc. 9.
2. J. Beard, J.L. Adamson, Ethel Bentham, B. Ayrton Gould,
J. Mill, Joseph Jones, F.W. Jowett, R.T. Jones, A. Loughlin.
3. T.U.C. Annual Report for 1930* pp. 220-1. The Final Report
was originally published separately, but was also reprinted
and included in ibid.
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1
Minority (three members) agreed that the principle of
cash allowances was sound, but maintained that the cost of
the Majority's scheme (£70,000,000) would greatly hinder the
expansion of services in kind. "It is merely blinking at
the facts", they stated, "to imagine that any Government in
the near future is going to be able to raise this sum in
addition to all other commitments, including extensions of
the social services". Before any decision on family allow¬
ances could be taken there would have to be introduced:
a complete medical service for all children from birth to
school leaving age; a pre- and post-natal maternity service
with cash payments for each child for the first year or two
after birth; the raising of the school leaving age, with
adequate maintenance allowances during the additional year;
the provision of nursery schools for children up to school
age; the provision of "adequate, healthy homes"; the
2
elimination of tuberculosis; and the supply of pure milk.
The Final Report was considered by the T.U.C. General
Council in March 1930, with no firm decision being reached.
On the 15th April it was again discussed by the Council,
this time in the company of the Labour Party Executive
Committee, but both bodies were divided on the lines of the
Majority and Minority Report. Finally, on the 28th May the
General Council decided by a 16 to 8 majority to adopt the
Minority Report, but suggested that the matter be debated at
the 1930 Conference.^
1. H.H. Elvin, W.H. Hutchinson, F. Wolstencraft.
2. ibid., pp. 218-9.
3. Ibid., pp. 217-8.
333
The year 1930 was thus crucial to the movement for
family allowances in Britain, for it marked the end of the
interest within the labour movement that had seemed so
promising five years earlier. At the T.U.C. Annual Conference
C.T. Cramp opened the debate by explaining the General Council's
decision. They had decided to reject family allowances, he
said, primarily on grounds of practicability, since "anything
we do as a Trade Union Movement ought to be capable of
achievement within a reasonable time and not merely held up
as an ideal to be achieved some time or other"; the enormous
cost of family allowances made them an impossibility in the
existing economic situation - for example, the Treasury had
just had to pay out £60,000,000 in order to shore up the
unemployment insurance scheme; in addition, the Council
considered services in kind more important and feared the
possible effect family allowances might have on union
solidarity. A long debate ensued, in which all the
familiar arguments were repeated and no agreement reached:
for example, on the question of union solidarity the anti-
family allowance lobby insisted that European schemes had
been very successfully used by employers as a means of
2
enforcing industrial discipline, while the pro-family
allowance lobby could point to the example of the General
Strike which had remained solid in Durham because the
1. Ibid., pp. 381-3-
2. Ibid., pp. 388-390.
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strikers' children were maintained by the Boards of
Guardians, whereas in Nottingham there was no such main-
tenance and the Strike collapsed. The two women who
spoke in the debate were both strongly in favour of family
allowances and criticised the majority of speakers who had
judged the issue solely in terms of whether the trade union
movement would benefit rather than in terms of the nation's
2
children, and the Miners' Federation representatives were
also supporters. Eventually, however, the assembled
delegates voted against a reference back (i.e. in favour
of the Minority Report) by 2,154,000 votes to 1,347,000.^
Much the same thing happened at the Labour Party
Conference later in the year, in October. A brief debate
was yet again initiated by Dorothy Jewson, but in view
of the T.U.C.'s decision the Conference voted against a
reference back by 1,740,000 votes to 495,000, and all the
I.L.P. were left with was a vague promise by Arthur Henderson
that the Party Executive would "keep the matter open" and
5
continue discussions with the T.U.C. It was 'kept open'
for another decade.
1. Ibid., p. 391.
2. Ibid., pp. 395-7 (speech by Miss D. Evans of the^Women
Clerks' and Secretaries' Union) and pp. 399-401 (speech
by Miss A. Loughlin of the Tailors' and Garment Workers'
Union).
3. For example, speech by P. Lee, ibid., pp. 383-5.
4. Ibid., p. 409.
5. Labour Party Annual Conference Report for 1930,
pp. 174-9, 212-3.
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Thus by the autumn of 1930 the campaign for family
allowances within the labour movement, which for a time had
seemed quite promising, came to an abrupt end. Family allow¬
ances, it had been officially decided, were to take second
place in any future Labour Party programme to extensions of
services in kind. The latter always held a greater appeal,
since they accorded with long-standing socialist demands for
a collectivist approach to child care through State welfare
services.
Beyond that, however, there were a number of other
reasons for trade union and Labour Party opposition. The
fact that family allowances were advocated most insistently by
the I.L.P. meant that any discussion on them invariably re¬
flected the power-struggle that was going on in the Labour
Party between the I.L.P. and the more conservative leaders
like Ramsay MacDonald. Deeply imbued with the tenets of
fiscal orthodoxy, this latter group viewed the Living Wage
1
proposals as "flashy futilities",' and naturally feared that
to give in to the I.L.P. would also mean handing over to them
the reins of power. Thus it was for both ideological and
tactical reasons that the Labour Party Executive in 1927
quickly brought out Labour and the Nation - a policy document
designed to steer the Party away from the Socialism in Our Time
programme, and one which made no mention of minimum wages or
1. Ramsay MacDonald, quoted in Cole, op. cit., p. 198.
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1
family allowances. Finally, it must be remembered that from
1929 a Labour Government was in power, and in such a situation
Party leaders were much less willing to be committed by the
Annual Conference to potentially expensive and controversial
?
social policies.
For their part, trade union leaders felt extremely
vulnerable in the aftermath of the General Strike. The
working class had 'lost' £700,000,000 in wage cuts over the
last ten years, they maintained, and the first priority was
4
to win this back in wage rises. The only practical instances
of family allowance systems had been Speenhamland and the
foreign industrial schemes - both of which seemed to provide
irrefutable proof that wage reductions followed. Indeed,
trade unionists even believed at this time that there was a
growing movement among employers to have the value of social
5
services taken into account in fixing wages. Family allow-
1. There was merely a promise "to abolish the grosser
scandals of underpayment". Op. cit., p. 22.
2. The I.L.P. became more and more disenchanted with the
Labour Party, and finally split away from it in 1932.
3. Total trade union membership had fallen from 8, 348 > 000 in
1921 to 4,858,000 in 1930. David Butler and Anne Sloman:
British Political Facts, 1900-1975 (1975), p. 299.
4. Speech by Arthur Hayday; Labour Party Annual Conference
Report for 1930, p. 178.
5. Speech by W.H. Hutchinson, T.U.C. Annual Report for 1930»
pp. 394-5. In February 1930 there had been published the
Macmillan Report on a textile industry wage dispute which
had suggested that when comparing the pre- and post-First
World War standard of living of the worker, the value of
recent social services should be taken into account. When
settling this particular wage dispute, Lord Macmillan wrote,
"it should be borne in mind that the average woollen operative
has not only received an increase in wage rates substantially
greater than the rise in the cost of living, but also has
greatly expanded social services at his disposal". 'Report
by a Court of Inquiry, Concerning the matters in dispute
regarding Wages in the Northern Counties Wool Textile
Industry, 1930. Cmd. 3505, P. 26.
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ances, they argued, would provide employers with a golden
opportunity to cut wages even further.
In addition, many trade unionists were deeply suspicious
of the real motives behind "those gatherings of dear philan¬
thropic ladies and gentlemen of the family endowment society
and people of that kind, not all of whom are in the Labour
2
Movement".. The fact that the F.E.S. contained people of
all political persuasions, including a Conservative Minister
of Labour, and subtly altered its propaganda to suit each
audience, was not lost on those in the labour movement.
They could maintain that at heart the Society's leaders were
deeply conservative, and could in justification quote statements
by Eleanor Rathbone such as: "Are any of us quite satisfied
that we are not moving towards a revolution of some kind, not
perhaps a Russian revolution, but a revolution which, even
if it takes constitutional forms, may be the outcome of the
discontent so present in conditions of life to-day that when
Labour gets into power with a sufficiently strong majority
it will be forced by the pressure behind it into embarking
on reforms, which, even if constitutional, may be dislocating
to the whole basis and structure of industry? Is it now our
duty as reasonable men and women to look to see whether there
1. Rhys Davies even believed, somewhat mysteriously, that
family allowances "were likely to be adopted as a principle
by the next Tory Government, and the working class would have
to pay for them by contributory deduction". Labour Party
Annual Report for 1930, p. 177.
2. T.U.C. Annual Report for 1930, p. 407. (Soeech by C.T. Cramp)
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is no other method, and whether the family insurance is
not the best method for insuring a higher standard of life
among the workers (without dislocating industry and over¬
burdening the back of industry) by simply redistributing the
available resources for the remuneration of the workers and
1
so effecting a reasonable revolution".
For their part, the Family Endowment Society leaders
undoubtedly felt that the trade unions' opposition was clear
evidence of the 'Turk complex' at work: the unions' much
greater interest in the cause of old age pensions, Eva Hubback
later wrote caustically, "may well have been because at any
one time only about 10 per cent of Trade Union members had
more than two dependent children, while nearly all the old
2
age pensioners themselves had votes". For the whole of
the 1930s, relations between the Family Endowment Society
and the trade union movement remained somewhat distant.
In the 1920s family allowances also aroused seme
interest within the Liberal Party. Liberals were sympathetic
to the idea of widows' pensions, and when the Labour M.P.
Rhys Davies introduced a motion in the House of Commons on
the 6th March 1923 proposing pensions for widows or for
those whose family breadwinner had become incapacitated,
1. Speech to the Faculty of Insurance, 1927, quoted in
Socialist Party of Great Britain pamphlet: Family
Allowances: A Socialist Analysis (n.d., probably 194-3),
pp. 14-15.




50 Liberals voted for and only 8 against. Although
greatly weakened by the Lloyd George-Asquith split for
much of the decade and the victim of long-term changes
in the class loyalties of the electorate, the Liberal Party
in the 1920s still considered itself a force to be reckoned
with; and indeed the ideological soul-searching undertaken
by the Party at this time, in an attempt to create a Liberal
revival, caused it to investigate a number of new ideas.
Family allowances were one of these.
Family allowances made their first official appearance
in Liberal circles in 1924 when (mainly thanks to Beveridge)
they were discussed at a Liberal Summer School at Oxford and
at a conference of the Liberal Summer School Movement at
2
Cambridge. Evidently, however, there was still much
suspicion over the idea in Liberal circles: the Liberal
Magazine of September 1924, for example, called it "a piece
3
of pure Socialism". During 1925, however, family allowances
began to attract more attention. Once again they were
4
discussed at the Summer School and within the Royal
Commission on the Coal Industry Beveridge was persuading
Sir Herbert Samuel (a prominent Liberal) to include them in
5the Commission's Report. But the most significant event was
the appointment, in July 1925, of a Women's National Liberal
Federation Committee to investigate family allowances.
1. Voting figures from Liberal Magazine, April 1923, pp. 246-7.
2. F.E.S. Annual Report for 1925, p. 2.
3. Liberal Magazine, September 1924, p. 548. This was when
mentioning the I.L.P.'s interest.
4. Liberal Woman's News, June 1925,'p. 73.
5. See Chapter 2, pp.93-5.
6. Liberal Woman's News, July 1925, p. 92.
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Interest within the Women's National Liberal Federation
A
(W.N.L.F.) had been growing in 1925, and in June of that
year its Council passed a resolution, introduced by .
Lady Violet Bonham Carter, to the effect that "the question
of Family Endowment raises an issue of great national
importance" and that the Council should appoint a committee
2
of enquiry into the subject. In the following month, there¬
fore, a Family Endowment Committee was appointed, with
Mrs. Dorothea Layton (wife of the economist, Walter Layton)
as Chairwoman, and a membership of Lady Violet Bonham Carter,
Mrs. Margaret Wintringham, Lady Emmott, Mrs. Isabella Herbert
and Mrs. Corbett Ashby. This Committee met practically every
fortnight from the beginning of October 1925 to the end of
March 1926, and took evidence from "economists, teachers,
manufacturers, mothers, and representatives of different
sections of the community", among whom were experts like
Beveridge, J.L. Cohen, Eva Hubback, and Professors
L\
D.H. Robertson and D.H. Macgregor.
1. In the April 1925 issue of the Liberal Woman's News
(p. 44-5), for example, Eleanor Rathbone had written a
short article on family allowances. As always, she
presented it in the form most acceptable to the political
inclinations of her audience: in this case, she made no
mention of a State-financed scheme but suggested
organisation through industrial pools or contributory
insurance.
2. Report of the Council Meeting of the Women's National
Liberal Federation for 1925, ibid., June 1925, p. o9.
3. There were some minor changes of personnel later. One
addition was Miss Lucy Mair as Honorary Secretary, who was
secretary to Professor Gilbert Murray (a member of the
Family Endowment Society) and the daughter of Mrs. Janet Mair,
Beveridge's secretary. Dorothea Layton and Margaret Corbett
Ashby were F.E.S. members.
4. W.N.L.F. Annual Report for 1926-7, pp. 19-20. The records
of the Liberal Party are now housed in Bristol University
Library, but unfortunately are as yet unindexed, and so it
was impossible to discover any surviving papers of this
Committee.
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In April 1926 the Committee published an Interim
Report, and at the next Annual Council Meeting, on the
22nd and 23rd June 1926, Mrs. Layton introduced a long motion,
in the light of the Interim Report, which supported the
principle of family allowances "as the most practical means
of making provision for the minimum needs of the children
of the nation", welcomed the Samuel Commission's recommend¬
ations on the subject, expressed the hope that private
industry would begin to initiate schemes, adding that "such
schemes need not prejudice in any way the introduction of a
National Scheme which the Committee prefer", and finally
requested that the Family Endowment Committee continue its
labours for another year so that it could come up with more
precise recommendations which the Council could then firmly
2
accept or reject. Mrs. Layton's motion was carried by the
relatively healthy majority of 231 to 178, and thereafter the
Committee continued taking evidence. Eventually their Final
Report was published in April 1927: it emphasised that the
need for family allowances was the product of long-term
historical trends (such as children changing from producers of
income to consumers), pointed out that family endowment existed
in many areas of the social services, and concluded that
industrial equalisation fund schemes would be the best form
1. Interim Report of the Family Endowment Enquiry Committee
set up by the Women's National Liberal Federation (1926).
The Report considered a State scheme to be "the most
logical and just" although "at the moment outside the scope
of practical politics" (p. 3), went on to discuss organ¬
isation by contributory insurance or industrial pools
(pp. 4-6) and concluded with some comments on possible
effect on the birthrate and wage levels (pp. 7-8).
2. Report of the Council Meeting of the W.N.L.F. for 1926,
pp. 2-3; Liberal Magazine, August 1926, p. 467.
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1
of development, with insurance-based schemes second best.
In May the Report was discussed at the Annual Council
Meeting, and Mrs. Layton must have had high hopes of it being
accepted. She introduced a motion (seconded by Lady Emmott)
calling on the Council to take up the cause of family allowances
for State and municipal employees, to recommend to the Liberal
Industrial Inquiry (which was going on at the time) that
family allowances be introduced in their proposals, and to
urge industry to initiate equalisation fund schemes. This
time, however, there was strong opposition from some Council
members: one speaker, for example, said the motion "would
be helping on the movement towards the nationalisation of
children" and asked "if allowances were paid to the mother
do you think she could keep the money away from a dissolute
or drunken husband?". Feelings such as these were in a
majority on the Council, and Mrs. Layton's motion was
2
defeated.
So ended the W.N.L.F.'s official interest in family
allowances. Some, like Mrs. Layton, continued campaigning:
she spoke to the July 1927 Liberal Summer School at
3
Cambridge, and later that year, in October, attended the
1. Women's National Liberal Federation: Final Report of the
Family Endowment Enquiry Committee: Children's Allowances
(1927). There was also a suggestion (pp. 18-19) that the
State could set an example by paying family allowances to
its employees and encouraging local authorities to do the
same.
'2. Report of the Council Meeting of the W.N.L.F. for 1927, pp. 5-6
3. Liberal Woman's News, September 1927, p. 127.
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Family Endowment Society's Conference at the London School
of Economics as a W.N.L.F. representative. On occasions,
the topic would briefly resurface within the W.N.L.F.: in
their 1929 pamphlet Liberal Policy for Women, for example,
there was a discussion of the need for equal pay and provision
for family responsibilities which concluded, albeit somewhat
lamely, that "whether this should be achieved through a
system of family allowances or otherwise is a matter for
2
consideration". But by the end of the 1920s the subject
had been quietly dropped.
Had the W.N.L.F. been wholeheartedly in favour of
family allowances it is possible that they might have
influenced the main Liberal Party. The Family Endowment
Society evidently considered there was sufficient interest
in the Party for them to publish in 1929 a pamphlet appealing
3to Liberals. In addition, there were some prominent Liberals
in the Family Endowment Society - Ramsay Muir, E.D. Simon,
John Murray and Professor Gilbert Murray - who stood as
Parliamentary candidates in the 1920s and presumably would
have liked the Party to include family allowances in its
1. Ibid., November 1927, p. 148. This was the conference
that produced the booklet, edited by Beveridge,
Six Aspects of Family Allowances (1927).
2. W.N.L.F. pamphlet: Liberal Policy for Women (1929),
p. 27.




official programme. However, evidently there was in the
Party much suspicion and hostility towards the idea. For
example, when the subject was debated at the 1928 Annual
Conference of the Union of University Liberal Societies -
a body that might have been more favourably disposed towards
social reform than the rest of the Party - a motion was carried
(after a sharp division of views, and by a small majority)
"that under present conditions, social, economic and political,
there can be no room on the Liberal Programme for any Scheme
2
of Family Endowment". And when the Party published a pam¬
phlet on its policies for children there was no mention of
family allowances, merely a vague statement that "the wealth
produced by the nation must be more justly shared, so that
any industrious working man may have in his own pocket enough
money to bring up his children in health, happiness and
■5
independence".
The only positive legacy seems to have been produced by
the Summer School discussions and research activities which
were directed at producing a new Liberal policy for revital¬
ising industry that would, it was hoped, appeal to the
electorate and help bring about a Liberal revival. Out of
1. According to the F.E.S. Annual Report for 1930» p. 2, during
the 1929 General Election "the subject of family allowances
was raised in many constituencies. A number of candidates
were approached, and many of all parties expressed interest
in and sympathy with our aims, and it was not uncommon to find
the cause of family allowances advocated in election addresses
However, in the collection of 1929 Liberal election addresses
(in Bristol University Library) neither Simon's nor Muir's
mentions family allowances.
2. Liberal Magazine, February 1928, p. 102.
3. Liberal Party pamphlet: Give the Children a Chance (1927)
p. 19.
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the Summer School activities Lloyd. George organised a
Liberal Industrial Inquiry, the Executive Committee of which
contained two members of the Family Endowment Society's
Council, E.D. Simon and Ramsay Muir. In addition, member¬
ship of the Special Committees included another two family
2
allowance campaigners, Eva Hubback and Mrs. Corbett Ashby.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the Industrial Inquiry's Report
contained a discussion of family allowances: they were seen
as "the most feasible way of providing for family needs, while
still leaving a margin for the reward of special ability and
effort. From another angle the proposal means that the loss
of wages which the employee without dependents (sic) suffers
is a compulsory saving or postponement of wages against the
time when he has a family and needs a supplement to his
standard wages"; and the Report suggested that schemes could
be introduced run either on a contributory insurance basis or
Zj.
by industrial pools.
1. Britain's Industrial Future,being the Report of the
Liberal Industrial Inquiry (1928), pp. v, viii.
The Executive Committee also contained H.D. Henderson,
Rowntree and Keynes - all of whom were sympathetic to
family allowances.
2. Ibid., p. viii.
3. This idea was remarkably similar to that applied, in
a different context, to wartime wages policy (including
family allowances) in Keynes's How to Pay for the War
(1940).
4. Britain's Industrial Future, op. cit., pp. 190-2.
A State scheme was considered too expensive.
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Compared with the Labour and Liberal Parties, the
interest shown by the Conservative Party in family allowances
in the 1920s was virtually non-existent. Although only
7 Conservative M.P.s voted for Rhys Davies's 1923 mothers'
pensions motion in the Commons (with 239 voting against),
the Conservative Government of 1924-9 did introduce the 1925
Widows', Orphans' and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act,
which by June 1928 was paying pensions of 10s.0d. per week
to 251,000 widows (with allowances of 3s.Od. or 5s.Od. per week
going to their 344,800 children) and allowances of 7s.6d. per
2
week to 15,000 orphans. But beyond that, the idea of supple¬
menting working class wages to bring them more in line with
family needs held no appeal in official Conservative circles.
Although widows' pensions were discussed at the 1923 Conserva¬
tive Party Annual Conference (one speaker admitting that women's
wages were insufficient to support a family of four or five)
and a motion was passed approving of the idea, family allow¬
ances were never discussed at any of the Conferences in the
1920s.4
1. Voting figures in Liberal Magazine, April 1923.
pp. 246-7.
2. Conservative Party pamphlet: What the Conservative
Government Has Done for Women and Children, 1925-1928
(-I5SS), p. 6. —
3. Conservative Party Annual Conference Report for 1923.
Reports for the 1920s are partly in the form of press
cuttings, and contain no page numbers.
4. Ibid., for 1920 to 1930.
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The Family Endowment Society had on its Council one
prominent Conservative politician - Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland,
who was Minister of Labour from 1924 to 1929. ■ Steel-Maitland
(1876-1935) had served as a Special Commissioner to the 1905-9
Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and was interested in social
problems; he was, for example, probably the only Conservative
Minister ever to have slept in common lodging houses and
gained a knowledge of the inside of a workhouse, and was
generally liked by the labour movement. As Minister of
Labour at the time when family allowances were enjoying much
discussion vis-a-vis wages questions it is to be expected
that he might have exerted his influence within the Government.
Yet the Steel-Maitland Papers contain no record of his ever
having done so, even at the time of the Samuel Report (which,
of course, recommended family allowances); nor do they
contain any letters from Eleanor Rathbone asking for his
2
help. Indeed, but for his name on the Council list there
is no evidence that Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland took any active
3
interest in the Family Endowment Society. All in all, there¬
fore, family allowances were almost completely ignored by the
Conservative Party in the 1920s.
1. Press cuttings in Steel-Maitland Papers, Scottish
Record Office G.D. 193/107/1.
2. See, for example, ibid. G.D. 193/81/1, and
G.D. 193/109/5 (on the 1926 coal dispute) and
G.D. 193/244 (miscellaneous articles and letters,
1922-30).
3. Apart, of course, from his introduction of family allowances
for staff of the L.S.E., referred to in Chapter 2,
pp. 85-6.
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Family allowances thus enjoyed a limited amount of
discussion within political parties in the 1920s, but in
no way did they ever become an issue of great importance.
Apart from the I.L.P. leaders, politicians were cautious:
at a time when fiscal retrenchment was the economic ortho¬
doxy most generally accepted, the sheer cost of a State-run
family allowance scheme made it appear a practical impossi¬
bility for the foreseeable future. Striking proof of this can
be seen in what happened after 1931. In the new climate of
extreme financial austerity family allowances disappeared
from political discussion, and for most of the 1930s were
rarely discussed within the three main political parties.
However, from about 1935 onwards Eleanor Rathbone began
to gather together in the House of Commons an all-party group
of M.P.s who grew in numbers until, in the Second World War,
they made up a considerable pro-family allowance lobby. The
emergence of this group was closely connected with the
emergence of a 'middle opinion' that has been noticed by
2
two recent historians. With the Labour Party greatly
1. They also enjoyed investigation by bodies like the
International Association for Social Progress, which
set up a sub-committee to look into family needs and
the social services (the committee included J.L. Cohen,
Professor A.M. Carr Saunders and Professor D.H. Magregor)
and published a Report on Family Endowment (1927) which
merely summarised the arguments for and against, and a
Report on Family Provision through Social Insurance and
Other Services (1928) which concluded (p. 17) with a brief
discussion of possible family allowance schemes.
2. Arthur Marwick: "Middle Opinion in the Thirties: Planning,
Progress and Political 'Agreement'", English Historical
Review, 79, April 1964, pp. 285-297; Paul Addison:
The Road to 1945 (1975), pp. 18, 38-40, 43-4.
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weakened after the 1931 split, the Liberal Party in decline,
the Conservative Party effectively leading a National
Government whose policy on social reform was to do as little
as possible, conventional party politics within Parliament
appeared to be in the doldrums; and by contrast, outside
Parliament violent clashes took place between communists
and fascists. In this situation, there emerged a group of
politicians of liberal views who accepted the need for
collectivist measures within a capitalist economy and aimed
at forming a middle way consensus between the extremes of
left and right that would evolve a programme of liberal
reforms based on long-term planning and empirical social
1
research.
Typical of how this middle opinion strand of thought
evolved was the case of Harold Macmillan. As a young
Conservative M.P. in the 1920s, representing the predomi¬
nantly working class constituency of Stockton-on-Tees,
Macmillan allied himself with other young liberal Tories
like Robert Boothby, Oliver Stanley, R.S. Hudson and
Anthony Eden. He became increasingly disillusioned with
Baldwin's leadership and, while out of Parliament in 1929-31,
contemplated joining Oswald Mosley's New Party. After
re-entering Parliament in 1933 he set about gathering
1. Ibid. For an interesting personal account, see Lord
Salter: Memoirs of a Public Servant (1961), pp. 241-7.
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support for the ideas he had been developing since the
1920s for greater planning in industry, social reform,
-i
international relations, etc. In the 1930s Macmillan was
active in organising the Next Five Years Group (whose member¬
ship also included Eleanor Rathbone, Eva Hubback, Seebohm
2
Rowntree, J.A. Hobson and Professor Gilbert Murray) and
took an active interest in social problems, including
family poverty and the need for family allowances.
The exact size of this pro-family allowance
Commons group of the late 1930s is very difficult to esti¬
mate. Certainly, it had reached 152 by the middle of
1941,^ but no firm evidence of its strength before then
1. Anthony Sampson: Macmillan (1967),
pp. 21-36.
2. Harold Macmillan: Winds of Change, 1914-39 (1966),
pp. 373-4, 485-8. For list of the Group's members,
see ibid., pp. 634-6.
3. See, for example, speech in Hansard, Vol. 337,
24/6/38, Col. 1440. In The Middle Way (1938), pp. 38-65,
Macmillan discussed in depth the problem of low wages
vis-a-vis Rowntree's and Boyd Orr's researches on
minimum needs; and then (pp. 301-311) went on to
discuss the necessity of a Government-established
minimum wage, including family allowances.
4. Note of deputation of M.P.s to Kingsley Wood,
16/6/41, P.R.O. PIN 8/163-
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is available. .Exactly how many M.P.s in the late 1930s
would have supported a family allowances bill is impossible
to say. The campaign conducted in the Commons was led by a
very small group consisting of (apart from Eleanor Rathbone)
Leo Amery, Duncan Sandys, Robert Boothby, Harold Macmillan,
John C. Wright and Robert Cary (Conservative), David Adams
(Labour) and Graham White (Liberal). They tended to raise
the topic every time the problems of the U.I.S.C. or U.A.B.
were discussed: if benefit and assistance rates could not be
brought up to nutritionally-adequate levels without touching
on wages and destroying work-incentives, they argued, then
the problem had to be tackled at the wages end through
family allowances.
1. A very interesting source of information would be the
Leo Amery Papers, but access to these was not granted.
The Graham White Papers (in the House of Lords Records
Office) consist of 21 large boxes of uncatalogued papers,
which, while containing much interesting primary material
on the Liberal Party and other matters (including a very
large file on the administration of the Eleanor Rathbone
Memorial Trust, of which White was a director), include
next to nothing on the pro-family allowance group of M.P.s.
The only item is an exchange of correspondence between White
and Amery in April 1940, which is of no significance. In
C.P, Cook: Sources in British Political History, 1900-1951,
Vol. Ill (1977), p. 83, it is stated that Air Commodore
John Cecil-Wright (who, as Wing Commander J.A.C. Wright,
was also a member of the all-party group) has a collection
of papers on family allowances. Air Commodore Cecil-Wright
(b. 1886) very kindly afforded the author a most inter¬
esting interview, but stated that he in fact had no papers
of relevance; and, more importantly, he doubted whether
much written material for the all-party group would have
survived, since communication between them was usually
made by word of mouth, telephone, messages in the House
of Commons, etc.
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The all-party group of Eleanor Rathbone supporters was
thus spearheaded by a number of Conservatives who felt
alienated from their Party's negative attitude to social
reform. The most important of these was Leo Amery, who
had served in Baldwin's 1924-9 Government but now found
himself rather in the political wilderness. Leo Amery first
heard about family allowances just after the First World War,
when he met the wife of a Lille manufacturer who told him of
the equalisation fund system run by her husband and a number
of other French employers in the area; "she was enthusiastic
on the merits of the scheme as a contribution to social
welfare, but also hopeful that it might, in the long run,
contribute to the restoration of France's sadly depleted
population". Amery observed with interest the growth of the
European schemes, and during the mining dispute of 1926
"urged on Baldwin its adoption, at any rate for the mining
industry". Only in 1936, however, did he study family allow¬
ances seriously, at which time he was beginning to realise
the extent of family poverty in Britain - added to which were
the 'overlap' arguments vis-a-vis the U.I.S.C. and U.A.B.
Realising the issue was "the most urgent aspect of social
policy", he became an active propagandist for family allow¬
ances: he wrote numerous articles on the subject, made
speeches in Parliament and in public, was an active leader
1. Amery, Leopold Stermett; b. 1873, educated at Harrow
and Oxford; barrister, and Conservative M.P. for
Birmingham Sparkbrook from 1911 to 1945; a number of
Cabinet posts, 1919-24, then Secretary of State for
Colonies, 1924-29; Secretary of State for India and
Burma, 1940-5; died 1955.
353
of the all-party Commons group, investigated, existing
private industrial schemes, and even persuaded the board
of Maclean's, Ltd., the chemical manufacturers (on which he
served) to introduce a family allowance scheme for their
employees.
Since Leo Amery was the most important figure among
the pro-family allowance Commons group of the late 1930s it
is illustrative of this section of opinion to analyse his
motives clearly. His first concern, he maintained, was over
the health and nutrition of the nation's children. As he saw
it, "children are both the creators and sufferers of poverty
in large families", and it was deplorable that 25% of the
child population were growing up under-nourished. He had
read a large number of the recent poverty surveys - he showed
knowledge of the investigations in Sheffield, Merseyside,
Miles Platting, Southampton, etc., and the work of Boyd Orr,
Rowntree, the B.M.A., the Pilgrim Trust and the Children's
Minimum Council - and quoted extensively from these surveys
4
when advocating family allowances in Parliament or at public
meetings such as the B.M.A.'s April 1939 Conference on Nutrition
(where family allowances were discussed at length).^
1. Leo Amery: . My Political Life, Vol. III. The Unforgiving
Years, 1920-1940 (1955), pp. 205-6. This potentially very
interesting section has been enormously hindered by the
refusal of access to Amery's private papers.
2- Hansard, Vol. 337, 24/6/38, Col. 1426.
3. Ibid., Vol. 341, 14/11/38, Col. 574.
4. Ibid., Cols. 576-7.
5. British Medical Association: Nutrition and the Public
Health (1939), pp. 91-104.
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Amery also advocated family allowances in pro-natalist,
'national security' terms. For example, in the House of
Commons in November 1938 he maintained that social reform
and rearmament went hand in hand, since both were "part of
a wider effort for national regeneration". "How can we",
he asked, "confronted by dangers not of today and tomorrow
but of the generations which lie ahead, contemplate with
equanimity the prospect of our population, already small
compared with some of our competitors, steadily dwindling,
1
above all in the younger spheres of life?". Again, when
writing on "Family Allowances in Industry" in the magazine
Co-Partnership in June 1938, he expressed an industrialist's
concern that the threatening decline in the population would
mean a decrease in demand for goods, a fall in purchasing
power, high taxation to support an increasingly aged and
non-productive population, and a growing expenditure on
national defence "against great States who are concentrating
all their abilities upon the maintenance of their numbers as
2
well as upon the expansion of their armaments".
Thirdly, Amery strongly supported the less eligibility
argument for family allowances. If unemployment benefit
and assistance levels were too low, but could not be raised
without overlapping onto wage rates, then family allowances
were the obvious solution. As an employer, Amery was insistent
1. Hansard, Vol. 341, 14/11/38, Col. 574.
2. Co-Fartnership, June 1938, p. 3.
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that the solution did not lie in overall wage increases;
industry simply could not afford this, he maintained. "If
we could, by a wave of the wand, bring the wage level of
this country all round up to what is required for a large
family, that would be the most obvious and most desirable
thing to do, but frankly that is not possible today", he
said, basing his case on Eleanor Rathbone's argument that
the three-child minimum wage would be both wasteful and
inadequate, in families with less or more than three
1
children respectively. To talk of all-round wage rises was
p
"merely evading the issue"; the only solution was a system
of family allowances, which, Amery suggested, should be an
insurance-based scheme providing 5s.Od. per week for all
children after the second, based on contributions of 4d.
per week from adult male employees and 2d. per week from
adult female employees and juveniles, with equivalent
amounts from employers and the State. Such an arrangement
would, he believed, overcome the overriding objection of
x
cost.
Leo Amery clearly saw family allowances as a conserva¬
tive social reform. "This is essentially a conservative
measure and will reflect credit on our party", he wrote to
1. Hansard, Vol. 341, 14/11/38, Col. 578-9.
2. B.M.A., op. cit., p. 96.
3. Ibid., pp. 102-3.
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Kingsley Wood in 194-2, when, as Secretary of State for
India, he was attempting to convert his Cabinet colleagues;
and in another letter at that time he emphasised to Churchill
that family allowances were "a reform which the nation as a
whole will keenly welcome and which our own Party in particular
will feel is a Conservative reform building up the family and
2
not merely a concession to socialism or trade unionism". At
the start of the Second World War (when family allowances
were being discussed both inside and outside the Government
as a possible means of controlling wages) Amery wrote in a
letter to The Times that an immediate introduction of family
allowances "would not only relieve the existing hard cases,
but would afford a logical basis upon which a stand could be
made against all further wage increases, except to the extent
they are directly justified by a rise in the cost of living".
Statements like these only served to heighten the
suspicions of trade unionists. Ellen Wilkinson (who had
actively supported family allowances in the 1920s) bitterly
commented in 1938 that "what the Amery type want is to feed
the existing and potential cannon-fodder with the greatest
economy and lack of waste. Pay the money for the upkeep
of each child; don't give it to the individual workman who
may have few or no children. In short, apply the means test
1. Amery to Wood, 30/5/42, P.R.O. T 161/116 (S.43697/3).
2. Amery to Churchill, 30/5/42, P.R.O. PREM 4 (97/5).
3. The Times, 14/1/40.
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1
to wages". In the late 1930s, labour leaders viewed such
Conservative support for family allowances as designed to
obscure the real issue of low wages: the Labour M.P.
George Buchanan, for instance, pointed out that Amery was
a railway company director, yet wages of railwaymen were
2
very low, some being "not far above starvation level".
Not surprisingly, the labour movement remained
suspicious of this all-party support for family allowances.
In 1939, for example, the T.U.C. were invited to send a
representative to the British Medical Association's nutrition
conference to participate in the discussion on family allow¬
ances. The T.U.C. General Council's Economic Committee briefly
re-considered family allowances, and decided to abide by the
1930 Joint Committee's Minority Report decision. Thus at
the B.M.A. conference George Gibson, the T.U.C. representative,
repeated all the familiar arguments in favour of services in
kind as having greater priority plus some new ones: Gibson
even claimed that a cash allowance would be mis-spent by
parents, since "even with the best will in the world, it is
questionable whether the average parent of the middle class,
let alone the working classes, is competent to decide the
best method of allotting an increased income in respect of
4
the absolute welfare and future outlook of a child".
1. Ellen Wilkinson in Tribune, 8/7/38, quoted in Amery,
op. cit. , p. 207.
2. Hansard, Vol. 338, 18/7/38, Col. 1863. Buchanan was,
however, generally a supporter of family allowances.
3. T.U.C. Annual Report for 1939, p. 245.
4. B.M.A., op. cit., pp. 112-4.
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However, there was a glimmer of hope in the Conserva¬
tive and Liberal Parties. At the 1937 Conservative Party
Conference Duncan Sandys introduced a motion expressing
great concern over the decline of the British birth rate,
the most serious result of which would be to endanger the
security of the British Empire, he maintained. Among
possible remedies proposed by Sandys, marriage loans and
family allowances figured prominently. Eugenic fears were
frequently mentioned, and the Conference passed Sandys's
motion without, however, calling on the Government to
2
consider family allowances. Clearly the pro-natalist
arguments for family allowances were beginning to arouse
some interest among Conservatives for 'national defence'
reasons, but only political outsiders like Amery, Boothby,
Wright and Sandys were wholeheartedly in favour.
Within the Liberal Party, on the other hand, the
very end of the 1930s saw a growing interest in family
4
allowances, spearheaded by Graham White. In common with
other 'middle opinion' politicians, White believed a middle
5
way could be found between extremes of left and right, and
1. Conservative Party Annual Conference Report for 1937,
pp. 37-9.
2. Ibid., pp. 39-43.
3. The next motion discussed at the Conference was on the
"integrity and unity of the Empire". Ibid., pp. 43-5.
4. White, Henry Graham (1880-1965); educated at Birkenhead
School and Liverpool University; Liberal M.P. for
Birkenhead East, 1922-4 and 1929-45; President of the
Liberal Party 1954-5 and Vice-President 1958-9.
5. "In this Election the sterile arguments about Socialism
and Capitalism are obsolete". 1935 General Election
Manifesto by Graham White, in Graham White Papers
(uncatalogued).
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was very interested in a reform of the social services, the
abolition of the means test, the problem of poverty and a
nutritionally-adequate minimum wage, the need to stimulate
-i
demand in the economy, and so on. White made no mention of
family allowances in his 1935 General Election manifestoes
2
and speeches, but by 1939 he had decided that in his next
appeal to his electors he would stress that the three most
needed measures were increased old age pensions, the extension
of medical benefit to the dependants of insured people, and
"a scheme of family allowances or some similar step to
improve nutrition".
In the House of Commons, Graham White was a strong
advocate of family allowances on child poverty grounds,
rarely if ever mentioning the birth rate arguments. Like
other Eleanor Rathbone supporters, he took the opportunity of
mentioning family allowances whenever the problems of the
4
U.A.B. and U.I.S.C. were discussed, and wanted a complete
overhaul of the social services, in order to remove the many
administrative anomalies and overlaps, including an official
5
investigation of family allowances.
1. Ibid. In the Graham White Papers there is a large file
dealing with his interest in unemployment.
2. Contained in ibid.
3. White to W.R. Davies, 23/1/39, ibid.
4. See, for example, Hansard, Vol. 337, 24/6/38, Cols. 1431-8;
and ibid., Vol. 345, 23/3/39, Cols. 1496-9.
5. Ibid., Vol. 349, 30/6/39, Cols. 828-831. 1935 General
Election Manifestoes, op. cit.
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The need for a reorganisation of the social services
was, of course, widely acknowledged by social administrators
in the late 1930s: indeed, the House of Commons discussed
a motion on this very subject on the 22nd February 1939,
rejecting it by the comparatively narrow margin of 172 votes
1 2
to 149. By May 1939, no doubt partly due to Graham White,
the Liberal Party decided to take up the cause of a social
services reorganisation plus family allowances and make
Ll
improved child nutrition one of their main aims. Family
allowances were discussed at the Liberal Summer School on
5
the 9th August 1939, where Lawrence Cadbury made a speech
presenting them primarily as a pro-natalist measure, empha¬
sising the serious industrial consequences of a declining
g
population, and Richard Titmuss delivered a paper on
7
maternal mortality. At the Summer School Lord Samuel
announced that the Party was going to make family allowances
a major issue at the next General Election: "We shall make
1. Hansard, Vol. 344, 22/2/39, Cols. 395-460.
2. In October 1937, the Council of the Women's Liberal
Federation had overwhelmingly passed a motion in favour
of family allowances. Report of Council Meeting of the
Women's Liberal Federation for 1937, p. 4T
3. Liberal Policy. Resolutions Adopted by Meeting of the
Assembly of the Liberal Party Organisation, 11 and 12/5/39,
pp. 5-6.
4. Liberal Policy. A Speech Delivered to the Council of the
Liberal Party Organisation on the 15th March 1939 by
Sir Archibald Sinclair.
5. Liberal Magazine, September 1939, p. 432.
6. L.J. Cadbury: A Population Policy and Family Allowances
(1939), esp. pp. 1-3.




this item a speciality of Liberalism", he said, "and bring
it as prominently as we can before the nation. Neither the
Labour nor the Conservative Party is taking up the matter
-i
effectively". Quite what would have been the response of
the electorate to this appeal is impossible to say, since one
month later war broke out and changed everything.
Thus in the inter-war years family allowances had at
one time or other aroused the interest of all sections of
political opinion, even if (with the exception of the Liberals
in 1939) they never became an official policy of any of the
three main parties. In the 1920s they had been seen by the
labour movement very much as a necessary part of the minimum wage
concept, with pro-natalist arguments hardly ever mentioned; but
eventually had been abandoned because of their high cost, because
they had been presented by the I.L.P., and because of trade
union opposition. Liberals (mainly women) had also shown
interest, and had tended to favour the gradual spread of
family allowances through industrial or contributory insurance
schemes. The 1931 economic crisis acted as an enormous setback,
but by the late 1930s interest in political circles was
resurfacing, mainly among Conservatives disenchanted with
the Baldwin-Chamberlain hegemony. In this period, anti-poverty
arguments were still mentioned, but so also were pro-natalist,
imperialist 'national defence' ones; and, most important of
all, family allowances were now being presented as an alternative
to a statutory minimum wage. Overshadowing all this, however,
1. Ibid.
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was the hostility and suspicion of the trade union movement;
trade unionists in the late 1930s saw the demand for family
allowances as obscuring the real issue of low wages, and
until they could be persuaded to change their minds family
allowances would remain a political impossibility.
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The Development of Family Allowances in Foreign Countries
"It is a curious fact about the movement we are
studying", wrote Eleanor Rathbone in 1927, "that it seems
to have begun, spiritually if not in material results,
almost simultaneously and quite independently in several
countries, and in several minds in each country".
This thesis is essentially about the movement for
family allowances in Britain, but to ignore what was
happening in other countries would be a serious error.
Social policy historians are now realising the importance
of comparative studies, and in the case of family allow¬
ances the fact that in several other countries demands
for a family wage were being voiced in exactly the same
way as in Britain indicates that the forces at work were
far deeper than can be explained by merely analysing the
activities of a pressure group like the Family Endowment
Society. This section, therefore, is not so long and
detailed as to obscure the fact that the subject under
study is Britain; but at the same time it tries to do
justice to the extremely interesting developments that
1. E. Rathbone: The Ethics and Economics of Family
Endowment (1927), p. 7^.
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were taking place abroad. Its aim, in short, is to
provide enough comparative information to enhance the
understanding of the British experience.
France has had a long history of pro-natalist
policies, but the first modern instance of a family
allowance system appears to have been that introduced by
Leon Harmel, the industrialist, in his Val-des-Bois factory
in 1840, and over the next forty years or so several other
systems appeared. In 1862 the French Ministry of Marine
granted 10 centimes per day for each child below the age
of ten to families of seamen up to the rank of quarter-
master having more than five years of service. Further
industrial schemes were launched in the late 19th century
(such as by a group of industrialists at Lille, Roubaix and
Turcoing in 1891), and some railway companies and coal mines
1. The literature on foreign developments in family
allowances is very extensive, particularly as regards
the 1920s when most Western industrialised countries were
encountering 'living wage' and other industrial problems.
In the United States, for example, (a country still without
a family allowance system proper) considerable interest
was shown in European developments in the 1920s. Out of
these many sources, four are outstandingly excellent and
provide far more information than can possibly be summarised
here: Paul Douglas: Wages and the Family (Chicago, 1925);
Hugh Vibart: Family Allowances in Practice (1926);
D.V. Glass: The Struggle for Population (1956) and
Population Policies and Movements in Europe (1940). The
second and fourth were originally postgraduate theses.
Vibart also composed a typescript bound volume of extremely
detailed tables giving information on European equalisation
funds, which is deposited in the B.L.P.E.S.
2. Glass, op. cit. (1940), p. 100.
3. Vibart, op. cit., p. 24.
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began to supplement the wages of their married workers by
various methods. By 1914, various forms of family allow¬
ances were being paid to workers in over thirty firms, and
schemes also covered school teachers, certain ranks in the
army, and civil servants in the Treasury, Post Office and
Colonial Office.^
The motives behind these early developments are not
easily identified. Vibart emphasises the 1891 Papal
Encyclical De Revum Novarum which outlined the duty of
employers to provide a family wage.- Glass considers it
unlikely that the Encyclical alone could have had much
effect, but stresses the general growth, in late 19th century
4
Europe, of a trend of thought favourable to the family wage.
In addition, it must be remembered that the idea of adding
supplements to the wages of married men had a long history
in Europe.
Whatever the reasons for the pre-1914 developments,
there is no doubt that the rapid development of family allow¬
ances in France during the immediately after the First World
War was due to rapidly falling real wages - a situation common
1. Glass, op. cit. (1940), p. 100; Vibart, op. cit., p. 27.
In the mining industry, the first family allowances took
such forms as free coal.
2. Glass, op. cit. (1940), p. 100-1.
3. Vibart, op. cit., pp. 9-11.
4. Glass, op. cit., (1940), p. 100.
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1
to all Continental countries. In response to growing
hardship and unrest (particularly among workers with
children), employers began to pay cost-of-living bonuses,
which soon became related to family needs. The best illus¬
tration of this is the case of the Joya metal works, where
in 1916 the manager, Emile Romanet, discovered the poverty
of some of his older workers with families and persuaded the
firm to introduce graded allowances for dependent children
under thirteen years of age; other firms in the Grenoble
area quickly followed suit, and in 1918 an equalisation fund
was created, into which all employers paid sums proportional
to the number of their employees, and from which allowances
were paid; in this way the danger that employers would tend
2
to hire only single men was avoided.
Rapid developments took place in 1918-25, so that by
mid-1925 fully 180 equalisation funds were in existence in
France. In 1918 equalisation funds covered 598 employees
and paid out a total of 113>352 francs per annum in family
allowances; by 1925 this had risen to 1,210,000 employees
and 160,000,000 francs.^ In 1924 the average amounts paid
1. The year of the fastest rise in the cost of living in
Europe, 1917, also marked the beginning of more rapid
developments of family allowances. Vibart, op. cit.,
p. 6.
2. Paul Douglas: "Family Allowances and Clearing Funds in
France", Quarterly Journal of Economics (Cambridge,
Massachusetts), 38, February 1924, pp. 257-8.
3. United Kingdom. Committee on Industry and Trade:
Survey of Industrial Relations (1926), p. 124.
4. Vibart, op. cit., p. 31•
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out by equalisation funds were 193 francs per month for
the first child, 27 francs for the second, 35 francs for
the third and 43 francs for the fourth; this, on average,
constituted additions to a married man's wages of 4% for one
child, 9% for two, 16% for three and nearly 25% for four.^
By this time, about 20% of all those working for wages and
salaries in France were covered by some form of family
2
allowance system, and the idea had spread into many areas
of employment. By the autumn of 1920, 80 French regional
Departments (out of a total of 90), 3 Algerian Departments
and 206 towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants were paying
family allowances to their public servants,^ and from 1922
a succession of laws stipulated that firms tendering for
Government contracts had to affiliate to an equalisation
4
fund. In addition, many equalisation funds had developed
supplementary family services: about two-thirds of them
granted maternity benefits, about one-fifth gave nursing
allowances, and some even employed social workers to visit
5
mothers in their homes. In 1920, a bill was introduced in
1. J.H. Richardson: "The Family Allowance System",
Economic Journal, 34, September 1924, pp. 382-3-
2. Douglas, op. cit. (1924), p. 260.
3- International Labour Office. Studies and Reports,
Series D, No. 13: Family Allowances - the Remuneration
of Labour According to Need (Geneva^ 1924), p. yT.
4. F.E.S. pamphlet: Family Allowances Abroad and in the
British Dominions (1932).
5. Douglas, op. cit. (1924), p. 265- The average amount
of birth allowances, for example, was 151-02 francs for
the first child and 128.88 francs for each subsequent
child. I.L.O., op. cit., p. 49.
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the Chamber of Deputies with the aim of making membership
of an equalisation fund compulsory upon all employers, but
it had to be dropped in the face of employers' opposition.
Eventually in 1932 an Act was passed giving legal recognition
to existing family allowance systems and providing for the
gradual extension of compulsory equalisation fund membership
2
to almost all employers in France.
This rapid growth of family allowance systems in
France was quite remarkable, given that employers took the
initiative in introducing them and financed them out of
profits rather than wage-deductions. Some employers, such
as Emile Romanet of the Joya works, took a genuinely sympa¬
thetic, if paternalist, interest in their workers' welfare
and introduced family allowances after witnessing the severe
hardship endured by married men in times of rapidly rising
prices. Such employers pointed with pride to the maternity
and child welfare services provided by their funds: in
Nancy, for example, the fund maintained several hospital
beds for sick children of employees and a doctor and nurse
visited mothers at home; at Lyons, a similar service was
credited with having cut the infant mortality rate among
1. For an account of this bill, introduced by
M. Maurice Bokanowski, see Douglas, op. cit. (1925),
pp. 79-88.
2. Jacques Doublet: "Family Allowances in France",
Population Studies, 2, September 19^8, p. 219.
3- E. Rathbone: The Disinherited Family (1924), pp. 193-6.
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children of employees from 123 to 44 per 1,000 live births.
Encouragement of the birth rate was often mentioned as an
2
employers' motive, but this seems extremely unlikely.
From the point of view of employers, the 'statistical'
argument in favour of family allowances was probably the
most important. Faced with a period of economic crisis and
rising living costs, employers saw family allowances as a
way of protecting their workers' living standards without
having to raise wages all round. Because of the statistical
distribution of children, family allowances were a relatively
cheap and efficient way of alleviating the worst hardship.
In 1922, for example, only 160,000 out of 700,000 employees
covered by French equalisation funds were fathers (of
270,000 children) - a proportion of 23%.^ Allowances added
only about 2% to the total payroll, yet met family needs in
a very efficient way. To illustrate this in one particular
case: in 1931 the Union of Metallurgical Manufacturers in
France set up an equalisation fund which, for a cost of 1.2%
of the wages bill, provided an allowance of 8 francs per
month per child; yet the same total amount of money, if
1. Douglas, op. cit. (1925), p. 62. Similarly, the
introduction of nursing allowances in the Auxene
district fund was claimed to have increased the
incidence of breast-feeding among infants of the
workers from 50% to 93% in two years. Family Endowment
Society. Monthly Notes, January 1925.
2. Glass, op. cit. (1940), p. 104.
3. Douglas, op. cit. (1924), p. 261.
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distributed, equally to all workers in the form of wage
rises, would only have provided 36 francs per annum per
1
worker - hardly covering the cost of a daily cigarette.
Yet this obviously raises the all-important question
of the extent to which employers used family allowances as
a means of avoiding having to pay across-the-board wage
rises. In the early 1920s in France, employers tended to
use the term "allocation familiale" (family allowance) and
interpreted allowances as a philanthropic addition to wages
which could be withdrawn at their own discretion; workers,
however, tended to use the term "sursulaire" (family wage)
and saw allowances as part of wages, legally to be paid for
2
as long as wages were paid. This difference of interpretation
symbolised a bitter struggle that took place in France after
the First World War between employers and unions over whether
family allowances should be used as an alternative to wage
rises. Vibart quotes a number of employers favouring allow¬
ances for this reason; or rather, maintaining that since
wage rises were economically impossible, family allowances
were the next best thing. Even the philanthropic
1. Family Endowment Chronicle, 1, January 1932, p. 37.
2. I.L.O., op3 cit., p. 61. Typical of the employers' view
was the comment of one that the introduction of family
allowances was evidence of the "creative and generous
spirit of French employers". Quoted in James C. Vadakin:
Family Allowances, An Analysis of their Development and
Implications (.Miami, 1958), p. 30"!
3. Vibart, op. cit., pp. 158-160. For example, at the
Second Congress of Compensation Funds, M. Bonvoisin,
Director of the Central Committee of Compensation Funds,
said: "We could cite examples where family allowances have
made it possible to carry out without damage reduction in
wages (which had become essential)".
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Emile Romanet stressed that one advantage of a family
allowance system was that it tended to reduce production
costs. Douglas gives an interesting example relating to
the Roubaix-Turcoing fund: in 1920, the fund was paying
allowances of 1 franc per day per child; after a strike
in March of that year a local agreement was established by
the Ministry of Labour providing for the periodic adjustment
of wages according to the fluctuations in the cost of living
index; between March and October of that year the cost of
living rose 13%, but basic wages were increased by only 7i%;
however, family allowances were raised to 3 francs per day,
thus putting workers with families in a better position than
if they had been awarded a full wage increase with no increase
in the allowances; in the following year, the Roubaix
employers ignored the Ministry of Labour agreement and cut
wages more rapidly than the cost of living, such that now
while the cost of living was Q^% below the March 1920 level,
wages were fully 17i% below. Yet family allowances remained
2
at 3 francs.
Not surprisingly, French trade unions viewed family
allowances in the early 1920s as an employers' weapon of
industrial warfare, particularly useful for 'buying' the
loyalty of married men and thus weakening trade union
1. Ibid., p. 159.
2. Douglas, op. cit. (1925), pp. 89-90. Vibart (op. cit.,
pp. 167-171) gives a detailed table of how family
allowances affected wage levels.
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solidarity. The granting of an allowance was usually
conditional upon the worker's 'good conduct' and payment
could be stopped in cases of absenteeism, lateness, strikes,
etc. Even if an industry had to work short time through
scarcity of materials or a breakdown of machinery, the
allowance would be reduced in proportion of the time lost.
Some funds, like the one in Strassbourg and the Lower Rhine,
declared that allowances could be withdrawn from anyone who
2
was deemed to be spending it carelessly. At the large
Roubaix-Turcoing fund, a representative declared that these
conditions attached to the payment of allowances caused the
workers "to think before listening to agitation, to talk
matters over with the employer, and to quit the shop only
under exceptional circumstances".
By the middle and late 1920s, however, French trade
unions had successfully fought back on this issue and were
generally in favour of family allowances; in 1925, for
example, Eleanor Rathbone was able to quote a favourable
statement from the Administrative Secretary of the large
'Confederation Generale du Travail': his verdict was that
1. Douglas, op. cit. (1925), p. 67.
2. "It /the allowance/ may be withdrawn from any one who puts
it to bad uses, or if those assisted are naturally careless.
The clearing fund may take any necessary measures to
ensure the proper expenditure of these amounts when it is
shown that they are being employed for a purpose other
than that for which they are intended." Regulations
of the fund, quoted in Ibid., p. 62.
3. Ibid., p. 67. At the 1923 Nantes Congress of Compensation
Funds, the Secretary of the Textile Consortium of Roubaix
said that "the withdrawal of family allowances for the
current month in the case of a strike has proved a most
efficacious means of preventing strikes". R. Picard:
"Family Allowances in French Industry", International
Labour Review (Geneva), 9, February 1924, p. 172.
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"the Family Wage makes possible a fairer distribution of
the product of labour, and increases the well-being of
children.... It cannot be maintained that the trade union
movement has been injured by the institution of the Family
Wage /which/ is purely and simply a redistribution on
sounder and more humane lines of the wage-bill". In 19i>2
the French Government introduced an Act making membership of
an equalisation fund compulsory (by stages) for employers
2
and establishing minimum rates for allowances.
Not surprisingly, similar developments to those in
France were also taking place in Belgium. Civil servants
in the Post Office received from 1910 allowances of 36 francs
per annum for each child under the age of fourteen starting
with the third; in 1915 the first private industrial scheme
appeared in the coal mining company at Tamines, and after
4
the First World War other coal mines followed suit; but
the first real expansion took place in 1921, when Belgium's
5
first equalisation fund was established at Verviers. Other
funds rapidly followed, and a pressure group, the 'Ligue des
Families Nombreuses de Belgique' (founded in 1920), began to
campaign for family allowances on social and demographic
1. E. Rathbone: Family Allowances in the Mining Industry
(F.E.S. pamphlet, 1925).
2. Vadakin, op. cit., pp. 35-6. Under this Act, allowances
were not to be used as alternatives to wage-rises.
3. Glass, op. cit. (1940), p. 125.
4. Douglas, op. cit. (1925), p. 96. On pp. 95-109 Douglas
gives an excellent account of Belgian developments.
5. E. Susswein: "Family Allowances in Belgium", Population
Studies, 2, December 1948, p. 278.
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grounds. As in France, the motives of employers were at
first deeply distrusted by the Belgian trade unions, with
good reason; but by the mid 1920s this distrust was
2
lessening. In 1924, all Belgian coal mines adopted schemes
and in 1928 an Act made membership of an equalisation fund
compulsory for all employers who obtained contracts from the
3
State or other public bodies. In 1930 an Act introduced, by
stages, compulsory coverage over all employees in industry,
commerce and agriculture and established minimum rates of
• Zj.
employers' contributions and child allowances; in addition,
as in France, employers were forbidden to use allowances as
wage-depressants and means of enforcing industrial
5
discipline.
By contrast with France and Belgium, Germany's develop¬
ment of family allowances in the 1920s was unspectacular.
Private schemes, such as the one at the Zeiss optical works,
1. In addition, the migration of Belgian workers to and
from France helped to spread the news of developments in
the latter country. Douglas, op. cit. (1925), p. 97.
2. For an interesting account, see ibid., pp. 102-9. The
Secretary of the Belgian Miners' Federation, which was
originally opposed to family allowances, wrote after four
years' experience of their operation: "The Allowances
have had no effect on the basic wage. Neither have they
in any way affected Trade Union solidarity. On the
contrary they have to some extent furthered Trade Union
influence. When a workman thinks himself injured by the
suppression or diminution of the allowance due to him, he
appeals to his Trade Union delegate to secure the fulfil¬
ment by the employer of the rules regulating the allowances".
Quoted in F.E.S. pamphlet: Will Family Allowances Mean
Lower Wages? (n.d., probably 1925).
3. Family Endowment Chronicle, 1, November 1931, p. 27.
4. Susswein, op. cit., p. 279.
5. Family Endowment Chronicle, 1, November 1931» p. 27.
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were fairly.common before the First World War; by 1912,
thirty-one German cities were paying to their municipal
employees allowances by which percentage additions to the
basic wage were made for each child; and during the War
2
many industries paid family-related cost of living bonuses.
The rapid price rises of 1920 led to a further expansion,
and in that year the first equalisation funds were established,
first in the metal industries of Berlin and then in the Cologne
chemical industries. The controversies aroused by these
schemes were identical to those in France and Belgium:
Heimann, for example, states that employers were very
interested in the scheme as a means of winning the loyalties
of the married men away from "revolutionary and syndicalist
4
elements". German trade unions were stronger in their
opposition than French and Belgian, however, and for this
and other reasons German equalisation funds never exceeded
5
eleven in number throughout the 1920s.
France, Belgium and Germany enjoyed the largest
developments in family allowances in Europe in the 1920s,
but schemes were also to be found in Austria, Czechoslovakia,
1. Eduard Heimann: "The Family Wage Controversy in Germany",
Economic Journal. 33, December 1923, pp. 509-510.
2. Vibart, op. cit., pp. 42-3.
3. Heimann, op. cit., p. 510.
4. Ibid., p. 512. For a discussion of this, see Douglas,
op. cit. (1925), pp. 114-8.
5. F.E.S. pamphlet: Family Allowances Abroad and in the
British Dominions (1932;.
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the Netherlands, Switzerland, Poland, Sweden, Norway,
Denmark, Finland, Yugoslavia, Italy, Spain and the Irish
Republic. In most cases, these were closely connected with
cost of living bonuses related to family size introduced
during and after the First World War (some continuing in
the 1920s as little more than that); opposition from those
on the political left was common; frequently family allowance
schemes were paid to public employees; and the mining industry
always proved a fruitful ground for development.
In the 1920s the development of family allowances was
also taking place in two countries outside Europe that were
pioneers in social welfare provision - Australia and New
2
Zealand. Whereas in Britain in the 1920s the problem of
wages and family needs never went beyond the confines of
theoretical discussion, in Australia and New Zealand inter¬
esting practical solutions were emerging.
1. For an account of developments in these countries, see
Douglas, op. cit. (1925), pp. 119-147, Vibart, op. cit.,
pp. 47-50, and Mary T. Waggaman: "'Family-Wage' System
in Germany and Certain Other European Countries",
United States Department of Labor. Monthly Labor Review
(Washington), 18, January 1924, pp. 25-9. A table giving
information on schemes to public servants in twenty
countries is contained in F.E.S. pamphlet: Memorandum
on Family Allowances presented to the Royal Commission
on the Civil Service (1950), Appendix B.
2. In addition to the following footnotes, an excellent
account of developments in Australia up to 1925 is to
be found in Douglas, op. cit. (1925), Chapter 11; and
for a general introduction see H. Heaton: "The Basic
Wage Principle in Australian Wages Regulation",
Economic Journal, 31, September 1921, pp. 309-319.
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The development of family allowances in Australia
can be seen as originating in 1907, when a Commonwealth
1
Arbitration Court dealt with a case brought by an employer
named Harvester over the issue of whether his wage rates
were "fair and reasonable": the employer had to prove this
in order to qualify for certain tax exemptions. The outcome
was the famous 'Harvester Judgement', by which the President
of the Court, Justice H.B. Higgins, declared that having
examined all the evidence relating to human needs, his view
was that the subsistence level for a family of five was
7s.Od. per day. This decision was the first attempt by a
court of law in Australia to establish a minimum wage based
on the 'average' family, and for several years after it
remained the basis for similar court judgements: within
each Australian State legal machinery existed for minimum
wage regulation and where an industrial dispute occurred the
2
solution tended to follow the Harvester precedent.
Price rises during and after the First World War
produced the same kind of living wage demands that were being
voiced in Europe at that time, and in response to these the
Federal Government appointed a Royal Commission on the Basic
1. Set up. in 1900 to deal with industrial disputes.
2. A.B. Piddington: The Next Step (Melbourne, 1925 ed.),
pp. 2-4. According to Heaton (op. cit., p. 309), the
preservation of industrial peace was a prime motive
behind this; Australian wage regulation laws, he
wrote, "have had about the same effect in preventing
strikes as the voluntary conciliation machinery has had
in British industry".
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Wage in October 1919, with the lawyer A.B. Piddington as
Chairman, to investigate the question of how a minimum wage
could be calculated according to human needs. The Commission
investigated the problem in meticulous detail; a large volume
of evidence was taken on clothing needs, food requirements,
2
rent levels, whether to include items like fares, and so on,
and eventually in their Report, published in November 1920,
they named the basic minimum for a family of five as £5.l6s.0d.
per week for Melbourne, with slight variations for other .
States. This, it was calculated, would cost industry in
the region of £93,000,000 - equivalent to one-third of the
A
total production of industry in 1918. Government and
industry regarded this as impossible, and so the Australian
Prime Minister asked Piddington to present an alternative
1. In announcing the appointment of the Royal Commission,
the Australian Prime Minister, W.M. Hughes, said: "If
we are to have industrial peace we must be prepared to pay
the price, and that price is justice to the worker... the
cause of much of the industrial unrest, which is like fuel
to the fires of Bolshevism and direct action, arises with
the real wage of the worker.... once it is admitted that
it is in the interests of the community that such a wage
should be paid as will enable a man to marry and bring
up children in decent, wholesome conditions.... it seems
obvious that we must devise better machinery for insuring
the payment of such a wage than at present exists". Report
of the Royal Commission on the Basic Wage, 1920, p. 7.
(Contained in Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol. IV,
1920-1).
2. In The Disinherited Family (1924), pp. 183-4, Eleanor Rathbone
who of course ridiculed this attempt to define the needs of
the 'average' family, poked fun at the spectacle of the seven
Commissioners (all men), "considering whether the suppositi¬
tious wife of the typical Australian workman should be allowed
six blouses a year (two silk, two voile and two cambric or
winceyette) as claimed by the Federated Unions; or only
three as suggested by the Employers".
3. Report, op. cit., pp. 12-58. On pp. 66-84 of the Report
there are intricately detailed tables of all minimum weekly
needs, such as one-eighth of a tin of floor polish.
4. Memorandum by A.B. Piddington, 22/11/20, in ibid., p. 91.
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scheme. This he did, recommending a minimum wage of £4
1
plus family allowances of 12s.Od. per week. The response
of the Government was to agree in principle to the minimum
2
wage, hut reduce the proposed family allowance to 5s.Od.
In fact, nothing practical was done by the Federal
Government to implement this promise, except that in 1920 it
introduced a family allowance scheme for its own officials:
5s.Od. per week was paid in respect of each child (subject
to an upper income limit of £400), and the scheme was financed
wholly by the Government until 1923, and by a contributory
scheme thereafter (until the national scheme was introduced
in 1941).^ Apart from an unsuccessful bill in 1921, the only
other development at Federal level in the 1920s was the
appointment in 1927 of a Royal Commission on Family Endowment,
following a discussion of the subject at the Conference of
Commonwealth and State Ministers in June of that year. The
Majority Report of the Commission opposed family allowances
on the grounds that basic wage schemes then in operation
already contained an element of family needs adjustment,
"sufficient, if directly applied, to provide for all existing
children", that the cost would be prohibitive and that
1. Piddington rested his case on the 'statistical fallacy'
argument regarding the three-child family. A three-child
minimum wage would have provided for 450,000 non-existent
wives and 2,100,000 non-existent children. Ibid., p. 90.
2. Piddington, op. cit. (1925), pp. 21-7.
3. T.H. Kewley: Social Security in Australia, 1900-72
(Sydney, 1973), pp. 136-7. "
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parental responsibility would be weakened. The Minority
recommended family allowances for each child after the
second; but the Government agreed with the Majority's
verdict and there was opposition from trade unionists who
feared that the introduction of a family allowance scheme
would be accompanied by wage-reductions for childless men.
However, in the Australian States in the 1920s the
question of family endowment was always a live issue: it
reappeared every time a State's industrial tribunal fixed
the basic wage in relation to 'average' family needs. In
1925, for example, both Queensland and South Australia
2
unsuccessfully tried to introduce family endowment bills.
The most noteworthy achievement was in New South Wales, where
as early as 1916 there had been introduced into the State
Legislative Assembly a motion from Dr. Richard Arthur proposing
■5
family endowment in very general terms. In 1919 the State
1. Ibid., pp. 138-140; Family Endowment Society pamphlet:
Family Allowances Abroad and in the British Dominions
(1932); J.B. Beyer: "Family Allowances in Australia",
Bulletin of the International Social Security Association,
January-February 1961, p. 47. — -
2. Kewley, op. cit., p. 137. For a brief account of the
events in Queensland, see University of Tasmania:
Employment Relations and the Basic Wage (Hobart, 1925),
pp. 17-19.
3. Three years later, in September 1919, Dr. Arthur put the
for Families and the Fallacy
System (Sydney, 1919).
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Industrial Arbitration Court fixed the basic wage for males
at £3.17s.0d., calculated on the three-child family, but in
response to vociferous protests from employers over the
amount this would cost the New South Wales Government intro-
duced a Maintenance of Children Bill. Under this the New
South Wales Board of Trade would have been obliged to calcu¬
late annually the cost of maintaining a child and on this
basis operate a family allowance system on top of a man-and-
wife minimum wage: only the children of employees earning
less than 5s.Od. above the minimum would receive the full
cost-of-living allowance; the other child allowances would
operate on a sliding scale; and no payment would be made in
2
respect of employees who earned over £8 per week. Opposition
from trade unions was very strong, however, because no payments
would be made during strikes or unemployment (since allowances
were financed wholly by employers as part of wages) and because
the scheme appeared to them as a device for avoiding the
enforcement of the minimum wage (which would have cost about
double the family allowance scheme - £11,930,000 as against
£6,250,000). In addition, there was opposition from employers
who feared that once introduced, the scheme would be greatly
expanded in the future.
1. New South Wales Industrial Gazette (Sydney), 16, October
1919, p. 448. Employers maintained that capital would
flow into other States where wage costs were not so high.
Mary Stocks: The Meaning of Family Endowment (1921), p. 25.
2. E. Rathbone: "The New South Wales Scheme for the Grading
of Wages According to Family Needs", Economic Journal, 30,
December 1920, pp. 551-2, and The Disinherited Family (1924)
pp. 185-6. ~ "
3. Ibid. (1924), pp. 187-8.
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This combined opposition prevented the bill from
becoming law in 1919, and a similar fate befell a Motherhood
Endowment Bill of 1921 which would have introduced 6s.Od.
per week for each child after the second, subject to an
income limit; though this second bill passed further in
the New South Wales Parliament than did its predecessor,
it was lost in a dissolution. However, New South Wales
established a Ministry for Motherhood and investigated
alternative methods of raising the necessary money (such
as by a State lottery); and finally in 1927 a family
allowance scheme was introduced that provided 5s.Od. per
week for each child under fourteen years of age where the
total family income was less than the basic wage plus £13
per annum. Until 1933 the scheme was financed by a payroll
2
tax on employers, and thereafter out of general taxation.
In general, therefore, Australian developments in
family allowances in the 1920s grew out of State-enforced
minimum wage legislation, and were thus financed by employers.
By contrast, the New Zealand Family Allowances Act of 1926
took no regard of the employment of the parents and was
wholly financed out of taxation - thus meriting the
1. Piddington, op. cit. (1925), p. 31; Family Endowment
Chronicle, 2, May 1932, p. 4; J.C. Eldridge: "Motherhood
Endowment in Australia", Eugenics Review, 14, April 1922,
pp. 54-8.
2. Kewley, op. cit., p. 138.
3. The extra cost was, of course, passed on in higher prices
to the consumer. Indeed, one argument put forward in
favour of family allowances was that by costing less than
a minimum wage programme they would also result in lower
price rises - 6% as against 22^%, in the case of the
Australian Federal Government's scheme. Piddington,
op. cit. (1925), p. 25.
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distinction of being the first true State system. In
New Zealand, the family endowment principle had been ack¬
nowledged in several ways before 1914 - for example, through
income tax child allowances and the payment of married allow¬
ances to school teachers - and during the First World War
further extensions were added in the form of service pay
separation allowances and unemployment dependants' benefits.
However, there appears to have been curiously little discussion
on family wages thereafter, and private members' bills on the
subject introduced into Parliament in 1922, 1924 and 1925
2
failed to pass. By the mid-1920s, New Zealand still had no
industrial schemes. Yet in 1925-6 family endowment suddenly
became a live political issue, and very soon after a General
Election (in which the Government promised to introduce a bill)
the 1926 Act was passed. It provided 2s.Od. per week for
each child under fifteen years of age after the second to
parents whose income did not exceed £4 per week; various
residence and nationality clauses were included (for example,
no payments were to be made to 'Asiatics', even if they were
British subjects); and allowances could be withheld if the
1. R.M. Campbell: "Family Allowances in New Zealand",
Economic Journal, 37, September 1927, p. 369.
2. These were introduced by the Labour member, M.J. Savage.
3- For the debates, see New Zealand Parliamentary Debates
(Wellington), Vol. 210, August 3 to August 28, 1926,
pp. 587-633, 667, 762-774, 833-845. Both sides
generally agreed with the principle; the main area of
controversy was over the level of the allowance.
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1
applicant was deemed to be of bad character. The scheme
remained in this form until 1938, when it was expanded in
2
scope and the payments renamed 'family benefit'.
Whereas in the 1920s family allowance developments in
Europe were closely connected with the question of minimum
wages, in the 1930s the main impetus changed to that of
raising birth rates. In this new decade, Germany and Italy
replaced France and Belgium as the main pioneers of family
allowances, and in both pro-natalist policies were deeply
imbued with fascist ideology.
By the early 1930s the comparatively minor developments
in private industrial schemes in Germany had been all but
wiped out by the effects of inflation, and of the few schemes
that survived most covered public employees. In 1933, however,
Hitler came to power and almost immediately there was launched
a wide-ranging pro-natalist and eugenic policy based on the
ideas expressed in Mein Kampf. In common with other European
nations Germany had been experiencing a falling birth rate
since the 1870s - from 39.2 per 1,000 of total population in
1876-80 to 14.7 in 1933 - and since the beginning of the
twentieth century there had appeared a continuous spate of
books and pamphlets expressing concern over this.
1. Campbell, op. cit., pp. 370-2; Family Endowment Chronicle,
2, May 1932, p. 5.
2. Peter Kaim-Caudle: Comparative Social Policy and Social
Security (1973), p. 251.
3. D.V. Glass, op. cit. (1940), pp. 269-275.
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However, only after 1933 was there any concerted
attempt to raise the German birth rate by the introduction
of both positive and negative pro-natalist eugenic policies.
The most important of these was the 1933 Marriage Loans Act,
under which interest-free loans of up to 1,000 marks were
made available to newly married couples, to be repaid at a
rate of only 1% per month. The aim of the loans was to
enable couples to-purchase furniture, kitchen utensils,
linen, etc., and thus payments were made in the form of
coupons that could be exchanged for these items. One-quarter
of the initial loan was cancelled on the birth of each child,
and in addition a birth entitled parents to postpone further
repayments for up to one year. Loans were only made to
'pure Aryans' who suffered from no inherited disease. On
the one hand, the Marriage Loans Act was aimed at lowering
unemployment by encouraging women to leave the labour market:
loans were only made if the wife had been gainfully employed
for at least nine months in the previous two years, and on
marrying she had to stay out of work unless her husband had
2
an income of less than 125 marks per month. On the other
hand, of course, the Act was a pro-natalist measure. In
this latter area much was claimed for it: the marriage rate
per 1,000 total population rose from 9.7 to 11.1 in the first
year of operation, and the birth rate (per 1,000 total popu¬
lation) from 14.7 to 18.0 - apparently a striking tribute to
the success of the loans. But in fact the most likely
1. Ibid., pp. 287-8: D.V. Glass: The Struggle for
Population (1936), pp. 22-3.
2. Ibid.
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explanation for these rises in birth;and marriage rates is
that the marriage loans programme coincided with a general
economic recovery, which caused postponed marriages to be
completed; a similar rise took place in couples not
1
receiving loans.
Many other pro-natalist measures were introduced.
From 1935 special grants were given to families with four
or more children under sixteen years of age: up to June 1936
these were being paid to about 190,000 families out of an
?-
estimated 750,000 with four or more children. Child tax
rebates (rising steeply with each successive child), reduced
railway fares, rent allowances, housing assistance, preferential
treatment in employment selection - all these were available
3
to parents of large families.
Such schemes can be considered family endowment in a
general sense, but in addition there were more limited family
allowance payments. Equalisation funds were sponsored by the
Government covering various occupational groups like panel
4
doctors, dentists and apothecaries. Several local family
1. D.V. Glass: "The. Berlin Population Congress and Recent
Population Movements in Germany", Eugenics Review, 17,
October 1935, pp. 210-1. Between August 1933 and February
1937, 694,367 marriage loans were granted and 485,258
children were born under them. This was a small figure
when compared with the total number of births in the years
1934, 1935 and 1936 of about 3,761,000. Marie Kopp:
"The Nature and Operation of the German Eugenical
Programme", Marriage Hygiene (Bombay), 3, May 1937, p. 283.
2. Glass, op. cit. (1940), p. 291.
3. Ibid.,, pp. 299-303.
4. Glass, op. cit. (1940), ppc 294-5.
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allowance schemes were set up, such as the one run by the
Berlin municipality: a number of carefully-selected families
were awarded 'baby sponsorship' grants for each third or
fourth planned child of 30 marks per month for the first
1
year and 20 marks per month for the next thirteen years.
All these family endowment schemes were, of course,
only available to those parents deemed of 'eugenically
sound Aryan stock'. The Berlin 'baby sponsorship' scheme,
for example, was only available to parents who passed the
most rigorous of examinations into their social, educational,
medical and hereditary background; the severity of these
criteria can be illustrated by the fact that out of 2,000
applicants in 1934 only 311 babies received sponsorship.
The other side to this apparently generous Nazi family policy
was thus the negative eugenic programme that ultimately led
to the extermination of millions of Jews.
Much the same motivation lay behind the Italian pro- '
natalist policies. In 1927 Mussolini had expressed alarm
over Italy's ability to be an expansionist, imperial nation
without a rapidly increasing population: "What are 40 million
Italians", he said, "as opposed to 40 million French plus
the 90 millions in their colonies, or as opposed to the
-z
46 million English, plus the 450 millions in their colonies?".
1. Kopp, op. cit., pp. 285.
2. Ibid. Of the initial 2,000 applicants, nearly half were
immediately rejected "on the ground of ill-health, bad
hereditary history or else the parents did not come up
to the required mental standards".
3. Quoted in Glass, op. cit. (1940), p. 220.
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Thereafter, a number of pro-natalist measures were intro¬
duced: encouragement of migration from towns to areas of
reclaimed land in the country, emigration schemes, suppression
of contraceptive information and severe restrictions on
abortion, a tax on bachelors, generous tax concessions for
large families, preferential employment selection for married
men, cheap honeymoon journeys to Rome, and so on. Family
allowance schemes before 1934- were mainly confined to some
State employees, but in that year an industrial scheme was
set up (partly for pro-natalist reasons but also in the wake
of wage reductions) which in 1935 covered 650,750 workers
with dependent children. In 1936 and 1937 further extensions
were made to provide family allowances for workers in industry,
2
commerce, agriculture, banking and insurance. As in the case
of Germany, these measures appear to have had little effect
on birth or marriage rates.
In France and Belgium, by contrast, the 1930s saw no
rapid advances; instead there was a gradual consolidation of
the situation established by the Acts of 1932 and 1930 respec¬
tively. As the provisions of these Acts were enforced by
stages more and more employers joined (though evasion was a
problem), and more and more workers were covered. The main
1. Eugenics Review, 27, April 1935, p. 5.
2. Glass, op. cit. (1940), pp. 248-255.
3. Ibid., pp. 261-8. Eva Hubback: "Family Allowances in
Relation to Population Problems, Sociological Review, 29,
July 1937, p. 282.
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event of interest was the promulgation in July 1939 of the
French 'Code de la Famille' which greatly extended family
allowance coverage to all occupied persons and introduced
a number of pro-natalist measures (including loans to assist
young couples to set up home in country districts). Even
less progress was made in Australia and New Zealand (apart
from the renaming of the New Zealand scheme in 1938, as already
mentioned); the economic depression of the 1930s appears to
have effectively removed family allowances from the realms of
2
political possibility.
However, in a few other countries population concern
resulted in family allowance schemes. In the Soviet Union
after 1934- there was a reaction against the sexual freedom of
the 1920s (when, for example, abortion had been easily obtain¬
able) and a number of pro-natalist measures were introduced,
culminating in the 1936 'All-Union Code of Family Law' that
made divorces more difficult, prohibited abortion and intro-
duced family allowances for each child after the seventh. By
the end of the 1930s Spain, Hungary and Chile had introduced
schemes, and the subject was under discussion in several South
Zl
American States.
1. For accounts of France and Belgium in the 1930s, see Glass,
op. cit. (194-0), pp. 106-218; E. Susswein, op. cit. ,
pp. 279-280; J. Doublet, op. cit., pp. 219-222.
2. Kewley, op. cit., p. 140.
3. Frank Lorimer: "Population Policies and Politics in the
Communist World", in Philip Hauser (ed.): Population and
World Politics (Illinois, 1958), p. 219; Bernice Madison:
Social Welfare in the Soviet Union (Stanford, 1968), pp. 42-4;
David Heer and Judith Bryden: "Family Allowances and
Fertility in the Soviet Union", Soviet Studies, 18, October
1966, p. 154.
4. E. Rathbone: The Case for Family Allowances (1940), p. 99.
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In conclusion, it can be seen that this necessarily brief
survey of foreign developments sheds some interesting light
on the British experience. In all European countries (or,
if one is to include Australia and New Zealand, countries
peopled by European-origin races) the early twentieth century
saw emerging labour movements, worsening industrial relations
and, as a result of both, interest in the question of the
minimum wage - which, in turn, led on to discussion of the
family wage. In all these countries, family allowances in
the 1920s were frequently seen as an alternative to across-
the-board wage rises or as a means of imposing wage reductions -
exactly the grounds upon which the 1926 Samuel Report recommended
them for the British mining industry and, in a different context,
the British Government introduced dependants' allowances into
unemployment benefit. Their use in Europe as a wage-depressant
and a means of enforcing industrial discipline aroused much
antagonism within the British trade union movement, and this
antagonism was, throughout the inter-war years, an insuperable
obstacle in the way of the Family Endowment Society.
The world-wide economic crisis of the early 1930s proved
to be an enormous setback to developments in Australasia, as in
Britain, but thereafter in Europe family allowances increasingly
came to be seen in pro-natalist eugenic terms as concern over
falling birth rates grew and international military rivalries
intensified: the schemes in Nazi Germany, in fact, represented
the logical extension of the version of family allowances
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favoured by the British eugenics movement. In only a very
few cases (such as the Belgian 'Ligue de Families Nombreuses
de Belgique' and A.B. Piddington in Australia) were pressure
groups or individuals of much significance, and even then
their influence seems to have been minimal - a point to be
borne in mind when evaluating the importance of the British
Family Endowment Society. In two obvious respects (Government
disinterest in the family wage concept and the slow growth of'
private industrial schemes) Britain was an exception to the
European pattern; but in general the forces at work in Britain
were remarkably similar to those at work elsewhere.
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The Development of Private and. Other Schemes
Finally, the growth of private industrial schemes and
the spread of the family endowment principle must be very
briefly mentioned. Unlike France and Belgium, where such
developments were probably the main impulse behind the eventual
introduction of a State scheme, Britain's industries did little
to pioneer this aspect of social welfare.
By the end of 1939, twenty industrial family allowance
schemes were in operation in Britain. Ten had begun in the
course of that year, six in 1938, and one each in 1926, 1918,
1919 and 1917. Allowances varied between 1s.Od. and 5s.Od.
per week per eligible child; only three firms paid allowances
to the first child (most beginning with the third); in most
cases a parental income limit was applied; and varying age-
limits were applied of between fourteen and eighteen years of
age. The cost usually amounted to a very small percentage of
the total wages bill - for example, only 0.15% in the case of
the oldest scheme, operated by E.S. and A. Robinson, Ltd., of
Bristol. The scheme run by H.P. Bulmer and Co. (Hereford),
the cider manufacturers, was financed by the income from
10,000 £1 ordinary company shares which the Chairman,
2
H.P. Bulmer, made over to trustees.
1. For details of all the firms and their schemes, see
Marjorie Green: Family Allowances (1938), pp. 11-12;
National Industrial Alliance: The Case For and Against
Family Allowances (1939), pp. 14-15; E. Rathbone:
The Case for Family Allowances (1940), pp. 115-8.
2. Press cutting from Daily Herald of 13/1/39, contained in
P.R.0. AST 7/390.
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Perhaps the Cadbury scheme was the most interesting,
1
for Lawrence Cadbury, like Seebohm Rowntree, was an employer
who was very interested in social questions. (He had been,
for example, a member of the Next Five Years Group and
treasurer of the Eugenics Society's Population Policies
Committee.) In the April 1939 British Medical Association's
Conference on Nutrition he spoke enthusiastically of his
firm's scheme. It covered 284 families, with a total of
410 dependent children, and Cadbury had had an investigation
made into how the allowances were being spent: 'clothing and
boots' absorbed 23% of allowances in low wage families and
19% in high wage; 'special food for children' absorbed 19%
of 'low wage' allowances and 17% of 'high wage'; in all,
food expenditure accounted for 57% of 'low wage' allowances
and 46% of 'high wage'; and only about 2% was spent on
2luxuries such as radios and gramophones.
These industrial schemes attracted the interest of the
Unemployment Assistance Board in 1938 and 1939 as the Board
began desperately to think of a way out of their less
eligibility predicament. In September 1938, for example,
Professor H.M. Hallsworth wrote on behalf of the Board to
1. Despite his avowed enthusiasm for family allowances,
Rowntree only introduced them into his family firm in York
in 1940. Asa Briggs: Social Thought and Social Action, a
Study of the Work of Seebohm Rowntree (1961), pp. 243, 275-6.
2. B.M.A., op. cit., pp. 105-7.
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F.G. Robinson (of Robinsons, Ltd.) asking for details of
1
his scheme: Robinson replied, giving information, and
concluding that "there is no evidence this allowance has
increased the birth rate, but there is plenty of evidence that
the amounts have been most gratefully received by the parents
and the gratitude expressed warrants the Company continuing
2
such expenditure". Cadbury's also sent considerable inform¬
ation, including an official leaflet published by the Bourn-
ville Publicity Department, which stressed the anti-poverty
arguments rather than the pro-natalist ones (because,
Paul Cadbury told Lord Rushcliffe, "we are anxious to get
genuine support for the scheme, and apparently working-class
opinion is suspicious of any direct approach to the population
~Z
question"). Allowances of 5s.Od. per week were paid for
each child after the second, up to eighteen years of age if
the child was at school or college, and without a parental
income limit; allowances were paid during absence from work
on account of sickness, accident, or short time, and during
holidays or other periods of absence with permission; but,
as in the case of early European industrial schemes, the firm
reserved the right to withdraw the allowances, they were kept
separate from wages (payment being made in separate envelopes),
and (though the pamphlet did not specifically mention this)
they would presumably not be paid during strikes.
1. Hallsworth to Robinson, 21/9/38, P.R.O. AST 7/390.
2. Robinson to Hallsworth, 24/9/38, ibid.
3. Cadbury to Rushcliffe, 3/12/38, ibid.
4. Bournville Publicity Department: Children's Allowances
(1939), contained in ibid.
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Other occupational systems existed by 1939. Apart from
the London School of Economics scheme (mentioned in Chapter 2),
the Methodist Church had paid family allowances since the end
of the 18th century, run on the equalisation fund principle:
the Wesleyan Methodists paid £8.8s.0d. per annum per child up
to eighteen years of age (with an extra £12 per annum for six
years of education), and the United Methodists paid £10.10s.0d.
a
per child per annum. By the 1930s some Church of England
Dioceses ran their own schemes: for example, in Southwark
married clergymen of three years' service received £30 per
annum for a wife and £15 per annum for each child, and similar
schemes were to be found in Lichfield, St. Edmundsbury,
2
Ipswich and York.
Finally, it must be remembered that by 1939 the principle
of family endowment had been acknowledged in a large number of
public and social policies: public assistance, unemployment
benefit, widows' pensions, war pensions, school maintenance
allowances, housing, service pay separation allowances and
1. F.E.S. pamphlet: The Case for Family Allowances Among the
Clergy (1932) and International Association for Social
Progress, op. cit. (1928), p. 11.
2. Family Endowment Chronicle, 2, August 1932, p. 15.
3. The 1930 Housing and Slum Clearance Act had contained a
clause (for which Eleanor Rathbone and E.D. Simon had
campaigned) permitting local housing authorities to use
their subsidies to provide children's rent rebates, and
by 1939 about 200 local authorities had done so. Hubback
in E. Rathbone: Family Allowances (194-9), p. 282. For a
detailed account, see Family Endowment Chronicle, 3,
April 1935, pp. 21-25.
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1
income tax child allowances. Yet rarely if ever had this
principle been challenged. For example, in the late 1930s
civil servants from relevant Government Departments met
regularly to discuss arrangements for a wartime Prevention
and Relief of Distress scheme. This was set up to administer,
among many other things, the payment of allowances to children
of families whose normal source of income had been disrupted
by bombing, evacuation, delay in receipt of separation allow¬
ances, etc.; yet in all these discussions never was the
2
State's obligation to meet family needs ever questioned.
What was really at issue, therefore, was whether the
family endowment principle should be applied to wages.
Compared to their European counterparts, British industri¬
alists had shown little enthusiasm for this idea up to 1939;.
and, apart from a flicker of interest within the U.A.B., the
Government had shown none at all.
1. In the Second World War billeting allowances in
respect of evacuated children were also paid by
the State.
2. See material in P.R.O. AST 11/1-4, P.R.O. AST 7/401
and 408.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
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By 1939 the movement for family allowances was just
over twenty years old, and at this point it is useful to
make a quick resume of what had been achieved in these
years. The principle of family endowment was a very old
one, and had been incorporated into a number of social
policies; but on the vital question of family allowances
in wages little progress had been made. A small number
of private industrial schemes were in operation by 1939,
but in comparison with other industrialised countries
(where there had been identical demands for a family wage)
Britain lagged behind. The interest shown by the labour
movement in the 1920s had quickly died away, and throughout
the 1930s the trade unions remained implacably opposed to
family allowances. By the late 1930s Eleanor Rathbone had
managed to gather together an all-party pro-family allowance
group in the House of Commons, but it mostly consisted of
political outsiders like Amery and Macmillan who had little
influence over their respective Parties. Family allowances
had been supported for a large number of reasons by a very
wide spectrum of opinion, but this had tended to confuse
issues, and often arguments for family allowances appeared
to contradict each other. Generally, these arguments fell
into two categories, the family poverty and the pro-natalist;
but although a vast amount of evidence had been produced in
support of both, this evidence had been rejected by the
Government. The only area of promise, so far as family allow¬
ance supporters were concerned, was in unemployment policy,
PhD Thesis Digitisation Project
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where by the late 1930s family allowances were being very
tentatively considered as the only way of preserving less
eligibility. However, such evidence as has survived
indicates that the version of family allowances contem¬
plated was the industrial equalisation fund one; a
universal State-financed system (the Family Endowment
Society's ultimate objective) was never considered. All
in all, the situation in 1939 was that the Government had
successfully resisted the campaign for family allowances
for twenty years, and all the signs indicated that it could
hold out for at least another twenty.
Yet within four years the Government had committed
itself to introducing family allowances, and in 1945 the
Act was passed. This dramatic change came about not
through any sudden acceptance by the Government of the
evidence of family poverty or the need to raise the birth
rate, but because of two main reasons: firstly, family
allowances became relevant to wartime economic policy;
and secondly, they were seen as a means of ensuring work-
incentives and labour mobility in any reorganised postwar
system of social security. This chapter will examine how
this change came about, and since the events of the 1939-45
period were extremely complex it is convenient to divide
them up into four sections. The first ran from the out¬
break of the War in September 1939 to the end of 1940:
in this period family allowances were being intensively
examined by the Treasury as a means of controlling inflation.
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The second period began in early 1941 with the renewed
activity by Eleanor Rathbone and her supporters, culmin¬
ating in their deputation to the Treasury on the 16th June
1941, and ended with the publication of the White Paper on
family allowances in May 1942. The third period covered
the Beveridge Committee's work (actually begun in mid-1941),
their recommendation of family allowances in the Report, and
the Government's reaction. Finally, the fourth period began
in mid-1943 and ended with the passage of the 1945 Act: in
this, it was mainly the administrative details of the scheme
that were settled.
The Treasury had opened a file on family allowances
_ 1
in 1938 (the same year as did the Unemployment Assistance
Board) in response to growing Parliamentary pressure, for
which the Chancellor had to be prepared. The pro-family
allowance group in the Commons were demanding some sort of
official enquiry or Royal Commission on the subject, but
2
the Government maintained an attitude of indifference.
For its part, the Treasury decided on a policy of cautious
hostility, and advised the Chancellor, Sir John Simon, to
be careful of what he said: on the one hand, he should not
appear implacably opposed to the idea of such an enquiry
since public opinion might demand one in the future, but on
1. P.R.O. T 161/1116 (S.43697/1), Family Allowances 1938-40.
2. Hansard, Vol. 337, 29/6/38, Cols. 1899-1900, and 30/6/38,
Cols. 2102-2103. Ibid., Vol. 338, 11/7/38, Col. 917.
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the other hand he should at all costs avoid making any-
rash promises, because "if the first step is taken, there
is a great likelihood that there would then be no escape
from the adoption of a scheme in some form or other, and...
while part of the cost might be. raised by contributions,
a considerable Exchequer subsidy would be inevitable".
This policy of wary opposition suddenly changed with
the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939.
For at least two years before the outbreak of war there
had been pressure on the Government to formulate a cohesive
economic strategy that could be put into operation immediately
war broke out. What was needed was a co-ordinated policy
covering price controls, wage regulation, levels of taxation,
profits, the adjustment of industry to war needs, the
financing of the war effort, and so on; above all, such
dangers as rapidly-spiralling inflation, widespread strikes
or flagrant profiteering had to be avoided. The economist
J.M. Keynes, in his capacity as a member of the Economic
Advisory Council's Committee on Economic Information, had
been impressing this upon Ministers and officials since
2
at least 1937. Pressure also came from industrialists:
on the 21st April 1939, for example, a group of them
demanded that an 'Economic General Organisation Staff'
1. Treasury note on family allowances (n.d., probably
June 1938), P.R.O. T 161/1116 (S.43697/1).
2. D.E. Moggridge: "Economic Policy in the Second World




"be set up to devise a wartime economic plan, and the
Government were aware that this feeling was widespread among
2
businessmen. In June 1939, therefore, a small committee
called the 'Survey of Financial and Economic Plans' was set
up under the leadership of Lord (Sir Josiah) Stamp with its
other two members being the economists H.D. Henderson and
3
Sir Henry Clay.
The 'Stamp Survey' worked throughout the second half
of 1939 on the many likely problems of a war economy. One
of the most crucial of these was the relationship between
wages and the cost of living. Above all else, the most
important thing to be avoided in a war economy was runaway
inflation: economists had the financial chaos of post-1918
Europe clearly in mind, and realised that rampant inflation
Ll
would be disastrous to Britain's war effort. A war economy
would open up a whole new range of employment prospects for
the working class, with high wages; this would result in
increased consumption (particularly of non-essentials) which
would be met by short supplies (owing to disrupted trade),
and prices would rise; in response to this, employees
(who would be in a relatively strong bargaining position)
would seek large pay rises. When added to the abnormally
1. Memorandum: Economic Defence signed by W.H. Coates,
Oswald Falk, Oliver Lyttleton, Arthur Salter,
George Schuster, Israel Sieff, R.L. Wedgewood,
21/4/39, P.R.O. T 160 (885/F.17545).
2. Sir John Anderson to Neville Chamberlain, 17/5/39, ibid.
3. Correspondence in ibid. See also, D.N. Chester (ed.):
Lessons of the British War Economy (1951), pp. 3-4, 37-3,
and W.K. Hancock and M.M. Gowing: British War Economy
(1949), p. 47.
4. R.S. Sayers: Financial Policy, 1939-45 (1956), p. 23.
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high level of Government expenditure, this would rapidly
produce high inflation - and in a time of high inflation
people would tend not to save and would thus withdraw
their capital from the war effort, channelling it instead
into inessential consumption.
The Stamp Survey's solution to this problem was to
suggest that in wartime the adjustment of wages should be
proportional to the rise in the cost of living - beyond a
certain minimum figure - only for the first £2 per week of
the income of the adult male wage-earner, with a lower
figure for women and juveniles, and less than proportional
2
to the rise in the cost of living for larger incomes.
However, the great drawback of this, Stamp realised, was
that a uniform figure of £2 per week would take no account
of differing family sizes, and hence differing financial
need. To be effective, a wages policy would have to be
related to family need, and thus the controversial question
of family allowances would have to be tackled. However,
Stamp warned, if introduced as a temporary measure in
wartime family allowances would undoubtedly become perman¬
ent; but at the same time this should not be used as
grounds for opposing what could be a vitally important
anti-inflation weapon. The best policy, he suggested,
1. Ibid., pp. 3-4. On pp. 1-22 Sayers gives an excellent
summary of the general problems of wartime finance.
2. Memorandum by Lord Stamp: Control of Prices, 26/10/39,
P.R.O. CAB. 89/22.
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would be for the Government to take the initiative and
introduce a family allowance system that would cost the
Exchequer as little as possible - either 'one run by
employers, or a contributory scheme linked to health or
unemployment insurance.
Within the Stamp Survey, H.D. Henderson seems to have
2
been the keenest advocate of family allowances; but the
strongest influence on the committee was from someone not
officially a member of it - J.M. Keynes. Keynes was a
close friend and colleague of Stamp, Henderson and Clay,
and thus it is not surprising that Hendersonfe interest in
family allowances as an anti-inflationary measure coincided
closely with Keynesideas on wartime finance. Soon after
the outbreak of the War Keynes began to clarify the theories
he had been working on since 1937. On the 20th October 1939
he gave a lecture to the Marshall Society at Cambridge on
'War Potential and War Finance'; four days later he sent
copies of his proposals to the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
Clement Attlee, R.H. Brand, Stamp, Henderson and the editor
of The Times; on the 27th October he outlined his ideas to
a dinner attended by civil servants, Ministers and M.P.s;
and on the 14th and 15th November he published two articles
■5
m The Times on 'Paying for the War'.
1. Memorandum by Lord Stamp: Wages and the Cost of Living,
30/11/39, P.R.O. T 161/1116 (S.43697/1). Stamp calculated
that contributions of 8d. per week each from employers,
employees and the State would yield an allowance of
3s.Od. to 4s.Od. per week per child.
2. Stamp's memorandum (ibid.) was based on one written by
Henderson on 20/11/39. P.R.O. CAB. 89/22.
3. Moggridge, op. cit., pp. 179-180. Roy Harrod:
The Life of John Maynard Keynes (1951), pp. 488-9.
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Keynes's ideas, which were finally published in
February 1940 in the short book How to Pay for the War,
were somewhat more detailed than those of the Stamp Survey.
As he saw it, voluntary savings by the general population
would never be sufficient to fill the gap between tax
revenue and expenditure on the war effort, and so the
Government would have to introduce some form of compulsory
borrowing. This was the rationale behind his plan for
'deferred pay': a levy would be made on wage packets which
would go towards the war effort and would only be paid back
once peace had returned. Whereas in the First World War
it was the profiteers and rich investors who made a financial
killing by lending money to the Government, Keynes envisaged
that under his plan it would be the ordinary wage-earner who
would emerge from the War richer; deferred pay, which could
be deposited in an institution of the individual's choice
p
(like a friendly society or trade union) would be, he hoped,
essentially "the accumulation of working-class wealth under
3
working-class control". However, alongside this general
reduction in consumption the lower income-groups would have
to have their living standards protected, via an agreed
minimum below which deferred pay would not be levied ana a
system of family allowances amounting to 5s.Od. per week per
child up to the age of fifteen.^ The overall effect of this,
1. J.M. Keynes: How to Pay for the War (1940), pp. 1-11.
2. Ibid., p. 43.
3. Ibid., p. iii.
4. Ibid., pp. 11, 32. Keynes also advocated the abolition
of income tax child allowances (p. 39).
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he believed, would be to increase the consumption of young
families with incomes less than 75s.Od. per week, to leave
unchanged the aggregate consumption of those with incomes
of about £5 per week, and to reduce the aggregate consumption
of those with incomes greater than £5 per week by about one-
third on average.
By 1939 Keynes was one of the most respected economists
in Britain. Many of his ex-Cambridge students were in the
2
Treasury and his ideas on wartime finance seem to have
aroused unanimous approval from fellow economists. However,
two factors prevented him from exerting official influence
within the Treasury at the start of the War. Firstly, as
a critic of the National Government in the 1930s he was not
exactly viewed with enthusiasm by Ministers, and it was only
with the fall of the Chamberlain Government in May 1940 that
Zi.
he was given a proper role to play. Secondly, a more
practical reason was that he was recovering from a serious
illness and could not take on too demanding work. For
both these reasons, he could only exert his influence
unofficially at the start of the War.
1. Ibid., p. 11.
2. Robert Lekachman: The Age of Keynes (1967), p. 124.
3. See F.A.- Hayek, reviewing How to Pay for the War in the
Economic Journal, 50, June-September 1940, p. 322.
4. It was only in July 1940 that Keynes was given a room
at the Treasury and a proper role as fulltime economic
adviser. Paul Addison: The Road to 1945 (1975), p. 117.
5. Roy Harrod in D.E. Moggridge (ed.): Keynes: Aspects of
the Man and His Work (1974), p. 14.
6. Keynes used all his contacts to get his ideas publicised.
For example, he arranged a debate 'in the House of Lords on
wartime finance to coincide with publication of
How to Pay for the War. Moggridge in Milo Keynes,
op. cit., p. 180.
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Keynes's unofficial influence on the Stamp Survey over
the question of family allowances was undoubtedly great.
On the 24th October 1939 he sent them a memorandum on his
proposals, which Stamp found so admirable that he urged
Keynes to publish it immediately so that civil servants,
politicians and the public could be made to realise that
their living standards would have to drop in wartime. A
few days later Stamp's committee discussed ways by which
declining living standards in wartime could be made to hit
the poorest sections of the community least of all, ana one
2
device for achieving this was family allowances. Through¬
out November and December the Survey worked on the possi¬
bility of family allowances, and while Sir Henry Clay
3
appears to have been rather opposed to the idea, both
Henderson and Stamp were strongly in favour.
The essence of the Stamp Survey's argument was that
since trade union demands for higher wages proportional to
the cost of living would depend for their justification on
the hardship suffered by the lowest income groups (especially
those with a large number of dependants), "the Government
could cut away this support for the trade union claim
completely by extending the system of national insurance to
4
cover family allowances". Rapid price rises were causing
1. Stamp to Keynes, 30/10/39, P.R.O. CAB. 89/22.
2. Conclusions of 30th Informal Meeting, 8/11/39, ibid.
3. See note by Clay: Family Allowances, 14/11/39, ibid.
4. Note by Lord Stamp: Differential Allowances for
Increases in the Cost of Living, 28/11/39, ibid.
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great hardship at the start of the war: taking September
1939 as an index of 100 for both wages and prices, by
December prices were 112 and wages 103, and by March 1940
prices were 115 and wages 108. In many industries trade
unions were pressing strongly for wage increases equal to
2
the rise in the cost of living, and in addition family
allowances were inevitably being suggested by Eleanor Rathbone
and her supporters as the remedy for this. Several large
industrialists had decided to meet trade union claims by
granting cost-of-living wage increases in relation to family
4
needs, and Stamp thought this should be encouraged. Ulti¬
mately, he believed, the aim should be to introduce a Keynes-
type economic policy which would include a family allowance
scheme run by contributory insurance; the Unemployment
Insurance Statutory Committee had been making a profit for
some time, and with low unemployment in wartime this would
increase: this profit could go towarcLs financing family
5
allowances. Family allowances as a means of wage control
were essential if a disastrous inflationary spiral was to be
avoided.
1. United Kingdom Statistical Office: Annual Abstract
of Statistics, No. 84, 1935-46 (1948), pp. 118, 252.
2. See, for example, the memorandum from the Directors
of I.C.I, to the Chancellor, 27/11/39, P.R.0. CAB. 89/22.
3. In early 1940, for example, there were requests for a
deputation to the Chancellor. Rathbone to T. Crookshank
(Treasury), 25/1/40, and to Kingsley Wood, 29/5/40;
Leo Amery to Wood, 18/4/40 and 28/5/40. P.R.0. T 161/1116
(S.43697/1).
4. Extract from Minutes of 11th Meeting of the Ministerial
Committee on Economic Policy, 7/12/39, P.R.0. CAB. 89/22.
5. Note by Lord Stamp, 28/11/39, op. cit.
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Although Keynes was by 1939 highly respected among
economists, Keynesian ideas were still regarded with
suspicion by the most senior of Treasury officials.
Nevertheless, the need for an anti-inflation policy was
very pressing, and thus throughout the 'phoney war' period
of September 1939 to May 1940 the Treasury began to sound
1
out opinion on family allowances.
First of all, the Treasury sought the opinions of
other Government Departments. The most important of these
was, of course, the Ministry of Labour, since it was the
Department most responsible for wages policy, and here the
Treasury immediately encountered opposition. The Minister
of Labour, Ernest Brown, said that he was personally
sympathetic to the idea of family allowances but was con-
p
vinced that the trade unions would oppose them. Civil
servants in the Ministry were suspicious of family allow¬
ances, and believed that T.U.C. opposition could never be
overcome. Stamp's proposal, one of them pointed out, viewed
family allowances "not so much as a general social improve¬
ment but as a means of buying off pressure for wage rises"
and since the unions were so opposed to them some other
method of wage-control would have to be found. Wages could
1. They also collected a large number of speeches and articles
on the subject. The relevant file, T 161/1116 (S.43697/1),
is very large.
2. Extract of Minutes of 11th Meeting of the Ministerial
Committee on Economic Policies, 7/12/39, op. cit. ~
3. F. Tribe (Ministry of Labour) to B. Gilbert (Treasury),
21/12/39, P.R.O. T 161/1116 (S.43697/1). Tribe was at the
Ministry of Labour and was personally in favour of family
allowances, though he realised that his Departmental
colleagues were generally opposed. Tribe to E. Hale
(Treasury), 30/4/40, ibid.
409
only be based on the skill of the worker, the Ministry
maintained, and not on family needs; neither arguments
about alleged child malnutrition in a small number of
families nor considerations of war finance were justi¬
fications for launching a massive new social policy that
1
would be bound to continue in peacetime. In an outburst
uncharacteristic of his Department's general attitude to
the working class but perhaps indicative of the strength
of their opposition, one Ministry of Labour official even
insisted that allowances would be wasted on "cinemas,
greyhounds, etc., like any other money coming into the
home".^
The Stamp Survey needed no reminding of the strength of
trade union opposition to their plans. At the start of the
War, trade union leaders (especially Ernest Bevin and
Sir Walter Citrine) were deeply distrustful of the
Chamberlain Government's willingness to distribute the
economic sacrifices of wartime equally over all classes;
at-the first meeting between the T.U.C. General Council and
the Prime Minister after the outbreak of the War Bevin had
insisted that the State would have to introduce strict price
controls, and when these were not forthcoming he took the
attitude that the working class henceforth had the right to
claim higher wages in the same way that industrialists were
1. Ministry of Labour Memorandum, 1-9/2/40, ibid.
2. Memorandum by F.W. Leggett, 7/2/40, ibid.
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being allowed high profits after taxation. In the eyes of
trade union leaders, Chamberlain and his Ministers were the
'guilty men' of unemployment, appeasement and laissez-faire
economics in the 1930s, and not to be trusted.
Included in this general distrust were the Stamp
proposals, and, realising that this trade union opposition
would have to be overcome, Stamp decided to use
Seebohm Rowntree as a mediator. Rowntree had taken an
interest in the problems of a wartime economy almost as
2
soon as the War broke out, and on the 5th December 1939
wrote to Stamp, enclosing a memorandum suggesting that price
controls should be accompanied by cost-of-living bonuses
on wages and family allowances of 5s.Od. per week for every
dependent child after the second. Stamp found Rowntree's
memorandum very interesting, and clearly hoped that as an
employer with a deep interest in social problems and the
welfare of workers Rowntree could be used to persuade both
unions and employers to accept wage control plus family
allowances. Accordingly, he met Rowntree and persuaded him
to send his memorandum to trade union leaders and employers'
L\.
organisations.
1. Alan Bullock: The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, Vol. I
(1960), pp. 644-5. The Ministry of Labour were
sympathetic to this view, and warned that the unions would
not accept a wages policy introduced without their
consent. Ernest Brown to Lord Stamp, 15/2/40, P.R.O.
CAB. 89/26.
2. See letter by Rowntree in The Times, 16/10/39.
3. Rowntree to Stamp, 5/12/39, P.R.O. CAB. 89/26.
4. Correspondence in ibid.
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Employers, apparently, reacted favourably. They were
being pressed by the unions to grant large wage rises equal
to the rise in the cost of living and expected the Government
to lay down guidelines for this, said Rowntree; he had
sent out copies of his memorandum to two hundred employers'
organisations in England and Wales and had received requests
2
for a further thousand copies. But trade union leaders
reacted angrily. In particular, Ernest Bevin (whose opinions
carried great weight in the trade union movement) wrote a
letter to Rowntree which is worth quoting extensively as a
vivid demonstration of trade union suspicion; after apolo¬
gising for the delay in replying, Bevin went on: "My time
has been taken up in trying to get wages commensurate with
the cost of living. I am determined to keep them up to a
proper level. The powers that be have won the first round
but that is only a temporary victory for them. As our people
sicken of this business they will revolt against the
depression of their standards. I disagree entirely with
your thesis and the answer to it is in the last paragraph.
4
No employer will make a sacrifice unless he is compelled to.
All the prices I have seen fixed, and the charges being made,
indicate that taxation and everything else is included and
the Employers rake off on the top, and in this farcical
state of society for one class to be trying to measure
5
another upon a fodder basis is intolerable".
1. Rowntree to Stamp, 10/1/40, ibid.
2. Rowntree to Stamp, 8/1/40, ibid.
3. Rowntree had suggested that employers should try to
keep selling prices down.
4. Rowntree had said that the initiative in introducing a
wage- and price-control would have to come from employers.
Rowntree to Bevin, 12/12/39, ibid.
5. Bevin to Rowntree, 29/12/39, ibid.
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Bevin's letter was passed around several Ministers and
officials, who finally realised the depth of trade union
opposition; Ernest Brown, for example, insisted that it
would be impossible to get any agreement on wage control
until workpeople clearly saw prices being held down.
Keynes found Bevin's letter "truly shocking", but said
that since Bevin's bark was often worse than his bite he
would try and see him personally and get him to change his
p
mind; and throughout late January and February 1940 there
were rather half-hearted suggestions about setting up a
joint conference of all sides to thrash the matter out.
Clearly, though, all concerned realised that a lot would
need to be done to win the confidence of the unions; indeed,
only a change of Government that removed the Chamberlainites
and brought in the Labour Party would have achieved this.
Their opposition to the Stamp proposals, therefore, was
caused by factors much more fundamental than dislike of just
family allowances.
'However, quite apart from this trade union opposition
there was a growing feeling inside the Treasury in the
early months of 1940 that a national family allowance scheme,
even if contributory, would end up as a very expensive social
reform and should therefore be resisted; in addition, since
price rises were flattening off, the Stamp proposals appeared
1. Brown to Stamp, 20/1/40, ibid.
2. Keynes to Stamp, 12/1/40, ibid.
3. Correspondence between Stamp and Brown in ibid.
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to hold less and less validity. The "real question",
argued Edward Hale (Treasury), was "whether the grant of
family allowances in any form will in practice make it
possible to avoid increases in wages which would otherwise
be unavoidable and which would cost more than the family
allowances", and by the spring of 1940 this was becoming
less and less likely. The cost would be enormous, and
introducing a national scheme would be "a job of the first
magnitude, both in the preparation of the necessary legis¬
lation and still more in its application. With the war at
its present stage it would be unthinkable to throw a burden
of this kind on the already hard-pressed Government machine";
the Chancellor should therefore tell Eleanor Rathbone and
Leo Amery that family allowances were impossible for the
p
moment. By September 1940 the Treasury could point to other
Government measures that were alleviating the worst of war¬
time hardship - extensions of services in kind to children,
food subsidies, rationing to ensure fair distribution, high
direct taxation - and the line they took with family allowance
supporters was that these immediate forms of assistance were
more effective in meeting urgent need than something like
family allowances which (even if accepted by the trade unions)
would take a long time to implement.
1. Memorandum by Hale, 29/4/40, P.R.O. T 161/1116 (S.43697/1).
2. Hale to B. Gilbert, 24/5/40, ibid.
3. Note by Francis Hemming (Treasury): Family Allowances,
3/9/40, P.R.O. CAB. 89/24. From July 1940 onwards, social
services to children were greatly extended. The provision
of school milk rose by 50%, and school meals by 100%.
R.M. Titmuss: Problems of Social Policy (1950), p. 509.
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Thus by about the middle ox 1940 the Treasury's
attitude had hardened into what it was to remain throughout
the remainder of the War: a determination to resist any
wartime scheme, in the hope that once peace returned the
arguments for family allowances would be greatly weakened.
Ironically, it was just around this time that there
occurred important political changes which, had they taken
place earlier, might have resulted in the implementation of
the Stamp family allowances scheme. In May 1940 the
Chamberlain Government was replaced by Churchill's Coalition,
and the entry into Ministerial office of the Labour leaders
Attlee, Bevin, Morrison, Cripps, Dalton and Greenwood meant
that the trade unions would henceforth be less suspicious of
Government proposals for family allowances since they now
knew their interests would be protected. The change of
Government brought in Kingsley Wood as Chancellor, and led
to the appointment of a special Consultative Council of
economists, businessmen, trade unionists, etc., which
included Henderson and Keynes. Keynes's official influence
on Government economic policy steadily increased after
May 1940, culminating in the 1941 budget.
In addition, the anti-inflation arguments for family
allowances- publicised by Keynes and others at the start of
1. A point stressed by Hilary Land: "The Introduction of
Family Allowances", in Hall, Land, Parker and Webb:
Change, Choice and Conflict in Social Policy (1975),
pp. 179-180.
2. Sayers, op. cit., p. 4p. Moggridge in Milo Keynes,
op. cit., p. 181.
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the War had breathed new life into Eleanor Rathbone's
campaign. Letters and articles on this theme were appearing
regularly in the Press: The Times in particular carried
several letters by well-known economists and others on the
need for family allowances in wartime economic policy.
The year 1940 saw renewed activity on the part of the
Family Endowment Society leaders and henceforth publications
began to appear more frequently, in contrast to the rather
2
barren years 1931-9 * Realising what was going on inside
the Treasury, Eleanor Rathbone and Leo Amery were sending
3
its officials a stream of persuasive information.
This renewed activity reached a peak in 1941, at which
point began the approximate second phase in the development
of family allowances in the Second World War.
The most significant feature of this period was the
change of attitude that took place within the labour movement.
In early 1941 meetings were held between the Labour Party
Policy Committee and the T.U.C. General Council's Economic
Committee and as a result the Labour Party National Executive
1. See letters to The Times by Rowntree on 20/11/39,
Amery on 14/12/39, L.J. Cadbury on 6/1/40, Lady Rhys Williams
and G.F. Goring on 6/1/40, Beveridge on 12/1/40 (and leader
article agreeing with Beveridge), Cadbury on 17/1/40 and
J.H. Richardson on 18/1/40; also article on "Family
Poverty" on 11/12/39.
2. Family Endowment Society: Family Allowances. The Case
for a National Scheme (1941*7*1 E. Rathbone: The Case for
the Immediate Introduction of a System of Family Allowances
(19A0) and The Case for Family Allowances (1940).
Eva Hubbackl Family Allowances To-day (1941) and
A New Plea for Family Allowances (1943). These repeated the
familiar arguments, but with a noticeably greater air of
confidence.
3. Contained in P.R.O. T 161/1116 (S.43697/1).
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prepared a memorandum on family allowances that was debated
at its Annual Conference in June 1941. In debate there was
still opposition from trade unionists on the wages question,
notably from Charles Dukes of the National Union of General
and Municipal Workers; but more speakers were in favour than
against, though it was stressed by Hugh Dalton that the memor-
1
andum was only a basis for discussion. A telling point in
the memorandum was that by 1941 there were so many existing
forms of family allowances - in the social services, war
pensions, service pay, income tax rebates, etc. - that
virtually the only group not receiving such benefits were -
2
those below income-tax level in civilian employment. This
was evidently unfair, and the memorandum therefore proposed
that a single family allowances scheme for all should replace
"5
these disparate forms of family endowment.
Later in 1941 (in September), an even more significant
event occurred when the T.U.C. Annual Conference re-opened
the question of family allowances for the first time since
1930. Proceeding with much the same caution as the Labour
Party, the T.U.C. General Council's Economic Committee had
recommended family allowances in principle, subject to the
1. Report of the Annual Conference of the Labour Party for
19^-1 , P~ 32"! The memorandum is in Appendix IV, pp. 189-193•
The debate is on pp. 166-9. The scheme envisaged was to be
tax-financed and would provide 5s.Od. per week for every
child of school age.
2. Ibid., p. 190.
3. Ibid., p. 191-2. This, it was estimated, would bring
the cost down from £127,000,000 to about £90,000,000. It
is important to note that the scheme envisaged the abolition
of income tax child allowances.
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proviso that any scheme should be tax-financed and run
by the State. In Conference, family allowances were
debated very briefly: two delegates spoke in favour,
emphasising the child malnutrition arguments, and then
with little comment the matter was remitted to the General
Council for further investigation; most remarkable of all,
there was very little concern expressed over the possible
2
effect on wage-bargaining. Clearly, with Labour Ministers
in the Government the unions felt much less suspicious that
family allowances would be forced upon them in a form that
would bring the most benefit to employers.
Interest was also being shown within the Conservative
Party. In April 1940 the Conservative Research Department,
evidently recognising the growing popularity of family
allowances, had composed a detailed forty-three page memor-
andum which they sent to the Chancellor. In addition, from
his Ministerial position as Secretary of State for India
U
Leo Amery was exerting his influence within the Government. '
And finally, it must be remembered that the extent of child
poverty revealed during the course of the evacuation programme
1. Annual Report of the Trades Union Congress for 1941,
PP. 183-4:
2. Ibid., pp. 372-6.
3. Joseph Ball (Conservative Research Department) to the
Chancellor, 25/4/40. In December 1939 the Executive
Committee of the Conservative Central Office had discussed
family allowances as a means of wartime wage control. See
correspondence between Eugene Ramsden (Central Office) and
Chamberlain, 15/12/39 and 24/12/39. P.R.O. T 161/1116
(S.43697/1).
4. For example, Amery to Wood, 10/9/41, P.R.O. T 161/1116
(S.43697/2).
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created a climate of opinion in 1940-1 that demanded
-i
more State measures to ensure the health of children.
Riding on this new wave of interest, the Family
Endowment Society leaders decided to concentrate all-out
on lobbying the Chancellor, Kingsley Wood. In February,
March and April of 1941, questions on family allowances
were put to Wood in the House of Commons, and on each
2
occasion he gave a reply that was discouragingly vague.
This, however, only goaded Eleanor Rathbone into greater
activity, and on the 29th April a motion was put down in the
Commons welcoming a national family allowances scheme, signed
by 152 M.P.s. Three days later she wrote to Wood, asking to
3
send a deputation.
By this time, the Treasury seem to have realised that
public and political pressure was growing at such a rate that
it would be very hard to resist demands for family allowances
in the long run. The best policy, they decided, would there¬
fore be to delay as much as possible in order to ensure that
the scheme would be a postwar one, limited in scope and low
in cost. Once peace returned, the movement for family allow¬
ances would probably lose much of its impetus; and in
1. A theme stressed in Titmuss, op. cit. Out of 31,000
children registered for evacuation in Newcastle, for
example, 13% were deficient in footwear and 21%
deficient in clothing. Ibid., p. 115.
2. Hansard. Vol. 369, 26/2/41, Col. 527. Ibid., Vol. 370,
27/3/41, Col. 702. Ibid., Vol. 371, 29/4/41, Col. 348.
3. Rathbone and Wright to Wood, 2/5/41, P.R.O. T 161/1116
(S.43697/2).
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addition it was important to avoid incurring "any permanent
commitments which may not prove to be within our capacity
after the war". Unless financed wholly by contributions from
workers (which would be a political non-starter) any wartime
scheme would be inflationary at the outset - and by May 1941
the Treasury wanted nothing to interfere with the delicate
economic stability they had been building over the previous
3
year. Besides, argued Kingsley Wood, the growing shortage
of labour was resulting in greater opportunities for well-
paid work and increased household income without any State
4
supplementation. However, Treasury officials realised that
there were arguments that would be difficult to refute -
notably that a large section of the population was receiving
family allowances anyway, through income tax rebates, service
pay allowances and in various social services - and to be
over-discouraging to Eleanor Rathbone's deputation might
provoke the pro-family allowance M.P.s into demanding a full
Commons debate, which would in the long run greatly aid their
5
cause.
Eleanor Rathbone's tactic at this time was to pester
the Chancellor with a series of technical questions on the
1. Memorandum by B. Gilbert, 14/5/41, ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. On the 7th April there had been introduced the budget
which was the cornerstone of wartime economic policy.
4. Note by Kingsley Wood, 7/6/41, ibid. The number of
insured unemployed fell from an average of 1,871,387
in 1938 to 233,508 in 1941. U.K. Central Statistical
Office: Annual Abstract of Statistics, No. 84, 1935-46
(1948), p. 114.
5. Memorandum by Gilbert, 14/5/41, op. cit.
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financial implications of a family allowances scheme, in
order to demonstrate that the cost would be greatly offset
by the abolition of child allowances in income tax, service
pay, war pensions, civilian widows' pensions, unemployment
benefit and assistance, public assistance and in allowances
for evacuated children. From April to July 1941 Kingsley Wood
was questioned on this, and eventually (after much prevari¬
cation) he gave the information that a universal 5s.Od.
allowance for each child under fifteen years of age would
cost £130 million, assuming no duplication with other allow¬
ances; child allowances in the social services amounted to
2
about £15 million per annum; and income tax child rebates
covered 4,000,000 taxpayers, with 5,500,000 children, at an
estimated cost of £50 million for the past year and £80 million
Zl
for the current year.
In pursuing their delaying tactics the Treasury were
suddenly blessed with a great stroke of luck. Just as they
were preparing to meet Eleanor Rathbone's deputation, the
Government announced the appointment of an inter-departmental
committee under Sir William Beveridge to look into the
5
reorganisation of the social services. The appointment of
1. Hansard, Vol. 371, 29/4/41, Col. 348 (question by
Eleanor Rathbone); ibid., 13/5/41, Col. 1076 (question
by Graham White); ibid., 20/5/41, Cols. 1395-6 (Rathbone);
ibid., 29/5/41, Cols. 1991-2 (Rathbone).
2. Ibid., Vol. 372, 12/6/41, Cols. 363-4.
3. Ibid., 3/7/41, Col. 1525.
4. Ibid., Vol. 373, 15/7/41, Col. 454.
5. The announcement of the Committee's appointment was made
on the 10th June 1941 in the House of Commons by
Arthur Greenwood, Minister Without Portfolio.
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this committee, whose Chairman was a convinced
Eleanor Rathbone supporter, ensured that henceforth
pressure would be taken off the Treasury on the awkward
question of family allowances. More importantly, since
the Beveridge Committee's terms of reference related
specifically to postwar reconstruction, its appointment
guaranteed that family allowances would never be introduced
in wartime.
Eleanor Rathbone's deputation met Kingsley Wood (and
representatives of other Departments) on the 16th June 1941.
It was technically led by Wing Commander John Cecil Wright
and, besides Eleanor Rathbone, consisted of six other M.P.s:
Clement Davies (National Liberal), Sir Francis Fremantle
(Conservative), Kenneth Lindsay (National Liberal),
John Parker (Labour), Wilfred Roberts (Liberal) and
Edith Summerskill (Labour). Wright opened the proceedings
and emphasised the wide support that family allowances now
enjoyed: 152 M.P.s from all parties had signed the recent
Commons motion, several Cabinet Ministers were favourable,
and from personal contact with trade unionists he believed
the T.U.C. were about to drop their long-held opposition.
Evacuation had revealed the extent of child poverty, he said,
and there was a good case for extending to low wage earners
the same benefits enjoyed by income tax payers with children.
Finally, he emphasised the pro-natalist arguments, saying
that he could not see "how we expect to build up the sort of
422
Empire that we hope to build up and maintain in the future
on a system which throws the whole burden.... on the poor man
who is raising a family". Other speakers emphasised more
arguments: the nutritional needs of children, the evidence
of poverty surveys, the increased economic dependency of
children if the school leaving age was raised, and (in
Eleanor Rathbone's case) more pro-natalist arguments that
were strongly imperialist and even racist. In the course of
a somewhat vague reply, Kingsley Wood agreed to set up an
enquiry but warned that it was by no means certain that money
1
spent on services in kind might not be more beneficial.
The Treasury enquiry was conducted by Edward Hale, and
was made as limited as possible. At no time was any pro¬
nouncement to be made for or against family allowances, since
this was a policy-decision that would have to be left to the
2
Cabinet. Hale was instructed simply to investigate the
practicality and cost of different family allowance schemes
that might be introduced; but this he evidently found
difficult, because "while there has been a good deal of
propaganda by Miss Rathbone and her friends there has been
no public controversy, so that if it is a question of
extracting arguments from pamphlets and reported speeches
the result would be quite one-sided". The most important
thing, however, was to seek the advice of other Government
Departments on these practical questions, and throughout the
period June to August 1941 Hale did this.
1. Note of Deputation, 16/6/41, P.R„0. PIN. 8/163.
2. Memorandum by B. Gilbert, 17/6/41, P.R.O. T 161/1116
(S.43697/2).
3. Hale to Gilbert, 29/10/41, P.R.O. T 161/1073 (S.43697/02/2).
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First of all, there was the question of whether the
scheme should be contributory or non-contributory. This,
the Treasury realised, was a very sensitive political issue
upon which might depend public acceptance or rejection.
Employers would want the former, unions the latter - and a
decision would have to be made on whom to please. In reality,
the Treasury well realised, such a distinction was largely
illusory since "in one sense, every scheme must be contri¬
butory. That is to say, in the long run someone must pay
for it". It was quite likely that in the postwar world
income tax would be greatly extended to cover the average
worker, and thus whether the scheme was financed by taxation
or weekly contributions the burden would still fall on the
working class. However, it had to be borne in mind that
"realisation of this fact may only come slowly the
popular view would be that there was a fundamental difference
2
between finance by contributions and finance by taxation".
Hale was reluctant to encourage this deception. "The idea
that the burden of the cost of any scheme of this kind could
be prevented by any method of finance from falling on the
working population", he wrote, "is an illusion which it
would be wrong to encourage. It may be that labour opposition
to family allowances could be bought off by a non-contributory
scheme but it is impossible to give an increased share of the
cake to the worker with children except by reducing that of
1. E.C. Lester (Treasury) to Hale, 4/7/41, P.R.O. T 161/1073
(S.43697/02/1).
2. Memorandum by B. Gilbert, 17/6/41, op. cit.
424
the worker without children. A contributory scheme has
the merit that it recognises and bases itself on this
-]
inescapable economic fact."
However, any decision on this would have to take into
account a second problem - the relationship between family
allowances and income tax rebates for children. The Family
Endowment Society were making much of this anomaly of 'child
allowances for the rich but none for the poor' and it was
something that the Treasury would have to settle. It might
be possible to introduce a system whereby parents could have
the first £13 per annum per child as either tax relief or
family allowance, but not both; however, this arrangement
would involve enormous administrative problems, not the
least of which was the fact that income tax was collected
in arrears and therefore a year would elapse before eligi-
2
bility could be assessed. A further dilemma, Hale main¬
tained, was that a scheme which gave cash allowances to upper
income-groups without imposing a means test would be very
unpopular, yet a means test would be even less popular.
Both these administrative problems were tied in with
a third - the scope of the scheme. Income tax rebates
covered the first child, so family allowances should too;
1. Memorandum by E. Hale: Family Allowances, 19/8/41,
P.R.O. T 161/1073 (S.43697/02/1).
2. Ibid.
3. Hale to S.P. Chambers (inland Revenue), 8/7/41, ibid.
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but the Treasury realised the amounts that could be saved
if the scope was limited. Excluding the first child would
lower the cost of a 5s.Od. weekly allowance from about
£132,000,000 to about £58,000,000 per annum, and starting
with the third child would make it only about £23,000,000.
Support for a restricted scheme came from Sir George Reid
of the Assistance Board (who was also serving on the
Beveridge Committee at the time). Reid insisted that most
wages were sufficient to meet the needs of two or three
children; any scheme should therefore start with the third
child, should be contributory, and limited to those with
2
incomes below £420 per annum. "The suggestion that family
allowances should include all children", he wrote, "is due,
I feel, to a muddled pre-occupation with very low rates of
wages, for which family allowances are not the appropriate
remedy at all".
Even stronger opposition came from the Board of
Education over the question of whether money spent on cash
allowances might not be better allocated to services in
kind. The Board were jealously protective of their tradi¬
tional role as guardians of the health of schoolchildren,
and insisted that the only way of ensuring that the money
reached the child was to provide extended free milk and
1. Family Allowances: Memorandum by the Chancellor of
the Exchequer, Cmd. 6354, May 19^2, p. 7.
2. Reid to Hale, 12/8/41, P.R.O. T 161/1073 (S.43697/02/1).
3. Memorandum by Reid, 1/5/42, P.R.O. T 161/1073 (S.43697/02/2).
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1
meals schemes. "I feel sure", minuted, the Board's new
President, R.A. Butler, "that if we are out to improve the
conditions of childhood the most effective way of doing so
would be to provide free meals, free milk and free boots and
2
clothing for all children who satisfy an income test". The
Board pressed this view strongly, and finally succeeded in
having the 1942 White Paper remind the reader five times that
the same amount of money might well be better spent on child
welfare services.
Fourthly, there was the question of administration
and staffing. If paid through their branches, the Post Office
would need extra staff and accommodation - and these might
Zi
be very hard to obtain in wartime. If introduced on a
contributory basis, family allowances would have to be
grafted onto the health insurance and pensions administration
at Blackpool, where the supply of clerical labour had already
been exhausted; the additional administration of claims for
5
2,250,000 children would be impossible.
1. D. Davidson (Board of Education) to Hale, 19/8/41,
P.R.O. T 161/1073 (S.43697/02/1).
2. Butler to Kingsley Wood, 21/10/41, ibid. In addition,
Lord Woolton (Minister of Food) wanted an undertaking that
the introduction of family allowances would not mean a cut¬
back in school milk and meals. Woolton to Wood, 17/10/41,
ibid.
3. Family Allowances: Memorandum by the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, Cmd. 6354, May 1942, paras. 2, 4, 5, 9 and 26.
4. D.J. Lidbury (Post Office) to R.J. Harvey (Treasury),
24/7/41, P.R.O. T 161/1073 (S.43697/02/1).
5. Memorandum by E. Hale: Family Allowances, 19/8/41, ibid.
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This raised a final problem - the date upon which the
scheme should commence. Hale argued that the administrative
difficulties were so great that family allowances could only
be introduced after the War; no makeshift scheme should be
introduced until the Beveridge Committee had reported; and
cash allowances might exacerbate wartime inflation since
"a considerable proportion of the money will be wasted by
bad housekeeping or spent by the parents on themselves....
in time of war we cannot afford to incur expenditure in such
a way that part of it will be wasted, aggravating the already
dangerous inflationary tendency". Gilbert also argued that
family allowances, if introduced, should only be considered
2
as part of a reorganised postwar system of social security.
However, a promise was a promise and Kingsley Wood was
duty bound to publish some sort of official report in response
to Eleanor Rathbone's deputation. On the 4th September he
decided to prepare a draft White Paper and circulate it round
relevant Cabinet Ministers for comment. This was done in
October, and their criticisms incorporated in a second draft,
-z
which was again circulated. Clement Atlee (Lord Privy Seal),
Ernest Brown (Minister of Health), Ernest Bevin (Minister of
Labour) and R.A. Butler (President of the Board of Education)
were all against the publication of a White Paper on family
1. Ibid.
2. Gilbert to Sir Horace Wilson, 20/8/41, ibid.
3. Correspondence in ibid.
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1
allowances, "but Kingsley Wood decided that he would have
2
to do so. Accordingly, more consultation and re-drafting
was undertaken from October 1941 onwards, and eventually in
May 1942 (after several questions in the Commons from M.P.s)^
the White Paper was published.
It could hardly have been a less encouraging document,
and constantly reminded the public that no attempt was being
made to pre-judge the validity of the arguments for or
against family allowances. After summarising briefly the case
for (child poverty in large families, increasing wages without
causing inflation, counteracting the birth rate decline, the
anomaly of child tax allowances) and the case against (the
effect on wage negotiations, the greater need for services
\ 4
in kind), it went on to consider the relative merits of
a contributory or non-contributory scheme, and was distinctly
lukewarm towards both, emphasising at every stage the aamini-
strative problems. Even on such a question as payment to
the mother, for example, which was a vitally important
principle to the Family Endowment Society, the White Paper
was unenthusiastic, merely saying that "to whichever parent
payment were made there would be no possibility of ensuring
1. Memorandum by Sir Horace Wilson, 24/10/41, P.R.O.
T 161/1073 (S.43697/02/2).
2. Hale to Gilbert, 29/10/41, ibid,
3. Hansard. Vol. 377, 20/1/42, Cols. 246-7. Ibid., Vol.
378, 26/3/41, Col. 2149. Ibid., Vol. 379, 21/4/41,
Col. 480, and 5/5/41, Col. 1203.
4. Family Allowances: Memorandum by the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, Cmd. 6345, May 1942, p. T.
5. Ibid., pp. 4-6.
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that the additional income was properly spent. If it
were considered necessary to ensure this, it could only
he done by the direct provision in kind of such things
as food, clothing and boots". Finally, there was an
outline of the costs of various schemes, such as the
linking of a non-contributory scheme with the income tax
system.^
The discouraging tone of the White Paper greatly
disappointed family allowance supporters. Its emphasis
on an income limit and, therefore, means-testing, seemed
to Wing Commander Wright to smack of a 'soup kitchen'
approach to the problem of family poverty; if the payment
of allowances was dependent upon a means test then many
"5
parents would be deterred from applying, he maintained.
Eleanor Rathbone expressed apprehension that the Treasury
were trying to delay matters until after the War when
i±
Parliament might be less concerned with social reform.
Thus when the Commons debated family allowances on
June 23rd 1942 she and her supporters made sure a motion
was passed by the House urging the Government to give
"immediate consideration" to the question of a national
5
scheme. Kingsley Wood agreed to this, subject to three
1. Ibid., p. 7.
2. Ibid., op. 7-11.
3. Hansard. Vol. 380, 23/6/42, Col. 1859.
4. Ibid., Col. 1863.
5. Ibid., Col. 1944.
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conditions which, he said, would probably be clarified
by the autumn: the recommendation of family allowances in
the Beveridge Report, a favourable decision by the T.U.C.
Annual Conference, and the nation's financial position.
Soon after the White Paper had been published,
Kingsley Wood recommended to his Ministerial colleagues
that the Government delay any decision on family allowances
2
until the Beveridge Committee had reported, and this was
the Treasury's official view for the next seven months.
Within the Government, however, there was growing opposition
towards family allowances from civil servants who argued that
services in kind would be less wasteful. In particular, the
Ministry of Food suggested that, if introduced, part of the
family allowance could be paid in the form of a food allow-
•3
ance, and expressed fears that cash payments might raise
food consumption to such an extent as to impose a serious
4
burden on supplies. Discussion on the question of 'cash
versus kind' took place within the Treasury in the summer
of 1942, and civil servants evidently felt irritated that
family allowance supporters had not given this much thought:
"So far as I can unravel the confusion of thought in the
minds of the Family Endowment Society", wrote Hale, "they
5
tend rather to the second point of view and trust that by
1. Ibid., Col. 1941.
2. Memorandum bv the Chancellor to the Lord President's
Committee, 29/3/42, P.R.O. T 161/1116 (S.43697/3).
3. Lord Woolton to Wood, 4/5/42, ibid.
4. C.H. Blagburn (Ministry of Food) to G.S. Dunnett
(Treasury), 15/5/42, ibid.
5. i.e. that allowances should be in cash.
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labelling the payment "family allowance" and giving it
to the mother, they can cause it to have a different effect
on the family budget from that of an increase of the same
amount in the wage earner's income - which I don't believe".
Clearly, Treasury officials were wondering if this point could
be used as an argument against family allowances: the
Government was already committed to an expansion of services
in kind for children, and (providing this cost less than a
family allowance scheme) it might be possible to expand
these services even further and thus stave off pressure for
2
cash allowances. As will be seen, this later became the
basis of the Treasury's successful campaign to reduce the
amount of the Beveridge-recommended family allowance system.
The summer of 1942 is a convenient point at which to
end this survey of the second phase in the development of
family allowances in the Second World War. In this period,
public support for Eleanor Rathbone's cause grew rapidly, and
in response to this the White Paper was rather reluctantly
published by the Government. At the same time, however, the
Treasury's determination to delay family allowances until
after the War was greatly aided by the appointment of the
Beveridge Committee, and therefore this second period had a
certain air of unreality about it, since for much of it all
concerned were waiting for the Beveridge Report to be
published. The third phase of development, therefore, was
connected with the work of the Beveridge Committee and its
recommendation of family allowances.
1. Hale to Gilbert, 5/6/42, ibid.
2. E.C. Lester (Treasury) to Hale, 11/8/42, ibid.
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The Beveridge Committee was set up as part of the
Government's overall plans for postwar reconstruction. As
early as December 1940, at a very uncertain stage in the
War, Churchill had decided to launch a study of postwar
problems, and put Arthur Greenwood, Minister Without
1
Portfolio, in charge of this. Rather than establishing
a Ministry of Reconstruction, Greenwood was instructed to
appoint a Ministerial Committee on Reconstruction Problems,
and this was done on the 24th February 1941.
Greenwood was very keen to get this Committee to
recommend family allowances as part of a general social
services reorganisation after the War, and in January 1941
the civil servants who were laying the foundations of this
new reconstruction programme began to collect relevant
material from other Departments, including that left by
the Stamp Survey. "I think that the case for the immediate
introduction of a system of family allowances is won with
the general public", one of them minuted, suggesting that
after consultation with other Departments a scheme should
be drawn up and presented to the Cabinet as quickly as
4
possible.
1. "The general aim will be to obtain a body of practical
proposals which will command broadly the support of the
main elements in all the political parties", wrote
Churchill. Minute by Churchill: Study of Post-War
Problems, 30/12/40, P.R.O. PREM. 4 (88/1).
2. See material in ibid.
3. Greenwood to Sir George Chrystal, 23/1/41, P.R.O.
PIN. 8/163.
4. S.B.R. Cooke to Sir George Chrystal, 27/1/41, ibid.
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The subject of family allowances, however, soon
became absorbed into the much wider problem of social
security reconstruction. Ernest Bevin was particularly
concerned to overhaul workmen's compensation, a Royal
Commission on which had been appointed in 1938 but done
2
little work since the outbreak of the War. Accordingly,
in April 1941 discussions were held on the appointment of
an inter-departmental committee primarily to investigate
the reorganisation of workmen's compensation and health
insurance. However, by the time that Beveridge was
appointed Chairman in early June, the scope of the
investigation had widened, and the terms of reference
required the inter-departmental committee "to undertake,
with special reference to the inter-relation of the schemes,
a survey of the existing national schemes of social insurance
and allied services, including workmen's compensation, and
4
to make recommendations".
Those last four words in the terms of reference were
vital to the subsequent history of the Beveridge Report, for
by his interpretation of them Beveridge transformed what
might have been a drily factual survey of existing services
into the most famous single document in the history of
British social policy.
1. Memorandum of 16/5/41, P.R.O. PIN. 8/85.
2. For a comprehensive account of this, see Helen Bolderson:
Compensation, Maintenance and Rehabilitation; the
conflict in British policies for the disabled, 1914-1946.
(Unpublished University of London (L.S.E.) Ph.D. thesis,
1976), pp. 215-223.
3. Letters, etc., in P.R.O. PIN. 8/85. The original chairman
was to have been Sir Hector Hetherington, who had led the
1938 Royal Commission.
4. Social Insurance and Allied Services, Cmd. 6404, 1942,
(Beveridge Report), p. 2.
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At the start of the War, Beveridge had "been one of
several distinguished economists (the others being
Sir Walter Layton and Sir Arthur Salter) who had held
important civil service roles in the First World War,
1
yet were not being adequately employed by the Government.
But in June 1940 he had been asked by Ernest Bevin to take
charge of a fairly unimportant man-power survey, and had
2
reluctantly accepted. Beveridge was not a modest man, and
3
could be very difficult to work with: evidently he aroused
a good deal of resentment and hostility among Ministry of
Labour civil servants, and Bevin found him a most uncongenial
4
colleague. Thus when the question arose of who should lead
the proposed new social insurance committee, Bevin thankfully
seized the opportunity to despatch Beveridge elsewhere, and
5
eagerly recommended him to Greenwood.
Initially, Beveridge was most resentful at being
shunted off into what appeared an administrative backwater.
Although appointed in June 1941, he had been kept busy at
his other tasks, and only after December was he able to
devote much time to the social insurance enquiry. There¬
after, he gradually realised the full potential of what he
1. Addison, op. cit., p. 64.
2. Lord Beveridge: Power and Influence (1953), p. 274.
3. Hugh Dalton, for example, found him "full of egoism and
petulance.... a most tiresome man". Dalton Diaries,
Vol. 26, 8/5/42.
4. Addison, op. cit., p. 117.
5. Alan Bullock: The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin,
Volume II (1967), p. 225.
6. Beveridge, op. cit., pp. 297-8.
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was working on: the Report could be the summation of a
lifetime's interest in social policy, and could make
amends for the shabby way he had been treated by Bevin
and others. By June 1942 he was totally absorbed in the
work of the Committee, and had decided that the Report was
1
going to be "quite revolutionary".
Beveridge evidently ran the Committee with a firm
hand, and on several important policy-matters he relegated
2
the Committee to something of a rubber-stamp. One of these
issues was family allowances: from his experiences in
dealing with the problem of the benefit-wages overlap in
the U.I.S.C., Beveridge had become convinced that family
allowances in wages would have to be part of a postwar
reorganised social security system in order to ensure work-
incentives and labour mobility. Thus there was never any
doubt that family allowances would be recommended, and the
Committee's discussions reflected this. The first meeting
1. Comment to Hugh Dalton, Dalton Diaries, Vol. 26, 5/6/42.
2. This, of course, resulted in the incident where, because
of the number of policy decisions made in the Report,
the civil servants on the Committee were instructed by
the Government not to sign the Report and instead have
themselves relegated to the status of "assessors".
Beveridge Report, pp. 19-20. Evidently, other civil
servants resented Beveridge's way of working. The
Report was to have contained a statement that the various
Government Departments "have given their views within the
Committee frankly", but at the Treasury's insistence this
was removed, and the final published version (p. 20) gives
a very subdued version. On this point Hale complained that
"Departments all felt - this was certainly the case with
the Treasury - that the time available was insufficient
for an adequate Departmental examination of issues
involving the whole structure of the social services".
Hale to Beveridge, 2/10/42, P.R.O. PIN. 8/87.
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was held on the 8th July 1941 and family allowances were
mentioned in the memorandum Social Insurance - General
Considerations (July 1941); but no reference to them was
made thereafter until the sixth meeting, on the 17th December,
and even then the Committee merely agreed to ask the Treasury
for details of cost and administration. Six days earlier,
on the 11th December, Beveridge had circulated to the
Committee the memorandum Basic Problems of Social Security
with Heads of a Scheme in which he outlined the 'less
eligibility case' for family allowances: "It is unreason¬
able to provide against want during interruption of earnings,
without removing the main cause of want during earnings -
namely, responsibility for the maintenance of dependent
children without resources specially allocated for that
purpose. Allowances designed as a guarantee against want
during interruption of earnings must take account of the
family responsibilities of the recipient. If they do so,
they are bound in an appreciable number of cases to be equal
to or greater than the earnings of the recipient, thus pro¬
ducing an indefensible position of penalising children if,
and because, their father returns to work or good health.
No satisfactory social security scheme can be framed except
2
on the basis of universal children's allowances". In the
face of this unequivocal statement, the Committee could
hardly have raised a note of dissent, even if they had
wanted to.
1. S.I.C. (41) 6th meeting, P.R.O. CAB. 87/76.
2. Contained in ibid.
3. Beveridge later wrote that "once this memorandum had
been circulated, the Committee had their objectives
settled for them and discussion was reduced to
consideration of means of obtaining that objective".
Beveridge, op. cit., p. 298.
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Thereafter, discussion of family allowances centred
on administrative details. Since there was, according to
Beveridge, "no need to argue the general case for family
allowances", the only points at issue were such questions
as whether allowances should vary with the age of the child,
what age limit there should be, what should be done in the
case of broken homes, and so on.
Thus when the Family Endowment Society submitted
written evidence to the Committee, and sent a deputation
on the 2nd June 1942, they found that the Committee only
wanted to discuss administrative problems. This was rather
awkward, since on such points the Society had no clear
policy. In their oral evidence, Eleanor Rathbone and
Eva Hubback emphasised that since the Society's chief aim
had always been to campaign for the principle of family
endowment to be accepted, questions such as whether levels
of allowances should vary according to the amount of rent
2
paid by the household could not be answered by them.
However, there was one administrative detail on which
Eleanor Rathbone and Eva Hubback disagreed, and this was
the question of whether income tax child rebates should be
1. Family Endowment Society, Notes for Examination,
memorandum by Beveridge, 1/6/42, Beveridge Papers VIII. 39.
Other memoranda on administrative problems are contained
herein.
2. The Society's written evidence and the memorandum on
their meeting with the Committee are contained in
P.R.O. PIN.. 17/1.
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abolished. Eva Hubback wanted this done once a family-
allowance scheme had been introduced, and maintained that
such rebates were just as much a form of State assistance
as cash allowances: a man earning £15 per week, she pointed
out, received the generous amount of 9s.7d. per week per
1
child in tax relief. Eleanor Rathbone disagreed, though:
both in her meeting with the Committee and in a memorandum
written by her and sent to Beveridge she argued that both
systems should exist together. Child tax rebates should be
retained, she declared, because of the need to stimulate
the birth rate of the professional classes and because of
the administrative complexities of abolishing such rebates.
With curious logic she suggested that the apparent injustice
of retaining the two systems could be countered "if the
taxation system were so adjusted and explained as to make
it clear that the well-to-do were paying for the benefits
they enjoy, so that the extra cost of giving them the benefit
of both schemes really represented not an addition to the
State burden, but a 'transfer of a fraction of the resources
of those who have no dependent children to those who have
2
such responsibilities' ". It was an important issue, and
one which was much more than a mere administrative detail,
but Beveridge merely shelved the issue by declaring that
the question of tax rebates was outwith his Committee's
1. Ibid.
2. Notes on the Cost of Alternative Schemes of State-paid
Allowances, memorandum by E. Rathbone, 19/5/42,




The most important question to be settled was the
level of the family allowance, and in deciding this Beveridge
enlisted the advice of the special sub-committee (consisting
of Seebohm Rowntree, R.F. George, Professor A.L. Bowley and
Dr. H.E. Magee) which had been set up to calculate minimum
subsistence. The 'subsistence principle' was an important
feature of the Report, and was said to be based on the
2
evidence of the poverty surveys of the previous two decades.
Repeatedly, Beveridge acknowledged the influence of the
"impartial scientific authorities" who had "made social
surveys of the conditions of life in a number of principal
towns in Britain" before the War, and who had "determined
the proportions of the people in each town whose means were
3
below the standard assumed to be necessary for subsistence".
Ostensibly, therefore, all benefits, including family allow¬
ances, were calculated according to scientific minimum
subsistence.
However, matters were a little more complex than this.
The ideal to be aimed at was benefit levels which were fixed
at a subsistence level "by reference to reasoned estimates
1. Memorandum of Meeting between Beveridge Committee and
Family Endowment Society, op. cit. In an earlier
memorandum, Beveridge had briefly considered the
question of tax allowances, but had not shown any
desire to recommend their abolition. Note on Family
Allowances, 19/5/42, Beveridge Papers VIII. 39.
2. Beveridge Report, pp. 76-90, 165-6. Janet Beveridge:
Beveridge and His Plan (1954), pp. 107-8.
3. Beveridge Report, p. 7.
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of the cost of providing housing, food, clothing, fuel
-1
and other necessaries". But there were three factors
which, according to Beveridge, might cause "benefits to be
fixed at a level below subsistence. The first was the
financial resources of the nation. The second was the
possible effect on voluntary insurance through friendly
2
societies and the like; as a great believer in voluntary
enterprise, Beveridge wanted his social security system
to encourage individual thrift and self-reliance. The
third was the most important of all: "the possible effect
on the readiness of recipients to take employment in prefer¬
ence to benefit.... While most men can be trusted to prefer
work to idleness even when there is little financial differ¬
ence between wages and benefit, there is a danger that
benefits up to subsistence level will weaken the incentive
of men to take employment and their readiness to take
4
unfamiliar employment or employment at a distance".
1 . S.I.C. (42) 3. The Scale of Social Insurance Benefits
and the Problem of Poverty. Memorandum by the Chairman,
16/1/42, p. T. Beveridge Papers VIII. 28. '
2. Ibid., p. 16.
3. "The State in organising security should not stifle
incentive, opportunity, responsibility; in establishing
a national minimum, it should leave room and encouragement
for voluntary action by each individual to provide more
than that minimum for himself and his family."
Beveridge Report, p. 7.
4. The Scale of Social Insurance Benefits, etc., op. cit.,
p^ 16-17. Beveridge added (p. 17): "In respect of
unemployment insurance this means that the conditions
governing receipt of benefit and the terms upon which
offers of employment may be refused need careful
examination, if the benefits are to be substantially
improved".
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There is no doubt that the minimum subsistence
sub-committee worked very hard at calculating a scientific
-i
basis for minimum needs. But there is equally no doubt
that at the back of their minds was the decidedly unscientific
consideration that benefits had to be kept below wage levels.
Early on, the Committee's Secretary, D.N. Chester, warned
that to fix benefits too high would reduce incentives to
voluntary saving and would result in an overlap onto wages;
however, if on the other hand the standard arrived at was
too low, he warned that this "would raise the much wider
question of minimum wages and the raising of the standard
2
of living of the working classes". The members of the
sub-committee clearly were aware of this dilemma: Rowntree,
for instance, declared on one occasion that "in arriving at
the amount of benefit to be paid to unemployed persons it
would in our opinion be unjustifiable to allow for a dietary
more costly than can be afforded by a large proportion of
working-class families when the chief wage earner is in
work".
The way out of this difficulty was through the
provision of family allowances: "a system of universal
family allowances would allow benefits for adults to be
increased considerably above subsistence level without
seriously conflicting with wages. But if there is no
1. See material in Beveridge papers VIII. 28.
2. Memorandum on Fixing Rates of Benefit by D.N. Chester,
5/1/42, Beveridge Papers VIII. 27.
3. Memorandum on Calculation of the Poverty Line - Food
Requirements by B.S. Rowntree (n.d., probably early 1942),
Beveridge Papers VIII. 28.
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universal system of family allowances even the payment
of benefits on subsistence level would be above the lowest
level of wages".
Beveridge undoubtedly saw family allowances as a
valuable means of combating family poverty and removing
economic obstacles to parenthood. The poverty surveys of
the previous two decades had demonstrated that the two
chief causes of poverty were interruption of earning power
and large families, he maintained, and quoted statistics
2
from these surveys to verify the latter point. Following
Eleanor Rathbone, he argued against the family-of-five
minimum wage concept as being both wasteful and insufficient
in relation to varying family needs: "Raising of wages has
proved to be no cure for poverty", he confidently asserted;
"But the rise of wages that has taken place makes it certain
that we are rich enough to abolish poverty if we decide to
"5
do so, by a suitable moderate re-distribution of income".
Family allowances would effect such a moderate redistribution
from the childless to the parents within classes and would
alleviate the worst family poverty. Similarly, on the
question of encouraging parenthood, Beveridge realised that
"it is not likely that allowances for children or any other
economic incentives will, by themselves, provide that means
1. Fixing Rates of Benefit, op. cit.
2. Beveridge Report, pp. 7-8.
3. Scale of Social Insurance Benefits, etc., op. cit., p. 8.
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/of raising the "birth rate7 and lead parents who do not
desire children to rear children for gain", but maintained
that "children's allowances can help to .restore the birth
rate, both by making it possible for parents who desire more
children to bring them into the world without damaging the
chances of those already born, and as a signal of the national
1
interest in children, setting the tone of public opinion".
Ostensibly, Beveridge arrived at his family allowance
level by calculating the cost of maintaining a child: this,
2
at 1938 prices, amounted to 7s.Od. per week on average, which,
with additions for the rise in the cost of living since 1938,
resulted in a figure of 9s.Od. per week. From this, he
deducted 1s.0d. in respect of services in kind for children
that would be provided by the State. However, this could
easily be criticised as nothing like a realistic figure: on
the Boyd Orr standard, for example, the sum would have had
to be about I4s.0d.^ The suspicion must remain that although
Beveridge certainly saw family allowances as combating family
poverty and encouraging parenthood, it was their less eligi¬
bility function that appealed to him most, and it was also
on these grounds that the figure of 8s.Od. per week was chosen.
1. Beveridge Report, p. 154.
2. Memorandum by Beveridge: Subsistence Needs and Benefit
Rates, 14/8/42, Beveridge Papers VIII. 28.
3. Beveridge Report, p. 90.
4. Hugh Lawson in Hansard, Vol. 408, 8/3/45, Col. 2339.
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Proof of this can be found in the discussion that took
place in the summer of 1942 with the Treasury on the cost
of the Beveridge scheme. They had been increasingly concerned
over the extra public expenditure proposed, and various
informal discussions took place between Beveridge and such
economic advisers as Keynes and Professor Robbins on possible
reductions. In one such meeting, for example, economies on
family allowances were discussed: Robbins said he favoured
a family allowance system as a means of reducing poverty "and
because, by widening the gap between benefit and wages, it
would produce a greater mobility of labour"; Beveridge said
that if an economy had to be made, and the first child had
to be excluded, it would still leave a sufficient gap between
2
benefit and wages.
As these discussions progressed, exclusion of the first
child was more and more frequently mentioned. On the
22nd July a meeting was held at the Treasury at which it was
pointed out that the Beveridge scheme would cost about
£800 million at postwar prices, which was too high; one
of the economies proposed was the exclusion of the first child
L\.
from the family allowance scheme. Matters came to a head
1. Janet Beveridge, op. cit., p. 6.
2. S.I.C. (42) 21st meeting, 24/6/42, P.R.O. CAB 87/78.
3. Eleanor Rathbone had suggested this as a possible economy
measure (which still insisting that child tax rebates
should be retained) in her memorandum to Beveridge.
Notes on the Cost of Alternative Schemes of State-paid
Allowances, op. cit.
4. Memorandum on meeting at the Treasury, 22/7/42, P.R.O.
PIN 8/87. At this meeting, Keynes suggested that Beveridge
should write his Report in two parts: "the first part
would set out the ideal to be aimed at, the second would
indicate the lines on which progress to that goal could be
reached by stages on various assumptions as to the money
available".
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in August, and were settled by a 'deal' between Keynes
and Beveridge whereby Keynes promised to support the Report
(and thus win the Treasury over) in return for which
Beveridge agreed to keep the additional burden on the
Treasury down to £100 million per annum for the first
five years.
Accordingly, Beveridge made a number of economies in
his scheme, one of which was the exclusion of the first
child and the fixing of allowances at 8s.Od. per week for
the rest; this reduced the cost of family allowances from
£163 million to £110 million. The interesting point to
note, however, is that Beveridge refused to reduce family
allowances any more than this, on the grounds that such a
reduction would destroy their effectiveness as an agent
of less eligibility. For example, he pointed out to his
Committee that it might be possible to limit the 8s.Od.
allowance to children of parents who were on benefit and
to give, say, only 6s.Od. to the second and subsequent
children of parents who were earning; but he warned that
"the main objection is that /this/ narrows the gap between
earnings and benefit income". Alternatively, £23 million
could be saved by reducing allowances to 4s.Od. per week
for each child after the first where the parent was earning.
"If the sole object of family allowances were the abolition
1. Lord Beveridge: Power and Influence (1953), p. 309.
2. Memorandum by the Chairman: Revision of S.I.C. (42) 100
to 24/8/42, 28/8/42, Beveridge Pacers VIII. 27.
3. Ibid.
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of want", he wrote, "then such a saving might be worth
consideration. But in my view it would be wrong for two
other reasons: as narrowing the gap between earnings and
benefit and.... in order to improve both the quality and
quantity of the population".
In the published version of the Report, Beveridge
was quite frank about his reasons for recommending family
allowances. Children's allowances were 'Assumption A'
of his plan, without which it could not work, because
"first, it is unreasonable to seek to guarantee an income
sufficient for subsistence, while earnings are interrupted
by unemployment or disability, without ensuring sufficient
income during earning.... Second, it is dangerous to allow
benefit during unemployment or disability to equal or exceed
earnings during work The maintenance of employment -
last and most important of the three assumptions of social
security - will be impossible without greater fluidity of
labour and other resources in the aftermath of war than has
been achieved in the past. To secure this, the gap between
income during earning and during interruption of earning
should be as large as possible for every man. It cannot
be kept large for men with large families, except either
by making their benefit in unemployment and disability
inadequate, or by giving allowances for children in time of
2
earning and not-earning alike".
1. W.H. Beveridge: The Pillars of Security (1943), p. 125.
2. Beveridge Report, p. 154.
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This was a classic restatement of the dilemma
experienced by the U.I.S.C. and U.A.B. in the late 1930s,
and Beveridge's solution to it was that proposed by most of
the social investigators of those years: family allowances
were an alternative to much more radical and expensive
wage-rises, and would push up the wages of married men just
enough to ensure the labour mobility and work-incentives
necessary to the successful working of a postwar economy.
Compared to this overriding consideration, arguments about
child poverty or encouraging parenthood were of secondary
importance, and the amount of space given to each in the
1
Report reflected this.
While the Beveridge Committee were conducting their
work, the labour movement was finally coming round to a
wholehearted approval of family allowances. At the Labour
Party Conference in May 1942 James Griffiths introduced a
long motion that included a call for family allowances;
there was still strong opposition from some trade unionists
(and support from Will Lawther, of the Minewarkers' Federation)
2
but the vote went in favour of the motion. More importantly,
in March the T.U.C. General Council agreed to recommend that
Congress accept the principle of State-financed non-contributory
children's allowances, and in September this was achieved with
3little fuss. The last real obstacle had been removed.
1. Ibid.
2. Report of the Annual Conference of the Labour Party for
1942, no. 132-7.
3. Annual Report of the T.U.C. for 1942, pp. 129, 301. In
1942 the Annual Co-operative Congress (representing
8,750,000 members of the co-operative movement) also
passed a motion in favour. Co-operative Union to
Chancellor, 20/6/42, P.R.O. T 161/116 (S.43697/3).
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The Beveridge Report was published on the 1st December
1942, and for the subsequent five months the subject of
family allowances became part of the stormy history of the
public reaction to the Report. In the final months leading
up to publication the Government began to view its proposals
with growing alarm. Beveridge had been leaking information
to the Press, probably to ensure that publication would not
be held up by the Treasury, and in October Brendan Bracken,
Minister of Information, warned Churchill that "some of
Beveridge's friends are playing politics.... when the
report appears there will be an immense amount of ballyhoo
about the importance of implementing the recommendations
2
without delay". Other Ministers were equally uneasy:
Kingsley Wood had great reservations about the cost, com¬
plaining that "the time for declaring a dividend on the
profits of the Golden Age is the time when these profits
3
have been realised in fact, not merely in imagination";
Sir William Jowitt was worried about whether they would be
able to stop Beveridge expounding his own personal views
/1
on the Report while the Government were considering it;
and Lord Cherwell, Paymaster-General, warned that to
declare acceptance of the whole Report and its cost might
affect postwar economic forecasting and hinder lend-lease
1. Henry Pelling: Britain and the Second World War (1970)
p. 169. " " ~~ " ~
2. Bracken to Churchill, 27/10/42, P.R.O. PREM 4/89 (2)
(part II).
3. Wood to Churchill, 17/11/42, ibid.
4. Jowitt to Churchill, 23/11/42, ibid. Jowitt was
Paymaster-General until 30/12/42, when he became Minister
Without Portfolio with responsibility for reconstruction.
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1
negotiations with the U.S.A. Either because of his
2
strong personal influence on Churchill or because it
seemed a real problem, Cherwell's point struck home, and
the Prime Minister asked Jowitt (who was now in charge of
reconstruction) to delay official approval of the Beveridge
Report until the arrangements with the U.S.A. had been
ratified.
Thus when Beveridge requested a Press conference to
expound his views prior to publication of the Report, it was
4
flatly refused and the Cabinet agreed that not only should
the practicality of the Report's recommendations be carefully
scrutinised, but it should also be considered in relation to
other reconstruction measures some of which might have greater
5
priority. However, public opinion was becoming interested
in postwar reconstruction in general and social security in
particular; early in November 1942 came the news of the
Allied Victories in North Africa, which appeared to mark a
significant change in the course of the War, and at the last
minute (two days before the Report was due to be published)
the Government suddenly reversed its stance: realising the
1. Cherwell to Churchill, 25/11/42, ibid. Henry Pelling:
Winston Churchill (1974), p. 502.
2. Cherwell was an old friend of Churchill, and for much
of the War "was in closer and more continuous contact with the
Prime Minister than any other man". The Earl of Birkenhead:
The Prof in Two Worlds - the Official Life of
Professor F.A. Lindemann, Viscount Cherwell (1961), p. 214.
3. Pelling, op. cit. (1970), p. 170.
4. War Cabinet meeting of 16/11/42, W.M. 153 (42), P.R.O.
CAB 65/28. "Once it is out he can bark to his heart's
content", minuted Churchill. Note of 25/11/42, P.R.O.
PREM 4/89 (2) (Part II).
5. War Cabinet meeting of 26/11/42, W.M. 159(42), P.R.O.
CAB 65/28.
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value of the Report as a wartime propaganda weapon,
Brendan Bracken set in motion plans to give it the widest
possible publicity.
When the Report was published, it immediately became
a best-seller. By midday on the 2nd December, 70,000 copies
2
had been sold and public reaction was ecstatic. With his
Pilgrim's Progress language and the vivid imagery of the
'Five Giants', Beveridge had produced exactly the blueprint
for the future that the public had been waiting for. The
British Institute of Public Opinion conducted a poll in the
second week following the Report's appearance, and discovered
that 95% of the public had heard of it; however, there appears
to have been a widely-held suspicion of the Government's
willingness to put the scheme into operation: only 53%
believed they would do so.
By and large the Report met with universal approval,
4
with many public figures speaking out for it.' In the general
euphoria, little criticism was made. At one end of the
political spectrum, Sir Ernest Benn called social security
"a dangerous opiate" and declared "it is crystal clear that
1. Addison, op. cit., p. 215-7.
2. The Times. 3/12/43.
3. The British Institute of Public Opinion: The Beveridge
Report and the Public, P.R.0. PREM 4/89 (2") (Part II).
See also, for public opinion in 1943, Beveridge Report:
Public Opinion on, P.R.O. PIN 8/162.
4. Some of these paeons of praise were so extreme as to be
meaningless, like the statement by William Temple,
Archbishop of Canterbury, that it was "the first time
anybody had set out to embody the whole spirit of the
Christian ethic in an Act of Parliament".
Janet Beveridge, op. cit., p. 135.
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-i
if you pay for unemployment you will get it"; at the
other, the Socialist Party of Great Britain saw Beveridge's
obsession with the contributory principle as middle-class
moralism designed to avoid real income distribution, and
argued that the proposals were only forthcoming because
the Government needed the co-operation of its citizens in
2
the War effort. In between these two poles, however, the
mainstream of political opinion welcomed the Report, though
there was a strong element within the Conservative Party
that wanted to approve of the Report in principle but\ then
"whittle it away by detailed criticism". In this atmosphere,
much public adulation was showered upon Beveridge - which did
4
nothing to lessen his vanity - and cartoons in the Press
portrayed him as a kindly old man, in contrast to a heartless
5
and indifferent set of Cabinet Ministers.
Throughout December 1942 and January 1943, however,
the Government failed to appreciate the full extent of public
feeling on the Beveridge Report. Immediately after its
1. Sir Ernest Benn: "Some Implications of the Beveridge
Report", in J.W. Nisbet: The Beveridge Plan (1943), p. 45.
" ' ' ' "
>e Clive Saxton:
2. Socialist Party of Great Britain: Beveridge Re-organises
Poverty (n.d., probably 1943).
3. Harold Nicolson: Diaries and Letters, 1939-45 (1970), p. 264.
4. Harold Nicholson met him in the lobby of the House of
Commons as the Report was being hotly debated in February
1943: "My two previous reports led to the fall of two
Ministers. This one may bring down a Government", said
Beveridge. Ibid., p. 283. Professor Lionel Robbins said
of Beveridge at the time: "He sees himself as a possible
future.Prime Minister, and certainly as a member of the War
Cabinet in the near future. He thinks that he can hear,
already, a cry going up next year, after confused political
debates and convulsive popular movements in his support, of
•Send for Beveridge' ". Dalton Diaries, Vol. 27, 16/12/42.
5. Janet Beveridge, op. cit., pp. 134, 142, 148, 153. Punch
even portrayed him as the Fairy Queen. W.H. Beveridge:
The Pillars of Security (1943), p. 79.
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publication, on the 3rd December, the Committee on
Reconstruction Problems agreed to set up a committee consis¬
ting of the senior officials of all relevant Departments to
1
look at the Report, and at once the Treasury began a campaign
against the Beveridge proposals. The Treasury's attitude
was: "We regard Beveridge as the ultimate objective but
we must decline to commit ourselves as to the stages by
which the ultimate objective is to be reached and the intervals
between those stages on major matters which are dependent for
feasibility on future economic prosperity, hoped for but still
2
to be achieved". The Treasury's obsession with Britain's
ability to pay for greatly expanded social security after
the War was shared by the Chancellor, Kingsley Wood, who
conveyed this message to the Cabinet. While the Phillips
Committee were casting a cold eye at the Beveridge proposals,
the Cabinet began to take stock of the situation. At a meeting
on the 14th January 1943, Kingsley Wood presented his Cabinet
colleagues with a memorandum stressing that the new social
security system could only come about after the War if the
economic situation was favourable, if trade was restored and
unemployment kept low, if taxation was reduced, and if other
reconstruction proposals with greater priority were imple¬
mented first; indeed, the only feature of the Report that
Wood welcomed was its strong emphasis on the contributory
principle.^
1. Minutes of meeting of Committee on Reconstruction
Problems, 3/12/42, P.R.O. T 161/1129 (S.48497/02). The
committee of civil servants was chaired by Sir Thomas
Phillips, Ministry of Labour, and its records are in
P.R.O. PIN 8/115-6.
2. Memorandum by B. Gilbert on the attitude of the Treasury
to the Beveridge Report, 7/12/42, P.R.O. T 161/1129
(S.48497/02).
3. War Cabinet meeting of 14/1/43, W.M. 8 (43), and
Memorandum by the Chancellor, 11/1/43, P.R.O. CAB 65/33.
453
During January the Cabinet maintained an attitude of
veiled hostility towards the Beveridge proposals. On the
8th January it agreed to approve the withdrawal of the
Army Bureau of Current Affairs pamphlet containing an
article on the Report, which assumed it would be imple-
mented; this notorious incident did much to damage the
Government, since many of the pamphlets remained in circu-
2
lation and were surreptitiously circulated among troops.
Four days later Churchill circulated to the Cabinet his
memorandum Promises About Post-War Conditions in which he
warned that "a dangerous optimism is growing up about the
conditions it will be possible to establish here after the
war"; after outlining the many economic burdens that Britain
would face in peacetime - regaining of export markets, food
rationing, economic development of "the tropical Colonies",
maintenance of the Armed Forces, and so on - he warned
against making rash 'homes for heroes' promises such as
occurred in the First World War: the Government must not
"deceive the people by false hopes and airy visions of utopia
and Eldorado". Similarly, Oliver Lyttleton, Minister of
Production, criticised the Beveridge Report for not investi¬
gating "the essential problem of creating the background
of reasonable stability which any such scheme requires for
4
its success".
1. War Cabinet meeting of 8/1/43, W.M. 5 (43), ibid. The
War Office had withdrawn it in late December.
Janet Beveridge, op. cit., p. 132.
2. Janet Beveridge, op. cit., p. 136.
3. Promises About Post-War Conditions - Note by the Prime
Minister. 12/1/43. W.P. (43) 18. P.R.O. CAB bb/35.
4. Social Security - Note by the Minister of Production,
13/1/43, W.P. (43) 21, ibid. *
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By February, however, the Cabinet's opposition was
weakening. The strength of public opinion was being rea¬
lised, and some Ministers, like Herbert Morrison, were
arguing strongly against the Treasury line. Despite
2
their personal dislike of Beveridge, the Cabinet were
realising that they would have to bow to political pressure.
Wood still stressed the financial obstacles, but several
Ministers warned that public and political opinion would
object strongly if the Report's main features were accepted
by the Government "in a grudging spirit". Lord Cherwell
began trying to persuade Churchill to drop his opposition
by pointing out that there was "nothing particularly novel
or revolutionary about the Beveridge plan. In the main it
consolidates and augments existing insurance schemes, thus
achieving administrative economy"; the cost of the scheme,
he argued, would mostly be borne by the workers, through
their own contributions, through the employers' contributions
being passed on to the consumer, and through income tax
"which, being marginal revenue, will to a certain extent
Zj.
also tend to fall on the small man".
1. Bernard Donoughue and G.W. Jones: Herbert Morrison -
Portrait of a Politician (1973), pp. 314-5.
2. There was great resentment over the way Beveridge appeared
to be making so much political capital out of the Report.
Thus when Beveridge asked to see Churchill to talk about the
Report he received the frosty reply: "I hope an opportunity
for a talk with you will occur in the future, but of course
I have to give my main attention to the war", Churchill to
Beveridge, 16/2/43, P.R.O. PREM 4/89 (2) (Part II).
3. War Cabinet meeting of 12/2/43, W.M. 28 (43),
P.R.O. CAB 65/33.
4. Cherwell to Churchill, 11/2/43, P.R.O. PREM 4/89 (2)
(Part II). Keynes was also persuading Churchill to
support the Report. Pelling,. op. cit. (1970), pp. 171-2.
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This change of heart came too late to save the
Government in the eyes of the public. On the 16th - 18th
February 1943 there took place the famous House of Commons
debate on the Beveridge Report, in which the Government
suffered great loss of prestige through their inept mis¬
handling of the affair, nearly precipitating a major back-
2
bench revolt. After this powerful demonstration of public
opinion, those Cabinet Ministers like Kingsley Wood and
Sir John Anderson who opposed the Report had to drop much
of their overt opposition.
Meanwhile, within the Government the Beveridge proposals
were being closely scrutinised by the Phillips Committee of
senior civil servants, and, interestingly enough, their
attitudes mirrored almost exactly the attitudes of most
of the Cabinet.
The Treasury now realised that family allowances were
without a doubt inevitable, and concentrated on reducing
their scope. There was irritation that Beveridge had not
mentioned any arguments against family allowances, and had
so sweepingly assumed that they ought to be introduced.
1. On the 15th February Churchill was still insisting to the
Cabinet that the Beveridge Report could not be introduced
until after an election. Dalton Diaries, Vol. 28, 16/2/43.
Labour leaders suspected that Churchill (who believed he
could not lose such an election) wanted to implement the
Beveridge recommendations himself, as Prime Minister of
a postwar Conservative Government. Francis Williams:
A Prime Minister Remembers (1961), p. 57.
2. For accounts of the debate, see: Bullock, op. cit. (Vol. II),
pp. 229-232; Addison, op. cit., p. 224; Michael Foot:
Aneurin Bevan (1962), pp. 409-410; Janet Beveridge,
op. cit., pp. 138-149. John Wheeler-Bennett:
John Anderson, Viscount Waverley (1962), pp. 273-5.
3. Memorandum by Gilbert to Barlow, Hopkins, Eady and Hale,
11/12/42, P.R.O. T 161/1116 (S.43697/3).
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But officials realised, that Beveridge's advocacy of them
was supported by public opinion, and hence discussion centred
on such cost-reducing devices as making the scheme contri-
1 2
butory or subjecting it to an income-limit. The latter
point had to be dropped because of the anticipated admini¬
strative difficulties (such as what to do in the case of the
self-employed),^ but the Treasury still wanted some means
(such as adjustment with income tax) of avoiding having to
z±
pay cash allowances to rich parents who would not need them.
Much the same lack of enthusiasm for family allowances
marked the discussions of the Phillips Committee. This
Committee first met on the 10th December, and was given a
month in which to pronounce on various difficult points con¬
tained in the Beveridge Report, such as whether benefits and
contributions should be flat-rate, whether all social security
measures should henceforth be the responsibility of one single
5
Ministry, and whether family allowances should be introduced.
At the fifth meeting, on the 29th December, family allowances
were discussed, and the reaction was quite hostile. Several
members wondered if the prewar arguments still held any
1. Ibid.
2. Memorandum by Gilbert: Income Limit for Children's
Allowances, 26/1/43, ibid.
3. Hale to Gilbert, 17/12/42, ibid.
4. Memorandum by Gilbert, 7/12/42, P.R.O. T 161/1129
(S.48497/02).
5. Memorandum (n.d., probably December 1942), P.R.O. PIN 8/115.
The Phillips Committee worked under the Cabinet Committee
on Reconstruction Problems. Outstanding problems were
allocated to different Departments, with the Ministry of
Health examining family allowances.
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validity, and there was general agreement that no scheme
should be introduced until after the War. The 'work-
incentive' argument was mentioned, but against that there
was no support for the pro-natalist case, and several
suggestions were made for reducing the scope (such as
starting only with the third child). Most important of
all, the Phillips Committee decided to recommend a figure
of 5s.Od. instead of the 8s.Od. proposed by Beveridge. This
was partly because of expected increases of services in kind,
but also because the figure of 5s.Od. "had the virtue of
not pretending to be a subsistence rate. If an attempt at
a subsistence rate were made (especially in a non-contributory
scheme) it would be very unstable and there would be pressure
for its increase if the cost of living rose or if the medical
experts revised their views on the minimum adequate diet.
It was therefore advisable to start low".
This hostile view was shared by several Departments,
whose opinions the Phillips Committee sounded out. The Board
2
of Education reiterated its preference for services in kind;
the Ministry of Labour feared that wage-bargaining would be
affected, and that family allowances would eventually lead on
to demands for a Government-enforced minimum wage; and the
Treasury continued its running battle by questioning
1. Minutes of the 5th meeting of the Phillips Committee,
29/12/42, ibid.
2. Board of Education memorandum: Children's Allowances -
Cash or Kind?, 11/12/42, P.R.O. PIN 8/116.
3. Ministry of Labour memorandum: The Effect of Children's
Allowances on Wages, 18/12/42, ibid*
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Beveridge's pro-natalist arguments, recommending that an
income limit be introduced, and calling for "an examination
whether the small minority of cases where wages are below
subsistence minimum should not be attacked in some other way
rather than by a remedy whose main cost arises on the many
cases where from this angle help is unnecessary". Thus the
Report of the Phillips Committee gave a very grudging approval
of family allowances, subject to the provisos that an income
limit be applied and the level of the allowance be lower than
2
the Beveridge-recommended 8s.Od. This was referred to the
Committee on Reconstruction Priorities, and they in turn
recommended to the Cabinet that the Government should accept
in principle family allowances of 5s.Od. per week for each
child after the first, the 5s.Od. being justified by reference
to increased services in kind.
In the midst of this unfavourable atmosphere, the
Family Endowment Society asked to send a deputation to the
Chancellor to press on him the need for the immediate intro¬
duction of family allowances; the T.U.C. were now in favour
and so was the Beveridge Report, they pointed out, and thus
had been fulfilled two of the three conditions Wood had given
to the Commons in June 1942.^" Wood agreed, and received the
1. Memorandum by Treasury: Family Allowances (Appendix C
to Report of the Phillips Committee), January 1943,
P.R.O. PIN 8/115. "
2. Report of the Phillips Committee, ibid.
3. Interim R.eport of the Committee on Reconstruction Priorities,
11/2/43, W.P. (43) 58, P.R.O. CAB 66/34, This was discussed
in Cabinet the next day. War Cabinet meeting of 12/2/43,
W.M. 28 (43), P.R.O. CAB 65/33.
4. Eva Hubback to Wood, 8/12/42, P.R.O. PIN 8/16.
459
Society on the 14th January 1943. The Society were
represented by 19 M.P.s, and others including Lawrence Cadbury,
Seebohm Rowntree, Professor Gilbert Murray and Eva Hubback,
plus the non-attending support of such figures as the
Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Balfour of Burleigh,
Viscount Samuel and Professor A.M. Carr-Saunders. The
points made were much the same as before, except that the
pro-natalist case was given far more emphasis than in the
past: in its written evidence the Society even went so far
as to suggest that, in order to raise the birth rate of the
professional classes, the Beveridge scheme should be supple¬
mented by "a self-supporting scheme or schemes, designed to meet
the needs of those on higher income levels and paid for by
horizontal redistribution between those with and without
children within those levels" - for example, raised child
tax rebates, or a special contributory scheme for those above
an income level. In her oral evidence, Eleanor Rathbone was
quite obsessed by the population aspect. It was, from a
national long-term point of view, by far the most important
question, she maintained, and went on to make the sweeping
claim that "the State has a means of either stimulating the
birth-rate or checking it through the system of family
allowances, so giving the community some power over its
2
future destinies".
1. " " 1 ~ ~ ;nt Society in Relation to
the reverse of what the Treasury were wanting.
2. Note of Proceedings of Deputation, 14/1/43, ibid. Other
speakers were John Cecil Wright, Seebohm Rowntree, and
Mrs. Ayrton Gould.
This,of course, was quite
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As on previous occasions, civil servants regarded, the
Society's deputation as little more than a time-wasting
nuisance. "Only Rowntree had anything new to say", was
1
Gilbert's acerbic comment. To a lesser or greater extent,
this had been their attitude toward the Society all along,
but now that they were concerned primarily with solving the
administrative problems they found the Society's general
statements of principle (such as the pro-natalist case) very
irritating. In June 1943, for example, Eleanor Rathbone and
2
Eva Hubback asked Sir William Jowitt if they could meet the
civil servant, Thomas Sheepshanks, who was then in charge of
the final stage of the family allowances enquiry. The
meeting took place, but Sheepshanks found it unhelpful. Of
the two ladies he wrote: "In point of fact, I discovered
that although they have no doubt studied the question for a
number of years, they had not really applied their minds to
all the difficulties and had only the most nebulous ideas
about such difficult questions as whether the family should
be the family by blood or the economic family. Indeed, I
4
do not think that the point had occurred to them".
1. Handwritten comment by Gilbert on duplicate of letter
from P.D. Proctor (Treasury) to Hubback, 15/1/43,
P.R.O. T 161/1116 (S.43697/3).
2. Jowitt was Minister Without Portfolio with responsibility
for reconstruction until 8/10/44 when he became Minister
of Social Insurance (re-named National Insurance on
17/11/44).
3. Rathbone to Jowitt, 4/6/43, P.R.O. PIN 8/16.
4. Sheepshanks to T. Daish, 8/6/43, ibid.
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The spring of 1943 marked the end of the third
'Beveridge Report' stage in the development of family
allowances in the period 1939-45. The fourth and final
stage ran from April 1943 to the passage of the Family
Allowances Act in mid-1945.
During this period, the administrative problems of
implementing a family allowances scheme were worked out in
great depth by the 'Central Staff' Committee of Departmental
representatives, under the Chairmanship of Thomas (later
Sir Thomas) Sheepshanks, who was Controller of Insurance
1
at the Ministry of Health. The Central Staff had been
formed - in the absence of a proper Ministry of Social
Security - to co-ordinate the work of the various Depart¬
ments dealing with the Beveridge recommendations, and to solve
outstanding problems, such as the principle of universality,
the abolition of the Approved Societies, conditions for
2
disability benefit, and so on.
Evidently the message of the February 1943 Commons
debate on the Beveridge Report had been firmly implanted
in the minds of Ministers and civil servants, for when the
Central Staff came to discuss family allowances on the
1. Memorandum on Progress of the Examination of the Beveridge
Report, 2/11/43, P.R.O. PIN 8/123.
2. In a memorandum of February 1943 Churchill had suggested
that a committee should be set up to work on the Beveridge
proposals so that they would be in an easily-implemented
form once peace returned. "We do not know what Government
is going to be in power after the war, or what Prime
Minister", he wrote: "We should get everything ready for
them and leave them a free hand to take up or reject a
scheme which will be perfected in itself". Beveridge
Report - Note by the Prime Minister, 15/2/43,
W.P. (43) 65, P.R.O. CAB 66/34. This naturally aroused
the suspicions of Labour Ministers.
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12th and 14th April 1943 they quickly agreed to recommend
the introduction of a scheme. Indeed, there was even dis¬
cussion on whether a scheme should be introduced immediately;
civil servants felt that in spite of the enormous administrative
problems the immediate introduction of family allowances was
1
a possibility, although there was the danger that a wartime
scheme would put a large amount of purchasing power in the
hands of parents without a corresponding increase in the
supply of foods and services taking place, which would be
2
inflationary.
Thus from April 1943 onwards the Central Staff worked
on the important administrative problems. These were: payment
to the mother or the father; whether the family unit should
be the 'economic' or the 'blood' family; the upper age limit
of eligible children; the question of children of aliens;
how payments would be made in respect of children in orphanages,
institutions, or local authority care; whether payments should
be continued when the maintaining parent was abroad; whether
to pay an allowance for the first child when the parent was
on benefit; and how to recruit and accommodate the extra
staff.^
1. Minutes of 12 and 14/4/43, P.R.O. PIN 8/1. These
administrative problems, such as the recruiting of an
estimated extra staff of 1,000, were of course greatly
exacerbated by the War.
2. Memorandum on Children's Allowances (n.d., probably
April 1943), P.R.O. PIN 8/2.
3. These questions, and more, are dealt with in
P.R.O. PIN 17.(1-16). See, in particular, P.R.O. PIN 17/2.
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That these questions took fully two and a half years
to settle must raise in a historian's mind the possibility
that deliberate delaying tactics were being used. Many of
these problems, after all, had been solved in the First World
War in the administration of separation allowances; and in
the regulations governing dependants' allowances in out-of-work
donation, unemployment benefit, etc., the Government had
precedents that could have been easily referred to. Again,
had the Stamp Survey won general approval for their family
allowance scheme, there is no doubt that the administrative
problems would have been solved in a matter of days. Was it
really necessary, for example, that the residence qualifications
for payment of an allowance should have taken a year and a half
2
to solve, with many repetitious memoranda being circulated?
On the one hand, there is good reason to believe that
the Treasury were still employing their delaying tactics, even
at this late stage hoping that a postwar scheme could be
reduced in scope and cost. Their case against a wartime
scheme rested on several arguments: it would increase pro¬
blems of supply and demand; it would exacerbate the existing
1. For example, for discussion in 1938-40 on the anticipated
administrative problems of separation allowances and
dependants' allowances under the Prevention and Relief
of Distress scheme in a future war, see P.R.O. T 162/563
(E.19143/06).
2. See material in P.R.O. PIN 17/5. In this file there is,
for example, a memorandum (dated 20/4/44) considering
what should be done in the case of a British citizen
working as a civil servant in India, with one child in
India and two in Britain; correspondence was even
exchanged with the India Office on this point.
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disparity between service pay and civilian wages; owing
to the existing rationing system, additional purchasing power
would not result in increased consumption of the most valuable
foodstuffs; and wages with the new opportunities for overtime
1
were adequate for family needs. In addition, argued Gilbert,
the fact that each Department had to be carefully consulted
at every stage on each of the Beveridge proposals meant that
2
delay was inevitable. These were valid arguments, but were
undoubtedly over-exaggerated by the Treasury as a deliberate
policy. Even after the passage of the 1945 Family Allowances
Act they tried to postpone the date at which payments would
commence, and in several cautious memoranda suggested that no
decision could be taken on this until after hostilities had
ceased. Evidently this tactic exasperated the new Labour
Chancellor, Hugh Dalton, for on the final memorandum he
angrily dismissed his officials' caution, insisting that
family allowances, were "much the best of our social service
advances".^
Yet on the other hand, there is equally no doubt that
after February 1943 Ministers and civil servants were acutely
aware of public enthusiasm for the Beveridge proposals, and
1. Memorandum on Finance of Beveridge Plan for Discussion
on 20/10/43, P.R.O. T 161/1193 (5♦48497/017).
2. Memorandum by Gilbert, 3/3/44, P.R.O. T 161/1193
(S.48497/025).
3. Gilbert to Sir Edward Bridges (Treasury), 25/6/45;
Bridges to Sir Thomas Phillips, 27/6/45; Memoranda by
Gilbert, 16/7/45 and 2/10/45. P.R.O. T 161/1199
(S.52494/01).
4. Handwritten comments by Dalton on memorandum by Gilbert,
2/10/45, ibid. Labour had taken office on the 27th July.
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impatience over the delay in implementing them.
Sir William Jowitt frequently impressed on civil servants
the need to work quickly, in view of public opinion: in
September 1943, for example, he urged this on Sir Thomas
1
Sheepshanks, and a month later told Sheepshanks that he
was "very anxious to get on with the clauses about Children's
Allowances as he thought it likely that he would be pressed
to introduce this as a separate measure even if its operation
2
was deferred until after the war".
The administrative problems certainly were enormous,
being greatly complicated by wartime shortages and by the
fact that other reconstruction programmes were being worked
on simultaneously. Thus although the first draft of a
Family Allowances Bill was drawn up by August 1943,^ many
administrative problems dragged on: for example, it took
one and a half years to settle the legal and administrative
ramifications of how to pay allowances to children in insti¬
tutions, and much of the delay was quite simply due to the
fact that children's services were being reorganised and the
Zi
Poor Law finally dismantled at the same time. Many of the
administrative problems were caused by the War, such as the
question of how duplication with service allowances could be
1. Sheepshanks to E.G. Bean (Ministry of Health), 15/9/43,
P.R.O. PIN 8/123.
2. Sheepshanks to H. George (Ministry of Health), 6/10/43,
P.R.O. PIN 17/2.
3. Contained in ibid.
4. See material in P.R.O. PIN 17/3. On a problem like this
the Government also had to consider the wishes of relevant
organisations. See Note of Deputation from the Council of
Associated Children's Homes" 19/4/45, ibid. ~~
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avoided if the main family allowance scheme was introduced
in wartime. Even if the scheme was introduced just after
the War, it would still be in advance of the main social
insurance reforms, which would result in an awkward interim
2
period of temporary regulations. A permanent family allow¬
ance scheme would have to contain no legal loopholes, and
thus questions such as what to do if two families had claims
to one child would need to be sorted out with great care.
Civil servants clearly felt aggrieved that the public in general,
and family allowance supporters in particular, were quick to
criticise the Government for taking so long without appreciating
4
the magnitude of the administrative problems.
Thus it is likely that even without the Treasury's policy
of cautious delay, the difficulties of launching a scheme in
wartime would have been overwhelming.
In this final phase, between the setting up of the
Central Staff and the passage of the Family Allowances Act,
two controversies arose. The first was the question of whether
the family allowance should be paid to the mother or the father.
This had long been an emotive issue with the Family Endowment
1. Memorandum on Date of Commencement, 25/7/44, P.R.O. PIN 17/8.
2. For example, the problem of how to deal with orphans.
See material in P.R.O. PIN 17/11.
3. See material in P.R.O. PIN 17/12 - 13.
4. For example, Sheepshanks expressed irritation that the
policy of no 'duplication with service allowances, which
the Central Staff had considered carefully, was seen by
critics in such terms as "doing down the soldier serving
in the Burmese jungle". Sheepshanks to Jowitt, 2/6/45,
P.R.O. PIN 3/65.
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Society, and was one of the few administrative details that
they insisted on. Payment to the mother was seen by them as
recognising the economic rights of women, guaranteeing that
the money would be spent wisely, and keeping the allowance
separate from the man's income - an important point if trade
1
union opinion was to be appeased.
In their discussions the Central Staff appear to have
had no strong opinion either way: they recognised on the one
hand that the issue was deeply important to women's organisa-
2
tions, but on the other hand payment to the father as legal
guardian involved fewer administrative difficulties. The
Home Office, for example, supported this latter point, main¬
taining that making the mother legally entitled to the allow¬
ance would create awkward precedents, and somewhat exaggeratedly
warning that "once the legal principle that the father or other
legal custodian is the person who is primarily responsible in
law for the maintenance of a child is abandoned, a whole new
code of legislation will be required"; however, they recog¬
nised that politically it would probably be necessary to grant
4
entitlement to the mother. The first two drafts of the White
Paper on Social Insurance reflected this indecision, with the
1. In two deputations to Sir William Jowitt on the Beveridge
proposals, in March and August 1943, the T.U.C. supported
payment to the mother. See material in P.R.O. PIN 8/7.
However, the Ministry of Labour, normally very sensitive
to T.U.C. opinion, favoured the father as the legal
guardian. Memorandum on Attitude of Departments to
Administrative Questions (n.d., probably June 1943),
P.R.O. PIN 17/2.
2. Several women's organisations (e.g. the Married Women's
Association) sent deputations to Jowitt on this. See
P.R.O. PIN 8/65-66.
3. Memorandum on Children's Allowances (n.d., probably April
19J3J, P.R.O. PIN 8/2.
4. Memorandum by Home Office, 4/2/44, P.R.O. PIN 8/132.
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1
word 'mother' being provisionally entered; but when it
was published in September 1944 this was reversed, although
2
the mother was also entitled to cash the allowance.
The wrath of the Family Endowment Society was naturally
aroused, and they sent a deputation to Sir William Jowitt on
the 10th October 1944. Both in their written and oral evi¬
dence they repeated their long-standing arguments for payment
to the mother; but as with all previous deputations, civil
servants remained distinctly unimpressed by the Society's
arguments on matters of principle: on the point that payment
to the mother would raise the status of women, they found it
"curious to rely on the payment of a few shillings each week
4
to achieve this desirable end".
The controversy continued right up to the debates on
5
the Bill in the House of Commons. At the last minute, however,
the Cabinet decided that in view of the strength of public
and political feeling on the matter, a free vote on that part
g
of the Bill should be allowed, and in the face of almost
1. P.R.O. PIN 8/148.
2. Social Insurance, Part I, 1944, Cmd. 6550, p. 15 (para. 53).
Likewise, the first three drafts of the Bill (contained in
PIN.17/2), which were drawn up as early as August-October
1943, favoured payment to the mother, but the final version
altered this.
3. Memorandum of F.E.S. Evidence and Note of Deputation in
P.R.O. PIN 8/68.
4. Memorandum on Deputation, 10/10/44, ibid.
5. Eleanor Rathbone was, of course, marshalling support from
those inside and outside Parliament on this point. See
letters to Beveridge, 2/3/45 and 13/4/45, Beveridge Papers
VI. 10.
6. War Cabinet Meeting of 6/3/45, W.M. 26 (45) 7, P.R.O.
CAB 65/49.
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unanimous opposition (Eleanor Rathbone having announced
that she would vote against the Bill if payment to the father
1 2
was not reversed) Jowitt gave way.
In deciding for payment to the father initially, the
Government had had in mind the danger that "to give the legal
title to the mother might imply a recognition that she was
responsible for the child's maintenance, and might thus
provide a demand for an increase in the allowance sufficient
to enable her to discharge that responsibility in full".
In other words, the Government wanted to forestall any
demands that family allowances be fixed at the full sub¬
sistence cost of maintaining a child, and this brings one on
to the second area of controversy in the 1943-5 period - the
decision to lower the level of the allowance from the Beveridge-
recommended 8s.Od. per week to 5s.Od.
As has been shown, both the Treasury and the Phillips
Committee wanted a 5s.Od. figure because this would obviously
be below subsistence and thus release the Government from the
obligation of increasing the allowance level as the cost of
1. Hansard, Vol. 408, 8/3/45, Col. 2285.
2. Ibid., Vol. 410, 10/5/45, Cols. 2056-2076.
3. War Cabinet meeting of 6/3/45, op. cit. This was in
addition to the already-mentioned legal difficulty.
Unfortunately the relevant P.R.O. file on payment to




living rose. However, in public Government spokesmen
gave a different justification. In the Commons debate on
the Beveridge Report, Sir John Anderson justified the
lowering of the allowance level to 5s.Od. by mentioning
the importance of services in kind, saying that "it is, in
the view of the Government, important that such allowances, if
granted, should not be at a rate which would in practice prove
an obstacle to the fullest development of the welfare services",
and vaguely promising that these services would be developed
more than Beveridge visualised when he fixed their value at
2
1s.0d. per child. 5s.Od. was thus the figure assumed by
the Central Staff in all their discussions, and this level
was defended in the 1944 White Paper on the grounds that
"nothing should be done to remove from parents the responsi¬
bility of maintaining their children The scheme here
set out is not intended to provide full maintenance for each
child. It is rather a general contribution to the needs of
families with children". Similarly, in the Commons debate
on the White Paper, Jowitt reiterated these sentiments and
R.A. Butler emphasised that whereas cash allowances were
going to cost £57,000,000, free milk and meals in schools
1. Minutes of 5th meeting of Phillips Committee, 29/12/42,
P.R.O. PIN 8/115. The 1942 White Paper on family
allowances (Cmd. 6354, p. 3) had mentioned the figure
of 5s.Od. "for illustration because this is the rate that
has been proposed by advocates of family allowances".
What was significant about the Phillips Committee's
decision was that it specifically altered the Beveridge
figure, and thus quickly abandoned the principle that the
family allowance plus the value of services in kind should
amount to subsistence.
2. Hansard, Vol, 386, 16/2/43, Cols. 1666-7.
3. Social Insurance, Part I, op. cit., p. 14 (para. 50).
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were going to cost even more, £60,000,000. Again, a few
months later in the debates on the Bill Jowitt insisted that
the Government was not betraying the Beveridge principles,
since the Beveridge Report had plainly stated that if provision
in kind were extended beyond the scope envisaged, then cash
2
allowances should be reduced; and he repeated the point that
the allowance was a form of general financial assistance to the
whole family rather than a maintenance payment earmarked for
"3
a particular child.
The disparity between the private and public reasons
for cutting family allowances from 8s.Od. to 5s.Od. was thus
quite striking, and it is likely that the real reason was
related to the general decision to abandon the Beveridge
principle of providing subsistence benefits, which was
announced in the 1944 White Paper. The reason given for
this was that the principle of flat-rate benefits and contri¬
butions meant fixing the latter at a level that low wage
earners could afford, and this automatically put an upper
!\
limit on what could be paid out in benefits. However,
\
there is no doubt that the real reason was economy, and that
the Treasury long campaign to cut the cost and scope of the
family allowance scheme was a partial victory.
1. Hansard, Vol. 404, 2/11/44, Cols. 986-7, and ibid., 3/11/44,
Col. 1111.
2. Ibid., Vol. 408, 8/3/45, Col. 2262.
3. Ibid., Vol. 410, 10/5/45, Col. 2031.
4. Social Insurance, Part I, p. 7 (paras. 12 and 13)
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Both these controversies surfaced in the Commons debates
on the Family Allowances Bill, between March and June 1945.
But apart from them, and a small rumpus over whether there
should be duplication with servicemen's family allowances,
the general tone of the debates was one of satisfaction that
the principle of family endowment in wages had been accepted.
Left wing speakers like Aneurin Bevan still made the point
that the introduction of family allowances was a tribute to
the fact that the industrial system was unable or unwilling
2
to pay proper wages, but Bevan approved of the measure. Most
speakers seem to have believed that the Bill marked a new era
of State legislation for children - "the country has become
child conscious", said Lady Astor - and that this would
4
automatically result in more measures. In view of this,
most M.P.s were willing to overlook the Bill's defects:
Eleanor Rathbone for one believed that the future trend
of the birth rate would force the Government to expand the
5
scheme. Finally, in the debates there were many tributes
to Eleanor Rathbone's remarkably dogged persistence in
campaigning for the past twenty-five years; the passage of
the Bill was very much seen as a personal victory for her.
On the 15th June 1945 the Bill was finally passed, and
payment of allowances commenced on the 6th August 1946.
1. Land, op. cit., pp. 220-1.
2. Hansard, Vol. 408, 8/3/45, Cols. 2345-6.
3. Ibid., Col. 2333.
4. At one point, Sir William Jowitt said "I feel this is
probably the first of a series of Family Allowance Bills".
Ibid., Vol. 410, 10/5/45, Col. 2045.
5. Ibid., Vol. 408, 8/3/45, Col. 2277.
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This final chapter is obviously crucial to the analysis
of the development of family allowances. As has been shown,
by 1939 the Government were still flatly rejecting the arguments
put forward by family allowance campaigners, and the fact that
the Act passed into law only six years later obviously raises
the all-important question of whether the Second World War
forced those in power to accept these arguments.
On the face of it, the theory that there is a strong
causal connection between the intensity of a war and the
degree of social change or social reform that follows has
some attraction. This theory was first outlined by Aristotle,
then Spinoza and Herbert Spencer, and has gained a degree of
academic respectability in the last thirty years. Its most
cogent theoretical discussion was in Stanislaw Andreski's
Military Organisation and Society (1954) where the theory of
the 'Military Participation Ratio' was posited: Andreski
argued that the extent to which a war flattened the pyramid
of social stratification depended on the proportion of
2
militarily utilised individuals in the total population.
It has also been taken up by conflict theorists, who instance
war as a time when, faced with an external threat, the internal
1. P. Abrams: "The Failure of Social Reform: 1918-20",
Past and Present, 24, April 1963, p. 45.
2. S. Andreski (Andrzejewski): Military Organisation and
Society (2nd ed., 1968), p. 33. Andreski suggested there
was an 'actual' military participation ratio (M.P.R.) and
an 'optimum' one: the former was what actually obtained
in a society; the latter was what could be achieved in
a society, given the existing technical resources; "and
the changes in social stratification during or after wars
are often due to the fact that the war emergency compels
states to approach the optimum M.P.R. and to abandon the




cohesion of some societies is strengthened. And for the
historian the theory received its most interesting expression
in Richard Titmuss's Problems of Social Policy (1950).
Titmuss argued that the imminence of invasion in
mid-1940 in Britain brought about a new attitude by Govern¬
ment and population alike towards social policy and equality.
"The mood of the people changed and, in sympathetic response,
values changed as well", he wrote: "If dangers were to be
shared, then resources should also be shared. Dunkirk, and
all that the name evokes, was an important event in the war¬
time history of the social services. It summoned forth a note
of self-criticism, of national introspection, and it set in
2
motion ideas and talk of principles and plans". In this
work, and in a later essay on "War and Social Policy",
Titmuss emphasised that the Second World War thrust into
national consciousness the needs of women and children in
particular, as part of a wider concern over the quality and
quantity of future generations: "In no particular sphere of
need is the imprint of war on social policy more vividly
illustrated than in respect to dependant needs - the needs
of wives, children and other relatives for income-maintenance
allowances when husbands and fathers are serving in the
1. Lewis Coser: The Functions of Social Conflict (1968 ed.),
pp. 87-95. "The Nazi attack appreciably increased the
internal cohesion of the British social system, temporarily
narrowing the various political, social and economic
fissures that existed in British society." Ibid., p. 94.
2. R.M. Titmuss: Problems of Social Policy (1950), p. 508.
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Forces The more, in fact, that the waging of war has
come to require a total effort by the nation the more have
the dependant needs of the family been recognised and
accepted as a social responsibility".
The development of family allowances would thus appear
to be a likely candidate for such an explanation. However,
the 'war and social change' theory has been strongly attacked
as being far too crude. Abrams, for example, has shown that
the First World War ushered in little real social reform and
suggests that Andreski's concept of the military participation
ratio needs considerable refinement before it can be historically
2
meaningful. It is evident that the theory, while an inter¬
esting framework of approach, is far too general to be really
useful. In addition, it is equally evident that it has all-
too-often been extrapolated from very superficial evidence.
Titmuss, for example, mentioned an editorial in The Times of
the 1st July 1940, which called for social justice, the
abolition of class difference, fairer distribution of wealth,
and so on, and included the statement that "the new order
cannot be based on the preservation of privilege whether
the privilege be that of a country, of a class or of an
individual". This he took as evidence of the fundamental
1. R.M. Titmuss: "War and Social Policy" (1955), in
Essays on 'The Welfare State' (3rd ed., 1976), p. 84.
Andreski (op. cit., p. 73) also mentioned women as an
important group whose status is changed by war.
2. Abrams, op. cit., pp. 43-64, esp. p. 62. See also
discussion between Abrams and Andreski in ibid., 26,
November 1963, pp. 113-4.
3. The Times, 1/7/40. Mentioned in Titmuss, op. cit. (1950),
p. 508, and op. cit. (1955), p. 82.
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change of attitude favouring social policy that was brought
about by the War, and subsequent historians have often
followed suit. Yet in the same issue of The Times, five
times the amount of space is devoted to the Court Circular and
Society News, chronicling the activities of the British
aristocracy. Clearly the change of attitude was rather less
fundamental than Titmuss believed, and a closer reading of
this source of evidence does not justify the *war and social
change' theory.
Similarly, it is hardly likely that the complex events
outlined in this chapter fit the 'war and social change'
theory. Most certainly, there was a great public interest
in postwar reconstruction, as the events surrounding the
Beveridge Report demonstrated. The movement for family
allowances benefited enormously from this public support, and
Ministers and civil servants realised that they would have to
concede to popular pressure. But this is not the same thing
as saying that they suddenly accepted the arguments put forward
by family allowance supporters. With the exception of Ministers
like Amery, Greenwood, Dalton and Morrison, those within the
Government certainly did not. As this chapter has shown, the
two crucial stages of development were those connected with
the Stamp Survey and the Beveridge Report. In the former,
family allowances were seen primarily as a means of holding
1. See, for example, Derek Fraser: The Evolution of the
British Welfare State (1973), p. 194. Fraser even
reprints the editorial in an appendix (p. 265).
477
down wages and combating inflation; in the latter, they
were seen primarily as ensuring less eligibility, labour
mobility and work-incentives. In both cases, it was the
needs of the economy rather than the children that dominated
discussion.
To re-emphasise this point finally, this chapter will
conclude with a summary of how the family poverty and the
pro-natalist arguments fared in wartime.
The former can be dealt with quickly. In the 1939-41
period, much of the activity centred on the Treasury, and
there is no evidence that relieving family poverty was ever
their aim. "At the present moment", Hale summed up in 1940,
"any proposal must be judged by one criterion alone, namely,
whether it will help to win the war", and thus the Treasury's
discussion of family allowances centred on factors like
wage control, inflation, problems of supply and demand, and
so on; besides, by mid 1940 the Treasury had decided to
oppose family allowances. Nor were other Departments
enthusiastic about the family poverty arguments: as has
been shown, Departments like the Assistance Board maintained
that if acute child poverty existed (and this was thought
unlikely), then the remedy lay elsewhere - possibly in
increased services in kind, as the Board of Education wanted.
Indeed, such was Departmental opposition that Kingsley Wood
only just managed to publish the 1942 White Paper. Beveridge
1. Memorandum on family allowances by Hale, 29/4/40,
P.R.O. T 161/1116 (S.43697/1).-
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undoubtedly saw family allowances as helping to alleviate
family poverty, but equally undoubtedly regarded this function
as secondary, and for him their less eligibility function was
paramount. It was on this basis that family allowances were
accepted by the Government, and thereafter, in the 1943-5
discussions on administrative problems, arguments about
family poverty were little mentioned.
A lengthier discussion must be given to the demographic
case, however, for the Second World War saw concern over the
falling birth rate reach its zenith. In the 1939-45 period,
the Family Endowment Society stressed the pro-natalist argu¬
ments more strongly than ever before. This was particularly
true of Eleanor Rathbone, whose language on this point often
became frankly racialist and imperialist. In the Society's
deputation to Kingsley Wood in June 1941 she warned that the
"Anglo-Saxon race" was diminishing in proportion to the
1
"yellow and coloured races"; when giving evidence to the
Beveridge Committee, she wanted child tax allowances enlarged
in order to stimulate the birth rate of the professional
2
classes; and this plea was repeated in another deputation
~Z
to Wood on the 14th January 1943. Yet when challenged on
the question of whether family allowances would actually
1. Note of Deputation, 16/6/41, op. cit.
2. Memorandum of Meeting between the Beveridge Committee
and the Family Endowment Society, 2/6/42, op. cit.
3. Memorandum by F.E.S. in Relation to Deputation on 14/1/43,
op. cit.
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influence the birth rate, she could be extremely vague,
making a statement like: "The argument that Family Allow¬
ances abroad have not increased the birth rate is partly
irrelevant and partly untrue; irrelevant, because everywhere
the amounts were too small to meet more than part, usually a
small part, of the minimum cost of child maintenance - untrue
because in fact there is evidence that everywhere the system
did help both to slow down the falling birth rate and to
increase the survival rate". What she appeared to be saying
was that a 5s.Od. allowance would not be enough to affect the
2birth rate, and that a higher figure was therefore needed.
Yet the ambiguity of statements like the above left the
impression that she did believe a 5s.Od. allowance was needed
for pro-natalist reasons. Typical of this ambiguity was the
section in her pamphlet The Case for the Immediate Introduction
of a System of Family Allowances (1940), where "declining
population" was named as one of the five elements in the
wartime case, yet under that heading there was no actual
statement that a family allowance scheme would raise the
birth rate.
In fairness, it must be remembered that in stressing
the pro-natalist case the Family Endowment Society were only
1. Ibid.
2. See, for example, statement in Hansard, Vol. 591, 16/7/42,
Cols. 555-8, and The Case for Family Allowances (1940),
p. 65.
3. Op. cit., p. 4. (Generally, page references have not been
given for F.E.S. pamphlets, since most of them were very
short; in some, pages were not even numbered).
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following the movement of public opinion, which was becoming
increasingly concerned about the population problem. Eloquent
testimony to this can be found in the Commons debate of the
16th July 1943 on the trend of population, which resulted in
Ernest Brown, Minister of Health, promising to set up a Royal
-1
Commission on the subject. In this atmosphere, it is hardly
surprising that family allowances were seen as a remedy: and
this misconception may have been further perpetuated by
Churchill's radio broadcast on the Beveridge Report in March
1943, in which he mentioned family allowances in pro-natalist
terms, warning that "if this country is to keep its high place
in the leadership of the world and to survive as a great power,
our people must be encouraged by every means to have larger
families. For this reason well thought out plans for helping
parents to contribute this lifeblood to the community are of
2
prime importance".
But to what extent were those in the Government influenced
by this? The Stamp Survey and Treasury plans certainly were
not. In his Report, Beveridge dispelled the notion that
children's allowances alone would influence the birth rate,
but said that their introduction might induce a climate of
opinion favourable to more pro-natalist measures. In none
of the Committee's surviving papers is there any evidence
1. Hansard, Vol. 391, 16/7/43, Cols. 544-653.
2. Quoted in Sir John Walley: Social Security: Another
British Failure? (1972), p. 80.
3. Beveridge Report, pp. 8, 154.
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that allowances were seen as pro-natalist. Beveridge
most certainly was concerned about the population problem,
1
and wrote many articles on it at this time. But, while
wanting income tax rebates for the professional classes and
skilled wage earners enlarged in order to remove the economic
2
obstacles to their infertility, he maintained that only if
economic inducements were combined with a change in public
opinion would the birth rate be raised. The 1942 White
Paper on family allowances only gave the demographic argument
the very briefest of mentions,^ and the 1944 White Paper on
social insurance ignored it completely. In the Commons
debates on the Family Allowances Act Sir William Jowitt
firmly maintained that pro-natalist arguments had little
value at that stage; only when the Report of the Royal
Commission on Population was published could the question
5
be answered.
Even more striking is the complete absence of any
evidence that demographic considerations played any part in
the policy-decisions of civil servants and Ministers. Out
of over eighty Public Record Office files relevant to the
development of family allowances in the Second World War
1. See Beveridge Papers IXa, 78-9.
2. W. Beveridge: "Children's Allowances and the Race", in
The Pillars of Security (1943), pp. 159-160.
3. Beveridge to Sir John Clapham, 18/4/43, Beveridge Papers
IXa, 78-9. Typescript of articles by Beveridge in The Star,
October 1945, and in Political Quarterly, March 194£Tj ibid.,
IXa, 81 (part I).
4. Family Allowances. Memorandum by the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, op. cit., p. 2.
5. Hansard, Vol. 408, 8/3/45, Col. 2260.
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that were consulted for this chapter, only three brief
references were found. Firstly, in discussing the Beveridge
recommendations the Phillips Committee quickly dismissed
the pro-natalist arguments, and agreed that if an increase
in population was desired it could only come about (if at
all) by a wide-ranging population policy going well beyond
the scope of social security. The second instance was a
Ministry of Labour Memorandum of December 1942, which very
briefly mentioned the failure of French and Belgian family
allowance schemes to raise the birth rate and noted that
"there is no reason for expecting a different result in this
p
country". Thirdly, after listening to the October 1944
deputation from the Family Endowment Society, a memorandum
somewhat impatiently dismissed the Society's pro-natalist
arguments by pointing out that stimulation of parenthood
was a complex subject best left to the experts on the Royal
3
Commission on Population.
Again, if one examines the Government's reaction to
the population question in general in the period 1939-45 one
finds no evidence of family allowances being discussed as a
remedy. The 1942 White Paper on the Current Trend of Population
in Great Britain made no mention, and merely summarised avail¬
able evidence on demographic change, ending with a fairly
1. Report of the Phillips Committee, January 1943,
P.R.O. PIN 8/115.
2. Ministry of Labour Memorandum: The Effect of Children's
Allowances on Wages, 18/12/42, P.R.O. PIN 8/116.
3. Memorandum of 10/10/44, P.R.O. PIN 8/68.
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optimistic prediction that the British population would
number 45,980,000 in 1971. The Government, of course,
responded to the public concern over the falling birth rate
by announcing, on the 16th July 1943, the appointment of
2
the Royal Commission on Population. In the preliminary
discussions concerning the appointment of the Royal Commission,
a number of outstanding issues were discussed, but family
allowances was not one of them. Evidently the Government
view was that proper statistics would have to be collected
before any claims for family allowances could be made; it
was pointed out that "until we know the distribution of
families by sizes we cannot even guess what effect might be
produced by alternative systems of graduated children's
allowances, or of marriage loans to be cancelled on the
4
births of children". The Report of the Royal Commission
contained a mention of family allowances: a plea was made
that the level of the allowance be increased, particularly
1. Current Trend of Population in Great Britain, May 1942,
Cmd. 6358, p. 11.
2. Hansard, Vol. 391, 16/7/43, Col. 651.
3. See memoranda by Professor E. Mellanby (2/10/43),
Sir H.D. Henderson (26/10/43) and Sir A.M. Carr-Saunders
(n.d., probably October 1943) in P.R.O. MH 58/407.
Carr-Saunders, for example, listed twenty-six important
questions relating to population change that he thought
the proposed Royal Commission should answer, but the
pro-natalist effect of family allowances was not one.
4. Memorandum: Paymaster General. The Form of the Population
Inquiry (handwritten comment says: "Note by W.A.B. Hopkin,
? early 1943"), ibid. This file is the only one available
for the Royal Commission at the moment. The only other
Ministry of Health file on population in 1939-45 is
MH 58/406, which deals with the problem of treating
infertility, and proposals that local authorities should
set up clinics for couples needing treatment. This was
viewed by the Ministry as a medical rather than a
demographic problem, however.
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in the case of older children, and that the first child be
included. But since the Royal Commission's Report was
published in 1949 it is, strictly speaking, outwith the
scope of this thesis; and, in addition, by then the birth
rate had risen such as to dispel the population panic.
Indeed, the Report was never even discussed by Parliament.
Therefore, both the child poverty and the demographic
arguments played little part in causing the Government to
accept family allowances in 1939-45; there is no evidence
that the changed atmosphere in wartime induced a fundamentally
different attitude on the part of the Government such as made
them agree with the Family Endowment Society's case. Family
allowances came about for two reasons. Firstly, there was
the Treasury plan of 1939-40 which, by arousing interest in
family allowances as an immediate wartime policy, gave a
tremendous boost to the family allowances campaign and
created a wave of public pressure that forced the Government
to take an interest - even if, as shown by the Treasury's
enquiry leading up to the 1942 White Paper, this interest was
very half-hearted. There is no doubt, however, that the
Government (and the Treasury in particular) could have
successfully resisted this public pressure almost indefi¬
nitely had it not been for a second and much more important
factor - the recommendation by Beveridge of family allowances
1. Report of the Royal Commission on Population,
June 1949, Cmd. 7695, PP. 16b, 1b9-170.
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as an essential precondition of any successful social
security system in a full-employment economy. Only in this
respect does the 'war and social change' theory have
validity: the Second World War undoubtedly speeded up
trends that were in evidence in the late 1930s, when there
was a growing consensus among social administration experts
that (a) the social services needed a drastic reorganisation,
and (b) in any such reorganisation the problem of men with
large families being better off financially when unemployed
than when employed needed to be tackled by the introduction
of family allowances. The fact that Beveridge, an
Eleanor Rathbone supporter, was selected to lead this
reorganisation made little difference: family allowances
would probably have been recommended anyway. At the end of
the 1930s the Government was presented with two possible
solutions to the benefitowages overlap problem: either it
could launch a large-scale State intervention into many areas
of industry in order to ensure that wages were raised to
nutritionally-defensible levels, or it could introduce a
system of family allowances that would push up the wages
of married men just high enough to preserve less eligibility.
The opposition of the trade unions was an immense obstacle
to the latter, until the Second World War, which brought
about certain conditions conducive to trade union co-operation -
the entry of the Labour Party into the Government, low unem¬
ployment and higher wages.
486
Thus despite all the arguments of the Family
Endowment Society on child poverty, encouraging the birth
rate and raising the economic status of women and children,
family allowances were attractive to the Government only in
so far as they were an alternative to, and a way of avoiding,
the whole question of minimum wages, and also as a way of
ensuring the work-incentives and labour mobility essential
to the successful working of the economy.
CONCLUSION
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The 1945 Family Allowances Act was seen by Eleanor Rathbone
as "the triumph of a great principle" and she intended to
continue campaigning for similar measures. But in January
1946 she died, and with her death the great driving force
behind the Family Endowment Society was removed: the
movement for family allowances was seen by contemporaries as
2
largely her creation, and without her it inevitably fizzled
out. The Society continued campaigning on minor issues for
3
a short time, and Eva Hubback even wanted it to turn its
4
attention to the U.S.A., but within a few years it had
disbanded.
From 1945 onwards, family allowances were allowed to
slip behind rises in the cost of living, gradually becoming
a more and more neglected area of social policy. In 1952
they were raised to 8s.Od., but this was to compensate for
the removal of food subsidies and represented no real
increase. In 1956 the amount for the third and subsequent
1. Speech for Family Allowances Reception (to celebrate
passage of the Act), 13/11/45, Eleanor Rathbone Papers
XIV 3 82.
2. See for example, James Griffiths: Pages from Memory
(1969), p. 81. Griffiths was Minister of National
Insurance when the first family allowance payments were
made.
3. For example, in February 1946 the Society tried to
persuade the Government to raise the proposed benefit
of 7s.6d. under the National Insurance Bill for the
first child of widows, the unemployed and the sick.
Hubback to Beveridge, 26/2/46, Beveridge Papers,
lib 45 (part 2).
4. Hubback to Beveridge, 10/3/46, ibid., IXa. 102 (part 1).
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children was raised to 10s.0d. and the age limit was
raised from sixteen to eighteen. Between 1956 and 1968
the purchasing power of the second-child allowance fell
by 39% and that of the other allowances by 31%. In 1968
increases were introduced by stages so that in 1969 allow¬
ances amounted to 18s.0d. for the second child and £1 each
for subsequent children. This brought them up to their
original real levels: in 1948 the value of family allow¬
ances paid to three children as a percentage of the standard
rate of national insurance benefit for a married couple
was 24%; by 1967 it had slipped down to 12%; but by 1969
it was back at 24% again. However, in order to stay at the
Beveridge-recommended levels this figure would have had to
be maintained at 40%.
The relative neglect shown by successive Governments
towards family allowances can be strikingly illustrated by
drawing a comparison with the child allowance component in
the income tax system. The latter has always provided a far
more generous system of family allowances to those sections
of the population who arguably need them least. In 1948-9,
for example, family allowances were paid in respect of
4£ million children at a total cost of £60 million, but
income tax allowances in respect of 25i? million wives,
1. Peter Kaim--Caudle: Comparative Social Policy and
Social Security (1973), pp. 264-5.
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"]
children and adult dependants cost a total of £360 million.
When one considers that over 40% of families with children,
containing 52% of the nation's children, were completely
exempt from income tax in 1948-9, then the discrepancy in
treatment under the two systems is very marked. In 1949
a man with an income of £300 per annum received, in effect,
a family allowance through the tax system of £10.10s.0d. per
annum for the first child, and nothing for subsequent children;
a man with an income of £500 received £18 for the first child,
£18 for the second, £l6.10s.0d. for the third and £6 for
the fourth; and a man with an income of £1000 received
£27 for each of his four children.-^ In 1953-4 the total
cost of income tax allowances for children amounted to £140
million per annum, while the ordinary family allowance system
cost only £103 million; by 1965-6 these amounts were £500 million
and £146 million respectively;^ and by 1971-2 they had risen
5
to £930 million and £255 million respectively.
By 1954 family allowances were being paid for nearly
5 million children in about 3.2 million families in which the
eldest child was under sixteen years of age; in addition,
there were about 3 million families with one child under the
1. Allan Cartter: "Income-tax Allowances and the Family
in Great Britain", Population Studies, 6, March 1953,
pp. 219-220.
2. Ibid., p. 225.
3. H.S. Booker: "Income Tax and Family Allowances in
Britain", ibid., 3, December 1949, p. 244. See also,
for tables of tax allowances, Neville Vandyke: "Family
Allowances", British Journal of Sociology, 7, March 1956,
pp. 42-3.
4. V. George: Social Security, Beveridge and After (1968),
p. 195.
5. Michael Meacher in New Statesman, 4/1/74.
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1
age limit. Of all families receiving allowances, 64% had
two children under the age limit, 23% had three, 8% had
four, 3% had five and 2% had six or more. Quite what
effect they had in alleviating family poverty is impossible
to say, since no survey ever attempted to measure this. By
1953-4, however, one household in ten was found to be living
at a standard less than 40% above the basis national assistance
level; and 29% of those persons living under this poverty
line were children under the age of sixteen.
Thus in the three decades following the 1945 Act
family allowances became, in Peter Kaim-Caudle's words,
Zj.
"the Cindarella of the social services", Concern over the
birth rate had all but disappeared, and (for most of the 1950s'
anyway) the worst excesses of family poverty, such as existed
in the depressed areas of the 1930s, appeared to have been
conquered. But even more important was the fact that the
1950s and 1960s were years of relatively full employment,
in which preserving less eligibility and work-incentives
became a minor problem; all that was needed was a wage-stop
in a few national assistance/supplementary benefit cases.
Since, from the Government's point of view, this latter
function was the main purpose of family allowances it is
hardly surprising that they fell into neglect.
1. Vandyke, op. cit., p. 39.
2. Ibid.
3. David Bull: "The Rediscovery of Family Poverty", in
Bull (ed.): Family^Poverty (1972 ed.), p. 16.4. Kaim-Caudle, op. cit., p. 264.
5. For example, out of a total of 1,844,000 persons receiving
national assistance in 1961, 12,000 were being wage-
stopped. Frank Field: Poverty: the Facts (Child Poverty
Action Group pamphlet, 1975),pp. 6, 20.
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In studying the movement for family allowances one is
thus studying something that rose to prominence in the
1918-45 period, and declined thereafter. The principle of
family allowances was a very old one, and had been most
notably applied in the Poor Law between 1795 and 1834. From
the late 19th century onwards in all European industrialised
countries several factors combined to produce a demand for
the 'living' or 'family' wage: the changing role of children
from producers of family wealth to consumers; the increased
cost of education; concern, in a period of growing economic
competition, over the health and productivity of the work¬
force, which led on to an interest in wage levels that would
guarantee basic physical efficiency and thus have to take
account of varying family needs; and the challenge of an
increasingly socialist labour movement. Added to this was
the emergence of feminism, with its demands that the State
should dispense greater economic justice to women and children.
By about the early 1920s the demand for a family wage was
being expressed in Britain most forcibly by the Family Endow¬
ment Society, who over the next 25 years led the campaign.
In the course of this campaign, a vast amount of evidence
was produced, based upon the latest research by leading
social investigators, medical scientists, economists, demo¬
graphers, etc., to support the anti-poverty and pro-natalist
arguments for family allowances. Yet up to 1939 all this
evidence had been repeatedly rejected or ignored by those in
1. Although of course since 1965 the Child Poverty Action
Croup has renewed the campaign for family allowances.
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government, and family allowances still seemed as remote
as they had appeared in 1918. By 1943, however, the
Government had made a firm promise to introduce family
allowances, and two years later the Act was passed; but
this sudden acceptance did not indicate a dramatic change
of heart on the Government's part. Anti-poverty and pro-
natalist arguments were still rejected: family allowances
aroused interest only in so far as they could be used as a
short-term economic strategy for controlling inflation in
wartime by holding down wages; and, in the long-term, they
were seen as essential to any postwar reorganised social
security system and the successful running of the economy
because of their ability to push up the wages of married men
just high enough to ensure the preservation of less eligi¬
bility, work-incentives and labour mobility.
Several interesting points can thus be drawn from
this case-study of social policy development. The movement
for family allowances was made up of many shades of political
opinion, each supporting family allowances for their own
peculiar reasons. Even within the Family Endowment Society
there were many different viewpoints - something that was
further compounded by Eleanor Rathbone's habit of altering
her case to suit the political opinions of whatever audience
she happened to be addressing at the time. Between the I.L.P.
viewpoint of the 1920s and that"of, say, Leo Amery in the late
1930s lay many different perspectives. Certainly, by the early
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years of the Second World War there had developed in
Parliamentary and public opinion a general consensus on
the need for family allowances; but in fact this consensus
was still made up of many shades of opinion, and on certain
arguments (most notably the demographic and eugenic) there
was much disagreement. In addition, such consensus as there
was did not include civil servants, most of whom opposed
family allowances. The 1945 Act appeared to satisfy all sides,
yet the addition of a few shillings a week cannot have resulted
in a dramatic improvement in the economic status of large
working class families, nor can it have induced couples to
produce more children.
Had this account been written solely from the evidence
of secondary sources it would have appeared as though family
allowances came about largely through the efforts of the
Family Endowment Society. As with much of the older,
consensus-inclined social policy historiography, it would
have been a case of one generation of reformist-orientated
academic social scientists writing history in terms of the
apparent importance of a previous generation of'exactly the
same sort of people. In fact, reference to primary sources
shows that this was not so.
Real power appears to have remained firmly in the hands
of civil servants. Most consensus explanations of social
policy development tend to view civil servants as disinterested
elements in the policy-making process, but this was clearly
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not the case with family allowances. The ease with which,
for example, Ministry of Health Officials were able to
deflect the Children's Minimum Council campaign is clear
proof of the extent of their power. Predominantly upper-
middle class, with public school/Oxbridge educations, senior
civil servants undoubtedly displayed strong class loyalties
that made them hostile or indifferent to a campaign aimed
at assisting working class mothers and children. Indeed,
they seem to have had a far greater influence over decision¬
making than did politicians - although it could be argued that
in the 1930s in particular, with a National Government in
power dedicated to fiscal retrenchment, civil servants had
greater power than either before or since. Even in the
1939-45 period the Treasury did all it could to get family
allowances dropped altogether, and succeeded in getting the
Beveridge recommendations whittled down. The power of
civil servants is not, of course, something that can be
'measured' in any quantitative sense; it is simply the
subjective impression of this author, having read a large
amount of surviving evidence. But the question of in whose
interests civil servants act is one that is crucial to any
explanation of social policy development.
1. For an interesting essay on this theme, see
Max Beloff: "The Whitehall Factor: the Role of the
Higher Civil Service. 1919-39", in Gillian Peele
and Chris Cook (eds.): The Politics of Re-aporaisal,
1918-39 (1975), pp. 209-231.
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Again, viewed from a comparative perspective the
movement for family allowances in Britain was not really
instigated by the Family Endowment Society, but was the
product of long-term forces at work in all industrialised
European nations, or in countries which had similar social
infrastructures. Although there was some variation in the
nature and timing of developments in each country, the
general trend of the arguments was exactly the same as
in Britain - from the controversy over wages in the 1920s
to the pro-natalist claims of the 1930s. This continued
in the 1940s, too: to give but one example, the intro¬
duction of the 1941 Child Endowment Act in Australia (which
provided 5s.Od. per week to each child after the first up to
the age of sixteen, as did the 1945 Act in Britain) was intro¬
duced as an anti-inflationary alternative to all-round increases
1
in the basic wage - exactly the grounds upon which they were
discussed within the Treasury in 1939-40. In Britain, those
in power were able either to ignore these arguments completely
(in the 1920s and 1930s) or else accept them very much on
their own terms (as in the early 1940s).
Clearly, therefore, family allowances did not come about
through a rational response by the Government to evidence of
need and hardship. If the movement for family allowances fits
either of the two general explanations of social policy develop-
1. T.H. Kewley: Social Security in Australia, 1900-72
(Sydney, 1973), pp. 190-5.
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ment outlined at the start of this thesis, it is the conflict
rather than the consensus. Despite all the evidence of family
poverty and the need to raise the birth rate, the Government
only ever showed interest in family allowances as a means of
preserving economic stability. By the late 1930s the problem
of maintaining the work-incentives and labour mobility essen¬
tial to the successful working of a free market economy could
only be solved in one of two ways. Either there could be a
large-scale State intervention into private industry in order
to raise wages to nutritionally-defensible levels, which
intervention would also be aimed at making industry more
efficient and hence better able to pay higher wages (as
socialists wanted); or there could be introduced a system
of family allowances sufficient to alter wages just enough
to make it economically more worthwhile for a man with a large
family to be in work rather than unemployed, leaving the
economic status quo basically unaltered (as suggested by
those of the political centre and right, including a growing
number of employers). The social and political upheavals of
the Second World War years allowed the Government to decide
between these two alternatives, and, not surprisingly, they
chose the latter - just as had the Speenhamland magistrates
at the Pelican Inn in 1795. At £57 million the cost of family
allowances seemed high at the time, but they were considerably
cheaper and far less radical than the alternative.
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